


# FROM TIME IMMEMORIAL



*The  
Origins of the  
Arab-Jewish Conflict  
Over Palestine*

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**JOAN PETERS**



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THE ARAB-JEWISH CONFLICT  
OVER PALESTINE

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1817

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This book is dedicated to many: to the countless thousands whose lives have been lost in Arab-Jewish conflict; to the courageous on both sides whose longing for lasting peace between Arabs and Jews transcends politics; to my endlessly tolerant friends; to Bill, to Cora, to Lori, and especially to Stanley, the most indulgent and supportive of all.





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We may with advantage  
at times forget what we know.

Publilius Syrus, *Maxims*

Every tradition grows ever more venerable—  
the more remote is its origin, the more confused  
that origin is. The reverence due to it increases from  
generation to generation. The tradition finally  
becomes holy and inspires awe.

Nietzsche, *Human, All Too Human*



THE MIDDLE EAST REFUGEES—  
RECOGNIZED AND UNRECOGNIZED





## The Puzzle's Extra Pieces

Alice: There's no use trying . . . one  
can't believe impossible things.

The Queen: I dare say you haven't had much  
practice. Why sometimes I've  
believed as many as six impossible  
things before breakfast.

—*Alice in Wonderland*

. . . conscience does make cowards of us all.

—*Hamlet*

**I**t was not until this book was well under way that I reluctantly confronted the historical factors underlying the “Palestinian problem.” The book was originally meant to be solely an investigation of the current plight of the “Arab refugees,” as that subject was then still generally known.

The deprivation of Arab refugees’ human rights and the political manipulation of their unfortunate situation were unconscionable to me, particularly because it seemed their plight had been prolonged by a mechanism funded predominantly by contributions from the United States. As an ardent advocate of civil rights I had been in Mississippi during the early days of the Civil Rights movement, to join hands in concern for equality. I’d investigated and written about Ku Klux Klan activities, against the judgment of my editor, who at first felt that such an assignment was too “dangerous” for a woman.

By the time I went to the Middle East during the 1973 Yom Kippur War as a free-lance writer with a CBS assignment, women were no longer excluded from consideration for such tasks. When I went to Lebanon after the war had ended, I managed to make contact with a leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). After I was led by one of his workers from my hotel through a series of purposeful mazes, to disguise the apartment building currently housing his headquarters—headquarters were constantly moved to avoid detection by either Israelis or enemy Arab factions—the PLO leader gave me an interview in his office. On a desk were intricately detailed maps, charts and plans for the invasion of Safed, in Israel, and a book lying open, about the strategies of Israeli generals. As we were talking, a familiar hum of approaching planes grew louder. That sound can be ominous directly after a war, and we rushed out to the tiny

iron-railed balcony to learn the cause of the sudden commotion. They were Israeli jets, strafing the area, as the PLO members said they did every day. When the planes flew directly overhead, the staff in the makeshift office dramatically threw themselves flat on the floor, face down, out of sight to evade a camera's identification, I was told, and thus prevent the Israelis from learning the whereabouts of the latest headquarters.

Afterward I was taken by a roundabout route to tour one of the poorer refugee camps on the outskirts of Beirut. It was there, in a refugee camp, where children were counting out arsenals of Kalashnikovs on the shelves of a small "hospital supply" warehouse, that I fully realized the unfairness and the futility of these perpetual "refugee camps." It was 1974, two and a half decades after the war against Israel's statehood, with two other Arab-Israeli wars since, and these appealing, victimized people were still refugees, with weapons as the remedy prescribed for their collective wound. Where were *their* civil rights? Why were the Arab refugees, unlike refugees on other continents, not yet rehabilitated but still in camps?

From that starting point, I came to learn that the Arabs weren't the only unfortunates who fled from their homes at the time of the Arab-Israeli War of Independence. Because I'd assumed that Arab refugees from Israel were *the* "Middle East refugees," I was startled to find that, also around 1948, whole Jewish populations from numerous Arab countries had been forced to flee as refugees to Israel and elsewhere in the world.

Though I read through stacks of documents concerning the refugees, looking for official consideration of these "other," Jewish "Middle East refugees," I found little or none. But in the process, some other key beliefs in the popular (and my personal) understanding of the Arab-Israeli conflict were shaken. For example, while I was examining United Nations data from 1948 onward, a seemingly casual alteration of the definition of what constitutes an Arab "refugee" from Israel caught my attention. I passed it by at first, and only returned to it after investigation of refugee transfers in other parts of the world had led me to note what the general definition of refugee eligibility was. In *other* cases the more or less universally used description of eligibility included those people who were forced to leave "permanent" or "habitual" homes. In the case of the *Arab* refugees, however, the definition had been broadened to include as "refugees" any persons who had been in "Palestine" for only *two years* before Israel's statehood in 1948.

Even after I'd noted the disparity, that alteration made little impression. However, during the subsequent rhetorical and political evolution of a new image for these Arabs—from "refugees" to "Palestinian people excluded from plots of land inhabited by them from time immemorial"—I found myself returning un-easily to that "two-year" clause.

The question that began to nag and unravel the outline of my book was: "Why was it necessary to amend that Arab refugee definition?" First, that the alteration was important enough to be incorporated into the official "refugee" definition

indicated the existence of a significant condition: such a blanket change would not have been required if only a few refugees had just recently arrived, in what became Israeli terrain. Since that was the logical deduction, the claim that the "Palestinian refugees" had been settled for "millennia" for the first time activated my curiosity. The two situations were not compatible: what the altered "two-years-presence" definition of an "Arab refugee" implied was a direct contradiction of assumed historical factors that are the very foundation of the current Arab claim of "legitimate rights of the Palestinian people to their homeland for a thousand" or "two thousand years."

Yet, the assumed historical setting had become so cemented into political dialogue and authoritative works about the Arab-Israel issue that it was the "two-year" clause I questioned, not the Arab historical claim. Why was that amendment there? Even then my research, already directed into the history of those overlooked Jewish refugees, assumed that those Jews were the only unknown quantity in this political equation. It was undoubtedly a common oversight, probably caused by an undue deference to the sheer pervasiveness of the popular "facts" about the Palestinian homeland; when Western governments and influential voices were reiterating only those axiomatic themes, then they must be true—or so, perhaps unconsciously, went the reasoning.

To many of us considering the Arab-Israel conflict, the "Palestinian Problem" had become a sticking point. The notion of the Arabs' "throwing Israel into the sea" was anathema to all the civilized world. Those who had learned of or personally witnessed the Holocaust of World War II were especially alarmed by any questioning of the right of the Jewish state to exist secure. Yet, there were disturbing elements in the plight of the embittered Palestinian people.

Recollections of the Arab world's saber rattling at the time of its war against Israel's independence in 1948 have become abstract and dulled; for those of us too young to have had political awareness or personal memories of that time, the "facts" as they were reported then are obscure and less important now than the persistent call for a "Palestinian homeland" for the "four million" Arab people who were said to have lived on their farms in the Holy Land "from time immemorial." In almost any given week of the last few years, Middle East specialists—the United States State Department, the British Foreign Office, esoteric strategy centers, university seminars, international forums, media columnists, and fledgling reporters in the field—all have been pursuing the gospel of the current Mideast problem, the "legitimate rights of the Palestinians." The Pope, and United States Presidents Carter and Reagan have in turn echoed, with only slight variation, the theme of the Palestine Liberation Organization—in PLO leader Yasser Arafat's words: "The main issue" of the Arab-Israel conflict "is the Palestinian state!"

Inherent in that claim are a number of fundamental, disquieting assumptions, so long and so often reiterated that they are considered unchallengeable: "The Arabs, Palestinians and otherwise, have nothing against Jews—Arabs and Jews lived harmoniously in Arab lands before 1948; it was only the alien European

'Zionists' who came back after two thousand years to usurp the property of the Palestinian Arab native throngs," it is said. "Jewish 'terrorists' intruded into the Arabs' traditionally poor but tranquil existence in 'Palestine,' " and "when Palestine became Israel" in 1948, "Jews forced the exodus of millions of Arabs from their plots of land inhabited by them from time immemorial."

As the Arab leaders shifted from outraged proclamations avowing Israel's destruction to sympathetic concern for Palestinian "rights," the adjusted approach dimmed general understanding of the Arab world's role in the conflict: in fact, the "Arab-Israeli" conflict has recently been regarded as only ancillary to the real "heart of the matter," the problem of the "Palestinians." "Once the Palestinians' plight is solved, the Arab-Israeli dispute can be settled," recent analyses have concluded. Lately the Arab world has been joined by humanitarian voices everywhere, raised in defense against the "wrongs" done to Palestinian Arabs when the Jewish state got its rights.

As a consequence, perturbation with Israel grows. Many who continue to believe in and defend Israel's rights must now reconcile the claims of other "rights"; they bear an oft-unnamed fear that their own championing of the Jewish state may have imposed an unfair burden upon the Palestinians. The very moral standards and principles by which Israel is judged a necessity now require that the "Palestinians' inalienable rights" must also be considered.

What once seemed clear-cut and indisputable becomes uncomfortably vague and confusing. The Palestinian problem has grown into a perplexing situation, with a competing set of claims that seem complicated and relevant to those of us who believe in justice and humanitarian treatment for all. "Surely the Jews had to have their homeland after the Holocaust, but to attain it only at the expense of displacing another people. . . ." If it is as the Arabs are telling it, it is at the very least, tiny nation against tiny nation, right against right, "diaspora against diaspora," a "twice promised land." Some of us put the Palestinian subject away, in a sort of side pocket, so that the uncertainties raised by persistent accusations need not be faced. That is one way to postpone indefinitely learning something one doesn't want to know. The discovery might be too painful—because the matter to be looked into is what the Jews may have brought upon the "Palestinians."

But the increasingly insistent depiction of the Arab Palestinians as victims of Israel's existence is difficult to avoid. The high visibility causes nagging doubts. The provoking of doubts is well financed and carefully orchestrated: a mere phone call to request refugee estimates from the United Nations Relief and Work Agency (UNRWA) brings to me, by return mail, not only the requested data, but politically focused brochures and eight giant elegantly printed photographic posters, eloquently and sympathetically depicting Palestinian women and children—"Survivors who go on surviving." News cameras that once captured "terrorist" Yasser Arafat with his revolvers in the United Nations later find him cuddling infants in the smoking ruins of Lebanon, and still later, as the "moderate" under siege by "extremists."

The popular angle of vision has been sufficiently adjusted so that even the conservative United States President Reagan, who long had insisted that the Palestinian problem was not a conflict of nationalities but only a "refugee problem," had altered his thinking and his formula by 1982, to a program that included solving the problem of the "Palestinian homeland." The somewhat vague "historical facts" central to the validity of the Palestinians' claims are becoming ever more decisive in the perception of what the Arab-Israel conflict is about. An additional, impressive element of credibility comes from the well-publicized fact that many dissenting Israeli voices have joined the chorus protesting the Palestinians' plight and charging Israel with "responsibility." The answers given by Israeli officialdom have never effectively quelled those doubts.

Given the wide acceptance of the conventional wisdom about the "Palestinians," the standard avoidance mechanism has also been at work. While allaying doubt, perhaps, it has also discouraged investigation. For instance, TV documentaries about the Middle East conflict that begin by describing the horrors of the Nazis' extermination of six million Jews are always assumed to be supportive of the Israeli position. Because they start with such descriptions, when the documentaries next invariably set forth the assumed "historical facts" of the "Palestinians," these presentations, with their built-in implications of Jewish, or Israeli, fault, are regarded as "even-handed" and accurate. As a consequence, they tend to cause bewildering, squeamish reactions, either expressed or unexpressed, of doubt or guilt—among even some of the strongest of Israel's defenders, even within Israel itself. Any intimation of guilt on the part of Jews causes particular distress and amplified effect: the Jews are perceived as a people with "special" responsibility. They who suffered the Holocaust must be more humane, more sanctified than anyone else.

For all the above reasons, and perhaps a few I cannot fathom, this book was nearly two years along and its outline still contained the assumptions of conventional wisdom about the pivotal past, unwittingly supporting and reinforcing central misconceptions of the Arab-Israel conflict even while I was attempting to uncover the truth. Despite some Arab writings I'd read that strayed from those assumptions, it was only after I had happened upon some rather definite statements describing *massive Arab immigration to Palestine*, by such persons as Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt, that I began to speculate about what these various pieces really meant to the puzzle. What, for instance, might the impact be of evidence of significant *Arab immigration into Palestine* before 1948?

Once that challenge to popular assumptions had become too compelling to disregard, I found myself troubled by other previously isolated and disparate items that had gone unrecognized during earlier research. The whole fabric of historical presuppositions unraveled upon close inspection. No sooner had one error been examined than another was revealed. What began as a closer look at the refugees led to reflecting on the lengths the Arabs were willing to go to, including their cruel indifference to the well-being of their own brethren, in their hostility toward a Jewish state. Concern and curiosity prompted a closer look at

the "harmony" between Muslims and Jews that had allegedly existed traditionally in Arab countries before the existence of Israel, from time immemorial.

The result of that historical penetration of the actual traditional relationship and its effect on contemporaries was so contrary to expectations that it literally directed me to an investigation into the Palestinian background of the Arab refugees. Were the actual historical traditions in Palestine perhaps as greatly at variance from conventional assumptions as what I'd learned about the relationship of Jews and Muslims in Arab lands? What really had caused the Arab leaders to treat their own countrymen so shabbily? Was it purely political behavior stemming from hostility toward Israel or were there other, more deeply rooted traditions responsible? My initial investigative efforts revealed hints of a set of conditions that, while logical on hindsight, were so unexpected and so contradictory to prevalent theories that, at first, they were staggering, and I found myself backing away. If the logical conclusions of the clues were established, they must alter the very basis of our understanding of the Arab-Israel conflict and destroy the foundation upon which the "Palestinian" claims have rested.

Thus I tentatively labeled one of my files "Arab immigration?" and set it aside; another was called "Zionism in Arab countries," and others, "Arab feudalism: traditional exploitation?", "Jews in early Palestine," "usury and corruption in the 19th Century"—and on it went. The thicker those files swelled with references and notes, the more disruptive they became, until ultimately they changed the focus of my book. The tension literally tore apart the fabric of the assumed "facts" of the Arab-Israeli question and blew away all the remnant "complications." Those files ultimately dictated the subjects for the book's chapters.

But this book is not strictly "about" the Arab peasants' plight in and around Palestine. Nor is it alone a history of the Jews' plight in the Arab world or their Zionism there, although several of the beginning chapters concentrate on a little-known background that is seminally influential to the later "conflict." It is not, either, a comprehensive recounting of the Jewish presence in Palestine following the defeat by the Romans, or a complete chronology of the conquests and population changes in Palestine since then. It is neither an exhaustive survey of the geographical details of all "Palestine," tracing the distribution of all its peoples, nor is it a sociological exposition of all Palestine's traditions throughout the ages. It does, however, try to ascertain how and why certain vital information has remained largely unknown.

As a result, I've had to search into all sorts of varied subjects, combining first-hand interviews with research on population movements and the presumptuous undertaking of an original demographic study. From investigating the history of violence in Palestine, and Turkish government attitudes toward Palestinian Jews, I was led into a laborious inquiry of the British-Arab-Jewish-Palestine relationships before England pulled out. It is now five years since I began to follow the unforeseen lead of those files. From start to finish, this book took roughly seven years. Indeed, by the date of its completion, it undoubtedly appeared, to

anyone who'd cared to follow its progress, as it does to me, to have been forthcoming "for millennia."

In the process, there were many trips to the region—Syria, Egypt, Israel—West Bank—Gaza, Jordan, and Lebanon. I spent weeks virtually camping in the Kew Gardens' Public Record Office outside London, where recently opened or overlooked "secret" correspondence files, pertaining to the British Mandatory government from the 1920s until the late 1940s, are inconspicuously mixed in among infinitely categorized clerical minutiae and diplomatic reports. The first sight of all that material was paralyzing: not the correspondence itself but just the subject-file *categories* occupied roomfuls of files and books, and needed an expert guide. Many more hours were spent at Oxford wading through personal papers and memoirs of British officials key to the administration of the Palestine Mandate, which had been willed to assorted archives there. Later, there was seemingly interminable but worthwhile sifting to do among the boxes of paperwork left behind in Palestine by the British, now largely in disuse in Israel's State Archives in Jerusalem. Whether in those formidable archives or obscured in the United Nations, the United States Library of Congress, and other document files, the buried records relevant to the conflict were indeed available to be found. Only after those records could be examined and then connected to other important sources was it possible to understand fully how extensively the conclusions contradict popular perceptions.

I had hunted in vain for a book that combined once-recognized factors with those that are newly traced here. The task that seemed to remain was to fill that void. It was to reveal the integral *connection* between what is and what is not known or considered about the Arab-Jewish conflict over Palestine, and to remind about the amalgam of pivotal, once-familiar facts that today are obscured or known only to experts.

For that reason, this book has combined original research and narrative of personal experience with a synthesis of relevant evidence from recognized authorities and primary documents—often in their own words.

With that synthesis as a background for the new materials, the events in today's headlines can be understood and evaluated in context. Combining previously known factors with the more original information provides new insights into the conflict, and produces a further net result: the muddy "complications" that have wrecked many proposed simplistic solutions became identifiable *not* as "complications" but, rather, as logical, natural, and tragic progressions from the real roots of the conflict.

The background information is presented here only to the extent that is essential. It is just a sampling of the important existing sources that have been largely forgotten in the current Mideast dialogue. Principally British, Arab, Turkish, and other earlier authorities were sources for the Arab and the Palestine past and present. Jewish sources, and Arab sources when available, provided the historical data on Jews in Arab countries, although Jews and Jewish culture were noted sparingly in Arab and Arabic literature, only when they were regarded as

relevant to Islam. For detailed information concerning Jewish settlement in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Palestine, Zionist, German, and some British sources were obtainable.

The thesis is developed in much the same way as the jigsaw puzzle is assembled. One must take care, because it is clarifying a picture jumbled for so long that it has become perhaps the most pervasively misconceived image of any political situation in the world. The completing of the puzzle has restored many pieces whose critical absence had not even been missed. Those "extra" pieces have filled in a vast space between perception and reality.

This book analyzes fundamental concepts in the West's perception of the Arab-Israel-Palestine conflict, against the background of the movements of the region's peoples.

The remaining chapters of Part I examine all the "refugees" displaced by the creation of Israel in 1948—where they are and what traditions created the unacknowledged "other" refugees: the Arab-born Jews who are the mass of Israel's "Sephardic" majority, and whose history and flight as refugees are somehow never adequately connected to the observation that they have since "orientalized" the Jewish state.

Part II traces the earlier composition of Palestine's peoples and their traditions, a combination of conditions that created unrecognized factors which alter the perception of the Arab-Israeli conflict today.

Part III illustrates how the twentieth-century continuation of earlier tradition was an unknown instrument in creating the circumstances of Arab refugees. At the same time, the third part of the book reveals how that tradition exercised an undetected influence so powerful that the cruel effect of its implementation has already thwarted justice—and the magnitude of the general ignorance of its consequences has thus far allowed history to be turned upside down.

In a strict sense, then, the book focuses on the quintessential and unrecognized role played by unknown or unconsidered traditions, particularly the importance of traditional population movements, in the reality of the Arab-Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the human sense, it is about the onrushing of peoples—about flight from conquest, from persecution, from corruption, from habit, and from poverty.

In essence, it is about the flight from fact.



## The Invitation

The people are in great need of a “myth” to fill their consciousness and imagination. . . .

—Musa Alami, 1948

Since 1948 Arab leaders have approached the Palestine problem in an irresponsible manner. . . .

They have used the Palestine people for selfish political purposes. This is ridiculous and, I could say, even criminal.

—King Hussein of Jordan, 1960

The nations of western Europe condemned Israel’s position despite their guarantee of her security. . . . They understood that . . . their dependence upon sources of energy precluded their allowing themselves to incur Arab wrath.

—Al-Haytham Al-Ayubi, Arab Palestinian military strategist, 1974

A strange and unlikely invitation was extended through the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1975. Farouk Kaddoumi, then the PLO political department head, declared that all the Jews who had fled from Arab states since 1948 were welcome “to return and exercise their full rights.”<sup>1</sup>

One day later an Iraqi broadcast from Radio Baghdad echoed the PLO offer to “return,” particularly to the 140,000 Iraq-born Jews who are now in Israel.<sup>2</sup> The Iraqi government underscored its invitation two weeks afterward, with paid advertisements in selected newspapers around the world. Readers of the *New York Times*, the *Toronto Star*, or *Le Monde* would have found the ad difficult to overlook; in half-inch boldface letters, “Iraqi Jews” were “invited to return to Iraq.”<sup>3</sup> The invitation excluded Jews who were Zionists, because “the latter is . . . racist . . . directed against Palestinian Arabs. . . .”<sup>4</sup>

The day after the ad appeared, the *New York Times* reported that the Arab offer “was scoffed at” by the Jews “as a propaganda move.” The *Toronto Star* expressed disdain for the ad’s “ostensibly generous invitation.” In its editorial, entitled “Iraq’s Phony Invitation,” the *Star* observed that “the militantly anti-

Israel" dictatorship "knows that the vast majority of Jews . . . support Israel and are therefore Zionist in sympathy." According to the Toronto paper, the "real purpose" of the ad was to emphasize the "Zionism-is-racism" United Nations resolution and "to deny the validity of Israel's existence." The editorial concluded that "Iraq's 'come-home' . . . hypocritical gesture . . . won't fool any Jews in Canada, and it shouldn't mislead any other Canadians. . . ."<sup>5</sup>

The Arab invitations\* were not simply a sales device to convince Israeli sympathizers that Zionism is guilty of the evils alleged by the Arabs and by the Arab-inspired United Nations resolutions. Most knew little or nothing about even the existence of such a Jewish community. Neither were the invitations designed to fool the Jews. The PLO's Kaddoumi has never pretended to hospitality toward them. In fact, almost simultaneously with his invitation, Kaddoumi had told *Newsweek*, "This Zionist ghetto of Israel must be destroyed."<sup>7</sup>

More likely, the Arabs' invitations were orchestrated for quite a different purpose. They were in all probability an attempt to offset little-known facts that were gradually emerging—facts with the potential to discredit one of the central themes relating to the "right" of the Palestinian refugees to "return."

Before the crushing 1967 "Six-Day" defeat of the Arab countries by Israel, the "Palestine-for-the-Palestinians" cause was met by "complacency, and . . . crass ignorance." The prominent Arab Palestinian activist, writer, and innovator Musa Alami tried virtually singlehandedly to interest the Arab world in this propaganda program in 1948.

In Iraq he was told by the Prime Minister that all that was needed was "a few brooms" to drive the Jews into the sea; by confidants of Ibn Saud in Cairo, that "once we get the green light from the British we can easily throw out the Jews."<sup>8</sup>

But the reality was much more complicated than the Iraqi Prime Minister had suggested. The Arabs had initiated hostilities in Palestine<sup>9</sup> upon the November 1947 United Nations' partition of Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab state,<sup>10</sup> employing outside forces and arms from Arab states as distant as Iraq<sup>11</sup> to prevent the creation of the Jewish state, "a series of killings and counterkillings that would continue for decades.†"<sup>12</sup> Thousands of Arabs, including the more affluent, left for nearby Arab states before Jewish statehood.<sup>13</sup> When Israel's independence was declared in 1948, the Arab forces combined to crush it.<sup>14</sup>

## Beckoning to the Arabs

At the time of the 1948 war, Arabs in Israel too were invited by their fellow Arabs—invited to "leave" while the "invading" Arab armies would purge the land of

\*Among others, Libya in 1970 and 1973, Sudan in 1975 (although the number of former Sudanese Jews now in Israel is "minute"), and Egypt in 1975.<sup>6</sup>

†See Chapters 9ff.

Jews.<sup>15</sup> The invading Arab governments were certain of a quick victory; leaders warned the Arabs in Israel to run for their lives.<sup>16</sup>

In response, the Jewish Haifa Workers' Council issued an appeal to the Arab residents of Haifa:\*

For years we have lived together in our city, Haifa. . . . Do not fear: Do not destroy your homes with your own hands . . . do not bring upon yourself tragedy by unnecessary evacuation and self-imposed burdens. . . . But in this city, yours and ours, Haifa, the gates are open for work, for life, and for peace for you and your families.<sup>17</sup>

While the Haifa pattern appears to have been prevalent, there were exceptions. Arabs in another crucial strategic area, who were "opening fire on the Israelis shortly after surrendering,"<sup>18</sup> were "forced" to leave by the defending Jewish army to prevent what former Israeli Premier Itzhak Rabin described as a "hostile and armed populace" from remaining "in our rear, where it could endanger the supply route . . ."<sup>19</sup> In his memoirs, Rabin stated that Arab control of the road between the seacoast and Jerusalem had "all but isolated" the "more than ninety thousand Jews in Jerusalem," nearly one-sixth of the new nation's total population.

If Jerusalem fell, the psychological blow to the nascent Jewish state would be more damaging than any inflicted by a score of armed brigades.<sup>20</sup>

According to a research report by the Arab-sponsored Institute for Palestine Studies in Beirut, however, "the majority" of the Arab refugees in 1948 were not expelled, and "68%" left without seeing an Israeli soldier.<sup>21</sup>

After the Arabs' defeat in the 1948 war, their positions became confused: some Arab leaders demanded the "return" of the "expelled" refugees to their former homes despite the evidence that Arab leaders had called upon Arabs to flee.† At the same time, Emile Ghoury, Secretary of the Arab Higher Command, called for the *prevention* of the refugees from "return." He stated in the *Beirut Telegraph* on August 6, 1948: "it is inconceivable that the refugees should be sent back to their homes while they are occupied by the Jews. . . . It would serve as a first step toward Arab recognition of the state of Israel and Partition."

Arab activist Musa Alami despaired: as he saw the problem, "how can people struggle for their nation, when most of them do not know the meaning of the word? . . . The people are in great need of a 'myth' to fill their consciousness and imagination. . . ." According to Alami, an indoctrination of the "myth" of nationality would create "identity" and "self-respect."<sup>22</sup>

However, Alami's proposal was confounded by the realities: between 1948

\*See British report in Appendix II.

†Such as President Truman's International Development Advisory Board Report, March 7, 1951: "Arab leaders summoned Arabs of Palestine to mass evacuation . . . as the documented facts reveal. . . ."

and 1967, the Arab state of Jordan claimed annexation of the territory west of the Jordan River, the "West Bank" area of Palestine—the same area that would later be forwarded by Arab "moderates" as a "mini-state" for the "Palestinians." Thus, that area was, between 1948 and 1967, called "Arab land," the peoples were Arabs, and yet the "myth" that Musa Alami prescribed—the cause of "Palestine" for the "Palestinians"—remained unheralded, unadopted by the Arabs during two decades. According to Lord Caradon, "Every Arab assumed the Palestinians [refugees] would go back to Jordan."<sup>23</sup>

When "Palestine" was referred to by the Arabs, it was viewed in the context of the intrusion of a "Jewish state amidst what the Arabs considered their own exclusive environment or milieu, the 'Arab region.'"<sup>24</sup> As the late Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser "screamed" in 1956, "the imperialists' 'destruction of Palestine' " was "an attack on Arab nationalism," which "unites us from the Atlantic to the Gulf."<sup>25</sup>

Ever since the 1967 Israeli victory, however, when the Arabs determined that they couldn't obliterate Israel militarily, they have skillfully waged economic, diplomatic, and propaganda war against Israel. This, Arabs reasoned, would take longer than military victory, but ultimately the result would be the same. Critical to the new tactic, however, was a device designed to whittle away at the sympathies of Israel's allies: what the Arabs envisioned was something that could achieve Israel's shrinking to indefensible size at the same time that she became insolvent.

This program was reviewed in 1971 by Mohamed Heikal,<sup>26</sup> then still an important spokesman of Egypt's leadership in his post as editor of the influential, semi-official newspaper *Al Ahram*. Heikal called for a change of Arab rhetoric—no more threats of "throwing Israel into the sea"—and a new political strategy aimed at reducing Israel to indefensible borders and pushing her into diplomatic and economic isolation. He predicted that "total withdrawal" would "pass sentence on the entire state of Israel."

As a more effective means of swaying world opinion, the Arabs adopted humanitarian terminology in support of the "demands" of the "Palestinian refugees," to replace former Arab proclamations of carnage and obliteration. In Egypt, for example, in 1968 "the popularity of the Palestinians was rising," as a result of Israel's 1967 defeat of the Arabs and subsequent 1968 "Israeli air attacks inside Egypt."<sup>27</sup> It was as recently as 1970 that Egyptian President Nasser defined "Israel" as the cause of "the expulsion of the Palestinian people from their land." Although Nasser thus gave perfunctory recognition to the "Palestinian Arab" allegation, he was in reality preoccupied with the overall basic, pivotal Arab concern. As he continued candidly in the same sentence, Israel was "a permanent threat to the Arab\* nation."<sup>28</sup> Later that year (May

\*Emphasis added.

1970), Nasser “formulated his rejection of a Jewish state in Palestine,” but once again he stressed the “occupation of *our* [Pan-Arab] lands,”\* while only secondarily noting: “And we reject its [Israel’s] insistence on denying the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people in their country.”<sup>29</sup> Subsequently the Arabs have increased their recounting of the difficulties and travail of Arab refugees in the “host” countries adjacent to Israel. Photographs and accounts of life in refugee camps, as well as demands for the “legitimate” but unlimited and undefined “rights” of the “Palestinians,” have flooded the communications media of the world in a subtle and adroit utilization of the art of professional public relations.<sup>30</sup>

A prominent Arab Palestinian strategist, Al-Haytham Al-Ayubi, analyzed the efficacy of Arab propaganda tactics in 1974, when he wrote:

The image of Israel as a weak nation surrounded by enemies seeking its annihilation evaporated [after 1967], to be replaced by the image of an aggressive nation challenging world opinion.†<sup>31</sup>

The high visibility of the sad plight of the homeless refugees—always tragic—has uniquely attracted the world’s compassion.<sup>33</sup> In addition, the campaign has provided non-Arabs with moral rationalization for abiding by the Arabs’ anti-Israel rules, which are regarded as prerequisites to getting Arab oil and the financial benefits from Arab oil wealth. Millions of dollars have been spent to exploit the Arab refugees and their repatriation as “the heart of the matter,” as the primary human problem that must be resolved before any talk of overall peace with Israel.

Reflecting on the oil weapon’s influence in the aftermath of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Al-Ayubi shrewdly observed:

The nations of western Europe condemned Israel’s position despite their guarantee of her security and territorial integrity. They understood that European interests and their dependence upon sources of energy precluded their allowing themselves to incur Arab wrath.<sup>34</sup>

Thus Al-Ayubi recommended sham “peace-talks,” with the continuation, however, of the “state of ‘no peace,’” and he advocated the maintaining of “moral pressure together with carefully-balanced military tension . . .” for the “success of the *new* Arab strategy.”‡ Because “loss of human life remains a sore point for the enemy,” continual “guerrilla” activities can erode Israel’s self-confidence and “the faith” of the world in the “Israeli policeman.”

Al-Ayubi cited, as an example, “the success of Arab foreign policy maneuvers” in 1973, which was

\*Emphasis added.

†As Rosemary Sayigh wrote in the *Journal of Palestine Studies*, “a strongly defined Palestinian identity did not emerge until 1968, two decades after expulsion.” It had taken twenty years to establish the “myth” prescribed by Musa Alami.<sup>32</sup>

‡Emphasis added.

so total that. . . . With the exception of the United States and the racist African governments, the entire world took either a neutral or pro-Arab position on the question of legality of restoring the occupied territories through any means—including the use of military force.

As Al-Ayubi noted, “The basic Arab premise concerning ‘the elimination of the results of aggression’ remains accepted by the world.” Thus the “noose” will be placed around the neck of the “Zionist entity.”

But the Arabs’ creation of the “myth” of nationality did not create the advantageous situation for the Palestinian Arabs that Musa Alami had hoped for. Instead, the conditions he complained of bitterly were perpetuated: the Arabs “shut the door” of citizenship “in their faces and imprison them in camps.”<sup>35</sup>

Khaled Al-Azm, who was Syria’s Prime Minister after the 1948 war, deplored the Arab tactics and the subsequent exploitation of the refugees, in his 1972 memoirs:

Since 1948 it is we who demanded the return of the refugees . . . while it is we who made them leave. . . . We brought disaster upon . . . Arab refugees, by inviting them and bringing pressure to bear upon them to leave. . . . We have rendered them dispossessed. . . . We have accustomed them to begging. . . . We have participated in lowering their moral and social level. . . . Then we exploited them in executing crimes of murder, arson, and throwing bombs upon . . . men, women and children—all this in the service of political purposes. . . .<sup>36</sup>

Propaganda has successfully veered attention away from the Arab world’s manipulation of its peoples among the refugee group on the one hand, and the number of those who now in fact possess Arab citizenship in many lands, on the other hand. The one notable exception is Jordan, where the majority of Arab refugees moved,\* and where they are entitled to citizenship according to law, “unless they are Jews.”<sup>37</sup>

## The Needy and the Numbers

According to various estimates, the accurate number of Arab refugees who left Israel in 1948 was somewhere between 430,000 and 650,000.† An oft-cited study that used official records of the League of Nations’ mandate and Arab census figures<sup>38</sup> determined that there were 539,000‡ Arab refugees in May 1948.<sup>39</sup>

There was heated controversy over the exact number of Arab refugees who left Israel. In October 1948, there were already three “official” sets of figures: The

\*The critical implications of the “exception” and the historical factors of “Palestine” which demanded Jordan’s actions are discussed in Chapter 12.

†The Statistical Abstract of Palestine in 1944–45 set the figure for the total Arab population living in the Jewish-settled territories of Palestine at 570,800.

‡Walter Pinner began with a total of 696,000 Arabs living within the Armistice lines in 1948, from which he subtracted the 140,000–157,000 who remained in their homes when Israel became independent. Pinner further asserts that no more than 430,000 were “genuine refugees” in need of relief. See the population study in Chapter 12 for new information and a detailed breakdown.

United Nations had two, the higher of which estimated the number would “shortly increase to 500,000”;<sup>40</sup> the Arab League’s official figures reported a total already greater by almost 150,000 than the higher of the UN figures. The swollen Arab League figures could never be verified because the Arabs refused to allow official censuses to be completed among the refugees.<sup>41</sup> Observers have deduced that the Arab purpose was to seek greater world attention through an exaggerated population figure and thereby induce the UN to put heavier pressures upon Israel, to force “repatriation.”

But the propaganda use of erroneous, inflated, or otherwise manipulated population statistics was not a recent phenomenon restricted to the Arab refugee camps. As subsequent chapters reveal, this practice has long played a critical, underestimated role in shaping the perceptions and the resolution—or the lack of resolution—of the Arab-Israeli conflict.\*

The former Director of Field Operations for the United Nations Disaster Relief Project reported in July 1949 that

It is believed that some local [Arab] welfare cases are included in the refugee figures.<sup>42</sup>

When the United Nations Relief and Work Agency (UNRWA) was established as a singular, special unit to deal with Arab refugees, practically its first undertaking, in May 1950, was an attempted refugee census to separate the genuinely desperate from the “fradulent claimants.” After a year’s time and a \$300,000 expenditure, UNRWA reported that “it is still not possible to give an absolute figure of the true number of refugees as understood by the working definition of the word.”<sup>43</sup> For the purpose of that census, the definition of “refugee” was “a person *normally resident* in Palestine who had lost his home and his livelihood as a result of the hostilities and who is in need.” A reason given by UNRWA for falsified numbers was that the refugees “eagerly report births and . . . reluctantly report deaths.”<sup>44</sup>

One of the first official reports to question the accuracy of the refugee figures stated that there could be “no true refugee population” figures because the agency director “did not consider it practicable to ask the operating agencies to impose any kind of eligibility test and . . . had no observers of his own for this purpose.”<sup>45</sup> The report stated it was having difficulty excluding “ordinarily nomadic Bedouins and . . . unemployed or indigent local residents” from genuine refugees, and

it cannot be doubted that in many cases individuals who *could not qualify as being bona fide refugees are in fact* on the relief rolls.†

\*A more current example of the traditional swelling of numbers was described by *New York Times* correspondent David Shieler during the 1982 Israeli routing of the PLO foundation in Lebanon. On July 14, Shieler wrote, “It is clear to anyone who has traveled in southern Lebanon . . . that the original figures . . . reported by correspondents quoting Beirut representatives of the Red Cross during the first week of the war, were extreme exaggerations.”

†Emphasis added.

One of the camp workers in Lebanon who was questioned about the accuracy of the refugee count answered,

We try to count them, but they are coming and going all the time; or we count them in Western clothes, then they return in *aba* and *kaffiyah* and we count the same ones again.<sup>46</sup>

UNRWA's relief rolls from the beginning were inflated by more than a hundred thousand,\* including those who could not qualify as refugees from Israel even under the newer, unprecedentedly broad eligibility criterion for the refugee relief rolls. UNRWA now altered its definition of "refugees" to include those people who had lived in "Palestine" a minimum of only *two years* preceding the 1948 conflict.<sup>48</sup> In addition, the evidence of fraud in the count, which accumulated over the years, was given no cognizance toward reducing the UN estimates. They continued to surge.

According to the Lebanese journal *Al-Hayat*, in 1959 "Of the 120,000 refugees who entered Lebanon, not more than 15,000 are still in camps."<sup>49</sup> A substantial de facto resettlement of Arab Palestinian refugees had actually taken place in Lebanon by 1959. Later that year *Al-Hayat* wrote that "the refugees' inclination—in spite of the noisy chorus all about them—is toward immediate integration."<sup>50</sup> The 1951–1952 UNRWA report itself had determined that "two-thirds of the refugees live elsewhere than in camps," and that "more fortunate refugees are not even on rations, but live rather comfortably . . . and work at good jobs."<sup>51</sup> The recognition in the United Nations and in Arab journals that the refugee camps had largely been emptied, through absorption and resettlement, raised appropriate subjects for inquiry with regard to correcting the number of persons receiving rations and seeking "repatriation."

After their 1960 investigation, Senators Gale McGee and Albert Gore<sup>52</sup> reported the surfeit of

Ration cards [which] have become chattel for sale, for rent or bargain by any Jordanian, whether refugee or not, needy or wealthy. These cards are used . . . almost as negotiable instruments. . . . many have acquired large numbers of ration cards . . . rented or bartered to others who unjustifiably receive . . . rations, much of which are now in the black market.

At the same time, the UNRWA Director admitted that the *Jordan ration lists alone* "are believed to include 150,000 ineligible and many persons who have died."<sup>53</sup> Officials told the two senators of twenty percent to thirty percent inflation of the relief rolls,<sup>54</sup> and an American representative on the UNRWA Advisory

\*UNRWA Director Howard Kennedy on November 1, 1950, reported to the United Nations Ad Hoc Political Committee that "a large group of indigent people totalling over 100,000 . . . could not be called refugees, but . . . have lost their means of livelihood because of the war and post-war conditions . . . The Agency felt their need was even more acute than that of the refugees who were fed and housed." In November 1950, Kennedy referred to "the 600,000 [Arab] refugees," although he had reported in May 1950 that UNRWA had distributed 860,000 rations, citing the hundreds of thousands of "hungry Arabs" who were not bona fide refugees but who claimed need.<sup>47</sup>



Board added, "I have actually seen merchants openly weighing and buying supplies from recipients of distribution centers."\*<sup>55</sup>

In 1961, UNRWA Agency Director John Davis acknowledged that the United Nations refugee counts included "other victims of the conflict of 1948," and that it would be wrong to deny them aid merely because they weren't legally qualified.<sup>56</sup> However, they were persons neglected by their own Arab governments, and they should not have been counted among the Arab refugees from Israel; by continuing to be unfaithful to its own mandate, UNRWA contributed to further distortion of an already misrepresented and misunderstood refugee situation. In fact, what were originally intended as humanitarian endeavors to aid needy Arab resident populations by the Red Cross and others would unwittingly contribute to the use of hapless humans for an entire political and military campaign.<sup>57</sup>

### Resettlement Opportunities: Dignity Denied

Over the last thirty-odd years, numerous projects have been proposed, international funds provided, studies undertaken, all indicating the benefits that could be derived by the Arab refugees from their absorption into the brethren cultures of the Arab host countries. Various international bodies and independent Arab voices over the years have clearly challenged as immoral the position of the Arabs in promoting the continued languishing of the Arab émigrés who came within their borders; also deplored on occasion is the Arab states' departure from the free world's unvarying precedent: of granting to refugees around the world the dignity of resettlement within a compatible environment where they can become productive citizens. From the beginning, the Arab host governments were offered unprecedentedly broad opportunities based on the refugees' rehabilitation, which could help develop their countries' vast potential under the proposed aid programs.

International experts reported and published undisputed evidence that integration and resettlement of those who were refugees, when implemented by the community of Arab nations, would benefit not only the Arab refugees but also the underpopulated areas within the Arab world, which needed additional labor forces to implement progress. Iraq and Syria were judged by many specialists in the area to be ideal for resettlement of the Arab refugees.<sup>58</sup> Among many such findings was the report by President Truman's International Development Advisory Board. Headed by Nelson Rockefeller, the board asserted that under proper development Iraq alone could absorb an Arab refugee population of 750,000. According to the report,

\*According to the *Mideast Mirror*, a weekly news review published by Arab News Agency of Cairo: "There are refugees who hold as many as 500 ration cards, 499 of them belonging to refugees long dead. . . . There are dealers in UNRWA food and clothing and ration cards to the highest bidder. . . . 'Refugee capitalists' is what UNRWA calls them." July 23, 1955.

. . . Israel [which] in the three years of its existence *has absorbed a Jewish refugee population, about equivalent in number to the Arab refugees, . . . in flight from Moslem countries in the Middle East and North Africa, cannot reabsorb the Arabs who fled its borders, but it can and indeed has, offered to contribute to a fund for Arab resettlement. The exchange of the Arab population of Palestine with the Jewish population of the Arab countries was favored by the . . . League of Nations as an effective way of resolving the Palestine problem. In practical effect, such an exchange has been taking place. The resettlement of the Arab refugees is . . . much simpler . . . in Arab lands.*<sup>59</sup>

Another of the authoritative studies reported:

Iraq could contribute most to the solution of the refugee problem. It could absorb agriculturists as well. This would benefit the refugees and the country equally.<sup>60</sup>

Pointing to Iraq's special availability for resettlement and countering the Arab argument that the Arab refugees were "unemployable"—the same study emphasized that

In the years 1950–51 100,000 Iraqi Jews left the country. . . . They left a big gap in the life of the city. Many of them were shopkeepers, artisans or white collar workers, while 15,000 belonged to the well-to-do. The gap could be . . . filled. . . . Again Iraq would also benefit. . . .

The study concluded that "host countries should take over responsibility for the refugees at the earliest possible date," and that "redistribution of the refugees among these countries is a primary requisite."

According to yet another study, by S.G. Thicknesse,<sup>61</sup> Iraq's were the "best long-range prospects" for resettlement of the Arabs from Palestine. Herbert Hoover suggested that "this would clear Palestine . . . for a large Jewish emigration. . . ."<sup>62</sup>

*El-Balad*, an Arab daily paper in the Jordan-held "old city" of Jerusalem, stressed the value to the Arabs of the Jews' flight from Iraq, since "roughly 120,000" Jewish refugees had fled Baghdad for Israel, leaving all of their goods and homes behind them.<sup>63</sup> Salah Jabr, former Prime Minister of Iraq and leader of Iraq's National Socialist Party had stated that

the emigration of 120,000 Jews from Iraq to Israel is beneficial to Iraq and to the Palestinian Arabs because it makes possible the entry into Iraq of a similar number of Arab refugees and their occupation of the Jewish houses there.<sup>64</sup>

A survey by the League of Red Cross Societies determined that thirty-five percent of the Palestine refugees were "townspeople" and could "easily fill the vacuum" left by the Jews.

\*Emphasis added.

. . . Their departure created a large gap in Iraq's economy. In some fields, such as transport, banking and wholesale trades, it reached serious proportions. There was also a dearth of white collar workers and professional men.<sup>65</sup>

Syria was also proposed by many experts as an area with great potential for absorbing refugees: according to one report, Syria required more than twice as many inhabitants as its then-current population of a little more than two million (after World War II).<sup>66</sup> According to Arab Palestinian writer Fawaz Turki, Syria "could have absorbed its own refugees, and probably those in Lebanon and Jordan."<sup>67</sup> The British Chatham House Survey<sup>68</sup> estimated that, with Syria's agreement, "Syria might well absorb over 200,000 Palestine refugees within five years in agriculture alone." Chatham House also recommended that about 350,000 refugees could be resettled in Iraq, further noting that the refugees themselves would "not offer serious resistance" if they were encouraged to realize that their lives would become more productive.

In 1949 a newspaper editorial from Damascus stated that

*Syria needs not only 100,000 refugees, but 5 million to work the lands and make them fruitful.\*<sup>69</sup>*

The Damascus paper, earlier recognizing that Arab refugees were not to be "repatriated," suggested that the government place these "100,000 refugees in district[s] . . . where they will build small villages with the money appropriated for this purpose."<sup>70</sup>

In 1951, Syria was anxious for additional workers who would settle on the land. An Egyptian paper<sup>71</sup> reported,

The Syrian government has officially requested that half a million Egyptian agricultural workers . . . be permitted to emigrate to Syria in order to help develop Syrian land which would be transferred to them as their property. The responsible Egyptian authorities have rejected this request on the grounds that Egyptian agriculture is in need of labor.‡

Near East Arabic Radio<sup>72</sup> reported that Syria was offering land rent free to anyone willing to settle there. It even announced a committee to study would-be settlers' applications.

\*Emphasis added.

†On June 27, 1949, Near East Arab Broadcasting, a British-run station, broadcast (in Arabic): "The Arabs must forget their demand for the return of all refugees since Israel, owing to her policy of crowding new immigrants into the country at such a rate that the territory she holds is already too small for her population, is physically unable to accept more than a small number of Arab refugees. The Arabs must face the facts before it's too late, and must see to the resettlement of the refugees in the Arab states where they can help in the development of their new lands and so become quickly assimilated genuine inhabitants, instead of suffering exiles." "Daily Abstracts of Arabic Broadcasts," Israel Foreign Office. Similar broadcasts were recorded on 10/31/50, 11/11/50, 11/29/50, 12/31/50.

‡200,000 Arab "refugees" were languishing in Gaza, along with "80,000 original residents who barely made a living before the refugees arrived," according to the UNRWA report in 1951-52, yet a project with "hope" to accommodate "10,000 families" in the "Sinai area" was "suspended."

In fact, Syrian authorities began the experiment by moving 25,000 of the refugees in Syria into areas of potential development in the northern parts of the country, but the overthrow of the ruling regime in August 1949 changed the situation, and the rigid Arab League position against permanent resettlement, despite persistence on the part of isolated leaders, prevailed.<sup>73</sup>

Notwithstanding the facts,<sup>74</sup> the Arab world has assiduously worked to build the myth that no jobs were available in Arab lands for Arab refugees in 1948 or since, and that the refugees had become surplus farm workers "in an era when the world at large and Arab countries in particular already has too many people in the rural sector."<sup>75</sup>

At around the same time, the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Muhammad Saleh ed-Din, in a leading Egyptian daily, demanded the *return* of the refugees:

Let it therefore be known and appreciated that, in demanding the restoration of the refugees to Palestine, the Arabs intend that they shall return as the masters of the homeland, and not as slaves. More explicitly: they intend to annihilate the state of Israel.<sup>76</sup>

Thus, while the "refugee" count kept growing, Arab leaders' confusion over "return" or "not return" had been more or less clarified: they proclaimed that the "refugees" must indeed "return," but not before Israel was destroyed.

The Lebanese paper *Al-Ziyyad*<sup>77</sup> anticipated a current expressed goal of the PLO charter, though it was less candid. In a sophisticated assessment, it suggested the *recognition of Israel* as a strategy that would accomplish the following results:

The return of all the refugees to their homes would be secured, thereby we should, on the one hand, eliminate the refugee problem, and on the other, create a large Arab majority that would serve as the most effective means of reviving the Arab character of Palestine, while forming a powerful fifth column for the day of revenge and reckoning.

Despite findings of the 1950 United Nations Palestine Conciliation Commission,<sup>78</sup> which recommended "concentration on Arab refugees' resettlement in the Arab countries<sup>[79]</sup> with both the technical and financial assistance of the United Nations and coupled with compensation for their property," the Arab League<sup>80</sup> insisted that

relief projects should not prejudice the right of the refugees to return to their homes or to receive compensation if unwilling to return . . .<sup>81</sup>

The *Revue du Liban* was among many dissenters who challenged the Arab League's position and discouraged Arab refugees from "return":

. . . it is a fact that many Arabs leave Israel today of their own free will.

The paper pointed out that “in the event of a return of the refugees they will constitute a minority . . . in a foreign environment . . . unfamiliar . . . , together with people who speak a language they do not understand.” Also, the paper stated, the refugees would “encounter the economic difficulties of Israel,” and

their settlement in Israel will cost much more than their absorption in the countries where they live today. After three years it is not human and not logical to compel them to wait without giving them concrete help. Syria and Iraq can easily absorb additional refugees. . . . They should form a productive force which might help to improve the economic conditions in the countries where they will be absorbed.<sup>82</sup>

Despite tacit recognition of the actual “resident”—as opposed to “refugee”—identity of so many of those involved, projects unparalleled for refugees elsewhere continued to offer to facilitate the Arab world’s resettlement of all its “refugees.”<sup>83</sup> Yet the Arabs rebuffed every effort to secure realistic well-being for their kinsmen. At a refugee conference in Homs, Syria, the Arabs declared that

any discussion aimed at a solution of the Palestine problem which will not be based on ensuring the refugees’ right to annihilate Israel will be regarded as a desecration of the Arab people and an act of treason.<sup>84</sup>

In 1958, former director of UNRWA Ralph Galloway declared angrily while in Jordan that

The Arab states do not want to solve the refugee problem. They want to keep it as an open sore, as an affront to the United Nations, and as a weapon against Israel. Arab leaders do not give a damn whether Arab refugees live or die.<sup>85</sup>

And King Hussein, the sole Arab leader who, for reasons that later become clearer, directed integration of the Arabs, in 1960 stated,

Since 1948 Arab leaders have approached the Palestine problem in an irresponsible manner. . . . They have used the Palestine people for selfish political purposes. This is ridiculous and, I could say, even criminal.<sup>86</sup>

Eleven years after the Arab leavetaking, the late United Nations Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld reiterated that there were ample means for absorbing the Arab refugees into the economy of the Arab region; he asserted further that the refugees would be beneficial to their host countries, by adding needed manpower to assist in the development of those countries. Hammarskjöld detailed the estimated cost of the refugee absorption, which he proposed be financed by oil revenues and outside aid. But again, plans for permanent rehabilitation of the refugees were rejected by the Arab leaders, because such measures would have terminated the refugees’ status as “refugees”; the Arab leaders reasoned that once the refugees accepted their new homes, they would eventually abandon their desire to “return” to former homes, as have other refugees. Such action would

have resulted in the Arab world's loss of a weapon against Israel,<sup>87</sup> and would have falsely implied acceptance of the Jewish state.

While the vast majority of refugees has now left the camps for greater opportunities among their brethren—many in the oil-rich Gulf states—most have been denied citizenship in the Arab countries to which they had moved. Regardless of their contributions as “law-abiding” citizens de facto, and regardless of their length of time there, they have largely been discriminated against. As one Palestinian Arab in Kuwait told *Forbes* editor James Cook in 1975,

They owe me citizenship. I've been here for nearly 20 years and I helped create this country's great wealth. I did. I haven't simply earned my citizenship, they owe it to me.<sup>88</sup>

This Arab refugee, whose plight is representative of so many, according to Cook, was “unlikely to get it,” although it is said that some of the Arabs who left Western Palestine for Kuwait have finally obtained Kuwaiti citizenship. In Iraq, Palestinians have been “allowed to live in the country but not to assume Iraqi nationality,” despite the fact that the country needs manpower and “is encouraging Arab nationals to work and live there by granting them citizenship, with the exception of Palestinians.”<sup>89</sup>

In this endeavor, the Arab world has received inordinate support from the United Nations, as a candid former United Nations Palestinian Conciliation Commission official admitted in 1966. Dr. Pablo de Azcarate wrote:

. . . solemn proclamation [of the “right of the refugees to return . . .”] by the [General] Assembly and its incorporation into the text of the resolution of December 14, 1948, have had three results.

In the first place, a platform has been provided, of inestimable value to all those Arab political elements who are more interested in keeping alive the political struggle against the State of Israel than in putting an end, by means of a practical and reasonable compromise formula, to the tragic situation of the refugees. The truth is that since the resolution, . . . the Arab states, whenever the question arose, have done nothing but attack Israel. . . .

The second result of the proclamation . . . has been complementary to the first—to paralyze any possible initiative on the part of those who would have preferred to give priority, not to the struggle against Israel, but to the solution of the refugee problem by means of a reasonable and constructive compromise formula.

[And third,] the proclamation and the propaganda surrounding it have created a state of mind among the refugees based on the vain hope of returning to their homes, which has immobilized their cooperation, . . . an indispensable condition if a way is to be opened to a solution at once practical and constructive of their distressing problem. . . .

. . . after years of effort, the sole achievement has been to feed and shelter the refugees in some sort of fashion, without taking a single step along the road to their economic and social rehabilitation.<sup>90</sup>

\*Emphasis added.

Arab propaganda has also managed thus far to direct all attention to one aspect of the Middle East refugee problem as if it were the only aspect of that problem, and thus to mask the overall reality. One crucial truth, among many that have been obscured and deprecated, is that there have been as many Jewish refugees who fled or were expelled from the Arab countries as there are Arab refugees from Israel, and that the Jews left of necessity and in flight from danger.

### The Exchange of Populations

For every refugee—adult or child—in Syria, Lebanon, or elsewhere in the Arab world who compels our sympathy, there is a Jewish refugee who fled from the Arab country of his birth. For every Arab who moved to neighboring lands, a Jew was forced to flee from a community where he and his ancestors may have lived for two thousand years. The Jews escaped to their original homeland, where their roots are even older; the Arabs also arrived where they were in the majority, where they shared the same language and culture with fellow Arabs, and often only a few dozen miles from their places of origin.

An exchange of populations has in actuality taken place and been consummated; by coincidence, even the *total* number of Arabs who reportedly left Israel is almost exactly equaled by the number of Jews exchanged. There has been a completed exchange of minorities between the Arabs and the Jews, and a more-than-even tradeoff of property for the Arabs. The Jews who fled Arab countries left assets behind in the Arab world greater than those the Arabs left in Israel.<sup>91</sup> Jewish property that the Arabs confiscated in Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Egypt apparently has more than offset Arab claims of compensation from Israel.

In fact, the concept of an “exchange of Arab and Jewish populations” was introduced by an *Arab leader* as a solution to the “disturbances” in the Middle East *long before* Israel or the actual exchange came about. In 1939, Mojli Amin, a member of the Arab Defense Committee for Palestine, drew up a proposal, published in Damascus and distributed among Arab leaders, entitled “Exchange of Populations.” Amin proposed that

all the Arabs of Palestine shall leave and be divided up among the neighboring Arab countries. In exchange for this, all the Jews living in Arab countries will go to Palestine. . . .

The exchange of populations should be carried out in the same way that Turkey and Greece exchanged their populations. Special committees must be set up to deal with the liquidation of Jewish and Arab property. . . .

I fear, in truth, that the Arabs will not agree. . . . But in spite of this, I take upon myself the task of convincing them. . . .<sup>92</sup>

At least a decade before the 1947 resolution to partition Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab state, the British had proposed the exchange of “Arab population in Palestine” for Jews elsewhere.<sup>93</sup> In 1945 Herbert Hoover stated that “The Arab population of Palestine would be the gainer from better lands in

exchange for their present holdings. Iraq would be the gainer, for it badly needs agricultural population. Today millions of people are being moved from one land to another." Therefore, Hoover suggested "financing" Iraq to "complete" the population transfer with greater facility.<sup>94</sup>

From the time Israel attained modern statehood, independent humanitarian pleas attempted to reveal the actualities of all the "Middle East refugees" and to spotlight the potential permanent relief. One example was clergyman Carl Hermann Voss, who hoped through his books to change the world's faulty perception. He wrote,

Some appeals for aid have implied that there is only an Arab refugee problem, enabling Arab propagandists to blame the Arab refugee plight on Israel. If proper attention is called to both Jewish and Arab refugee problems, much ill-will may be avoided and genuine human need, regardless of race or creed, will be served.<sup>95</sup>

### Sui Generis?

Why was this de facto exchange of Arab and Jewish populations treated differently from all other population exchanges? Virtually all mass movements of refugees—even those which went one way and were not reciprocal, as are population exchanges—have been solved by resettlement or absorption of the refugees in either the original host country or another designated area.<sup>96</sup>

In the roster of the world's unfortunate shifts of population the number of refugees is staggering: from 1933 to 1945, a total of 79,200,000 souls were displaced;<sup>97</sup> since the Second World War at least 100,000,000 additional persons have become refugees. In times of conflict throughout history those who became insecure migrated to regions where they felt safer. Most are no longer refugees, because the resettlement and integration of these refugee transfers by the host country has been considered by the world community to be the normal and humanitarian course of action. The international legal precedent of granting refugees the privilege to live in dignity as citizens in their countries of asylum has been consistently urged for all refugees.<sup>98</sup> There has been no successful mass repatriation by any refugee group except after a military victory; further, in instances of refugee *exchanges* there is no historical, moral, or other basis for one-way repatriation.

The exchange between India and Pakistan in the 1950s was overwhelming in magnitude: 8,500,000 Sikhs and Hindus from Pakistan fled to India, and roughly 6,500,000 Muslims moved from India to Pakistan.<sup>99</sup> Even in "crowded, waterlogged West Bengal," according to the *New York Times*,<sup>100</sup> where refugees streamed from East Pakistan, the refugees "felt their only hope for solace was among people who spoke their language, had the same dietary habits and shared their customs and traditions." This exchange had not come about peacefully. As reported by the *Times* of London,<sup>101</sup>



Moslems have been murdering Hindus and Sikhs, Hindus and Sikhs have been murdering Moslems. Each side blames the other with passionate vehemence and refuses to admit that its own people are ever at fault.

Yet, contrary to Arab attitudes, Pakistani President Mohammed Ayub Khan, at a Cairo press conference in 1960, announced that he had directed his people to deal with their own refugees, without "substantial support from Muslim brethren over the world"; he suggested that Pakistan's settlement of its nearly seven million refugees from India might act as an example for the "three-quarters of a million refugees from Palestine" in the Arab countries.<sup>102</sup>

The modern precedent was set in 1913 when Turkey and Bulgaria began their equal population exchange; and in 1923, Turkey and Greece exchanged 1,250,000 Greeks and 355,000 Turks. An agreement was signed in 1930 abandoning individual appraisal in favor of wholesale liquidation of accounts by lump-sum compensation between Greece and Turkey.<sup>103</sup> Since almost all the property of the Indians and Pakistanis who changed homelands had been taken over and put to use by the respective governments, India and Pakistan eventually had to reach a similar solution.<sup>104</sup>

Millions of refugees who left their homes because of religious, ethnic, or political pressures have been successfully resettled. Many millions more are now being absorbed slowly into the life of their respective countries of asylum. The United States Committee for Refugees' (USCR) latest official figure (1982)<sup>105</sup> estimated a current "Worldwide Total" of more than 10,000,000 refugees. As that committee reported, "... few resettled refugees ever require assistance again from the UN," although the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) "lists resettled people as refugees until they acquire a new nationality."<sup>106</sup>

Among the dozens of countries to which tens of millions of refugees have fled for asylum, the only instance in which the "host countries refused," as a bloc, to assist properly, or even to accept *aid* in the *permanent* rehabilitation of their refugees, occurred in the "Arab states."<sup>107</sup> In March 1976, the director of the United States Committee for Refugees said that while "everyone must accept their refugees—that's the world situation," still, the "Arab refugees are a special case."<sup>108</sup>

Why is the "Palestinian refugee" problem treated as a special case? The United States Catholic Conference's eminent expert, John McCarthy, attempted to put the circumstances of the Arab refugees into the broader context, through his decades of first-hand worldwide experience with refugees. McCarthy's own private affiliations—he has worn "several hats" in Catholic-sponsored refugee resettlement organs—have accomplished the resettlement of roughly one hundredth of the world's hundred million refugees rendered homeless since World War II. During an interview in December 1978, he was asked:

Q: Is the world really receptive to observing the precedent of finding new homes for refugees?

McCarthy: We've settled about a million people in the past 30 years. At the present time we have from Southeast Asia—we can provide homes and jobs for 7,000 people a month, without regard to race, religion, what-have-you. There's no problem with this—it works. We're carrying out resettlement programs in Canada, Switzerland, Austria, Germany, Nordic countries, also New Zealand, Australia—all Southeast Asians. We're working with Egyptians, and out of Europe we're taking care of Ethiopians, Kurds, Iraqis, and the whole Iron Curtain. So we have quite a movement of people. There isn't any problem. It always works—if they're told the story as it should be told. You must remember that in any structure—black, white, green, yellow—there's always a certain resistance to the newcomer. If we can show that these people can contribute—that these people have a problem, that these people are good—if we can show that they're your brother, it works.

Q: In the case of the Palestinian Arab refugees—why hasn't it worked there?

McC: It *has* worked there.

Q: You mean *unofficially*?

McC: You must remember—it's such an involved political structure. I've worked in the Palestinian structure, trying to say, "Let's resettle these people." The governments of Egypt and so on, they all said, "Wait a while," or "No, we won't do it. The only place they're going to resettle is back in Israel, right or wrong." You must remember—well—these people are simply pawns.

Q: What can be done?

McC: We can do things with people if we have the help, just the permission of the governments. But you must remember one thing: the Arab countries don't want to take Arabs. It's discriminating against their own. . . . Our only job is to see if we can create new life opportunities.

The most important thing is to get the refugees, the people, resettled.<sup>109</sup>

"Permanent resettlement" remains the general goal of the United States government as well.<sup>110</sup> Yet the current dialogue omits any mention of the rehabilitation or resettlement of Palestinian Arab refugees. It is the "right of the Palestinians to their homeland" that is consistently reiterated.

The abuse of the refugees, their deprivation of real "human rights" from 1948 onward, and the true motive behind their rejection by the Arab world have all been buried by propaganda slogans and omissions. Humanitarian voices of concern for "human need" and dignity are now muted by the louder and increasingly prevalent trumpeting of the "rights" of the "Palestinians" to "return."

Amid that campaign, the belated recognition of the "other" Middle East refugees, the Jews, was termed an ill-timed "complication" by United States officials during the Carter administration.<sup>111</sup> To the benefit of the Arab propaganda mechanism, and perhaps to the ill fortune of many perpetual Arab refugees, Israel has not made an effective case for its own Jewish refugee claim; Israelis say that they have reserved the matter of the population exchange for overall peace negotiations, although they have referred to the exchange during discussions of refugee compensation, and in forums such as the United Nations.

However, if the Israelis chose virtually to ignore the propaganda benefits to be gained from exploitation of their refugees, the Arabs predicted otherwise.

Perhaps because of the Arab world's own political use of its refugees, some Arabs have anticipated with apprehension the Israelis' eventual use of what the Arabs see as a strong claim for Israel and its resettled Jewish refugees from Arab countries.

There have been sophisticated warnings that the existence of those hundreds of thousands of Jewish refugees who fled to Israel from Arab states would trump the Arab refugee "propaganda card." Even before the propaganda line substituted the term "Palestinians" to replace the term "Arab refugees," the Arab world manifested popular recognition that its demand for the "return" of the Arab refugees to Israel was implausible: in 1966, a prominent Egyptian newspaper published an editorial stating that "we all know that Zionist influence . . . brought about the transfer to Israel, of thousands of Jews from Yemen . . . thousands of Moroccan Jews, the same thing was done in Tunisia, and Syria also tried to follow the same policy . . ."

As a result, the editorial reasoned, Israel can claim that, if "tens of thousands of Jews who previously lived in the Arab countries" are settled in Israel, "why should the Arab refugees not be settled in their stead? . . . This proposal . . . can serve as a propaganda card to arouse the interest of world public opinion."<sup>112</sup>

In 1974 the question was obliquely raised again by the Arabs—this time by an Arab-born Israeli journalist, interviewing the head of the PLO delegation to the United Nations at that time, Dr. Nabil Shaat. The Israeli journalist asked, "Why did you send your people to kill innocent people in Ma'alot and Kiryat Shemona . . . knowing they were mostly populated by Oriental Jews, whom you call brothers?" At the reference to the Arab-born Jewish refugees, Dr. Shaat responded, "I have no answer to that. I will personally raise the question in our organization when I return to Beirut. . . ."<sup>113</sup>

The PLO's Dr. Shaat granted another interview months later, which he used as a platform for his answer: Shaat called for a "charter of rights of Arab citizens of Jewish persuasion."<sup>114</sup> Shortly afterward the series of "invitations" from the Arab world to "its Jews" resumed.

Continuing Arab concern was indicated in May of 1975 by an unusually candid article written for the Beirut journal *Al Nahar*. Sabri Jiryis, an Arab researcher, author, and member of the Palestinian National Council, wrote that "the Arabs were very active" in the creation of Israel, although

this is hardly the place to describe how the Jews of the Arab states were driven out of their ancient homes, . . . shamefully deported after their property had been commandeered or taken over at the lowest possible valuation. . . . This is true for the majority of the Jews in question.

Jiryis warned that "Israel will air this issue in . . . any negotiations undertaken regarding the rights of the Palestinians. . . . Israel has been assembling the minutest details about the Jews who left the Arab states after 1948 . . . so that these can be used when the time comes."

Jiryis concluded that

Israelis will put these claims forward: . . . “It may be . . . that we Israelis entailed the expulsion of some 700,000 Palestinians. . . .

“However, you Arabs have entailed the expulsion of just as many Jews from the Arab states. . . . Actually, therefore, what happened was a . . . ‘population and property exchange,’ and each party must bear the consequences.

“Israel is absorbing the Jews, . . . *the Arab states for their part must settle the Palestinians in their own midst and solve their problems.*”<sup>115\*</sup>

Lebanese Arabs demanded in 1977 that the “Palestinian refugees be relocated to all Arab nations . . . each according to its own capacity.”<sup>116</sup> That the motives for the Lebanese proclamation were political and not strictly humanitarian was evident: the PLO had contributed greatly to the transformation of Lebanon from international playground to countrywide battlefield. Significantly, however, the demand went to the *Arab* countries and not to Israel. Thus the responsibility for the refugees was placed, albeit briefly, by Arabs upon the Arab world.

Nonetheless, rumblings of renewed external recognition of this Middle East population exchange continued to appear in the late 1970s, nearly thirty years after the fact.

University of Chicago population expert Philip Hauser, former United States Census Director, who represented the United States on the United Nations’ Population Commission from 1947 to 1951, stated in 1978 that

the exchange of populations between out-migrant Arabs and out-migrant Jews is real—precedents have been established. As far as the unprecedented refusal by the Arabs to accept Arab refugees—some quarters call this a deliberate means of destroying Israel. What the out-migration of Arabs from newly-created Israel did was to provide in Arab countries a milieu in which the Arab refugees had access to a common culture and language . . . a unique historical situation, in the sense that most refugee populations are faced with the necessity of living in a new cultural and linguistic world. . . . In light of the total situation—and now I will speak not in the demographic vein but in the less familiar political vein—it would be absurd for the Arabs to insist on what would be double compensation from Israel. . . .<sup>117</sup>

Moreover, perhaps in view of the Israeli government’s relegation of its refugee equation to a state of suspended animation, the Jewish refugees themselves finally began to coalesce into independent bodies; in several countries such organizations grew up. One international body calls itself WOJAC—World Organization of Jews from Arab Countries—with delegations of Arab-born Jews representing sixteen countries of asylum. The Jewish refugees, who never had been clearly identified or adequately discussed in world forums, decided to become recognized, to explain why they can never go back to their lands of origin, and to demand “even-handedness.”<sup>118</sup>

It was precisely when WOJAC announced the convening of its organizing conference in Paris that the Arabs issued several of their invitations to the

\*Emphasis added.

Arab-born Jews to “come back.” The Jews disdained the gesture of “hospitality,” and composed a response. They enumerated the “miseries” they had endured in the Muslim Arab society at a press conference called to communicate their negative answer to the invitation.\*

In 1981, the United States Committee for Refugees noted, as it had not done in many previous reports, the “600,000 Jewish refugees resettled from Arab countries . . . three decades ago.”<sup>119</sup> By the next survey, however, that important recognition was singularly negated.<sup>120</sup> Had the Jews initially drawn worldwide attention to their Arab-born Jewish refugees in Israel, had they broadcast the persecution of the Jews and other minorities in the Arab countries—and the social and economic burden of absorbing the Jewish refugees from Arab countries—the Arab demand for one-sided repatriation might be perceived today in a different, more evenhanded and objective perspective, and other, critical unknown elements in the conflict might have by now intruded into the consideration of “justice.”

As we have seen, all those hapless peoples counted as “refugees” were not in fact refugees: many were needy souls of other nationalities who found sustenance in the camps, and in the process became—and their children became—unwitting human weapons in a holy war that never ends.

The immediate objective of the Arab world’s propaganda strategy has been one-sided Arab “repatriation,” a “return” in the name of “self-determination” of those Arab refugees who have been perceived as *the* Palestinian people from time immemorial, with “rights” to “their land.” In the foundation for those claims, one cornerstone is the popular perception that the Arabs are the *only* hapless refugees who were uprooted in 1948.

The Arabs well know how Jews were—and in least one case, still are—treated in Arab countries, † however they may have publicly congratulated themselves for “traditionally benign” treatment of “their” Jews. Consequently, they have grounds for concern for the success of one aspect of their program. If the world recognizes that there has been an irreversible exchange of Jewish and Arab refugee populations, this Arab political maneuver, perhaps, might be expected to reach an impasse.

And yet, as illustrated earlier here, some in the world community *have* recognized the Arab world’s cynical and heartless manipulation of those Arab brethren—men, women, and children who found themselves in refugee camps in

\*In January 1976, the American Sephardi Federation “representing more than 1½ million Jewish refugees from Arab lands” took a full-page advertisement in the *New York Times* to “decline” the Iraqi government’s “invitation.” A photograph of two bodies suspended from a scaffold, surrounded by angry-looking onlookers was identified as a “News Service Photo: Iraqis watch the bodies of Sabah Haim (left), and David Hazaquiel, both Jews, dangle from the scaffold after they were hanged in Baghdad.” Beneath the photograph the organization responded: “INVITATION DECLINED.”

“We, the Jewish refugees from Arab lands whose history in those countries goes back more than 2,000 years, long before Islam—suggest that the Arab governments finance the welfare of their own brothers instead of using them as political pawns, while they spend huge amounts for hypocritical propaganda, half truths and outright lies.” (January 11, 1976, *New York Times*.)

†See Chapter 7.

search of a better life. Why has that recognition failed to bring about a reasonable solution? Why is this refugee problem different from other refugee problems?

Why has UNRWA spent well over a billion humanitarian-contributed dollars—mostly from the United States—to perpetuate the refugee dilemma? More important, why does the Arab world of nearly 200 million people and millions of miles of territory remain so steadfast in its rejection of one minuscule Jewish state that the Arabs have been willing to sacrifice the human rights and often the very lives of their own people? And, given the honorable and predominantly well-intentioned motives of the free world community—oil-benefit seekers aside—how have the Arabs managed to perpetuate this status quo ante?

The answers lie in what is known—and what is not known—about the region.

Having worked to obliterate from the practical dialogue the history of the Jews as “Palestinian people,” and having in fact denied Jewish historical ties to their Holy Land (as in, for example, Article 20 of the PLO Covenant), the Arabs have consistently claimed that in the proposed “secular democratic state of Palestine,” most of the Jews who are now in their homeland of Israel would have to depart,<sup>121</sup> presumably back to their countries of origin—including the little-known major component of Arab-born Jews.

But a mutual repatriation obviously could not be demanded if one side of an exchange of populations had fled from intolerable conditions and could not return. Hence the need for a revised scenario, the Arab “invitation” to Jews to return, and the alteration from “Arab refugees” to “Palestinians.” Armed by myths, prevalent among outsiders, that the “alien” Jews lived harmoniously among the “native” Arabs before Israel became a state, the Arabs have tried, through consistent diplomatic and media repetition of statements by Arab leaders, to convince world opinion that the Jews would be “welcome again” in the Arab states if they were forced out of their homeland in Israel, the “Palestinian homeland” of the “Palestinian people from time immemorial.”

Because there are extensive contradictions to important popular perceptions and reports—discernible by reading the sentiments and strategies expressed by Arab writers and by visiting the Arab “confrontation” states—the purported “facts” and the “legitimate rights” that are part of the current rhetoric of the Arab-Israel conflict become recognizable as persistent and troubling questions.

Despite the Arab nations’ splintered, disparate reactions to what they consider greater threats than Israel—for some the primary danger is seen as the Soviet Union, for others Muslim Fundamentalism, and for the Gulf states its retention of the power of oil—the Arab world remains adamant and uncharacteristically united in its goal, as Al-Ayubi stated it—to tighten a “noose” around the “Zionist entity.”

It is the motive for the unchanging, overarching Arab strategy vis-à-vis Israel, the historical factors behind that motive, and the maneuvers that created a climate where that strategy is advocated as “morally” acceptable, which must now be traced.

## The Arab Jew

Before the Jewish state was established,  
there existed nothing to harm good relations  
between Arabs and Jews.

—The late King Faisal of Saudi Arabia,  
November 1973, to Henry Kissinger

We are not against the Jews.  
On the contrary, we are all Semites  
and we have been living with each  
other in peace and fraternity, Muslims,  
Jews and Christians, for many centuries.

—Yasser Arafat, head of the PLO

**S**ince the rebirth of Israel, hundreds of thousands of Jews from Arab lands have swarmed into the new state. In 1948 more than 850,000 Jews lived in the Arab world. Today there are fewer than 29,000, a shadow of the former ancient community. Most of those Jewish refugees fled to Israel. Where did they come from with such urgency—and why?

Contrary to the myth that Jews lived in harmony with the Arabs before the Zionist state, innumerable authoritative works document decisively the subjugation, oppression, and spasmodic anti-Jewish eruptions of violence that darkened the existence of the Jews in Muslim Arab countries.

In truth, before the seventh-century advent of the Prophet Muhammad and Islam, Jews and Arabs did have harmonious relations, and words of praise regarding the noble virtues of the Jews may be found in ancient Arab literature.<sup>1</sup>

Before the Arab conquest, in fact, some rulers of Arabia “had indeed embraced Judaism,” as Muslim historians attest.

The Koran itself has been witness to the Jewish nature of the “Israelite communities of Arabia”: Koranic references appear about the rabbis and the Torah which they read, and the prestige and reverence with which the earlier community viewed them.<sup>2</sup>

The Koran “contains so many legends and theological ideas found in Talmudic literature that we are able to draw a picture of the spiritual life of the Jews with whom Mohammad must have come into contact.”<sup>3</sup>

It was the Prophet Muhammad himself who attempted to negate the positive image of the Jew that had been prevalent earlier. According to historian Bernard

Lewis, the Prophet Muhammad's original plan had been to induce the Jews to adopt Islam;<sup>4</sup> when Muhammad began his rule at Medina in A.D. 622 he counted few supporters, so he adopted several Jewish practices—including daily prayer facing toward Jerusalem and the fast of Yom Kippur—in the hope of wooing the Jews. But the Jewish community rejected the Prophet Muhammad's religion, preferring to adhere to its own beliefs, whereupon Muhammad subsequently substituted Mecca for Jerusalem, and dropped many of the Jewish practices.

Three years later, Arab hostility against the Jews commenced, when the Meccan army exterminated the Jewish tribe of Quraiza.<sup>5</sup> As a result of the Prophet Muhammad's resentment, the Holy Koran itself contains many of his hostile denunciations of Jews<sup>6</sup> and bitter attacks upon the Jewish tradition, which undoubtedly have colored the beliefs of religious Muslims down to the present.

Omar, the caliph who succeeded Muhammad, delineated in his Charter of Omar the twelve laws under which a *dhimmi*, or non-Muslim, was allowed to exist as a "nonbeliever" among "believers." The Charter codified the conditions of life for Jews under Islam—a life which was forfeited if the *dhimmi* broke this law. Among the restrictions of the Charter: Jews were forbidden to touch the Koran; forced to wear a distinctive (sometimes dark blue or black) habit with sash; compelled to wear a yellow piece of cloth as a badge (blue for Christians); not allowed to perform their religious practices in public; not allowed to own a horse, because horses were deemed noble; not permitted to drink wine in public; and required to bury their dead without letting their grief be heard by the Muslims.<sup>7</sup>

As a grateful payment for being allowed so to live and be "protected," a *dhimmi* paid a special head tax and a special property tax, the edict for which came directly from the Koran: "Fight against those [Jews and Christians] who believe not in Allah . . . until they pay the tribute readily, being brought low."<sup>8</sup>

In addition, Jews faced the danger of incurring the wrath of a Muslim, in which case the Muslim could charge, however falsely, that the Jew had cursed Islam, an accusation against which the Jew could not defend himself.

Islamic religious law decreed that, although murder of one Muslim by another Muslim was punishable by death, a Muslim who murdered a non-Muslim was given not the death penalty, but only the obligation to pay "blood money" to the family of the slain infidel. Even this punishment was unlikely, however, because the law held the testimony of a Jew or a Christian invalid against a Muslim, and the penalty could only be exacted under improbable conditions—when two Muslims were willing to testify against a brother Muslim for the sake of an infidel.<sup>9</sup>

The demeanment of Jews as represented by the Charter has carried down through the centuries, its implementation inflicted with varying degrees of cruelty or inflexibility, depending upon the character of the particular Muslim ruler. When that rule was tyrannical, life was abject slavery, as in Yemen, where one of the Jews' tasks was to clean the city latrines and another was to clear the streets of animal carcasses—without pay, often on their Sabbath.

The restrictions under Muslim law always included the extra head tax regard-



less of the ruler's relative tolerance. This tax was enforced in some form until 1909 in Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Turkey; until 1925 in Iran; and was still enforceable in Yemen until the present generation. The clothing as well as the tax and the physical humiliation also varied according to whim. Thus, in Morocco, Jews had to wear black slippers,<sup>10</sup> while in Yemen, Jewish women were forced to wear one white and one black shoe.<sup>11\*</sup>

Jews were relegated to Arab-style Jewish ghettos—*hara*, *mellah*, or simply Jewish Quarter were the names given the areas where Jews resided—recorded by travelers over the centuries, as well as by Jewish chroniclers. A visitor to fourteenth-century Egypt, for example, commented in passing<sup>12</sup> on the separate Jewish quarter, and five hundred years later another visitor in the nineteenth century verified the continuation of the separated Jewish existence: "There are in this country about five thousand Jews (in Arabic, called 'Yahood'; singular, 'Yahoodee'), most of whom reside in the metropolis, in a miserable, close and dirty quarter, intersected by lanes, many of which are so narrow as hardly to admit of two persons passing each other in them."<sup>13</sup>

In 1920, those Jewish families in Cairo whose financial success had allowed them out of the ghetto, under relatively tolerant rule, had been replaced by "poor Jewish immigrants." Thus, although the character of the population may have changed, the squalor and crowding remained. As one writer, a Jew, observed:

Our people are crowded and clustered into houses about to collapse, in dark cellars, narrow alleys and crooked lanes choked with mud and stinking refuse, earning their meagre living in dark shops and suffocating workshops, toiling back to back, sunscorched and sleepless. Their hard struggle for existence both inside and outside the home is rewarded by a few beans and black bread.<sup>14</sup>

Under no circumstances were Jews considered truly equal. Among the Jews in Arab lands were many individual personal successes and regionalized intermittent prosperity, but the tradition of persecution was characteristic throughout most of Jewish history under Arab rule.<sup>15</sup> If the *dhimmi* burdens were light in one particular region, the Jew had the residue of fear left from the previous history of pogroms and humiliations in his area. These harsh and ancient *dhimma* restrictions persisted even up to the present time to some degree, in some Arab communities, and their spirit—if not their letter—continued generally throughout the Arab world.<sup>16</sup>

Throughout the centuries, the Jews were the first to suffer persecution in times of economic turmoil or political upheaval,<sup>17</sup> and the cumulative effect of the sporadic mass murders left their mark on the Jews even in periods of relative

\*The edict set by the Sultan of Morocco in 1884 varies somewhat, as did most interpretations of the *dhimma* law. His restrictions also included insistence that Jews work on their sacred day of rest; carry heavy burdens on their backs; work without pay; clean foul places and latrines; part with merchandise at half price; lend beasts of burden without payment; accept false coinage instead of negotiable currency; take fresh skins in return for tanned hides; hold their beds and furniture at the disposal of government guests, etc.

quiescence. In Syria, the infamous blood libel of 1840 brought about the death, torture, and pillage of countless Jews falsely accused of murdering a priest and his servant to collect the blood for Passover matzoth!<sup>18</sup> Before the Jews were finally vindicated of this slander, word of the charges had spread far from Damascus, causing terror in numerous Jewish communities.

The scurrilous blood libel has not been purged from Arab literature, however. In fact, the Arabs seem in the past two decades to have seized upon this primitive old calumny with renewed vigor. In 1962 the UAR (Egyptian) Ministry of Education published "Human Sacrifices in the Talmud" as one of a series of official "national" books. Bearing on its cover the symbol of the Egyptian Institute for Publications, this modern book is a reprint of an 1890 work by a writer in Cairo.<sup>19</sup> In the introduction, the editor shares his discovery: "conclusive evidence . . . that this people permits bloodshed and makes it a religious obligation laid down by the Talmud." The editor's description becomes more vile as it purports to become more explicit regarding the "Indictment."<sup>20</sup>

Two years later, in 1964, a professor at the University of Damascus published his own affirmation of the nineteenth-century blood libel, stating that the wide attention given the story served a valid purpose: to warn mothers against letting their children out late at night, "lest the Jew . . . come and take their blood for the purpose of making matzot for Passover."<sup>21</sup> Still another version, also published in the 1960s, "The Danger of World Jewry to Islam and Christianity," alleges that thousands of children and others disappear each year, and all of them are victims of guess who?<sup>22</sup>

They've even dramatized the infamous canard for the theater. In November 1973, a former minister in the Egyptian Foreign Service published a play based on the 1840 blood libel in Damascus—replete with gory descriptions—in a widely circulated Egyptian weekly.<sup>23</sup> During the same month the late Saudi Arabian King Faisal stressed the importance of the blood libel of 1840 in Damascus as a requisite to understanding "Zionist crime."<sup>24</sup> And in 1982, shortly after Israel transferred its much coveted Sinai territory to Egypt for a more coveted peace, the Egyptian press (government-run) dredged up inflammatory variations on the horrible theme. Two examples: ". . . The Israelis are Israelis and their favorite drink is Arab blood. . . ."<sup>25</sup> and "A Jew . . . drinks their blood for a few coins."<sup>26</sup>

The departure of European colonists in the twentieth century brought into being a highly nationalistic group of Arab states, which increasingly perceived their Jews as a new political threat.\* The previous Arab Muslim ambivalence—an ironic possessive attitude toward "their" Jews, coupled with the omnipresent implementing of the harsh *dhimma* law—was gradually replaced by a completely demoniacal and negative stereotype of the Jew. Traditional Koranic slurs against the Jews were implemented to incite hostility toward the Jewish national move-

\*The Arab reaction seems not dissimilar to that of a Ku Klux Klansman in the United States, responding vehemently to the question I once asked about his attitude toward integration: "They're our 'Niggers,' and we've taken good care of 'em, but I'll be damned if I'll let 'em take over. . . . Our 'Niggers' don't really wanna vote, y'know." (The epithet is his.) *Chicago Daily News*, April 10, 1965.

ment. The Nazi anti-Semitism in the 1930s and 1940s flourished in this already receptive climate.

Although Arabs themselves frequently speak of “anti-Semitism” as synonymous with anti-Jewishness—before the 1947 partition, for example, Egyptian UN Representative Haykal Pasha warned the General Assembly that partition would bring “anti-Semitism” worse than Hitler’s<sup>27</sup>—frequently they justify or obscure an anti-Jewish action by saying, “How can I be anti-Semitic? I’m a Semite myself.” According to Professor S. D. Goitein, “the word ‘semitic’ was coined by an 18th-century German scholar, concerned with linguistics. . . . The idea of a Semitic race was invented and cultivated in particular in order to emphasize the inalterable otherness and alien character of the Jews living in Europe.”<sup>28</sup>

Another eminent Arabist, Bernard Lewis, dates the invention of the term “anti-Semitism” to 1862, although “the racial ideology that gave rise to it was already well established in the early 19th century. Instead of—or as well as—an unbeliever . . . the Jew was now labeled as a member of an alien and inferior race. . . .”<sup>29</sup>

As early as 1940 the Mufti of Jerusalem requested the Axis powers to acknowledge the Arab right “to settle the question of Jewish elements in Palestine and other Arab countries in accordance with the national and racial interests of the Arabs and along lines similar to those used to solve the Jewish question in Germany and Italy.”<sup>30\*</sup>

Hitler’s crimes against the Jews have frequently been justified in Arab writings and pronouncements. In the 1950s, Minister Anwar Sadat published an open letter to Hitler, hoping he was still alive and sympathizing with his cause. Important Arab writers and political figures have said Hitler was “wronged and slandered, for he did no more to the Jews than Pharaoh, Nebuchadnezzar, the Romans, the Byzantines, Titus, Mohammed and the European peoples who slaughtered the Jews before him.” Or that Hitler wanted to “save . . . the world from this malignant evil. . . .”<sup>31</sup>

Arab defense of the Nazis’ extermination of the Jews has persisted: prominent Egyptian writer Anis Mansour wrote in 1973 that “People all over the world have come to realize that Hitler was right, since Jews . . . are bloodsuckers . . . interested in destroying the whole world which has . . . expelled them and despised them for centuries . . . and burnt them in Hitler’s crematoria . . . one million . . . six millions. Would that he had finished it!”<sup>32</sup>

Mansour alleged at another time that the vicious medieval blood libel was historical truth: “the Jews confessed” that they had killed the children and used their blood; thus he justifies persecution and pogroms of “the wild beasts.”<sup>33</sup> That article was followed by a “report,” after Mansour returned from representing Egypt at the Fortieth International PEN (writers’) Conference in 1975 in Vienna. In it, Mansour continued the theme: “The Jews are guilty” for Nazism; “. . . the world can only curse the Jews . . . The Jews have only themselves to blame.”

\*For a discussion of Jewish-Arab relations in Palestine, see Chapter 9; additional information on the Arab leadership’s sympathies is found in Chapter 17.

Mansour was angry that “the whole world” protested “all because” a “teacher” told the Jewish waiter serving him in Vienna that “. . . Hitler committed a grave error in not doing away with more of you. . . .”<sup>34</sup>

It was from such a climate that the Jews had escaped, seeking refuge in Israel.

## Yemen

The entire Yemenite community of Jews, who swarmed almost 50,000 strong into Israel via “Operation Magic Carpet,” believed that “King David” Ben-Gurion was actually the Messiah calling them home. Jewish settlements in Yemen existed more than 2,000 years ago,<sup>35</sup> and some claim the Jews’ presence there has been longer—from the Jews’ Babylonian captivity and the fall of the First Temple in 586 B.C. Yemenite Jewry fled to Israel from what historian S. D. Goitein described as “the worst aspect” of the Arab mistreatment of Jews. A Yemenite law decreed that fatherless Jewish children under thirteen be taken from their mothers and raised in Muslim homes as Muslims.

“Children were torn away from their mothers,” according to Goitein. Despite attempts of family and friends to adopt the children secretly, “very often the efforts . . . were not successful. . . . To my mind, this law, which was enforced with new vigor about fifty years ago, more than anything else impelled the Yemenite Jews to quit that country to which they were very much attached. . . . The result was that many families arrived in Israel with one or more of their children lost to them . . . some widows . . . [were] bereaved in this way of all their offspring.”<sup>36</sup>

Persecution was constant and extreme—stoning Jews, an “age-old” custom, according to “an old doctor of Muslim law,”<sup>37</sup> was still common tradition at the time of the 1948 exodus—although the bearability of life throughout the centuries of Muslim domination often depended upon whether the rule was Turkish or Arab.

The Yemenite Jews’ situation changed drastically for the worse in the seventh century, with the Arab conquest. After the Jews who lived in what is now part of Saudi Arabia<sup>38</sup> were either expelled by the Prophet Muhammad or obliterated, Jewish communities in the rest of the conquered Muslim territory fell under the new infidel status.<sup>39</sup> The Jews of Yemen were subjected to the severest possible interpretation of the Charter of Omar, plus carefully devised brutal improvisations on the *dhimmi* theme. For about four centuries, the Jews suffered under the fierce fanatical edict of the most intolerant of all Islamic sects.<sup>40</sup>

In the twelfth century the conditions were so punishing, and formerly repugnant forced conversion to Islam was so eagerly sought by terrified Jews, that the “Great Rambam”—the venerated Rabbi Moses Maimonides—was prompted to write the famous “Yemen Epistle,”<sup>41</sup> in which he commiserated with Yemen’s Jewry and besought them to keep the faith.

The eighteenth century was one of almost unbearable burden, bringing the

1724 famine, in addition to insidiously varied humiliations and violence. Fanatical rulers ordered synagogues destroyed, and public prayers were forbidden. Many thousands attempted to follow "false messiah" Shabbetai Zevi on his pilgrimage to the Holy Land, but they were attacked on the way, and the Chief Rabbi of San'a was "tortured to death."<sup>42</sup>

One overlord decided to rid the Arabian peninsula of Jews by offering them a choice of religious conversion or banishment; the overwhelming number chose to leave the capitals and head for the Red Sea coast. Those who had not died of starvation, thirst, or illness during the torturous journey—for many, on foot—were allowed to settle in a town called Mauza', where more casualties were caused by the cruelties of the climate. The Jews' exile at Mauza' was terminated by decree in 1781,<sup>43</sup> according to one report, because the exiled Jews had been the only craftsmen in the country and their work was keenly missed.

The latter eighteenth century, with its more tolerant ruler, allowed Yemen's Jews brief respite from both hunger and humiliation. One Jew was even accorded an official position as Minister of Currency—he was imprisoned for two years by his ruler, however, after many years of prominence.

A visit was paid to Yemen in 1762 by a Danish-German explorer who described life in the Jewish ghetto under the "improved" circumstances of the eighteenth century:

Completely shut off from the city of San'a is the Jewish village . . . where 2,000 Jews live in great contempt. Nevertheless they are the best artisans, potters, goldsmiths, engravers, minters and others. By day they work in their shops in San'a, but by night they must withdraw to their isolated dwellings. . . . Shortly before my arrival, twelve of the fourteen synagogues of the Jews were torn down, and all their beautiful houses wrecked. . . .<sup>44</sup>

Throughout the nineteenth century Jews were victims of hunger and of Arab attacks on the ghetto, which resulted in murder and pillage.

In the middle of the nineteenth century a writer from Jerusalem described the Yemenite Jews' plight during the two years he lived with them:

The Jews who have been living in Yemen for many hundreds, perhaps even thousands of years, are now in a position of inferiority, and are oppressed by a people which declares itself holy and pious but which is very brutal, barbarous and hard-hearted. The natives consider the Jew unclean, but his blood for them is not unclean. They lay claims to all his belongings, and if he is unwilling, they employ force. . . . The Jews . . . live outside the town in dark dwellings like prison cells or caves out of fear for murderers and robbers. Whoever has any money or valuables conceals them in the earth or in such secret holes as they have in their little houses so that nobody may see them. . . .

It is particularly bad for the Jew if he is himself accused of a crime. There is then no mercy. For the least offense, he is sentenced to outrageous fines, which he is quite unable to pay. In case of non-payment, he is put into chains and cruelly beaten every day. Before the punishment is inflicted, the Cadi addresses him in gentle tones and urges him to change his faith and obtain a share

of all the glory of this world and of the world beyond. His refusal is again regarded as penal obstinacy. On the other hand, it is not open to the Jew to prosecute a Muslim, as the Muslim by right of law can dispose of the life and the property of the Jew, and it is only to be regarded as an act of magnanimity if the Jews are allowed to live. The Jew is not admissible as a witness, nor has his oath any validity.<sup>45</sup>

Beginning at the turn of the century, the Yemenite Jews were even prohibited from fleeing the country to escape persecution. "Those who live in a country which discriminates against them most blatantly want to have, at least, one right: to leave that country," historian Goitein believes. But the Shi'ite Muslims in Yemen adhered to the "strictly inner Islamic legal basis"—that "a Jew, a 'protected' subject, was not allowed" into "enemy territory"—which to the Shi'ites meant any region ruled by non-Shi'ites. The few who managed to emigrate "had to leave everything behind," and "for the great masses . . . the old prohibition was a source of great suffering."<sup>46</sup>

In one town, however, the Jews became the center of a power struggle between two Arab tribes: as a result, the town's ruler loosened Jewish restrictions to the extent that some Jews became wealthy and a few were allowed to have houses even higher than the Muslims'.<sup>47</sup>

There have always been conflicting reports on the number of the Jews in Yemen, but because famine often struck the Yemenite Jews, death through starvation was "a common event." (Thus, even though the birth rate was high and polygamy occurred among the Yemenite Jewish community, the rate of natural increase was kept down in Yemen, into the twentieth century.) One visitor wrote, "Nothing moves the Jewish traveler so much as the sight of many places where all of the Jewish inhabitants have been carried off by the last famine. The average rate of mortality is terrible."<sup>48</sup>

A teacher was sent from Beirut in 1910 to assess the constant reports of travail for the Yemenite Jews. He noted that, after

more than a week, I have made myself acquainted with the life of the Jews in all its phases. . . . They are exceedingly unfortunate. . . . If they are abused, they listen in silence as though they had not understood; if they are attacked by an Arab boy with stones, they flee.<sup>49</sup>

There were some Yemenite Jews who fled on foot over the desert in pilgrimage to the Holy Land, particularly during the nineteenth century, and into the twentieth. One group of Jews decided to sell their possessions for half their worth, and a movement to the Holy Land commenced. "In 1912 alone, over 2,000 Yemenite Jews disembarked at Jaffa." They kept embarking on the hazardous pilgrimage, even during World War II, and many had to disguise themselves as Arabs to avoid being intercepted and imprisoned. Often it was the Jewish children who unwittingly exposed the disguise—when the Arabs tested them by offering *un-kosher* food (not edible by Jewish Orthodox law).<sup>50</sup>

As late as 1946, an American missionary reported that a Yemenite Jewish

mother and son had been put into chains for accepting a ride in the American's jeep.<sup>51</sup>

Nearly 50,000 traditionally religious Yemenites, who had never seen a plane, were airlifted to Israel in 1949 and 1950.<sup>52</sup> Since the Book of Isaiah promised, "They shall mount up with wings, as eagles," the Jewish community boarded the "eagles" contentedly; to the pilot's consternation some of them lit a bonfire aboard, to cook their food!

## Aden

"When I stood in the ancient graveyard of the Jewish community of Aden—from which tombstones 700 and 800 years old had been taken away to museums, and looked toward the natural harbor where ships of local design were still being built, it occurred to me that King Solomon's ships, not very different from those I saw there, might have anchored nearby. . . ."<sup>53</sup>

"Archeological evidence puts us on firmer ground," Goitein tells us. A room in Beth She'arim, Palestine, "dating from approximately 200 A.D. . . . was reserved for Jews from . . . South Arabia."<sup>54</sup>

Thus Jews are certain to have appeared in Aden in A.D. 200, and although the Jewish community seems to have eluded thorough historical documenting,<sup>55</sup> a letter yet remains, "sent by a Jewish merchant from Aden in South Arabia to Cairo about 850 years ago. In this letter he asks his business correspondent in Cairo to buy for him all kinds of goods for the needs of his household."<sup>56</sup>

That there were prominent Jewish merchants in Aden in the early twelfth century hints at a difference in opportunities between the Jews of Yemen and Aden at that period.<sup>57</sup> Documentary evidence exists that some of the Aden Jewish community was substantial enough so that they could contribute "ample donations to a well-known Spanish poet" in the thirteenth century.<sup>58</sup>

Still, the general quality of life for Aden's Jews during the Arab reign was hardly "golden." The proximity to Yemen and the same dominating power indicate that Jews of Aden suffered conditions of humiliation under Muslim rule similar to those of the Yemenite Jews "until Aden was conquered by the British in 1839."<sup>59</sup>

Through the middle of the nineteenth century, most of Aden's Jewry continued to languish under the intermittent persecution and degradation that was the lot of the Jews in that area of Arabia. The exceptions were the "few Jews in Hadramaut and its environs (an area which was known as the Protectorate of Aden)." The Jews in the Protectorate paid their traditional head taxes to the Arabs but in return they were given "more comfortable conditions" than the hapless Jews of Yemen and of the rest of Aden.<sup>60</sup>

In twentieth-century Aden,

The Jews . . . always knew that they were living on sufferance; the local Arab population never harbored anything but hatred towards them. They (the Jews)

remembered that “light” pogrom in 1933, when a few people were beaten up and wounded outside the Jewish Quarter, when there was some stoning and when a number of rioters entered a Jewish house and did some looting.

That reminiscence of the 1933 anti-Jewish uprising in Aden was contained in an eye-witness “memorandum” which described the “Disaster of the Jews of Aden,” the Arab-led mass murder, pillage, and destruction that came down on Aden’s Jews in December 1947.<sup>61</sup>

An Englishman who was in Aden from 1931, and was appointed Aden’s governor in 1951, later described a traditional enmity between Arabs and Jews that preceded the Palestine partition by decades. His report contradicted others, which blamed the bloody pogrom in 1947 on outside factors and incitement in behalf of the Palestinian Arabs.<sup>62</sup> Sir Tom Hickinbotham wrote that

The Jews are disliked by the Arabs whom they fear. . . . Therefore, we are always liable to have trouble between the Arabs and the Jews which might well spread to the Hindu community. . . .

[The Jews], generally speaking, kept very much to themselves, were self-effacing and their contacts with the Arabs were reasonably good. . . . The Arabs consider that the Jews are their social inferiors and, provided they keep their own place, or what the Arabs consider to be their place, there is no trouble at all and the two communities may live side by side in peace for years; but as soon as the Jews tended to forget that they were Jews and began to assert themselves as men, then there was always a likelihood of serious trouble.<sup>63</sup>

The British Commissioner of Police in Aden testified in 1947 that “Since I arrived in Aden there has been a steady growing antagonism between Jews and Arabs . . . shown by many petty assaults and by children throwing stones at each other.”<sup>64</sup>

The antagonism that was evident in 1933 and more so in 1942 was inflamed by anti-Jewish broadcasts from Egypt just before the partition of Palestine. The messages of hate were relayed in public meeting places and helped to incite Arabs against Jews in Aden.<sup>65</sup>

In addition to the Egyptian broadcasts, “Orders [were] issued by the Arab League to arrange strikes and protests against the decision to partition Palestine,” and rumors were spread that the Jews had been killing Arabs.<sup>66</sup>

The pogrom that erupted on December 2, 1947, was devastating—82 Jews were murdered and 76 wounded; 106 out of the 170 existing Jewish shops in Aden were robbed bare and eight were partially emptied. Four synagogues were “burnt to the ground” and 220 Jewish houses were burned and looted or damaged.<sup>67</sup>

There were a few wealthier Jewish families who lived in an area called “Steamer Point,” where passengers disembarked from the large liners.<sup>68</sup> But after the 1947 massacre most of Aden’s Jews were isolated for their own security and “for months did not dare to venture out of” the Jewish Quarter. A visiting Jewish official reported in January 1949 that “one felt that the pogrom had taken place



not a year ago but a week ago . . . the Jews still live in a state of tension and anxiety. . . . the Jews still erect barricades at night.”<sup>69</sup>

Many thousands of the Aden Jews boarded the “wings of eagles” for Israel along with the Yemenite refugees.<sup>70</sup> In 1958 some were victimized by murder and looting, and those diehard Jews who had remained in Aden after the 1947 massacre were alarmed.<sup>71</sup>

A visitor at the time of the 1958 riots observed,

It would seem that the problem of this Jewish community is not where to turn, but when to turn. They might be wise to remember that “he who hesitates is lost.” They would not be the first Jewish community that waited too long.<sup>72</sup>

The remnant of the Jewish community in Aden was victimized again after the 1967 Six-Day War. Murder, looting, new destruction to the synagogues—Jews were finally evacuated with the help of the British, when they discovered the Arabs were planning to massacre what remained of the Jewish community. The Jewry of Aden became virtually “the community that was.”<sup>73</sup>

## Iraq

The Jews of Iraq, too, fled to Israel—between 1949 and 1952 alone, more than 123,000<sup>74</sup> Iraqi Jews escaped or were forced to flee to Israel and to leave their assets and communal holdings behind.

The Iraqi Jews took pride in their distinguished Jewish community, with its history of scholarship and dignity. Jews had prospered in what was then Babylonia for twelve hundred years before the Muslim conquest in A.D. 634;<sup>75</sup> it was not until the ninth century that *dhimma* laws such as the yellow patch, heavy head tax, and residence restrictions were enforced. Capricious and extreme oppression under some Arab caliphs and Mamluks brought taxation amounting to expropriation in A.D. 1000, and in 1333 the persecution culminated in pillage and destruction of the Baghdad synagogues. In 1776, there was a slaughter of Jews at Basra, and the bitterness of anti-Jewish measures taken by Turkish-Muslim rulers in the eighteenth century caused many Jews to flee.<sup>76</sup>

Just after the turn of the present century, the British vice-consul in Mosul wrote a report that illustrated the nature of the “traditional relationship” between Muslim and Jew in a less volatile moment:

The attitude of the Moslems toward the Christians and Jews, to whom as stated above, they are in a majority of ten to one, is that of a master towards slaves whom he treats with a certain lordly tolerance so long as they keep their place. Any sign of pretension to equality is promptly repressed. It is often noticed in the streets that almost any Christian submissively makes way even for a Moslem child. Only a few days ago the writer saw two respectable looking, middle-aged Jews walking in a garden. A small Moslem boy, who could not have been more than 8 years old, passed by and, as he did so, picked up a large stone and threw it at them—

and then another—with the utmost nonchalance, just as a small boy elsewhere might aim at a dog or bird. The Jews stopped and avoided the aim, which was a good one, but made no further protest.<sup>77</sup>

There was a particularly fearsome period just before the British Mandate; with the outbreak of the First World War, Jews were forced to finance the military expenses of the army stationed nearby. If they refused, they were tortured, and if they hid, they were caught and hanged.<sup>78</sup> The Jews of Iraq actually welcomed the Arab revolt against the Turkish governors, and they rejoiced after the war when the state of Iraq was established under British Mandate.<sup>79</sup>

Some Jews were allowed to hold official posts; under the British Mandate Iraqi Jews were supposed to be treated as “equals.” Many were writers, traders, and physicians, and some became quite wealthy through commerce and banking.

Near the end of the British reign, Hitler’s accession to power began, and by the time Iraq declared independence in 1932, the German minister in Baghdad had organized an efficient and influential power base for Nazi propaganda.<sup>80</sup> Within the first year of Iraq’s sovereignty, the new government benignly pronounced that minorities would continue to have some measure of freedom.

Almost immediately afterward, in August 1933, the Iraqi army massacred the Assyrians and the Jews began to feel increased foreboding. The *London Daily News* reported<sup>81</sup> that “. . . when the Iraq army returned after the weekend [following the Assyrian atrocity], not one Christian or Jew was seen on the streets.” By now the increasingly violent demonstrations over the “Palestine problem” added to deteriorating conditions for the Jewish community; many Jews were murdered by agitated mobs,<sup>82</sup> nitric acid was thrown by terrorists upon Jews in the street, and bombs were flung into synagogues.<sup>83</sup>

In 1941 the violence exploded into a bloody *farhud*—massacre—of the Jews, with the police openly participating in the attack. The investigating committee appointed by the Iraqi government determined that “all these attacks were carried out by the army with the assistance of some civilians”; the massacre was executed “without the police arresting anyone or protecting the Jews,” and “large British forces stood at the gates of the city, none of them lifting a finger.”<sup>84</sup> “Judaism” was “a threat to mankind,” the Iraqi Minister of Justice declared.<sup>85</sup>

According to the eminent Iraqi-born historian Professor Elie Kedourie, “. . . once the disorders started, . . . the soldiers and the police, debauched by Nazi propaganda, and bereft of leadership, ran amuck and themselves began the attacks on the Jews.” None of the officials “were willing to assume the responsibility. . . .”

Cowardice was universal. . . . As for the police, the report of the investigating committee pertinently pointed out that they had no need to seek orders from their superiors for firing on looters and murderers caught in *flagrante delicto*. The director-general of police and his assistants and the *mutasarrif* forgot or feigned to forget, the report declared, that every member of the police had the right to fire in such circumstances.<sup>86</sup>

The number killed is uncertain—estimates range between 150 and “hundreds,”<sup>87</sup> but one member of the investigating committee “later told the chronicler Hasani (who had the story confirmed by the then-Baghdad chief of police) that the true figure was nearer six hundred but that the government was anxious for the lower figure only to appear in the official report.”<sup>88</sup> Hundreds more were wounded, and more than a thousand Jewish-owned houses and businesses looted and destroyed.

From that time, Arab documents chronicle a systematic attempt by the government, using official means, to destroy the Iraqi Jewish community.<sup>89</sup> Jews suffered indiscriminate torture, imprisonment without charge, and relentless persecutions. When Iraq joined the Arab war against Israel’s independence, in May 1948, government terror increased; Jews, who had been restricted to some degree from travel, now were forbidden to leave the country, and many fortunes were extorted or confiscated. Despite the law, thousands escaped illegally by paying heavy bribes.

After Israel’s 1948 victory and official recognition of Jewish statehood, Nuri Said, fourteen times Prime Minister of Iraq, who “ruled the country in the 1950s irrespective of whether or not Nuri headed the cabinet himself,”<sup>90</sup> recommended a final Jewish solution for Iraq. Nuri Said proposed to the British Ambassador in Jordan at that time, Sir Alec Kirkbride, that “the majority of the Jewish community in Iraq” should be forcibly evicted “in army lorries escorted by armoured cars . . . to the Jordanian-Israel Frontier.” There the “Iraqi Jews” would be ordered to “cross the line.”<sup>91</sup>

Kirkbride later assessed the fate of Iraqi Jews, had Nuri Said’s plan been enacted: “Either the Iraqi Jews would have been massacred or their Iraqi guards would have had to shoot other Arabs to protect the lives of their charge.”<sup>92</sup> The likelihood of the Jews’ protection by the Iraqi guards was remote, considering the precedent established by the police and army participation in the 1941 massacre. Nuri Said’s solution, then, was unambiguous, as was the temper of Iraq toward its Jews.

Zionism became a capital crime, and Jews were publicly hanged in the center of Baghdad, with an enthusiastic mob as audience. Although no laws authorized the confiscation of Jewish property in Iraq before 1950,<sup>93</sup> the Jews were stripped of millions of dollars through economic discrimination, “voluntary donations” appropriated by the government, and other subterfuges.<sup>94</sup>

An Egyptian journal<sup>95</sup> reported in 1948 that all Iraqi Jews who went to Palestine and did not return would be tried in absentia as criminals. Those who were tried in absentia were sentenced to hang or serve extended prison sentences. There had been more than 130,000 Jews in Iraq in 1947, 100,000 of them living in or near Baghdad. Although some part of the Jews’ property had already been expropriated, the bulk still remained in Jewish hands, while vast amounts were taken by officials who participated in illegal escapes.

Perhaps because of the desperate financial condition of the Iraqi government, Jewish “emigration” was legalized—upon confiscation of property and perma-

ment loss of citizenship. In 1950, Iraq enacted a law that allowed Jews to "leave Iraq for good."<sup>96</sup> The Jews left their vast accumulated holdings behind, and within the first three years of the law, most of them were flown to Israel, with the Iraqi government taking "a handsome share of the profits" produced by the flights.<sup>97</sup>

Thus, the Jews—who, according to Nuri Said, "have always been and will forever be a source of evil and mischief"—had largely been forced from Iraq.<sup>98</sup>

Between 1969 and 1973 at least seventeen Jews were hanged in a public square, and twenty-six others were "slaughtered" in their homes or in Iraqi prisons.<sup>99</sup> As of 1982, most of Iraq's Jewry had found refuge in Israel, and several thousand had found sanctuary elsewhere.

## Egypt

In 1948, 75,000 Jews lived in Egypt, in a community dating back to before the Babylonian captivity.<sup>100</sup> After the Arab conquest, Jews in Egypt, as in other Arab countries, lived at the whim of erratic Arab sovereignty. One Arab caliph invoked *sunna* ("the Muslim term for customs ascribed to Mohammed") to tyrannize the Jews and Christians in Cairo in the ninth and tenth centuries.<sup>101</sup> Under the caliphs of Baghdad<sup>102</sup> life was restrictive at times, and generally unpredictable.

One caliph, al-Hakim of the Fatimids, devised particularly insidious humiliations for the Jews in his attempt to perform what he deemed his role as "Redeemer of Mankind." First the Jews were forced to wear miniature golden calf images around their necks, as though they still worshiped the Golden Calf. But the Jews refused to convert. Next they wore bells, and after that, six-pound wooden blocks were hung around their necks. In fury at his failure, the caliph had the Cairo Jewish Quarter destroyed, along with its Jewish residents, in 1012.<sup>103</sup>

The rule of the Ayyubids (1171–1250) continued the demeaning *dhimma* laws,<sup>104</sup> and during the thirteenth-century reign of the Burji Mamluks, Jews were particularly sought out for attack, with the result that the Jewish population "greatly declined."<sup>105</sup> At the end of the thirteenth century, the poll tax, or head tax, was "reintroduced in Egypt, where it had fallen into oblivion,"<sup>106</sup> and in the fourteenth century Jews were subject to "anti-dhimmi" mob "riots." With the reign of "mainly" Circassian-born Mamluks, "the prevailing attitude . . . was more severe than ever."<sup>107</sup> In the sixteenth century, a religious fanatic wreaked terror among the Jews in Cairo. "He regarded himself as a religious and moral reformer and whipped and mulcted the Jews . . . in Cairo, where the Mamluk sultan Kanush al-Ghauri was then in power."<sup>108</sup>

From even those scholars who have documented the Arab persecution of Jews, there are accounts of a "flourishing" Jewish community in Egypt under the Ottoman rule.<sup>109</sup> Yet Edward Lane's definitive report of the first half of the nineteenth century, which asserts that "the Jews . . . are under a less oppressive government in Egypt than in any other country of the Turkish empire,"<sup>110</sup> puts

the Jews' role in general, and the relatively "flourishing" Egyptian Jewry, into a somewhat more realistic perspective by that report's description of Egypt's "less oppressed" Jews:

They [the Jews] are held in the utmost contempt and abhorrence by the Muslims in general . . . the Jews are detested by the Muslims far more than are the Christians. Not long ago, they used often to be jostled in the streets of Cairo, and sometimes beaten merely for passing on the right hand of a Muslim. At present, they are less oppressed; but still they scarcely ever dare to utter a word of abuse when reviled or beaten unjustly by the meanest Arab or Turk; for many a Jew has been put to death upon a false and malicious accusation of uttering disrespectful words against the Kur-an or the Prophet. It is common to hear an Arab abuse his jaded ass, and, after applying to him various opprobrious epithets, end by calling the beast a Jew.

A Jew has often been sacrificed to save a Muslim, as happened in the following case.—A Turkish soldier, having occasion to change some money, received from the seyrefee (or money-changer), who was a Muslim, some Turkish coins called 'adleeyehs, reckoned at sixteen piasters each. These he offered to a shopkeeper, in payment for some goods; but the latter refused to allow him more than fifteen piasters to the 'adleeyeh; telling him that the Básha had given orders, many days before, that this coin should no longer pass for sixteen. The soldier took back the 'adleeyehs to the seyrefee, and demanded an additional piaster to each; which was refused: he therefore complained to the Básha himself, who, enraged that his orders had been disregarded, sent for the seyrefee. This man confessed that he had been guilty of an offence; but endeavored to palliate it by asserting that almost every money-changer in the city had done the same, and that he had received 'adleeyehs at the same rate. The Básha, however, disbelieving him or thinking it necessary to make a public example, gave a signal with his hand, intimating that the delinquent should be beheaded. The interpreter of the court, moved with compassion for the unfortunate man, begged to the Básha to spare his life. "This man," said he, "had done no more than all the money-changers of the city; I, myself, no longer than yesterday, received 'adleeyehs at the same rate." "From whom?" exclaimed the Básha. "From a Jew," answered the interpreter, "with whom I have transacted business for many years." The Jew was brought, and sentenced to be hanged; while the Muslim was pardoned. The interpreter, in the greatest of distress of mind, pleaded earnestly for the life of the poor Jew: but the Básha was inexorable: it was necessary that an example should be made; and it was deemed better to take the life of a Jew than that of a more guilty Muslim. I saw the wretched man hanging at a window of a public fountain which forms part of a mosque in the main street of the city.\* One end of the rope being passed over one of the upper bars of the grated window, he was hauled up; and as he hung close against the window, he was enabled, in some slight degree, to support himself by his feet against the lower bars; by which his suffering was dreadfully protracted. His relations offered large sums of money for his pardon; but the only

\*"It is surprising that Muslims should hang a Jew against a window of a mosque, when they consider him so unclean a creature that his blood would defile the sword. For this reason a Jew, in Egypt, is never beheaded."

favour they could purchase was that of having his face turned towards the window, so as not to be seen by the passengers. He was a man much respected by all who knew him (Muslims, of course, excepted); and he left a family in a very destitute state; but the interpreter who was the unintended cause of his death contributed to their support.<sup>111</sup>

One historian has documented persistent blood libel persecutions throughout nineteenth-century Egypt—six separate instances between 1870 and 1892 alone, preceded by others—in 1844 in Cairo, where “Muslims . . . despised and sometimes abused the Jews,” and even in such cosmopolitan communities as Alexandria, in 1869.<sup>112</sup> That such acts “undermined the confidence of the Egyptian Jews” was the cautious conclusion drawn by the definitive historian of the subject.

Among the populous Muslim peasant (*fellahin*) community, the Jews were not better off. A Britisher long connected with the *fellahin* through his Egyptian government job, reported in 1888 that “Armenians, Syrians, Circassians, Jews, are all hated as well as the Turk himself. I think it would be difficult to discover which particular race is most hated (by the Egyptian *fallahin*) [*sic*] but I fancy that the Jew or Armenian would take the palm. I mention Jews because one of the most powerful and disliked Pashas . . . is spoken [of] by many as a Jew, and always in terms of disgust.”<sup>113</sup>

In 1890 an Egyptian version of the false charge “documenting” the “Human Sacrifices in the Talmud” was published in Cairo.<sup>114</sup> Anti-Jewish “agitation” and persecution of the Jews in Port Said was frequent between the 1880s and 1908, when a Jewish leader in Cairo wrote of concern for the “insecurity of Port Said’s Jews.”<sup>115</sup>

In 1926 the first Egyptian Nationality Code established that Egyptian citizenship would be offered only to those who belonged “racially to the majority of the population of a country whose language is Arabic or whose religion is Islam.”<sup>116</sup> From the late 1930s, Egyptian nationalism, Arab unity against Zionists, and Nazi propaganda fused with traditional prejudice to ignite violently against the Jews.<sup>117</sup> Often the destruction victimized other infidels. One such major incident was the burning of synagogues and churches, and other communal buildings belonging to non-Muslims.<sup>118</sup>

Beginning in the forties, many Jews were killed or injured in organized anti-Jewish riots, putting into fearsome perspective the 1946 report that “the general position of the Jews in Egypt is beyond comparison better than any [Arab and Muslim] country so far. . . .”<sup>119</sup> Jews suffered extensive economic losses when the Egyptians passed a law that largely precluded Jews from employment; the government confiscated much Jewish property and “wrecked” the economic condition of the Jews within a few months.<sup>120</sup> In the days following the November 1947 vote to partition Palestine, Jews in Cairo and Alexandria were threatened with death, their houses were looted, and synagogues were attacked.<sup>121</sup>

Anti-Jewish riots were rampant in 1948. According to an eyewitness account,

in one seven-day period, 150 Jews were murdered or seriously wounded.<sup>122</sup> Perhaps the letter to the editor of an Egyptian newspaper from a Muslim provides an insight to the hazards of Jewish life then:

It seems that most people in Egypt are unaware of the fact that, among the Moslem Egyptians, there are some of white skin. Every time I take the tramway I hear people around me saying, while pointing at me with their fingers, "A Jew . . . a Jew. . . ." I have been beaten more than once because of this. This is why I beg you kindly to publish my photo, specifying that I am not a Jew and that my name is Adham Moustafa Ghaleb.<sup>123</sup>

With the outbreak of the 1948 war, Egyptian Jews were barred from leaving Egypt, whether for Israel or elsewhere. Then, early in August 1949, the ban was abruptly lifted, and much sequestered Jewish property was returned.

From August until November of 1949, more than 20,000 of Egypt's 75,000 Jews fled, many to Israel.<sup>124</sup> There was a brief and surprising period under the more tolerant leadership of General Muhammad Naguib, but he was overthrown by General Gamal Abdel Nasser, who authorized mass arrests and property confiscation. At the beginning of 1955 the Nasser regime hanged two Egyptian Jews as "Zionist spies," an action the Egyptian Embassy in Washington justified by distributing a pamphlet called "The Story of the Zionist Espionage in Egypt," claiming that "Zionism and Communism" both sought "world domination."<sup>125</sup> After the Sinai Campaign of 1956, thousands of Jews were interned without trial,<sup>126</sup> while still other thousands were served with deportation papers and ordered to leave within a few days; their property was confiscated, their assets frozen.<sup>127</sup>

Worldwide concern for Egypt's Jews was evidenced in 1957 by the statement issued at an international conference of Jewish organizations:

Large numbers of Jews of all nationalities have either been served with orders of expulsion or were subjected to ruthless intimidation to compel them to apply for permission to depart. Hundreds who have reached lands of refuge have testified that they were taken in shackles from prison and concentration camps to board ships. In order to ensure that this deliberate creation of a new refugee problem should not evoke protests from international public opinion, documents proving expulsion were taken away from expellees before departure. Furthermore, they were compelled to sign statements that they left voluntarily. The victims of this barbaric process were deprived of their possessions.<sup>128</sup>

The 1926 Nationality Code, with its racist tone, was "reinforced" by a 1956 version excluding "Zionists."<sup>129</sup> That law was "regulated" still further in 1958 by the Egyptian Minister of the Interior, stating in "unambiguous terms that all Jews between the ages of 10 and 65, leaving Egypt, are to be added to the list of persons who are prohibited from returning to Egypt."<sup>130</sup>

In 1964 President Gamal Abdel Nasser declared, in an interview, that Egypt still pledged allegiance to the old Nazi cause: "Our sympathy was with the Germans." Nasser gave an example of that loyalty: "The president of our Parlia-

ment, for instance, Anwar Sa'adat, was imprisoned for his sympathy with the Germans."<sup>131</sup> Anti-Jewish publications deluged Egypt—including the infamous "Protocols"—many of them circulated by the Egyptian government.<sup>132</sup> When the Six-Day War began, Jews were arrested and held in concentration camps, where they were beaten and whipped, deprived of water for days on end and forced to chant anti-Israel slogans.<sup>133</sup> By 1970, these Jews too had escaped the country. "Egypt," according to the officer in charge of an internment camp, ". . . had no place for the Jews. . . ."<sup>134</sup>

## MOROCCO

From the Maghreb, known as North Africa, more than 300,000 Jews have crowded into Israel<sup>135</sup> since 1948. Almost 250,000 of them arrived from what is now Morocco, where Jews have lived since 586 B.C. The history of the Jews under Arab rule in North Africa is turbulent and erratic. The conditions of their lives as infidels under the Charter of Omar might have been bearable under a more tolerant Arab caliph of one region, while at the same time, in another, Jews would have been under siege, or massacred.<sup>136</sup>

Practically from the beginning of the seventh-century Arab conquest, Jews were forced to live separately—in Morocco the ghetto was called *mellah*, while in Tunisia the Jewish area was a *hara*. Some "Jewish tribes" had lived separately for "reasons of convenience," in some pre-Islamic periods, but now Jewish Quarters were *imposed* by the Arab conquerors of North Africa, with their "special Maghrebi" type of Islam—the "Malakite *madhhab*, school most intolerant of non-Muslims," and "the establishment of the *tariqas*, mystical fraternities headed by religious fanatics."<sup>137</sup>

Because most of the Christian minority fled—those who had not been massacred or converted to Islam by the twelfth century<sup>138</sup>—restrictions became increasingly harsh toward the Jew. Native Jews were the sole *dhimmi* group who had neither the inclination toward conversion nor the Christian's claim to his European community's protection.<sup>139</sup> Although the *dhimma* law was amended in the eleventh century to allow a Jew to hold office—with authority limited to taking orders, not giving them—the one Jew who rose to real power in the thirteenth century was murdered with his family when he became the object of envy among his Muslim rivals.<sup>140</sup>

Despite their general misery and deprivation, some Jews managed to accumulate wealth.<sup>141</sup> However, most Jews were outcasts who suffered not only the traditional contempt of the *dhimma* code, but were subject to imaginative interpretations thereof. Slaps in the face upon payment of the head tax, bullying, and insults were everyday occurrences. Rapes and looting, burning of synagogues, ripping of sacred Torah scrolls, even murder—all were "so frequent that it is impossible to list them."<sup>142</sup>

In 1032, 6,000 Jews of Fez were murdered, and still others were "robbed of



their women and their property."<sup>143</sup> In 1146, Fez was attacked by the Almohads, leaving "one hundred thousand persons killed." Marrakesh suffered similarly, when an unbelievable "one hundred twenty thousand" were slaughtered. According to an account of "eye-witness" reports, "On entering, . . . the Almohads tried to convert the Jews to Islam by debate and persuasion . . ." until "a new commander . . . solved the problem by a more efficient method. One hundred and fifty were killed . . . the remainder converted. . . ."<sup>144</sup>

One of the frequent violent power struggles among Muslims that especially affected the Jews, the Almohad atrocities left a deep imprint on Jews throughout North Africa. Those few Christians still in the region were "completely wiped out" by the Almohads, leaving the Jews as lone infidel survivors to suffer "the spite of the second Almohad generation."<sup>145</sup> Forced conversion to Islam, death, or exile were the choices for the survivors of the Almohad massacres.

It was the brutality of the persecution against Morocco's Jews that inspired Moses Maimonides to write the "Epistle Concerning Apostasy," in 1160, exhorting the Jews to remain true to Judaism.<sup>146</sup>

Maimonides reminded the persecuted Moroccans:

Now we are asked not to render active homage to heathenism but only to recite an empty formula which the Moslems themselves knew we utter insincerely in order to circumvent the bigot. . . . Indeed, any Jew who, after uttering the Moslem formula, wishes to observe the whole 613 precepts in the privacy of his home, may do so without hindrance. Nevertheless, if, even under these circumstances, a Jew surrenders his life for the sanctification of the name of God before men, he has done nobly and well, and his reward is great before the Lord. But if a man asks me, "Shall I be slain or utter the formula of Islam?" I answer, "utter the formula and live. . . ."<sup>147</sup>

Because of the practical advice Maimonides gave to the Jews—keep the faith while appearing to go through the motions of conversion in order to stay alive—Maimonides became a marked man among the Arabs. He had written his letter in Arabic, so that all the Jews in the area would be able to read it, but Maimonides made enemies among the Muslims, who also read it. He was warned by a Muslim poet that suspicion had "already fallen on the writer of the *Letter*."<sup>148</sup>

At the same time, his friend, Ibn Shoshan, was "attacked and hacked to death in the course of an aroused religious frenzy." Perhaps that was the moment Maimonides decided to leave his home in Fez.

Some Jews chose conversion. But those who chose to be Islamicized, rather than the inexorable alternative, found they were considered "Muslims of Jewish origin," ordered to continued demeanment and separateness. A thirteenth-century Arab historian quoted one ruler of the twelfth century who insisted that "the new Muslims" wear humiliating garments despite their conversion. Abu Yusuf Ya'qub confided,

If I were sure that these Jews have wholeheartedly embraced Islam, I should permit them to mix with the Muslims by marriage and in every other way. And

if I were certain that they are infidels, I should put the men to death, sell their children into slavery and confiscate their property in favour of the believers. But I am perplexed about the matter.<sup>149</sup>

In the latter part of the thirteenth century, "immediately before the founding of the New City [of Fez], the Muslims in the Old City rioted against the Jews."<sup>150</sup>

One of the cruelest of the "forced Muslim" deprivations was denial of the right to raise children, "who were considered Muslims from birth," while the converted parents were deemed not to be true Muslims. "According to Islamic law, a non-Muslim cannot be the natural . . . guardian of Muslim children."<sup>151</sup>

Many Jews among those who had chosen conversion over death or slavery continued to practice Judaism in secret. Whole Jewish movements were developed from their furtive but persistent fidelity to their faith.<sup>152</sup> And into modern times, the words "hypocrite" and "hypocritical" and other expressions of suspicion run throughout the modern writings of Arab theologians paraphrasing the Koran—"saying with their lips what was not in their hearts." "When they meet those who believe, they say: 'we believe.'" The converts were rarely if ever trusted despite their apparent renunciation of Judaism.<sup>153</sup>

A relatively small number, particularly Jewish scholars of the Maghreb, sought asylum and escape from the death-or-conversion dilemma in Syria, Palestine, Egypt or Italy.<sup>154</sup> But exile was generally unlikely—the North African Jews had hardly anywhere to go. In fact, it was to Morocco that many of the exiled Spanish and Portuguese Jews escaped, seeking sanctuary in 1391. Their reception was described thus: ". . . those who went to Arab countries endured untold suffering. . . . Especially the villagers rose against them—saying that they were protecting their religion—and put them in chains . . . part were impelled by their tribulations to say: Let us make a captain, and let us return. . . ." <sup>155</sup>

While Jewish martyrs had impotently defended themselves against insuperable odds, most Jews learned that the only comparative safety was to take cover in their *mellahs* until the storm had passed. Fez was the scene of repeated anti-Jewish scourges in the early fifteenth century. Jews were "plundered" by the Moors "from time to time," as "upon the death of a king." They were eventually "transferred to the new city of Fez."<sup>156</sup> But anti-Jewish propaganda was used to incite Muslim masses in a power struggle and many Jewish lives were taken. In 1465 Muslims of Fez attacked the collective Jewish community, accusing the Jews when they found a slain Muslim. "Men, women and children were killed . . . and only a few families escaped."<sup>157</sup>

The fact that "a few Jews" were appointed to the service of the Merenid rulers in the thirteenth through fifteenth centuries "ought not to be interpreted" as evidence of harmony between the Muslims and Jews; according to Norman Stillman's comprehensive study *The Jews in Arab Lands*, it was the "marginal" status of Jews in Morocco—without any "power base"—that made the Jews at

times most desirable as courtiers: because they found “no sympathy among the Muslim masses,” they were “totally dependent upon their masters.”<sup>158</sup>

The bulk of Moroccan Jewry suffered still greater humiliation and brutality when Morocco was cut off from the rest of the Maghreb.<sup>159</sup> Although a Jewish elite existed—one that achieved intellectual recognition as well as commercial and diplomatic success in the sixteenth century<sup>160</sup>—“indeed, there were few [Jewish] communities in Morocco and Algeria which escaped pillage and even massacre.”<sup>161</sup>

The “fierce persecution of 1640, called the al-Khada,” was described by a victim of another assault, in a rare ancient manuscript; this report illustrates that in rare instances of Jew insulting Muslim, the Muslims reaped vengeance upon the entire Jewish community with utter disregard for individual innocence or guilt.

. . . in Fez, . . . the persecution . . . occurred because the Jews had become so arrogant and lawless that they went to the Great Mosque, stopped up the source of the water pouring forth there and filled the marble basin from which the water poured with wine and drank there all night, and at daybreak they went away, leaving one Jew there drunk and asleep. And the Gentiles came and found him there, and they killed all the male Jews who were there, and only those escaped who changed their religion. And they killed children and women and brought Jews from another place and settled them in their stead. And during the second persecution, it was decreed that the Jews might only wear a garment made of hair. All this I found written on some faded paper, and I copied it in order that it might be remembered. I, the poorest of my clan, the smallest on earth, the lowliest of all, Moses the son of the honorable teacher and rabbi, Rabbi Jacob Gavison, may the Lord protect him and keep him alive. Tuesday, the 17th day of Tammuz (may God turn it to the good), 5449/1689.<sup>162</sup>

Down through the nineteenth century, the Jews' existence in Morocco remained insecure and tenuous, their misery often recorded by foreigners. The Jews were subjected at various times under Islam to “*such repression, restriction and humiliation as to exceed anything in Europe.*”<sup>163\*</sup>

Charles de Foucauld, a French officer who posed for two years as a rabbi in an intelligence-gathering mission, was one of many who recorded Jewish life under Arab rule in nineteenth-century Morocco:

Bled white without restraint, . . . they are the most unfortunate of men. . . . Every Jew . . . belongs body and soul to his seigneur, the sid. . . . He came into the sid's possession through inheritance, as part of his personal belongings under the rules of Moslem law. . . . If he had settled only recently in the place where he lived, then immediately on his arrival, he had to become some Moslem's Jew. Once having rendered homage, he was bound forever, he and his descendants. . . . Nothing in the world protected the Jew against his seigneur: he was entirely at his mercy.<sup>164</sup>

\*Emphasis added.

De Foucauld was not sympathetic to the Jews generally, as many of his descriptions in "Reconnaissance au Maroc" illustrate, yet his accounts are poignant—of Jewish children being snatched, slaves sold at auction, robbery followed by expulsion of whole *mellahs* and Arab enjoyment of Jewish wives; when "the *sid* was headstrong and a spendthrift, his treatment of his Jews [was] like the squandering of an inheritance."

In even the "most fortunate of *mellahs*," the miserable physical existence of Jews prevailed. Yet those regions which the Turks had captured for their empire found the Jews less desperate, occasionally affluent, and even wealthy by contrast. The wealth was accumulated through those limited occupations that Jews' political subjection would allow; although there were exceptions, the Jews became mainly occupied in trades that allowed for quick departure, and in which they could take their accumulations with them—namely, hard currency.

The brutal carnage, however, did not cease for long. Five hundred Jews were killed in Marrakesh and Fez by "Muslim mobs" in 1864.<sup>165</sup> Two decades afterward, a "savagely anti-Jewish" attack on the Jews of Demnate created a furor in the world's Jewish press.<sup>166</sup>

French rule came to Morocco in 1912, and brought welcome relief for the Jews, despite yet another pogrom in Fez that killed sixty Jews and left 10,000 homeless.<sup>167</sup> Because Moroccans were not granted French protection in the same fashion as Algerian or Tunisian Jewry, local Arab rule continued and the Jews remained *dhimmi*; nonetheless, their confusing situation—between French rule and Muslim tradition—was measurably improved.<sup>168</sup>

By 1948, Jews had become nominally involved in local politics. When Israel was established, French authorities kept vigilant watch, struggling to maintain an equilibrium between the Muslim and Jewish communities, and the Muslim sultan appealed to his subjects to restrain violence against the Jews—reminding them of the protection Morocco had always given to its Jews.<sup>169</sup>

Early in June 1948, mob violence erupted simultaneously against the Jewish communities of several towns in northern Morocco, resulting in dozens of Jewish deaths. Shortly afterward, the first major group of Moroccan Jews—30,000—fled to Israel. The fate of Morocco's Jewish community fluctuated with each strong political wind: Moroccan independence as an Arab state was declared in 1956, and although emigration to Israel was declared illegal, 70,000 more Jews managed to arrive in the Jewish state. The sultan's return was followed by appointment of Jews to major government posts—then, in 1959, Zionism became a crime. Two years later a new king ascended the throne and attempted to ease the panic among the Jews by legalizing emigration, but when he lifted the ban, another hundred thousand made their way to Israel.

Israeli victory in the 1967 war brought heightened hostilities from Muslim mobs, and by 1982 Moroccan Jewry had shrunk to less than ten percent of its former number.

## Algeria

The fate of Algeria's Jewish community was harsh; despite some historians' judgments that life for the Jews there was relatively calmer than nearby Morocco's, the two were often interchangeable. At the end of the fourteenth century, the Jews of the town of Tlemcen were persecuted to such extremes that one eminent historian states that there is no indication of "how the indigenous Jews managed to survive the period of tribulations."<sup>170</sup>

Even on the edge of the Sahara Desert, the Jews were plundered and murdered. In late-fifteenth-century Tu'-at, an "oasis" town, a sheikh incited the Muslims by accusing the Jews of "sorcery" and of the arrogance of their failing to conform to the "discriminatory" codes; many Jews were killed and others forced to wear conspicuous and peculiar garb. This took place, ironically, in 1492, when the Jews were expelled from Spain and were wearily arriving in North Africa in search of respite from persecution.<sup>171</sup>

In the sixteenth century, Tlemcen was still a site of tribulation for its Jewish community. The town was an important power base and, regardless of who the changing parties to the power struggle happened to be, the Jews were invariably attacked. Some were forcibly converted, others were sold into slavery, still others "thrown into prison" to await their redemption, which sometimes came, but in the form of "a heavy ransom."<sup>172</sup>

The Algerian Jewish community continued to bear the outrages of local "protectors," even after Algeria came under Turkish domination. In 1801 a would-be ruler promised, in return for assisting the overthrow of a rival, to give the soldiers "8 times their pay, white bread and the right to sack the Jews for three days."<sup>173</sup> In the next fifteen years, hundreds of Jews were massacred; during one episode three hundred Jews were slaughtered within a few hours, while as the result of another carnage, the Algerian Chief Rabbi was decapitated. The murder of a Jew by a soldier sparked yet another bloodletting: while desecrating a synagogue, it claimed among its victims more than a dozen Jews who were at prayer.

An American consul in Algiers from 1816 until 1828 described conditions thus:

The Jews suffer frightful oppressions. They are forbidden to offer resistance when they are maltreated by a Moslem, no matter what the nature of the violence. They do not have the right to bear arms of any sort, not even a cane. . . . A number of times when the janissaries [army] revolted, the Jews were pillaged indiscriminately; they are still tormented by the fear of similar occurrences. . . . Their lives [are] nothing but . . . debasement, oppression and outrage. I believe that today the Jews of Algiers are perhaps the most unhappy remnant of Israel.<sup>174</sup>

Recognizing the history of frequent ravages, one historian writes, nevertheless, that "Algeria was relatively peaceful"<sup>175</sup> compared with Morocco, while another asserts the Algerian government was "most oppressive."<sup>176</sup> Perhaps the

reason for what appears to be a historians' dispute can be clarified somewhat by an eminent scholar's description of the limitations imposed even upon Jews of "wealth": because "Jews were the only non-Muslims, . . . Jews were the only persons who traveled to European countries on political missions, and were agents and vice-consuls of European states. . . . At the same time, that wealthy stratum that had access to the authorities . . . did not enjoy a favored status with the Muslim rulers; they were subject to the same humiliations as their fellow Jews."<sup>177</sup> For the relatively few Jews who possessed it, wealth, that universal symbol of success, tended to be misleading, and the trappings of affluence encouraged misinterpretation, when applied as a measure of freedom for the Jews in Arab lands.

In 1830 Algeria was occupied by the French, marking the end of North Africa as a single political entity. The French colonization also signaled Algerian Jews' release from their unpredictable fate under Muslim rule. Although the French culture never was to penetrate local customs or alter religious rites,<sup>178</sup> the French were greeted by a deliriously happy Jewish community, which burst into freedom with exuberance. Jews became prime organizers in establishing schools, and in 1870 they were granted the dignity of French citizenship.

There was resentment at the new Jewish freedoms, however, and Jews once again became the target for hostile action—in Tlemcen, 1881; Oran, 1883; and Algiers, 1882, 1897, and 1898.<sup>179</sup> This time, however, the Muslims were not solely responsible; it was the European political element that incited a smear campaign in the press. Synagogues were once again desecrated, Jews were robbed and murdered, and anti-Jewish riots and massacres commenced. In 1898 anti-Jewish riots erupted in all the principal communities of Algeria.<sup>180</sup>

The ascent of Nazi Germany gave rise to new waves of anti-Semitism, which reinforced compatible Muslim attitudes of the past. "The swastika appeared everywhere."<sup>181</sup> The massacre at Constantine in 1934 left twenty-five Jews slain, dozens wounded, and Jewish property once again pillaged.<sup>182</sup> Muslims involved in the massacre were apprehended and the year afterward they came to trial, where "it became clear that the almost criminal ineffectiveness of the local authorities" had facilitated the attack.<sup>183</sup>

The appointment of a Jew as Premier of France<sup>184</sup> further inflamed the Nazi-incited Algerians. Then, in 1940, the Nazi-allied Vichy government took over. Jews were stripped of French citizenship, banned from schools and public activities, and rendered "pariahs"<sup>185</sup> through the passage of a new law.<sup>186</sup> Only the Allies' landing prevented the transfer of Algerian Jews to European death camps. It should be noted particularly, however, that Messali Hadj, the "father of the Algerian Nationalist movement," refused to support Nazi Germany's policies.<sup>187</sup>

The Jews struggled against the Vichy regime along with the Algerian Resistance.<sup>188</sup> After World War II, when they attempted neutrality between the French and the Nationalists, during the struggle for Algerian independence, their neutrality backfired—the Jewish Algerians were hit by both factions. In addition,

Algeria now had forged stronger links with the Arab League, which redounded to the detriment of the Jews. In 1960, Jewish Agency officials were kidnapped and assassinated; the historic and venerated Great Synagogue in Algiers and the Jewish cemetery in Oran were desecrated.<sup>189</sup> Jews were threatened ominously by the Arab Liberation Party.

The Jews, a people who had "arrived with the victory of the first conquerors" (the Phoenicians), left 2,500 years afterward.<sup>190</sup> The Jewish community of Algeria, which had numbered 140,000 in 1948, diminished within months; many thousands of Jews fled to Israel, and 125,000 went to France. In 1962 Algeria gained independence as an Arab state—one that the Algerian Liberation Front had touted as a "secular democratic state"; that the Jews of Algeria had largely disappeared was fortunate, because the Nationality Code of 1963 permitted "secular democratic" Algerian citizenship only to those residents whose father and paternal grandfather were Muslim.<sup>191</sup>

## Tunisia

Tunisian Jewry, along with the other Maghrebi Jewish communities, has been relegated to "a backwater of Jewish history"—mainly because of the comparatively meager supply of source material readily accessible until recently to Jewish historians, and also because, generally, the Arab historians understandably dwelt upon the Islamic chronicles, touching only peripherally the infidel communities.<sup>192</sup> Painstaking research by present-day scholars has closed the historical gap. The Jews of Tunisia "existed continuously for about 2300 years," numbering among them important intellectual and religious leaders, and, sporadically, prominent international traders.

An apparently paradoxical role as detested *dhimmi* was allotted to the Jews at the same time: it is important to understand the special "otherness" of the Jew even in what some historians have judged to be the periods of "splendour" for the Jews in Arab lands.

For example, perhaps the definitive historian on the North African Jews, H. Z. Hirschberg, notes that in fifteenth-century Tunis, several Jews held "positions of honor." To a Western-oriented reader, the "position of honor" would indicate freedom from persecution. Yet an authenticated and respected document of that period, written by a visiting Flemish nobleman, describes Tunisian Jews as "despised and hated." After noting the privileged positions of local Christians, the nobleman wrote:

The Jews, on the other hand, have no freedom. They must all pay a heavy . . . tax. They wear special clothes, different from those of the Moors. If they did not do so, they would be stoned, and they therefore put a yellow cloth on their heads or necks; their women dare not even wear shoes. They are much despised and hated, more than even the Latin Christians. . . .<sup>193</sup>

When confronting the fact that the Flemish nobleman's observations contradicted his findings, the historian explained that the "special yellow headgear of the Jews" was a mark of "native-born [Jewish] residents and not foreign traders. . . . The contempt shown to the wearers of the yellow headgear, and their fear of transgressing the discriminatory regulations, likewise indicate that the reference is to people not enjoying the protection of a European state."<sup>194</sup> Those foreign Jewish traders wore a "round cape" to distinguish them.<sup>195</sup>

Yet the historian notes that even "wearers of round capes" were subject to similar "humiliations." The point is that, through the careful, even hair-splitting research that establishes fact, academic disputes can result in the spreading of erroneous assumptions, which have had important political consequences in the Middle East refugee matter. While one scholar might argue that the Arab Muslims' massacres of Jews were "not necessarily specifically anti-Semitic," and another might conclude, from a superficial look at the incomplete source material readily available, that Jews in Arab countries were "better off than Jews in Europe," their statements, out of context, are misleading, and when quoted often enough, can serve as a conduit to the misconception that "harmony" and "equality" existed for Jews in Arab lands. Such obviously was not the case.

From the seventh-century Arab conquest down through the Almohad atrocities, Tunisia fared little better than its neighbors.<sup>196</sup> The "complete expulsion" of Jews from Kairouan, near Tunis, occurred after years of hardship, in the thirteenth century, when Kairouan was anointed as a holy city of Islam.<sup>197</sup> In the sixteenth century, the "hated and despised" Jews of Tunis were periodically attacked by violence, and they were subjected to "vehement anti-Jewish policy" during the various political struggles of the period.<sup>198</sup>

An Arab historian offered insight into the enormous uncertainty of Jewish life in Tunisia at that time: in 1515, the "fanatically religious" founder of the Saad Dynasty in Morocco incited the Muslims to anti-Jewish hostilities as he was "passing through Tunis on a pilgrimage to Mecca" by delivering inflammatory speeches against the Jews. He even extorted "contributions" from the objects of his capricious chastisement.<sup>199</sup>

Tunisian Jews were somewhat better off than either their Algerian or Moroccan brothers at times throughout the last few centuries,<sup>200</sup> but the separate Jewish Quarter, or *hara*, of Tunisia was not much less squalid and miserable than were other North African ghettos before French rule began. Jews were permitted to live as *dhimmi*s, and as such, they led an uncertain existence at the alternating inclinations of their overlords. The smaller community of Jewish elite in Tunisia was allowed by more moderate sovereigns to engage in commerce and, from earliest times, eminent scholars and rabbis emerged from the Tunisian ghettos.

Yet, a historian reminds us,

The success that Tunisia's Jews achieved in the various trades and professions should not . . . obscure the fact that there also existed . . . a large group of Jews



of the lowest social status—the Jew of the *hara*. This urban proletariat was only slightly less unfortunate than that of the Moroccan *mellah* and there were many thousands of people who . . . were permanently unemployed, the . . . misfits. . . .<sup>201</sup>

An Italian observer described the *hara* of the mid-nineteenth century: “the . . . *hara* appears as a labyrinth of muddy narrow alleys lined with ancient tumble-down buildings, at times frighteningly so, with middens of filth at the entry to the house. It lodges thousands of persons who live a life of hardship. . . .”<sup>202</sup>

When Muhammad Bey ascended the throne in 1855, he abolished the special *dhimma* tax for Jews, the first real attempt at legal reform of the contemptible infidel status.<sup>203</sup> The reaction in the Muslim community was hostile and immediate: the old *dhimma* law—whereby the word of a Jew was unacceptable in defense of a Muslim’s charge of blasphemy against Islam—was invoked against a Jew. The Bey refused to intervene, and the Jew was decapitated.<sup>204</sup>

The Muslim society had been unprepared for the Bey’s attempt at uprooting its traditional persecution, and the revolution of 1864 sufficiently intimidated the Bey so that he was compelled to revoke the new liberal laws. Some ravages in the aftermath of that 1864 revolt are described among eyewitness reports.<sup>205</sup> One witness wrote:

Another disaster to report! Muslim fanaticism . . . unleashed against our brethren on the island of Djerba. . . . Arab tribes . . . turned upon . . . the Jewish Quarters, which they sacked, destroying everything. . . . [On] Yom Kippur . . . synagogues profaned and defiled. The Scrolls . . . torn in pieces and burnt . . . men injured and trampled . . . all the women and girls raped. . . . My pen refuses to set down the terrifying . . . atrocities . . . in all [their] horror. . . . The governor of the island refused to intervene to re-establish order; . . . the pillage did not cease for 5 days and nights. . . .<sup>206</sup>

Another complained of the Tunisian ruler’s deviations:

The Sovereign of Tunis found nothing better to do to pass the . . . Ramadan than to take by force—on the pretext that he had become a Muslim—a Jewish youth . . . not yet 15! He had the victim shut up in the men’s seraglio and obstinately refuses to give him up to his parents. . . .<sup>207</sup>

An outraged writer bitterly assailed the government’s “protection”:

Eighteen Jews have already fallen in a few months to the knives of fanatical [Muslim] murderers; and His Highness’s Government, far from punishing the guilty, protects and apparently encourages them.

The Government’s conduct toward us is macchiavellian beyond words. *We are not directly persecuted but such is the scornful treatment we receive, when we ask for justice from the Bey or his ministers, that open persecution would be a hundred times better. Acknowledged persecution however, would expose the executioner and his victim to the world, and the Tunisian Government wishes to appear*

*impartial, whilst masking killers surreptitiously.* \* . . . We do not seek an eye for an eye, blood for blood, but that the guilty should be . . . legally condemned. †<sup>208</sup>

A Jew from Tunis protested assassinations in a neighboring community:

Nabel is a town of fanatics, and we must unfortunately record six other murders of our co-religionists, the perpetrators of which have not been punished. . . .<sup>209</sup>

The violence spread in 1869 to the city of Tunis, where Muslims butchered many Jews in the defenseless ghetto. The French Protectorate was established in Tunisia in 1881, and life improved considerably for many Tunisian Jews. In 1910 they were allowed to become French citizens, though they were not fully accepted in Muslim and French societies.<sup>210</sup>

The subsequent Nazi occupation and Vichy regime did not improve conditions; the Great Synagogue in Tunis was put into use as a Nazi stable. When Tunisia became independent in 1956, a Jew was included in the Bourguiba cabinet, while at the same time, paradoxically, an authoritative report published in 1956 stressed that "the Jew in Tunisia has lost his position of middle man in the distributive industry—with commerce becoming more and more the privilege of a Moslem caste. . . ." <sup>211</sup>

The Jews of Tunisia soon began to flee from the extremism that the "Arabization" policy of the government had fostered. Of 105,000 Jews in 1948, 50,000 emigrated to Israel and roughly the same number have gone to France and elsewhere.

## Syria

Jewish history in Syria began in biblical times. By A.D. 70, 10,000 Jews dwelt in Damascus, and a consistent Syrian Jewish presence was maintained for more than two millennia. From the time of the Arab conquest, the Jews' position in Syria was found by a Christian Arab scholar to be ". . . outside the community; they were not allowed to carry weapons, to bear witness against Moslems in courts of law, or to marry Moslem women; . . . they were subject to special . . . taxation. But they were permitted to retain their beliefs and their property, . . . and to manage the internal affairs of the communities according to their own laws and customs. . . ." <sup>212</sup>

The Jewish community of Syria became a refuge for Jews fleeing the Spanish Inquisition.<sup>213</sup> For centuries under Ottoman rule, it has been maintained, the Jews were allowed to live "relatively secure," often "prosperous" lives—chiefly as

\*The nineteenth-century complaint about the "government's wish to appear impartial" to the world while "masking" its persecution illustrates the sophisticated aptitude for image making that was practiced more than a hundred years ago. The "invitation" from the Arab world to its Jews (see Chapter 2 above) is one modern example of the continued tradition.

†Emphasis added.

merchants—in their *mellahs*. Spanish exiles were responsible for establishing many Jewish religious schools in Damascus and Aleppo, and more than one Jew held the post of Finance Minister.

But in Syria, as elsewhere in the Arab world, the “position of Jews in many ways precarious.”<sup>214</sup>

A thirteenth-century Syrian Arab writer provided a classic example of the durability and consistency of the Muslims’ traditional Koran-inspired demoniacal image of “the Jew”—the image through which the Prophet Muhammad and his followers sought to avenge the Jews for favoring Judaism over the “new,” seventh-century religion. The Syrian wrote that

. . . this [Jewish] group is the most cursed of all God’s creation, the most evil-natured, and the most deeply rooted in infidelity and accursedness. They are the most evil-intentioned of mankind in their deeds, even they are the most ostentatious in humility and self-abasement. . . . When they manage to be alone with a man, they bring him to destruction, they introduce, by trickery, a stupefying drug into his food, and then they kill him.<sup>215</sup>

As *dhimmis* they paid the special tax, and their testimony against Muslims was invalid in the Syrian courts. Jews bore many traditional *dhimma* discriminatory burdens: forbidden to ride a horse in town; forbidden to wear Muslim apparel; forbidden to carry arms; and “usually” prohibited from building or repairing places of worship. To those consistent humiliations were added the intermittent “oppression, extortion and violence by both the local authorities and the Muslim population.”<sup>216</sup>

One Jew who rose to the post of “treasury manager,” at the end of the eighteenth century, ran the gamut of the schizoid Jewish existence under Muslim rule. In the first stage of his ascendancy, he was arrested, an eye was gouged out, and his nose and ears cut.<sup>217</sup> In the second stage, he gained prominence “unique” for Jews, under the tolerant reign of a new pasha—a Christian writer in Damascus wrote that “Hayim the Jew . . . doing whatever he wishes . . . a Jewish person dominates the Muslims and Christians . . . without any restriction.”<sup>218</sup>

A Swiss writer observed at the actual time (1811) of “Hayyim the Jew’s” influence, “There is scarcely an instance in the modern history of Syria of a Christian or Jew having long enjoyed the power or riches . . . he may have acquired. These persons are always taken off in the last moment of their greatest apparent glory.”<sup>219</sup> True to this prophecy, “Hayyim the Jew” was executed in 1820 and his property was confiscated by yet another successor to the Syrian reign.<sup>220</sup>

According to nineteenth-century historians, some Jewish families in Aleppo—which, like Alexandria, was an atypically tolerant cosmopolitan center of international commerce—were affluent and relatively safe. Others, even in Aleppo, who were less well-connected were “subject to violence and oppression from various quarters.”<sup>221</sup> Money was extorted by officials on every pretext, petty bullying was commonplace, and one Jew reported that “When a Jew walked

among them [the Muslims] in the market, one would throw a stone at him in order to kill him, another would pull his beard and a third his ear lock, yet another spit on his face and he became a symbol of abuse."<sup>222</sup>

In 1831, Egyptian rule improved markedly the lot of non-Muslims; Christians finally gained full equality. Not quite so for the Jews, although some at times were now allowed to repair their synagogues, and extortion through illegal taxes was officially forbidden. Muslims and particularly Egyptian soldiers were "severely punished" for abusing Jews.<sup>223</sup>

According to reports from the Jewish community in 1839, however, it was the European consuls who insisted on the protection of the Jews—not entirely the beneficence of the occupying Arab government: "Had it not been [for] the consuls' supervision, we would have all been destroyed and lost, since the gentiles wish but to eat the Jews and to accuse them falsely."<sup>224</sup>

A gradual decline of the Jews' position continued during the Egyptian occupation. European settlers began to usurp the Jews' role as traders.<sup>225</sup> Then, in 1840 a general economic slump, and incitement by means of the vicious "ritual murder" canard, exploded into riots and a pogrom against the Jews—the infamous Damascus blood libel of 1840.<sup>226</sup> The Arabs adopted the inflammatory mechanism as their own and have used it until the present day, despite the fact that the false charge was eventually proved fraudulent in a Turkish court.<sup>227</sup> As the Egyptians were forced out of Syria, a Turkish imperial *firman* was issued, exonerating the Damascus Jews from the foul accusation,\* and stating "that the charges made against them . . . are nothing but pure calumny. . . . The Jewish nation shall be protected and defended."<sup>228</sup>

During the 1850s the Muslims began to concentrate violence upon the Christian community in Syria, and the nonplussed Jewish community remained unharmed. The Jews enjoyed a greater measure of religious freedom—to the extent that a synagogue was designed by the sultan's architect. Ottoman officials revered the chief rabbis, and life for the Jewish *dhimmi*—still forced to observe the discriminatory practices—was noticeably relieved.<sup>229</sup>

The French were assigned mandatory rights over Syria in 1920, and in 1925, the time of the Druse revolt against the French, the Jewish Quarter of Damascus was attacked; many Jews were murdered, dozens were wounded, and homes and shops were looted and set afire. The French persistently attempted to protect Jews from the increasing attacks brought about by Arab resentment of foreigners in general and of the French in particular.

But the rise of the Palestine antagonism crystallized hostility, and anti-Jewish riots were hurled upon the Jews of Damascus in 1936. The fact that the Jewish community made known its support of the Arab nationalists<sup>230</sup> was to no avail; Syrian Jews were accused of being Zionists, and the late '30s were fraught with

\*Earlier, similar absurd charges were levied against Syrian Jews in Aleppo—1810, in Homs—1824, and in Anatakia—1826.

anti-Jewish violence.<sup>231</sup> Jews were stabbed by activist Muslims, and demands were made to boycott the Jewish Quarters.

Damascus was now a headquarters of anti-Jewish activities, and in 1937 a Nazi delegation, conferring with its Nazi representative in the Middle East, paid a visit to Damascus. As a result, anti-Jewish propaganda intensified and closer affiliations grew up between German and Arab youth organizations. An armed extremist group, the Arab National Youth Organization, declared a boycott against Arab merchants who bought "Zionist goods from Palestine."<sup>232</sup>

From Damascus the Arab Defense Committee warned the Jewish Agency president that "Your attitude will lead you and Jews of the East to the worst of calamities that has been written in history up to the present."<sup>233</sup> Despite the then-dominant Nazi-allied Vichy regime, local French authorities continued to defend the Jews from Arab extremist attack, although Jews were dismissed from official posts and penalized by economic restrictions. The Allied occupation in 1941 restored equilibrium somewhat, but Nazi propaganda continued.

In 1942 the Axis radio in Damascus caused additional alarm through broadcast of the false report that Roosevelt and Churchill had promised Syria to the Jews as part of a post-war Jewish state. The Jewish Quarter was raided in 1944 and 1945,<sup>234</sup> and the end of World War II intensified the persecution and restrictions against the Jews. Tens of thousands of Syrian Jews had fled between the world wars and after. The Jews numbered roughly 35,000 in 1917; in 1943 about 30,000 still remained.<sup>235</sup> In June 1945 the director of the Alliance Jewish-affiliated school was murdered.

That same year Syria won its independence, and the Damascus Mufti warned at a religious conference that if Jewish immigration into Palestine was not halted, all countries of Islam would declare a "holy war" against the Jews.<sup>236</sup> Shortly afterward a Syrian student mob celebrated a Muslim holiday by desecrating the Great Synagogue of Aleppo, beating upon Jews at prayer and burning prayer books in the street.<sup>237</sup>

Intimidation by the government was initiated, and Jews were prohibited from leaving. Jewish leaders were informed that unless they publicly denounced Zionism and surrendered Jewish refugees en route to Palestine, all refugees captured would be put to death along with their helpers. When the Jews protested, the Syrian Prime Minister amended the law to provide life imprisonment instead of death. But he exacted three conditions from the Jews: "Surrender all persons aiding the movement of refugees; cooperate with security forces in capturing refugees, and issue a public statement denouncing Zionism and calling on all Jews in the Arab states to support the struggle against Zionism."<sup>238</sup>

It was through such scare tactics that Syrian Jews were induced to testify that "Jews of Syria were happy and not discriminated against; that their situation was excellent under the present Syrian government; and that they had absolutely nothing whatever to do with Zionism." A member of the Anglo-American Committee, investigating the precarious position of Jewish minorities in Arab states,

reported that after the Syrian Jews raced through the "45-seconds of testimony," they fled to their seats amid "murmurs of sly amusement from the Moslem audience which said, as clearly as words, 'They knew what was best for them.'"<sup>239</sup>

By early 1947, only 13,000 Jews remained; thousands more Jewish refugees had fled, many of them covertly, and the Syrian government, according to the *New York Herald Tribune*,<sup>240</sup> launched "an investigation into the disappearance of some 17,000 Syrian Jews since the last government census [1943]."

Letters were smuggled out of Syria; one told of

the war against Zionism [which] has turned into a war against the entire Jewish people, . . . Anti-Jewish propaganda is rampant in the press, over the radio and in special pamphlets. . . . Poisonous articles, full of degradation and employing the lowest form of expression, are read over the radio and in the mosques. The masses follow faithfully, since the sheikhs promise them . . . paradise. . . . I am writing anonymously as I cannot give you my name for fear of vengeance. . . ."<sup>241</sup>

Around the same time as the hate campaign, various restrictions brought Jewish economic life to a halt. Jewish leaders accused the Syrian government of "making their livelihood impossible by denying them jobs in the government, withholding import and export licenses, and making virtually impossible the admission of Jewish youths into secondary schools."<sup>242</sup> Jews were still forbidden to leave the country, and terrified of venturing even near to the edge of the ghettos.<sup>243</sup>

In December 1947 anti-Jewish riots climaxed in a vicious pogrom; Syrian mobs poured into the *mellah* of Aleppo, burnt down most of the synagogues, and destroyed 150 Jewish homes, five Jewish schools, fifty shops and offices, an orphanage, and a youth club. Holy scrolls, including a priceless ancient manuscript of the Old Testament, were burned, while the firemen stood by and police "actively helped the attackers."<sup>244</sup> In the aftermath, the Syrian president asserted to a visiting Jewish delegation that "Incidents of this sort occur even in advanced countries. . . ."<sup>245</sup> and the Minister of Finance rejected the request for a loan to repair one of the synagogues so that the Jews could continue to worship.<sup>246</sup>

A bomb tossed into the heart of the Damascus Jewish Quarter, in front of the Alliance Israelite Universelle, caused inestimable damage; most important, it reinforced terror among the Damascus Jews. On the eve of the establishment of the State of Israel, in April 1948, several Aleppo rabbis wrote to a Brooklyn congregation:

This is the third day we are in hiding. The Arab mobs are raging and threatening our lives. Pray for us. Act in our behalf before your government. Our lives are in total danger . . . help us!<sup>247</sup>

Addressing its Jewish former citizens, the government ludicrously warned all "Syrian" citizens that unless they returned immediately,<sup>248</sup> they would lose Syrian citizenship. Compounding the orders prohibiting Jews from leaving the country,

they were forbidden to change their places of residence,<sup>249</sup> sell private property, or acquire land.<sup>250</sup> In 1949 all bank accounts held by Jews were frozen.

In summer 1949, following the ascendance of a regime that promised “equality,” the synagogue at Damascus was bombed during Sabbath preparations, with more than a score dead and twenty-six wounded. The new Syrian president called for an investigation and arrests, and when a Palestinian Arab confessed, the president promised justice based on the evidence.<sup>251</sup> But the new leader was killed in another military coup, with his successor’s subsequent government becoming more unremitting in its severity than ever before.

Palestinian Arabs, many militantly anti-Jewish, were given the Jewish public buildings and the vacant former living quarters of Jewish escapees in the *mellah*; there they confronted their Jewish neighbors with omnipresent threats, often fulfilled. Such was the quality of terrorizing that some members of the normally close-knit protective Jewish community became informers when an Israeli escaped from prison in 1953 and sought sanctuary at the Damascus synagogue:

The congregation was in consternation. The hostile regime and the suffering it had caused them had destroyed their self-respect. Anyone suspected of aiding Israel only brought disaster on himself, and now an Israeli prisoner, escaped from jail. . . . [His] fate was sealed the moment he crossed the threshold of the synagogue. . . . A squad broke in and removed the “dangerous Zionist” . . .<sup>252</sup>

The Jews were kept strictly within the confines of the ghetto, with penalties for escape as harsh as those of a prison. Yet many remained unintimidated—those Jews took great risks through carefully guarded secret routes, leaving everything behind, to escape from the oppressive existence; hundreds of Jews, including women and children, were arrested and tortured in the attempt to be smuggled out.<sup>253</sup>

Since then, except for brief periods,<sup>254</sup> Syria’s Jewish community has huddled together, its collective and individual human rights and dignity distinctly cut off.<sup>255</sup>

## Lebanon

Jews have been in the Mediterranean coastal region now called Lebanon since A.D. 70, if not earlier.

Although all thirty-five Jewish families living in Beirut were slaughtered by the Crusaders,<sup>256</sup> Jews survived elsewhere in Lebanon and their population was infused with Spanish Jews who fled from Spain in 1492. During the Turkish reign, Jews in Lebanon, as elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire, paid the poll tax to ensure their protection,<sup>257</sup> along with other infidels in the Muslim state, and at times were subject to severe dress codes or harsh legal restrictions.<sup>258</sup>

But life for the small Jewish community in Lebanon—fifty-five families in 1826—was comparatively easy,<sup>259</sup> until the infamous blood libel charges spread—to Beirut in 1824 and to (Lebanese) Tripoli in 1834.<sup>260</sup>

With the calumnies came the predictable attacks and suffering, which were compounded by the anti-Jewish attacks during the Druse Rebellion<sup>261</sup>—the uprising wiped out the Jewish community in the town of Dir el-Qamar in 1847.

Under the early twentieth-century French occupation, Jews were less discriminated against in Lebanon than elsewhere in the Middle East; only “a few” recorded incidents of anti-Jewish attacks marred Jewish life there in the thirties. In 1945, the time of Lebanese independence, twelve Jews were murdered in the Muslim-populated town of Tripoli; following the 1947 partition of Palestine, houses and synagogues were attacked by Muslims.<sup>262</sup> In 1948 a Beirut Jew was murdered; in 1950 a Jewish school was bombed and its director killed—acts predominantly executed by Muslim groups.<sup>263</sup> Money extorted from the Lebanese Jews as “contributions” often went directly to finance Arab Palestinian sabotage.

Yet, on the whole, historians note that Jews were protected by authorities as Lebanese independence emerged in 1946. During the anti-Zionist demonstrations at the time of Israel’s declaration of statehood, “police forces were posted” in Beirut’s Jewish Quarter “day and night when required”—sharp contrast to the official behavior in other Arab states at the time.<sup>264</sup>

During the 1948 war, Maronite Christians as well as Christian authorities protected the Jews from “Muslim fanatics”<sup>265</sup> and offered assistance to Jewish refugees fleeing from Iraq and Syria. Jews retained their jobs, even as civil servants, until 1957, and authorities continued to guard the Jewish community from the Muslim opposition’s attacks.<sup>266</sup>

Until 1958, Lebanon was the sole Arab state where Jews had increased in number—to about 9,000—after the war of Israel’s independence. When Lebanon officially began to finance terrorist activities by the newly inspired Arab Palestinian “Revolution” in 1968, many of the remaining Jews left.

Although no Lebanese Jews were employed by the government, and the Lebanese could not communicate with the “enemy territory” of Israel, Jews were allowed to travel freely, even within the Middle East, before Lebanon’s Arab-versus-Arab bloodletting was renewed in the early 1970s. But few of them visited the Arab countries of their own volition.<sup>267</sup>

The Jews of Lebanon enjoyed greater freedom than any other Jewish group living in the Arab world, primarily because of the Christian-dominated government. It was not until the advent of Muslim revolt—the demise of “secular democracy” in the Arab world—that the Lebanese Jews became sufficiently insecure to flee in great numbers.

## Libya

Libya’s Jewish community has virtually disappeared, its roots dug up after millennia of deep attachment to the North African terrain that is Libya today.

Jews were attracted to the country before the destruction of Jerusalem—many



from the "Egyptian diaspora."<sup>268</sup> According to Josephus Flavius, "100,000 Jews [were] transferred from Palestine" by Egyptian ruler Ptolemy around 300 B.C., and thousands of those Jews were "settled" in Libyan cities employed as a human shield to protect Egypt from its enemies.<sup>269</sup> The Jewish community was reportedly destroyed in the anti-Roman rebellion of A.D. 73, reappearing in Tripoli before the fourth century.<sup>270</sup>

The seventh-century Arab conquest, taking fifty years to subjugate all of North Africa, brought Libyan Jews under the same fluctuating oppressive *dhimma* restrictions as elsewhere in the Maghreb. Once again the Jews became a buffer against attack—this time protecting the Arabs of Tripoli against the Byzantines.<sup>271</sup>

From that period forward, the Jewish population was, in one city or another, sacked, cheated, and pillaged alternately by nomads and Bedouins, with sterner penalties and banishment meted out arbitrarily, according to the whim of whichever Muslim tribal leader had at that moment defeated his rival.<sup>272</sup> In addition to the reverberations of feuds, disease, and poverty, the Jews of Libya—then Tripolitania—were subject to the "nomad invasions, highway robbery and piracy" of the general populace.<sup>273</sup>

The twelfth century brought the barbarity of the Almohads to the eastern plains, and the Jews were severely persecuted "for the purpose of conversion" about 1140.<sup>274</sup>

. . . the blood of sons and daughters was spilt on a sabbath day. . . . There is not a Jew, not a single one, in Dajayya or al-Mahdiya, and for Sabrat and Tura my eye always weeps.<sup>275</sup>

The remaining historical fragments on twelfth-century "sufferings of African Jewry" are few: the above was excerpted from one, and the following mid-twelfth-century description from another:

. . . years of distress, oppression and persecution to Israel, and they were exiled from their localities: such as were for death, to death and such as were for the sword, to the sword, and . . . to the famine, and . . . to the captivity. . . . and such as were destined to leave the community left because of the sword of Ibn Tūmart, who went forth into the world in the year 4902 (1141/2) and who had decided to eliminate Israel. . . . And so he left no name of them in the whole of his kingdom nor remnant . . . , from the end of the world to the city of al-Mahdiya.<sup>276</sup>

European travelers through the region have recorded the persistence of various compulsory *dhimma* demeanments inflicted by the Berber and Arab Muslims, who "despised and vilified" the Jews. Though there are writers who speak of the relative "haven" Spanish exiles found as refuge from the Inquisition, Tripolitania proffered something short of the sanctuary that the fleeing Spanish Jews had hoped for.<sup>277</sup>

Because of the Maghrebi Jews' imposed "otherness"—the miserable living

conditions in many ghettos and the stubbornness that resistance to conversion must spawn—the more cosmopolitan Jewish refugees from Europe reportedly “scorned” the peculiar, unfamiliar North African Jewish “locals,” with whom the Spaniards were reluctant to identify. One historian admitted the difficulty of “merging the two strata”—which “took centuries and is still not complete”<sup>278</sup> in the 1970s. Another claimed the “confrontation . . . passed on the whole harmoniously . . . with a minimum of communal damage. . . . [the] diversity . . . minimized.”<sup>279</sup> Yet he, too, later reported the “friction” that developed between native and newcomer.

In the late sixteenth century many of the Libyan Jews whose ancestors had fled the forced conversion of Spain ironically were faced with the choice of death—or conversion to Islam.<sup>280</sup> “Hundreds” of Jews were murdered during the persecutions of Ali Gurzi Pasha’s reign.<sup>281</sup>

The Ottoman conquest of Tripolitania in 1835 brought a measure of relief to Jews in Tripoli and some other cities. At the same time, Jews in other regions of Tripolitania did not benefit from the Turkish rule; they were subjected to forced conversion and anti-Jewish pogroms, and they shared the ghetto miseries suffered in other parts of North Africa. Numerous complaints were registered by Jewish leaders in Tripolitania.<sup>282</sup> A few excerpts might color one’s perspective regarding the “relative security” of Jews among the Arab Muslims. Regarding the burning of a synagogue in Zliten—

. . . everyone knows what the Arabs, the *Cadi* [judge], the Ulema were doing to the Israelites. . . . If the Governor here had rendered justice to the Jews of Zliten, both with regard to their cemetery and their synagogue, the people of Zliten would not have dared to carry out this disgraceful act . . . if, God forbid, they do not obtain ample satisfaction, . . . the Jews will be obliged to emigrate to save their lives and their few possessions.<sup>283</sup>

Also at Zliten—

. . . some Muslims attacked the house of a Jew, and stole all he had after seriously injuring him. . . . [others] entered the house of another Jew, stripped him of all his possessions, struck and injured both him and his wife, and killed his son aged about 20. . . . robbed [another] Jew . . . injured him and killed a young child at its mother’s knees. Finally . . . at Zawiya Gharibya, only 7 hours away from here, the Sacred Synagogue was plundered and profaned in every . . . way. . . .<sup>284</sup>

Another plea came from the entire Jewish community of Tripoli—

. . . The situation of the Jews in all parts of Tripolitania is very dangerous. From all the rights . . . we are unfortunately excluded by reason of extreme ill-treatment and persecution at the hands of the Muslims in our country, under the . . . present [Governor] . . . who does not wish to . . . protect us against the cruel and inhumane Muslim population. . . . Last Thursday, a Jew on the way to his village was killed by Arabs and his companion was injured. . . . the authorities have not attempted

to find the criminals. . . . to the Muslims, Jews are of no account, and our personal safety is in jeopardy and our belongings are not our own.<sup>285</sup>

A final example is from the Sahara region—

. . . In these out-of-the-way places . . . the Jew may not ride a horse or ass in an Arab's presence. The Jewish rider, on seeing an Arab coming, must dismount quickly and go on foot, leading his mount until the Arab disappears. . . . If the Jew forgets this or takes too long to dismount, the Arab brutally reminds him . . . by throwing him to the ground. . . . The Jews of Gebel (one of these regions) told me that within the last 20 years three Israelites had been killed in this way. The testimony of a Jew is not accepted and he would never dare to accuse anyone of robbing him. . . . Along all this part of the Tripolitanian coast, small communities of Jews are living amongst the Arabs, more or less subjected to them.<sup>286</sup>

The Libyan Jews, enjoying the "easier" conditions under the Ottomans, confronted arbitrary anti-Jewish cruelties, and taxation amounting to extortion, in most of the country through the end of the nineteenth century. Jewish religious institutions survived, but the *hara*, or ghetto, was at best barely above poverty level. With the Italian occupation in 1911, the Jews escaped from *dhimmi* status and the Jewish community thrived until the mid-thirties, when Libya, as the only Arabic-speaking Italian possession, became Mussolini's Muslim center for fascist propaganda.<sup>287</sup>

The Second World War brought a great wave of persecution—in 1941 and 1942 Benghazi's Jews were attacked,<sup>288</sup> Jewish property in Benghazi was pillaged and nearly 2,600 Jews were sent to a forced labor camp in the desert, where more than 500 died. Later in 1942, thousands more Jews from Tripoli and other towns were condemned to forced labor.

On the eve of the Allied victory in Tripoli, Axis troops stormed the Jewish Quarter and slaughtered the leaders of the Jewish community. As the Allies freed the Jews from concentration camps and the British took control of Libya, anti-Jewish crowds stormed Tripoli and other communities.<sup>289</sup> Nonetheless, Jewish activities were revived. "Palestinian Jewish soldiers serving with the British army opened Hebrew schools for liberated Jewish children,"<sup>290</sup> and peace brought some restoration of security to Libya's Jews.

The struggling community was totally unprepared for the violent anti-Jewish bloodbath that began November 4, 1945. The Tripoli pogrom was inspired by anti-Jewish riots in Egypt a couple of days earlier, but the ravages in Tripolitania were even more devastating. Whereas the Egyptian violence was directed to pillage and looting, Arab nationalism and religious fanaticism in Tripoli was aimed at the physical destruction of Jews.

According to the *New York Times*' Clifton Daniel,

Many of the attacks were premeditated and coldly murderous in intent.<sup>291</sup>

Babies were beaten to death with iron bars. Old men were hacked to pieces

where they fell. Expectant mothers were disemboweled. Whole families were burned alive in their houses. Two brothers lost 27 relatives in one attack. . . . When the riots were raging, the thirst for blood seemed to have supplanted the desire for loot and revenge.<sup>292</sup>

Forced conversion, girls raped with their families looking on—the Muslim gangs' bestiality was directed specifically against Jews, and only Jewish dwellings and businesses were devastated. Just one week after the atrocity had ended, an Arab leader was interviewed:<sup>293</sup> he warned that because of "Zionist activity"—Libyan Jewish Boy Scouts sang "Zionist" hymns and Zionist clubs were formed—the Arabs "have become annoyed" and the Jews must disavow "militant Zionism." In the short period following the November 1947 vote to partition "Palestine" into a Jewish state and an Arab state, the Libyan mobs murdered more than 130 Jews.<sup>294</sup> Another Tripoli horror was perpetrated the following year, with impassioned zeal, and the erstwhile unswervable Jewish community began to flee. Libya's Jewish population in 1948 was 38,000; by 1951 only 8,000 Jews remained.<sup>295</sup>

The precarious position of Libyan Jewry deteriorated further when the British began to move Arab families into the former homes of departed Jews, in the walled *hara*. Where before the Jews had felt some measure of security in isolation, now there was hostility on the doorstep.<sup>296</sup> By the time Libya achieved independence in 1952, there were relatively few Jews left to take advantage of the purported equality offered under the new constitution. From the time of Libya's entry into the Arab League, Jewish clubs were closed, and life, while less violent, was no more secure.

By the 1960s, only some hundreds of Jews remained, and with the renewal of Arab mob violence after the Six-Day War,<sup>297</sup> practically all of Libya's remaining Jewish population was forced literally to run for their lives.<sup>298</sup> Leaving behind everything they owned, most became a part of the 37,000-member Libyan refugee community in Israel.

In 1970, President Qaddafi confiscated Jewish-owned property that the fleeing Libyan-born Jews had left behind.<sup>299</sup> The expatriate Libyan Jewish community in Rome protested the property takeover, claiming that such action contradicted the Libyan constitutional decree of citizen equality. Thereupon a Libyan official invited the Libyan Jews to return to the country, and assured them that their property would then be released. Libya's "invitation" came on the heels of a new government regulation that prohibited those few Libyan Jews who remained from leaving Libya, no matter how short the duration of the requested visit.<sup>300</sup>

When Qaddafi visited France during the 1973 Arab-Israeli Yom Kippur War to press the Arab oil embargo and negotiate arms, the Tunisian-born writer Albert Memmi responded to Libya's invitation to Jews in a personal address to Qaddafi:

Is it true that you have said that the Jews have always lived at peace in the Arab countries? And that you have nothing against Jews, only Zionists? . . .

The error which may have been made at Deir Yassine<sup>[\*]</sup> is constantly being thrown in our faces. Ah, but we have undergone a hundred Deir Yassines, a thousand Deir Yassines!<sup>[†]</sup> And not only in Russia, Germany or Poland, but also at the hand of Arab people; yet the world has never been upset over it! . . .

. . . if you really wanted to avoid having us come together on this particular bit of land, . . . Israel . . . , then why did you hound us and expel us from the regions over which your power extends? . . .

Do you believe that the Jews born in Arab countries can go back and live in the countries from which they were expelled, before being plundered and massacred? . . .

. . . your constant affirmation [is] of the unity of the Arab nation. . . . When you come right down to it, the Palestinian Arabs' misfortune is having been moved about thirty miles within one vast nation. Is that so serious? Our own misfortune, as Jews from the Arab countries, is much much greater, for we have been moved thousands of miles away, after having also lost everything. And today [we] are . . . half the population of Israel. . . . And no one has the right to challenge our possibility of taking in our past and also, alas!, our future survivors.<sup>302</sup>

The Arab world had been virtually emptied of its Jews, and the fledgling Jewish state would bear the burden of its hundreds of thousands of Jewish Arab-born refugees almost in secret.

So unknown and undisclosed are these Arab-born Jews and the plight they have faced—the camps, squalor, uprooting, loss of property and security, discontent, unemployment, and what they sensed to be neglect of their problems in Israel—that in countless conversations outside the Middle East with academics or professionals, from university graduates to blue-collar workers, including Jews as well as non-Jews, when the question of the “Middle East refugees” is raised, almost without exception the response is, “You mean the Palestinians—the Arabs, of course.” It is as though the sad and painful story of the Arab-born Jewish refugees had been erased, their struggle covered over by a revision of the pages of history.

\*An Arab village harboring Iraqi and other Arab troops, blocking the supply route to Jerusalem, during battles immediately before Israel gained statehood. Although the Palestinian Jewish Irgun and Stern troops who bombarded Deir Yaseen in April 1948 first warned the community and called for surrender, their subsequent attack killed an estimated 250 villagers along with the regular Arab army troops in the village. Jewish authorities punished the renegade force, and British investigations found it to be one of the “few” Jewish reprisals, among a “law-abiding” Jewish population, after years of “almost unbelievable self-restraint” from retaliation for continuous Arab terrorist attacks upon Palestinian Jews. Arab propaganda has used “Deir Yaseen” as a “justification” for unlimited international acts of Arab terrorism.<sup>301</sup>

†See Chapter 9.

## Ideology of the East, Rhetoric of the West

Because of the wrongdoing of the Jews . . .  
 distorting with their tongues and slandering religion. . . .  
 The most vehement of mankind in hostility [be] the Jews  
 and the idolators. . . .  
 the greediest of mankind. . . .  
 desire nothing but your ruin. . . .  
 commit evil and become engrossed in sin.  
 Allah hath cursed them for their disbelief.  
 Taste ye the punishment of burning.

—The Koran, from quotations excerpted in this chapter

The Jews . . . lived exiled and despised since by their nature  
 they are vile, greedy and enemies of mankind.

—Syrian second-year junior high school textbook, 1963–1964

**T**he pages of history unfolded in the foregoing chapter, to which this chapter is in essence an epilogue, reveal the traditional treatment by the Arab world of “its Jews.” By no means is it an exhaustive study; it is merely a drawing of characteristic features sufficiently detailed to preclude distortion or doubt. The causes for Jewish tribulation in Arab lands may be subject to interpretation or even in some minds to justification; the historical record itself, however, cannot be subject to opinion or obfuscation—that record exists.

Despite that record, modern Arab claims to the contrary have been allowed to supplant the facts. The Arabs currently have been painting a specious propaganda portrait of the “tranquility” and peace attained by “their Jews” before the independence of Israel. The late King Faisal of Saudi Arabia told Henry Kissinger that “. . . Before the Jewish state was established, there existed nothing to harm good relations between Arabs and Jews. . . .”<sup>1</sup> Ironically, no Jews were allowed to enter or live in Saudi Arabia.

Jordan’s King Hussein stated, “The relationship that enabled Arabs and Jews to live together for centuries as neighbors and friends has been destroyed by

Zionist ideas and actions.”<sup>2</sup> Yet the Jordanian Nationality Law states that “a Jew” cannot become a citizen of Jordan.<sup>3</sup>

It was “Zionism”—Israel—that drove a wedge between Arabs and Jews, Arab rulers have insisted. Yet King Faisal subsequently distributed illuminated copies of one of the most infamous and durable of all anti-Jewish libels—the czarist forgery known as “The Protocols of the Elders of Zion”—along with an anthology of other anti-Jewish calumnies, to journalists who accompanied French Foreign Minister Jobert to Jedda in January 1974. Saudi officials were reported to have asserted that these defamatory books were the King’s “favorites.”<sup>4</sup>

Sheikh Goshah, Grand Cadi (Chief Judge) of Jordan, spoke of the happy past together shared by the Jews and Arab Muslims, “stressing the Mosaic roots of Islam.”<sup>5</sup> But when Goshah spoke at Al-Azhar University to Muslim theologians at the Fourth Conference of the Academy of Islamic Research, he said, “Treachery was the business of Jews throughout their ages and times. . . . Allah backed Muslims until they gained victory throughout all incursions and battles against the treacherous hypocritic Jews.”<sup>6</sup>

Implicit within many such statements is the intention of enforcing the religious command that Jews shall be “returned” to their former status as humiliated infidels in the Arab lands, according to the will of the Koran. The message seems to be that “these Jews who have always been ‘our Jews,’ are insolent in daring to insist upon treatment as equals in the Arab world.” Whoever heard of a *Dhimmi* State?

Determining to a great extent the Arab world’s historical subjugation and mistreatment of Jews, the Koran, and to some extent the *Hadith*—statements attributed to the Prophet Muhammad—have been pivotal in creating the modern Jewish stereotype for Muslims.<sup>7</sup> One *Hadith* of the Prophet Muhammad appeared in Egyptian publications in the 1930s and 1940s:

The resurrection of the dead will not come until the Muslims will war with the Jews and the Muslims will kill them; . . . the trees and rocks will say, “O Muslim, O Abdullah, here is a Jew behind me, come and kill him.”<sup>8</sup>

The holy writings of Islam also contain benign references to Jews, which often are cited to support the fantasy of “harmonious relations between Muslims and Jews in Arab lands.” Wherever Jews have lived under Arab Islam, however, their conditions appear to have been determined by the *negative* images of Jews within the *Hadith* Reports and the Koran, the juridical source of Islamic law, images found in such statements as the following:

Ignominy shall be their portion [the Jews’] wheresoever they are found. . . . They have incurred anger from their Lord, and wretchedness is laid upon them. . . . because they . . . disbelieve the revelations of Allah and slew the Prophets wrongfully. . . . because they were rebellious and used to transgress.<sup>9</sup>

And thou wilt find them [the Jews] the greediest of mankind. . . .<sup>10</sup>

Evil is that for which they sell their souls. . . . For disbelievers is a terrible doom.<sup>11</sup>

Taste ye [Jews] the punishment of burning.<sup>12</sup>

Those who disbelieve Our revelations, We shall expose them to the fire. As often as their skins are consumed We shall exchange them for fresh skins that they may taste the torment.<sup>13</sup>

Because of the wrongdoing of the Jews. . . . And of their taking usury . . . and of their devouring people's wealth by false pretenses. We have prepared for those of them who disbelieve a painful doom.<sup>14</sup>

Allah hath cursed them [the Jews] for their disbelief.<sup>15</sup>

They [the Jews] will spare no pains to corrupt you. They desire nothing but your ruin. Their hatred is clear from what they say, but more violent is the hatred which their breasts conceal.<sup>16</sup>

In truth the disbelievers are an open enemy to you.<sup>17</sup>

And thou seest [Jews and Christians] vying one with another in sin and transgression and their devouring of illicit gain. Verily evil is what they do. Why do not the rabbis and the priests forbid their evilspeaking and their devouring of illicit gain? . . . . evil is their handiwork.<sup>18</sup>

O ye who believe! Take not the Jews and Christians for friends.<sup>19</sup>

The most vehement of mankind in hostility [are] the Jews and the idolators.<sup>20</sup>

Fight against such of those [Jews and Christians] . . . until they pay for the tribute readily, being brought low.<sup>21</sup>

Allah fighteth against them [the Jews]. How perverse they are!<sup>22</sup>

Believers, many are the rabbis and the monks who defraud men of their possessions. . . . Proclaim a woeful punishment to those that hoard up gold and silver and do not spend it in Allah's cause. . . . their treasures shall be heated in the fire of Hell. . . .<sup>23</sup>

They [the Jews] spread evil in the land. . . .<sup>24</sup>

[The Jews] knowingly perverted [the word of Allah], know of nothing except lies . . . commit evil and become engrossed in sin.<sup>25</sup>

Many of these words of holy hatred and others were repeated amid religious fervor at a Cairo "religious" conference in 1968.<sup>26</sup> The tone of that conference, *Arab Theologians on Jews and Israel*, was unambiguous. First the introductory remarks:

I welcome you in the name of Islam which gathered you under the banner of righteousness and good . . . as active prominent scholars, and to reinforce through you brotherhood in religion. [Dr. Mahmud Hubballah, Secretary General of the Islamic Research Academy]<sup>27</sup>



Then the proceedings, including the following unbrotherly interpretations:

The Jews . . . had resorted to their former policy and thus they deserved to be called, the worst of beasts in the Quran . . .

They are characterized by avarice and many other vices. . . . [Sheikh Abd Allah Al Meshad]<sup>28</sup>

. . . it behoves us to refer to the distortion of the Jewish creed that filled the life of Jews with perfidy and evil. . . .

Islamic tolerance is in complete contrast with Jewish intolerance and cruelty . . . I should like to say before I conclude that I have thoroughly scrutinized the nature of the Jews. They are avaricious, ruthless, cruel, hypocrite and revengeful. These traits govern their lives. [Mohammed Taha Yahia]<sup>29</sup>

The Jews' wicked nature never changes. . . . Evil, wickedness, breach of vows and money worship are inherent qualities in them. Many a time were they punished for their evil, but they never repented or gave up their sinfulness. [Kamal Ahman Own, Vice-Principal, Tanta Institute]<sup>30</sup>

Against the turbulent, uncertain, and unmistakably iniquitous background of the Arab world's Jewry, it is commonly claimed that the Jews were, during certain periods in the Arab lands, "better off" than they were in Christian lands of Europe. They were not burnt in ovens, and perhaps in part because more twentieth-century Arab-born Jews escaped with their lives, however subjugated, many contemporary Jews have romanticized their historical relations with the Arabs.

Some have not. In the mid-nineteenth century, "Benjamin II," a Rumanian Jewish traveler, wrote about his five years in the Orient and told the "Jews of Europe,"

How happy I would be if (by my book of travels) I could interest the Jews of Europe in the plight of their coreligionists who are the victims of oriental barbarism and fanaticism. Our free brethren who have the good fortune to live under liberal regimes, where they are governed by wise laws and are treated humanely will understand how deplorable and urgent is the abnormal situation of their brothers in the Orient. . . . May the Almighty One lessen the burden of so many tribulations, may he reward their heroism after centuries of slavery as well as their indomitable faith under such cruel persecutions.<sup>31</sup>

Non-Jewish European observers, too, determined that the more brotherly "spirit" enjoyed by the Jews of Europe had not penetrated the Middle East. The British consul in Jerusalem in 1839 reported:

The spirit of toleration towards the Jews is not yet known here to the same extent it is in Europe . . . still, the Jew in Jerusalem is not estimated in value much above a dog. . . .<sup>32</sup>

A Christian clergyman and traveler to the Middle East in 1858 commented sorrowfully:

It is said that in Rome the Jews never pass under Titus' Arch, but if they also keep such long memories and grudges in Muslim lands, I do not see where they can walk.<sup>33</sup>

Somehow the brutal facts have been replaced by crueler fiction. Even some Jewish historians—who have themselves placed time and cause of Arab persecution, who have themselves chronicled a detailed calendar of horrors over many centuries in their own works—even these historians have demonstrated an inability to fathom or, perhaps, to accept the implications of the history they themselves have uncovered. Thus, among the presentations of documented Arab atrocities perpetrated against the Jews, there is in some volumes a recurrent theme of the particular author's discomfort with the subject and his findings, and even a peculiar sort of apologia for having bared them. "Although the slaughter was violently anti-Jewish, we cannot say that this was true anti-Semitism. Anti-Semitism did not exist historically in Arab countries." The problem lies in the susceptibility to misinterpretation, in the risk of being taken literally—but out of context. In the example just quoted above, the "fact" that might remain in the reader's mind is "Anti-Semitism did not exist historically in Arab countries." Although one or two or a dozen experts might understand that the writer was making an obtuse differentiation, the vast majority of readers, using the work for superficial reference or information, might be expected to perpetuate the myth further.

In one case, a historian wanted to make the point that, "though violent, these crises were of a passing nature." "These crises" were the senseless bloodlust, brutality, and premeditated torture of Jews by the Almohads in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, which the author had just described on the preceding pages in the following fashion: "The chronicles of the Jewish communities of North Africa repeat the same phrases *again and again*: 'They plundered all the Jews. . . . They carried off so many Jews. . . . They slaughtered so many women, so many children, so many Jews. . . . Who can know our unhappiness. . . . Those that survived the mob were mowed down by death . . .'" and more. The historian cited the "plaint" of a famous Jewish poet in his illustration of the "sufferings of the Jews of North Africa," where "Jews became the victim of every crisis."<sup>34</sup> Yet, perhaps unwittingly supporting the contention that the "crises were . . . *passing*,"\* that otherwise extensively helpful compilation omitted the pivotal fact that the Sephardic (Oriental, non-European) Jewish world's leading scholar of the period, Maimonides, was forced to leave his home in Fez as the result of Muslim rage at his letter to the Moroccan and Tunisian Jews, an "epistle" commiserating with their persecution. The historian in question wrote that Maimonides' family stayed in Fez, Morocco, "so safe a town" that they lived in a house in the Moslem medina, "he taught in the Mosque," and only noted cryptically that "he left Fez in 1165 for Palestine and later for Egypt." Then, a few paragraphs later, the same

\*Emphasis added.

historian wrote that, "In Morocco, the condition of the Jews deteriorated further."<sup>35</sup> Allowing for poor translation—a possibility—this book and some others, when examined closely, seem to exhibit a prevalent tendency to reject the unpleasant conclusions that follow from their own findings, even though the works contribute valuable documentation in little-known areas. One such ambivalent historian was interviewed for this book, and his revealing comments to a Syrian escapee appear in Chapter 6.

Some noted historians have confronted the myth of "equality" for Jews among Arabs. A few concluded significantly that it might be *Muslims* who inspired the *Christians* to certain anti-Jewish discriminations. One historian pointed out that it was "the [12th century] *Almohad* example which *decided Christendom to adopt the . . . measure*" of forcing Jews to wear the humiliating yellow badge or other "distinctive mark,"\* which *Christians did not institute until a century later*.<sup>36</sup>

Another distinguished Orientalist, Bernard Lewis, reached the conclusion that

The golden age of equal rights was a myth, and belief in it was a result, more than a cause, of Jewish sympathy for Islam. The myth was invented by Jews in 19th century Europe as a reproach to Christians—and taken up by Muslims in our own time as a reproach to Jews.

. . . European travelers to the East in the age of liberalism and emancipation are almost unanimous in deploring the degraded and precarious position of Jews in Muslim countries, and the dangers and humiliations to which they were subject. Jewish scholars, acquainted with the history of Islam and with the current situation in Islamic lands, can have no illusions on this score.<sup>[37]</sup> [Arminius] Vambery is unambiguous: "I do not know any more miserable, helpless, and pitiful individual on God's earth than the *Jahudi* in those countries. . . . The poor Jew is despised, belabored and tortured alike by Moslem, Christian and Brahmin. . . ."<sup>38</sup>

In some places and under special circumstances, life was allowed to be more civil, when the individual ruler was just or kindly or where the colonial protector tempered or restrained the inclinations of the local populace. During those intermittent periods when the Arab countries were under Turkish, French, or British colonial rule, at some times a relatively less insecure, occasionally even financially flourishing—albeit unequal and separated—Jewish community was permitted. But the operative word is "relatively"—the conditions for Jews under the "best" of circumstances in the Arab world must be viewed in the proper perspective.

During isolated periods, Christians in the lands of Islam were more severely persecuted and oppressed by pogroms than were Jews. In the Middle Ages, for instance, and to some extent ever since, the Christians became an enemy threat to the Muslims, suspected as a potential fifth column, and regarded as a security risk.

\*Emphasis added.

Most of the Christian community fled to more comfortable, Christian-dominated regions, however. The Jews remained—at best the sole *dhimmi* minority to be “tolerated” in many of the Arab countries, particularly North Africa—with no place to go and no outside affiliation or political power sufficient to protest against their oppressive “protected” treatment.

It was with the advent of Israel, when the Jews finally gained the political protection of their own liberation movement, that the contemptible *dhimmi* role was replaced. To the Arabs, the Jews became perceived as Zionists—the infidel European-inspired “fifth column.”

An eloquent illustration of the Arabs’ altered attitude toward the Jews was expressed in 1951 during a private conversation between the Iraqi Prime Minister and an eminent Arab historian. The historian asked whether it would not be wiser for the Iraqi government to defer lifting the ban on Jewish exits from Iraq until “the Palestinian and refugee problems are settled.”\* The Iraqi Premier replied,

The Jews have always been and will be forever a source of evil and mischief for Iraq. They are spies. . . . They do not possess land which they can sow. So how will they live? What would they do if they remained in Iraq? No, my friend, we had better get rid of them, so long as the opportunity for getting rid of them is open.<sup>40</sup>

The transformation of the Arab attitude toward Jews—from capricious “toleration” and prejudice of a harmless, safely scorned, and intimidated minority, to fierce and active hatred of the Jewish presence as an enemy force—was evidenced frequently in Arab statements such as the following:

The Jews in the Arab countries have not respected the defense that Islam has given them for generations. They have encouraged World Zionism and Israel in every way in its aggression against the Arabs. . . . The Congress hereby declares that the Jews in the Muslim countries whose ties with Zionism and Israel are proved shall be regarded as fighters against the Muslims, unfit for the patronage and protection which the Muslim faith prescribes for adherents of peaceful protected faiths.<sup>41</sup>

Numerous official Arab Ministry of Education materials have been produced to prepare the present adult Arab generation for its continuation of “harmony” among Arabs and Jews.

The following are a few examples from publications officially distributed by the Ministries of Education in various Arab countries:<sup>42</sup>

\*Another Iraqi, ex-Premier Muzahim el Pachachi, also urged Iraq to delay the Jews’ leavetaking. Pachachi recognized the implications of the massive Jewish exodus to Israel and Iraq’s confiscation of their property. Thus, he suggested, the government should consult the member states of the Arab League so that a united policy on Jewish immigration from Arab countries could be formulated. “We should study the question of whether it would not be possible to *exchange* our Jews for the Arabs of Israel or the Palestine Arab refugees.”<sup>19</sup> (Emphasis added.)

Jordan, 1966, for third-year junior high school: *Modern World History*. For example, "The Jews in Europe were persecuted and despised because of their corruption, meanness and treachery."

Jordan, 1964, department for school curricula and textbooks, for first-year high school: *Glances at Arab Society*, p. 117. An exercise: "Israel was born to die. Prove it."

Syria, Damascus, 1963–64, for second-year junior high school: *The Religious Ordinances Reader*, p. 138. For example: "The Jews . . . lived exiled and despised since by their nature they are vile, greedy and enemies of mankind."

Syria, 1963, fifth-year elementary school: *Basic Syntax and Spelling*. An exercise: "We Shall Expel All the Jews." For example, "Analyze the following sentences: 1. The merchant himself travelled to the African continent. 2. We shall expel all the Jews from the Arab countries."

Egypt, 1965, Egyptian State Seal, for first-year junior high school: *Grammar*, p. 244. An exercise: "The Arabs do not cease to act for the extermination of Israel."

U.A.R. (Egypt), for ninth-grade secondary schools: *Zionist Imperialism*, by Abbad Muhmud Al-Akkad, p. 249. ". . . Israel hopes to be the homeland of the Jew, and they have the stubbornness of 4,000 years of history behind them. But Israel shall not live if the Arabs stand fast in their hatred. She shall wither and decline. Even if all the human race, and the devil in Hell, conspire to aid her, she shall not exist."<sup>43</sup>

Among the many examples, a Jordanian textbook for use in second-year high school asserts that the God of Judaism "is a God who . . . is bloodthirsty, fickle minded, harsh and greedy . . . pleased with imposture and deceit."

The anti-Semitic literature published by the Arabs since World War II has been voluminous, and is continually increasing, despite the almost total evacuation of the Arab world's Jews.<sup>44</sup>

The virulence of this literature is disturbing, but even more significant is the official or governmental origin of the publications—not from an extremist fringe, which might be lightly dismissed, but from Arab governments, including those called "moderate."

Arab propagandists and sympathizers have persisted in the charge that Israel is a foreign outpost of Western civilization, the intruding offspring of Europe inhabited by European survivors of Nazi brutality. In actuality, more than half of the people in Israel today are Jews or offspring of Jews who lived in Arab countries and have fled from Arab brutality; Israel's present population consists mainly of refugees and their descendants from two oppressions, European-Nazi and Arab. As the Arab writer Sabri Jiryis has acknowledged, either by official edict or by the Arab's own harsh mistreatment of the Jews among them, the Arab world has expelled or has caused Jews to flee to Israel. Were the facts popularly recognized, the Arab propaganda claim of a "European" Israel would long ago have been refuted. The Arabs have long helped to make the Jewish state predominantly an "Oriental" Israel of Jews from Arab lands.

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## Last Year and Next Year in Jerusalem: Zionism in the Arab World and the Holy Land

My heart is in the East and I am at the  
uttermost West.

—Judah Halevi, 1086–1141

The mode of conducting Jewish affairs  
among themselves . . . is entirely  
in Hebrew, which ancient custom  
they are very tenacious of and  
desirous to maintain.

—W. T. Young, British Consul in Jerusalem, 1839

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**C**learly the massive exodus of Jewish refugees from the Arab countries was triggered largely by the Arabs' own Nazi-like bursts of brutality, which had become the lot of the Jewish communities. Walter Laqueur writes: "History has always shown that . . . men and women have chosen to leave their native country only when facing intolerable pressure."<sup>1</sup> But the history is long of persecution against Jews by the Arabs, a chronicle of "intolerable pressure" that had its beginnings in and took its inspiration from the seventh-century book of the creator of Islam.

History has also illustrated that persecution and its pressures become "intolerable" only when an alternative other than death is provided. The Arab-born Jews suffered in silence until they learned that they could act out their hope of getting to a Jewish state.

They bore their burdens as did many peoples of the world before and until the United States became the universal haven of the oppressed. Yet the hapless black peoples who had been brought to America as slaves could not even begin to alleviate *their* oppression and exploitation here until they began to gain the freedoms and thus the strength to resist and insist upon their rights—rights that are in some areas yet to be achieved.

There is no doubt that the long-sought Jewish national homeland was finally brought into being by a horrified, conscience-stricken international community, which viewed Israel as a necessary refuge for Jews throughout the world who had

become victims of the Nazis or their followers. However, after World War I, in 1918, nearly half of the total Jewish population in Jerusalem consisted of "Sephardic" Jews—that is, the Jews of the Middle East, non-European Jewry.<sup>2</sup> And it cannot be denied that the overwhelming majority of hundreds of thousands of Jewish refugees fleeing from Arab persecution *also* poured directly into Israel—in fulfillment of an unflagging, little-known "Zionism," a national liberation movement among Arab-born Jews whose gestation period had lasted roughly two thousand years.

From the Arab conquest, hundreds of thousands of Jews in the Arab world managed to survive between traditional ravages. Most had religious affiliations. The Arabs' general prohibition against political activities by their Jewish *dhimmi*s might have been a factor that inhibited and submerged the growth of Zionism as a political phenomenon among the Sephardic Jews. But what may be called a "spiritual Zionism" took root in biblical times in the Sephardic Jewish community; those Jews, who are uniquely indigenous to the terrain that now is the Arab world, have retained in their liturgy the steady longing for "return" to the Land of Israel, a longing that has been mistakenly assumed to be exclusively "European."

Jews from Arab countries often become incensed when confronted with the argument that Zionism originated in Europe. Every Sephardic Jew interviewed had the same immediate reaction: the Sephardim are just as truly believers in Zion, and their ancient uninterrupted Jewish history led directly from the destruction of the Temple at Jerusalem.

They too were descendants of the original exiles, and, unlike their Western Jewish brothers, their empathy with the Bible was not dependent upon "unyielding interpretations," because Sephardic Jews lived in close proximity to the world of the Bible and could more easily relate to it. During an interview with an eminent Jewish scholar from Tunisia, I mistakenly likened the Sephardic Jewish communities, which have burgeoned in Israel and elsewhere since the Jews' exodus from Arab countries, to the European "shtetl." The scholar promptly corrected that assumption, somewhat bitterly and with alacrity. He explained that

They are more like our own "*mellah*" or "*hara*," which many people probably never heard of. Zionism was in the Arab countries with every prayer we uttered—for millennia before Herzl.

## The Jewish Presence

The Jewish presence in "the Holy Land"—at times tenuous—persisted throughout its bloody history. In fact, the Jewish claim—whether Arab-born or European-born Jew—to the land now called Palestine does not depend on a two-thousand-year-old promise. Buried beneath the propaganda—which has it that Jews "returned" to the Holy Land after two thousand years of separation, where

they found crowds of “indigenous Palestinian Arabs”—is the bald fact that the Jews are indigenous people on that land who never left, but who have continuously stayed on their “Holy Land.” Not only were there the little-known Oriental Jewish communities in adjacent Arab lands, but there had been an unceasing strain of “Oriental” or “Palestinian” Jews in “Palestine” for millennia.<sup>3</sup>

The Reverend James Parkes, an authority on Jewish/non-Jewish relations in the Middle East, assessed the Zionists’ “real title deeds” in 1949.<sup>4</sup>

It was, perhaps, inevitable that Zionists should look back to the heroic period of the Maccabees and Bar-Cochba, but their real title deeds were written by the less dramatic but equally heroic endurance of those who had maintained the Jewish presence in The Land all through the centuries, and in spite of every discouragement. This page of Jewish history found no place in the constant flood of Zionist propaganda. . . . The omission allowed the anti-Zionists, whether Jewish, Arab, or European, to paint an entirely false picture of the wickedness of Jewry trying to re-establish a two thousand-year-old claim to the country, indifferent to everything that had happened in the intervening period. It allowed a picture of The Land as a territory which had once been “Jewish,” but which for many centuries had been “Arab.” In point of fact any picture of a total change of population is false. . . .

It was only “*politically*” that the Jews lost their land, as Parkes reminded us. They never abandoned it physically, nor did they renounce their claim to their nation—the only continuous claim that exists. The Jews never submitted to assimilation into the various victorious populations even after successive conquerors had devastated the Jewish organizational structure. But, more important, despite becoming “much enfeebled in numbers and deprived both of political and social leaders and of skilled craftsmen,”<sup>5</sup> the Jews, in addition to their spiritual roots, managed to remain in varying numbers *physically at all times* on the land.

Thus, despite “physical violence against Jews and pagans” by the post-Roman Christians, more than forty Jewish communities survived and could be traced in the sixth century—“twelve towns on the coast, in the Negev, and east of the Jordan [land that was part of the Palestine Mandate, called Transjordan in 1922, and declared the “Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan” only thirty-odd years ago] and thirty-one villages in Galilee and in the Jordan Valley.”<sup>6</sup>

In A.D. 438 the Jews from Galilee optimistically declared, “the end of the exile of our people” when the Empress Eudocia allowed the Jews to pray again at their holy temple site.<sup>7</sup> Recent archaeological discoveries determine that in A.D. 614 the Jews fought along with the Persian invaders of Palestine, “overwhelmed the Byzantine garrison in Jerusalem,” and controlled that city for five years.<sup>8</sup> By the time the Arabs conquered the land two decades later, the Jews “had suffered three centuries of Christian intolerance, and monkish violence had been spasmodic during at least half of that period.”<sup>9</sup> And the Jews hopefully welcomed the Arab conquerors.

The Muslim Arabs who entered seventh-century Jerusalem found a strong Jewish identity. At that time, “*we have evidence that Jews lived in all parts of the*



country and on both sides of the Jordan, and that they dwelt in both the towns and the villages, practicing both agriculture and various handicrafts.”\* A number of Jews lived in Lydda and Ramle—which have been identified by modern propaganda and even by more serious documents as historically “purely Arab” towns. “Large and important communities” of Jews lived “in such places as Ascalon, Caesarea and above all Gaza, which the Jews . . . had made a kind of capital [when] . . . they were excluded from Jerusalem.”<sup>10</sup>

Jericho was home to many Jews<sup>11</sup>—the seventh-century Jewish refugees from Khaibar in Arabia among them. Khaibar had been a thriving Jewish community to the north of Mecca and Medina. After the Jews had “defended their forts and mansions with signal heroism,” the Prophet Muhammad had “visited upon his beaten enemy inhuman atrocities,” and “by the mass massacre of . . . men, women and children,” the Prophet of Islam exterminated “completely” two Arabian Jewish tribes.<sup>12</sup>

The consequences of the war were catastrophic. For centuries the Jews of Khaibar had led a life of freedom, peace, labor and trade; now they had to bow under the yoke of slavery and degradation. They had prided themselves on the purity of their family life; now their women and daughters were distributed among and carried away by the conquerors.<sup>13</sup>

An Arab “notable” from Medina, who visited the site of hostilities afterward, was quoted by a ninth-century Arab historian:

Before the Moslem occupation, whenever there was a famine in the land, people would go to Khaibar. . . . The Jews always had fruit, and their springs yielded a plentiful supply of water. After the conquest of Khaibar, the Jews were said to design evil schemes against the Moslems. But hunger pressed us to go to their fields. . . . We found the landscape completely changed. We met none of the rich Khaibar landowners, but only destitute farmers everywhere . . . When we moved on to Kuteiba we felt much relieved. . . .<sup>14</sup>

The Jewish survivors from the area surrounding Khaibar were expelled from “the Arabian Peninsula” when the extent of the Muslim conquest was sufficient to add enough Arab farmers and replace the detested Jews.† Based on the Prophet Muhammad’s theory, Caliph Omar implemented the decree “Let not two religions co-exist within the Arabian Peninsula.”<sup>15</sup>

The Arab theologians’ 1968 conference, 1,300 years later, continued to justify the Khaibar extermination of its Jews. One participant explained:

. . . Omar . . . got experience that the Jews were the callers and instigators of the sedition at any time and everywhere. He purified Arabia from them. Most of them dwelt at Khaibar and its neighborhood. That was because he was informed that the Prophet said while he was dying: “Never do two religions exist in Arabia.” [Sheikh Abd Allah Al Meshad]<sup>16</sup>

\*Emphasis added.

†See Chapter 8.

Another Arab participant at that conference emphasized,

All people want to get rid of the Jews by hook or by crook. . . . People are not prejudiced against them but the Jewish evil and the various wicked aspects . . . are quite clear. . . .

When Bani Qoraiza were punished, an end was put to the Jews of Madina. Those Jews had been the strongest, the richest and the most pernicious and harmful ones. They had been deeply rooted in the society and they had had a high rank and an important status. . . .

Some orientalist ignore the various reasons why the Jews of Khaibar and others were punished. . . . These orientalist alleged that the invasion of Khaibar was launched because the Prophet wished to reward the Muslims of Hodaibeya and comfort them. . . . but we have mentioned the most evident reasons of the punishment befalling the Jews. The question of the booty is casual and always subsidiary for waging the wars of the Prophet. It is mentioned in the Verses of the Quran about *Jihad* [holy war] as a secondary reason for striving against the Unbelievers. [Muhammad Azzah Darwaza]<sup>17</sup>

The seventh-century Jewish refugees from Khaibar's environs joined the indigenous Jewish population in "Transjordan, especially in Dera'a." In fact, Arabian Jewish exiles settled "as far as the hills of Hebron," but had they not "intermarried" with the established Jewish communities and connected somehow to the "Diaspora centers, they [the Jewish settlements] could hardly have survived as Jewish communities for hundreds of years." A settled Jewish community was present then in the northern Transjordanian city of Hamadan, "or Amatus" —"a city famed for its palms"—in the area that one day would be part of the League of Nations\* Mandated "Jewish National Home" in Palestine.<sup>18</sup>

The Christian Crusaders of the eleventh century were merciless but unsuccessful in their efforts to remove any vestige of Jewish tradition. In 1165, Benjamin of Tudela, the renowned Spanish traveler, found that the "Academy of Jerusalem" had been established at Damascus. Although the Crusaders had almost "wiped out" the Jewish communities of Jerusalem, Acre, Caesarea and Haifa, some Jews remained, and whole "village communities of Galilee survived."

Acre became the seat of a Jewish academy in the thirteenth century. And while "many may have merged themselves into the local population, Christian or Muslim," the Jews "stayed, to share and suffer from the disorder" of the aftermath of the Crusaders' "feudalism,"<sup>19</sup> resisting conversion. During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, "there was a constant trickle of Jewish immigrants into the country . . . some from other Islamic territories and especially North Africa."<sup>20</sup>

Jews from Gaza, Ramle, and Safed were considered the "ideal guides" in the Holy Land in the fourteenth century, as Jacques of Verona, a visiting Christian monk, attested. After the Christian had "noted the long established Jewish community at the foot of Mount Zion, in Jerusalem," he wrote,

\*See Chapter 12.

A pilgrim who wished to visit ancient forts and towns in the Holy Land would have been unable to locate these, without a good guide who knew the Land well, or without one of the Jews who lived there. The Jews were able to recount the history of these places since this knowledge had been handed down from their forefathers and wise men.

So when I journeyed overseas I often requested and managed to obtain an excellent guide among the Jews who lived there.<sup>21</sup>

In 1438 a rabbi from Italy became the spiritual leader of the Jewish community in Jerusalem,<sup>22</sup> and fifty years afterward, another Italian scholar, Obadiah de Bertinoro, founded the Jerusalem rabbinical school that dealt authoritatively “in rabbinic matters among the Jewish communities of the Islamic world.”<sup>23</sup>

The Jews, meanwhile, were plentiful enough so that in 1486 “a distinguished pilgrim” to the Holy Land, the Dean of Mainz Cathedral, Bernhard von Breidenbach, advised that both Hebron’s and Jerusalem’s Jews “will treat you in full fidelity—more so than anyone else in those countries of the unbelievers.”<sup>24</sup>

The “Ishmaelite,” or Islamic-born, Jewish immigration to the Holy Land was prominent, and became intensified after the Spanish Inquisition. The Holy Land’s throbbing, spirited Jewish life continued, even in Hebron, where “the prosperous Jewish community . . . had been plundered, many Jews killed and the survivors forced to flee” in 1518, three years after Ottoman rule began. By 1540, Hebron’s Jewry had recovered and reconstructed its Jewish Quarter, while the first Jewish printing press outside Europe was instituted in Safed in 1563.<sup>25</sup>

Under Turkish rule the Jews in Jerusalem and in Gaza maintained “cultural and spiritual unity,” and Sultan Suleiman I allowed many Jews “to return to the Holy Land.” In 1561, “Suleiman gave Tiberias, one of the four Jewish holy cities, to a former ‘secret’ Jew from Portugal, Don Joseph Nasi, who rebuilt the city and the villages around it.” Nasi’s efforts attracted Jewish settlement from many areas of the Mediterranean.<sup>26</sup> And those “Ishmaelite” Jewish communities that did not or could not make the pilgrimage were nonetheless spiritually attached to their brothers in the Holy Land.

## **Sephardic Zionism**

Nearly every one of the recurrent “false Messiahs” who attempted to play the Messianic role in leading the Jewish people back to Israel were apparently Sephardic Jews.<sup>27</sup> One Messianic movement was started by two Sephardic Jews who attempted to negotiate with the Pope in 1524. When they failed to convince him of a plan that would liberate Palestine for the Jews, another proposal was made to the German emperor, Charles V, after which both would-be Messiahs were arrested and jailed.<sup>28</sup> One, Solomon Molcho, was burned to death, “a martyr’s death,” and the other, David Reubeni, “a mysterious character,” disappeared, leaving his diary behind.<sup>29</sup>

Shabbetai Zevi, who along with his prophet, Nathan of Gaza, is considered

“the most outstanding” Messianic pretender, was born in 1626 in Asia Minor, son of “Mordechai of Smyrna.” Zevi’s followers came from “Amsterdam to Yemen, from the eastern frontier of Poland to the outlying villages in the Atlas Mountains of North Africa.” His unparalleled ability to lead the receptive Jewish people “back” was attributed by Gershom Scholem, the foremost authority on Zevi and his Sabbatean movement, to “the general atmosphere within Jewry,” which was “more decisive in shaping the movement than the peculiar spiritual state of the youthful . . . Sabbatai Sevi.”<sup>30</sup> Because the seventeenth century was fraught with persecution for both Sephardic and Western (Ashkenazic) Jews, “penitents and seekers of liberty—rich and poor, scholars and the ignorant—thus united round” the Messianic movement.

It was Zevi himself who was the “weakest of its leaders”—“in 1666 . . . the Jews who saw him entering the sultan’s palace” never dreamed that “the messiah had adopted . . . Islam.” But Zevi had done exactly that, upon “being threatened with great physical punishment and even death.” Because of Zevi’s conversion, one writer says that “The greater part of Jewry was shaken to the core. The blow was even greater than the crucifixion of Jesus had been to his followers.”<sup>31</sup> The disillusionment was shattering; “Jesus had paid the highest price that could be demanded from a man, but Shabbetai had not.”<sup>32</sup> Zevi “fell into a state of deep depression” after his conversion, then recovered and “went wandering from community to community, preaching . . .” and committing “strange actions” afterward. The letter of renunciation of his former visions, which Zevi had been “compelled” by a “strict rabbinical court” to sign in Venice two years after his conversion, remained intact.<sup>33</sup>

Although I have declared that I saw the *Merkava* as Ezekiel the prophet saw it and the prophecy declared that Shabbetai Zevi is the Messiah, the Rabbis and Geonim of Venice have ruled that I am in error and there was nothing real in that vision. I have therefore admitted their words and say that what I prophesied regarding Shabbetai Zevi has no substance.<sup>34</sup>

Shabbetai Zevi died at fifty in 1676.

Another prominent Sephardic Zionist was Spanish-born Rabbi Manasseh ben Israel, a major seventeenth-century Jewish scholar. Rabbi ben Israel became convinced that England—which had no Jewish population for three hundred years—was holding back the redemption and return to the Holy Land. The horror of the Spanish Inquisition, he maintained, had fulfilled part of the biblical requisite—the suffering—but the Bible had promised to restore the Jews to Israel only after they had also been dispersed to every part of the world.

Since ben Israel had ascertained that some settlers in America were Jewish, he concluded that only England—bereft of Jews—stood in the way of “return.” In a formal “declaration” to the British, he explained that “. . . before the Messiah come . . . first we must have our seat here likewise.” For good measure, he strengthened his argument by stressing the economic benefits England could

derive through imports and exports from Jewish merchants throughout the world. The British may have considered other factors more determinative, but some historians credit Rabbi ben Israel as the direct force that brought about the re-entry of the Jews to England.<sup>35</sup>

There have been Sephardic Jewish "Zionists" from the time of the biblical exile of the Jews from Jerusalem in 586 B.C. "It is common knowledge that religious life in the Diaspora was bound up with the Holy Land and with the Temple so long as it existed. The connection of Cyrene, Carthage and the rest of North Africa with Palestine was in fact quite strong."<sup>36</sup>

"Jason of Cyrene" wrote a five-volume work about Palestine, where he arrived during the Hasmonean Revolt.<sup>37</sup> The pilgrimages to Jerusalem by Libyan Jews were recorded in the Bible,<sup>38</sup> as was the Jerusalem synagogue that was named after them.<sup>39</sup> "Simon the Cyrenian" was one of many of the Libyan pilgrims who remained in Jerusalem. It was Simon who was reported by the New Testament to have been "a chance passerby just arrived from the country," who "was forced to take part in the crucifixion."<sup>40</sup>

The holiday of Passover, commemorating the Jews' return from exile in Egypt to the Holy Land of Israel, was not celebrated differently by eleventh-century "Palestinian Jews" than by modern Jews around the world. It was when the Jews left Egypt, no longer slaves, that they became organized—a people with the prospect of returning to their land.<sup>41</sup> Passover service for Jews everywhere concludes with the words, "Next year in Jerusalem." Sephardic clergy explain rather impatiently that the basic Sephardic liturgy is "much the same" as the European, although the Sephardim are particularly proud of the indigenous poetry that enhances their religious literature.

In fact, much of the universal Jewish liturgical devotion to the Holy Land has been adopted from Sephardic Jewish scholars. An important example is the venerated twelfth-century rabbinical scholar and poet, Jehudah Halevi, whose words became a prominent part of the universal Jewish liturgy—"My heart is in the East and I at the uttermost West . . ." and "Ode to Zion,"<sup>42</sup> among others.

Halevi was also a pragmatist who wrote serious treatises on the theme that became the foundation of modern Zionism—rather than languish in exile, he stressed, the Jews themselves must take the first step and the Messiah would come later. Faithful to his enjoinder, Halevi left his thriving family and career as a physician, and set out from Spain in the twelfth century on what was then the hazardous journey to Palestine.

Halevi was warned by friends and compatriots when he broke journey in Egypt, according to his German biographies. But after resting, he resisted their attempts to dissuade him from continuing: "In Egypt, Providence showed itself in a hurry as it were; it settled down permanently in the Holy Land only," Halevi wrote. His German biographer likened Goethe's Faust to Halevi's "highest moment"—"when he first set eyes on the Holy City, as it came into his view between the mountains." Halevi "wanted to walk barefooted over the heap of ruins that

had once been the Temple." According to traditional history, he had barely arrived at the gates of Jerusalem and was kissing the stones of hallowed land, when he was slain by an Arab tribesman.<sup>43</sup>

The concept of the "return" of the Jews from exile to the biblical homeland in Zion—the promised land—was an integral part of Jewish life everywhere, but nowhere was it more fervently held or more inextricably interwoven with daily life and long-range hope than among the Sephardim. They were intense in their religious observances. Some of the most perceptive and distinguished Jewish scholars came from "Arab" countries, and the revered Babylonian Talmud was compiled in what is now Iraq. The Sephardic Jews were diligent in their religious pursuits, and would have disdained any open attempt to deviate from the flexible norm of religious observance. The synagogues in many *haras* or *mellahs* were the hub of social life as well as a moral duty.

Jewish communities were tightly knit, and their interpersonal relationships attained the close warmth of an extended family. They spoke their prayers with understanding and expectation of eventual fulfillment. Their implorations for deliverance from the austerity of exile in foreign lands, and the promised ingathering of the Jews back in the Holy Land was, for many of them, not mere cant recited by rote, but a sincere profession of anticipation and desire.

Scattered throughout the vast extent of what became the Arab world, and isolated within it during all the centuries of harsh Arab rule that came after their exile, the Sephardic Jews looked forward to this realization of a prophecy. Although from time to time manifested in the temporary acceptance of one Messianic pretender or another who would lead them back to Zion, the eventual debunking of these self-anointed zealots did not diminish hope.

Their synagogues, as every synagogue in the world theoretically, were constructed so that the worshiper would be directed toward Jerusalem—when he entered, upon facing the Torah (holy scrolls), and when he or she stood to pray.<sup>44</sup> Even in the most isolated Jewish troglodyte communities of southern Tunisia or the remote island of Djerba, the prayers which were offered were much the same as those in the services of a modern American synagogue.<sup>45</sup> Whether said three times a day, as prescribed by pre-eminent religious Jewish scholars in Arab and European countries alike, or recited at dawn and sunset—when the Tunisian Jews from troglodyte villages around Matmata<sup>46</sup> came out of their limestone caves to pray—the prayers always<sup>47</sup> included the plea to

. . . Sound the great Shofar for our freedom; . . . bring our exiles together and assemble us from the four corners of the earth. Blessed art thou, O Lord, who gatherest the dispersed of thy people Israel to return in mercy to the city Jerusalem; . . . rebuild it soon, in our days. . . . Blessed art thou, O Lord, Builder of Jerusalem.<sup>48</sup>

Perhaps the most unfortunate among the Jews in Arab countries took their prayers more literally than the relatively secure. Many orthodox Jewish victims of European persecution also turned inward toward hope of redemption, while

many others observed fewer symbolic traditions—European Jewish citizens who obstinately believed themselves “assimilated” up until the decree of a death sentence by Hitler’s Nuremberg Laws or their precursors. But for the Jews in the Arab Muslim world, “assimilation” was a contradiction in terms, as impossible in the twentieth century as it had been a thousand years before.

For virtually all Sephardic Jews, religious life was active, and was integrally connected to the “Palestinian center.”<sup>49</sup> Because Jerusalem had been sacred to Jews fifteen centuries before the Prophet Muhammad was born—just as Mecca and Medina are sacred to Muslims because the Prophet Muhammad lived and worked there<sup>50</sup>—over the centuries the dispersed Oriental Jews continuously sent offerings to Jerusalem. There a Jewish center had been established near the “Western” or “Wailing Wall,” the sacred ruin at the site of the original Temple built by King Solomon, and the site too of the Jews’ Second Temple that the Romans had destroyed in A.D. 70.

Though the Jewish refugees from Arab lands in the twentieth century had no international multigovernment assistance agency, as the Arab refugees have had UNRWA, the latter-day outpouring of Jewish funds to modern Israel for its refugees stemmed from an ancient tradition. Historian S. D. Goitein tells of the disgrace that befell an eleventh-century Tunisian Jewish community because it had failed to make its “annual appeal for the Academy of Jerusalem” promptly. However, the community “assures us that the Jerusalem appeal was carried through, . . . albeit belatedly,” and thus, redeemed itself.

As an amusing example of the geographical diversity of “Palestine’s” jurisdiction over the Jews in Diaspora,

A Jewish court in *India* . . . issues, in the year 1132, a [proprietary] document for a local girl and a merchant from *Tunisia* in the name of exilarch of *Baghdad* and of the *Palestinian* Gaon [Chief Rabbi], who at that time had his seat at Cairo.\*<sup>51</sup>

Jewish schools in the Mediterranean Diaspora prayed for the “welfare of dedicated community leaders at the holy places in Jerusalem.”<sup>52</sup> The “synagogue of the Palestinians,” † which described itself in legal documents as “acting on behalf of the High Court of the yeshiva [academy] of Jerusalem and its head . . .”<sup>53</sup> was the main synagogue of Old Cairo, Alexandria, Ramle, Damascus, and Aleppo in the eleventh century. Documents have been found attesting to Jewish

\*Emphasis added.

†The centuries-old traditional use of the term “Palestinian” to describe Jews provides forceful repudiation of the present popular usage of “Palestinian”—to denote exclusively the Arab refugees. The psychological propaganda benefit derived by the Arabs from annexing the word “Palestinian,” to designate only Arabs, is considerable: if the Arab refugees are seen as *the* “Palestinians,” the world reaction becomes conditioned to identifying the Arab “Palestinian” refugees with Palestine. Although the greatest bulk of Palestine is known today as Jordan, this fact has become obscured. There appears today no popularly known “Palestine” except the smaller area which became Israel, so the perceived connection between Arab Palestinian refugees and Israel will follow. Thus, the misstatement now in common use: “Palestine became Israel.” See Chapters 8 and 12.

cultural and spiritual life in a "sizeable" fourteenth-century Jewish community at Bilbays, a town "on the caravan route from Cairo to Palestine," even after it had been subjected to forced conversion to Islam *en masse*, and its synagogue turned into a mosque.<sup>54</sup>

Pilgrimages such as Rabbi Halevi's or Maimonides' were frequently made with great difficulty from all corners of the Arab world. And the inspiration for the Spanish-born Halevi was provided by the writings of a native of Fez, Morocco, the eleventh-century Rabbi Isaac Alfassi, who was called "the symbol of Hebrew scholarship in North Africa."<sup>55</sup> Complaints were in fact registered about the heavy burden of maintaining the way stations in Egypt's Jewish community, where Jewish pilgrims en route to the Holy Land "expected to be equipped" for the rest of the arduous trip.<sup>56</sup>

Documents recording the modern history of the Jewish national liberation movement give sparse credit to the significant role of Sephardic Jews' devotion over the centuries to the philosophical and spiritual nationalism that undoubtedly prepared a base for modern Zionism. Indeed, a Sephardic Jew, Rabbi Yehudah Alkalay (1798–1878), has been called the precursor of modern Zionism. Walter Laqueur,<sup>57</sup> in a study dealing primarily with the European Zionist movement, states: "It should be noted at least in passing that another rabbi, Yehuda Alkalay, writing in Serbia . . . had already drawn up a practical program toward . . . the return to Zion"; Sephardic "Zionist" Alkalay's development came *twenty years before* the European Zionist whose work Laqueur was discussing.<sup>58</sup>

That some Jews from Arab lands were already "home" in Alkalay's time is attested to by many recorded visits and foreign consulate communications. One dispatch from the British Consulate in Jerusalem in 1839 reported that "the Jews of Algiers and its dependencies, are numerous in Palestine. . . ."<sup>59</sup> In 1843, a Christian missionary from England wrote of "the arrival" in Jerusalem of an additional "150 Jews from Algiers," and he noted: "There is now a large number of Jews here from the coast of Africa, who are about to form themselves into a separate congregation."<sup>60</sup>

Not only were the Sephardic Jews "numerous" in the Holy Land, but their language, Hebrew, was popularly used "in the ordinary affairs of life" long before the "new Jewish immigration of the early eighteen-eighties."<sup>61</sup> In 1839 British Consul Young, in Jerusalem, reported that "the mode of conducting Jewish affairs among themselves . . . is entirely in Hebrew, which ancient custom they are very tenacious of and desirous to maintain. . . ."<sup>62</sup> Young had found it "necessary" to hire a Hebrew interpreter "immediately upon his appointment in 1838."<sup>63</sup> Another British consul, James Finn, in 1850 transmitted the "translation" of a Hebrew petition from "the Moghrabi or African Jews settled in Jerusalem . . . [who] form a considerable body, increasing in numbers. . . ."<sup>64</sup>

In 1862 Finn suggested sending a Hebrew-speaking member of his staff to "the Jews of Galilee,"<sup>65</sup> and he noted in his memoirs that, "With regard to pure Hebrew, the learned world in Europe is greatly mistaken in designating this a dead language. In Jerusalem it is a living tongue of everyday utility." In fact,



Hebrew was “spoken” and widely used in the “English Consulate.”<sup>66</sup> His wife, in her own book, *Reminiscences of Elizabeth Anne Finn*, related that in everyday life as well as official business, “all the men spoke Hebrew, and I have seen men from Kabul, India and Jerusalem, meeting as total strangers, at once fall to conversing in Hebrew, which was still a thoroughly living language, for speaking as for literary and religious purposes.”<sup>67</sup> Thus, Sephardic “Zionists” found a “living” Hebrew when they arrived at “The Land.”

Simultaneously, non-Jewish “Zionists” were urging the “regeneration of Palestine” as a Jewish homeland, in part due to their horror at learning of the tortures and persecution of the Jews of Damascus following the blood libel of 1840. In June of 1842 Colonel Charles Churchill, the Duke of Marlborough’s grandson, wrote that, “in his view, the Jews ought to promote the regeneration of Palestine and the eastern Mediterranean region. Were they to do so, they would, Churchill believed, ‘end by obtaining the sovereignty of at least Palestine.’ Charles Churchill felt strongly that the Jews should resume what he described . . . as their ‘existence as a people.’ ”<sup>68</sup>

Another non-Jew reportedly espousing the Jewish nation was Napoleon Bonaparte, who launched his campaign to conquer Palestine in 1799 with a pledge to “restore the country to the Jews.”<sup>69</sup> While Napoleon was unsuccessful in his attempt, some believe he was a catalyst for

a distinguished gallery of writers, clerics, journalists, artists and statesmen [who] accompanied the awakening of the idea of Jewish restoration in Palestine. Lord Lindsay, Lord Shaftesbury (the social reformer who learned Hebrew), Lord Palmerston, Disraeli, Lord Manchester, George Eliot, Holman Hunt, Sir Charles Warren, Hall Caine—all appear among the many who spoke, wrote, organized support, or put forward practical projects by which Britain might help the return of the Jewish people to Palestine. There were some who even urged the British government to buy Palestine from the Turks to give it to the Jews to rebuild.<sup>70</sup>

Sir George Gawler, who had fought in the battle of Waterloo, wrote in 1845 that “the most sober and sensible remedy for the miseries of Asiatic Turkey” was to “Replenish the deserted towns and fields of Palestine with the energetic people whose warmest affections are rooted in the soil.” Gawler published a series of pamphlets on the theme, one on “the emancipation of the Jews,” and in 1849 he made a pilgrimage to Palestine with his friend, Jewish leader Sir Moses Montefiore.<sup>71</sup>

In 1847, Lord Lindsay declared his hopes that

The Jewish race, so wonderfully preserved, may yet have another stage of national existence opened to them, may once more obtain possession of their native land. . . . The soil of Palestine still enjoys her sabbaths, and only waits for the return of her banished children, and the application of industry, commensurate with her agricultural capabilities, to burst once more into universal luxuriance, and be all that she ever was in the days of Solomon.<sup>72</sup>

In Britain, the idea of increasing the Jewish population in Palestine to form a Jewish state took on such popular appeal<sup>73</sup> that the press repeated false rumors that Lord Beaconsfield—Benjamin Disraeli—had attempted and failed to achieve the restoration of Jewish Palestine, and asserted that “If he had freed the Holy Land and restored the Jews, as he might have done instead of pottering about Roumelia and Afghanistan, he would have died dictator.”<sup>74</sup>

Meanwhile, thousands of miles distant, more than 2,000 Yemenite Jews were setting out on the perilous journey to their homeland, where they would arrive in 1881. There the “first enduring Jewish agricultural settlement in modern Palestine”—Petach Tikvah—was founded on the “deserted and ruined” Sharon Plain by “old-time” Palestinian Jewish families who left “the overcrowded Jewish Quarter of the Old City of Jerusalem” in 1878. It was four years later that what is called the first *aliyah* (Hebrew), a great wave of Jewish European refugees, would settle on the land.<sup>75</sup> Theodor Herzl came with his own concept of modern Zionism, but not until many years afterward. In fact, Theodor Herzl’s grandfather reportedly attended the Sephardic Zionist Yehudah Alkalay’s synagogue in Semlin, Serbia, and the two frequently visited. The grandfather “had his hands on” one of the first copies of Alkalay’s 1857 work<sup>76</sup> prescribing the “return of the Jews to the Holy Land and renewed glory of Jerusalem.” Contemporary scholars conclude that Herzl’s own implementation of modern Zionism was undoubtedly influenced by that relationship.<sup>77</sup>

Alkalay was subjected to “scornful criticism” for his unorthodox dream: “that all of Israel should return to the land of our fathers.” Alkalay was perhaps the first to write of the “Damascus Affair”—the blood libel of 1840—and that episode apparently crystallized his “daring” ideas. “Complacent dwellers in foreign lands” must be chastened by the suffering of the Jews in Damascus.<sup>78</sup> Intent upon unifying a worldwide Jewish coalition for nationhood, in 1874 Alkalay immigrated to Jerusalem at the age of seventy-six.<sup>79</sup> Although he is cited in some authoritative chronicles and anthologies,<sup>80</sup> his achievement remains little-known. Alkalay and Sephardic Jews in general are given greater cognizance in a contemporary French study: “From the period of the ‘golden age’ of Spain to the death of Alkalay . . . the contribution of the Sephardim—beyond its extraordinary cultural influence on Judaism—to the rebirth of the Jewish national entity . . . resides incontrovertibly in their” overwhelming adoption of the Jewish state, “the intensity of their love for Zion and their unshakeable belief in the coming of the Messiah.”<sup>81</sup>

A dramatic illustration of this point is the 2,500-year-old Jewish community in Yemen, which in 1948 picked up its collective self and boarded “the wings of eagles” to Israel. As discussed at some length in the last chapter, the Yemenite Jews had remained singularly adherent to the ancient Jewish tradition despite, or perhaps because of, the constant persecution and degradation to which they were subjected by the Arabian Muslims. They seemed still faithful to the reminder that the venerated philosopher, Maimonides, had written them, in his “Epistle to Yemen” in 1172:

It is, my coreligionists, one of the fundamental articles of the faith of Israel, that the future redeemer of our people will . . . gather our nation, assemble our exiles, redeem us from our degradation, propagate the true religion, and exterminate his opponents as is clearly stated in Scripture. . . .

Remember, my coreligionists, that on account of the vast number of our sins, God has hurled us in the midst of this people, the Arabs, who have persecuted us severely, and passed baneful and discriminatory legislation against us, as Scripture has forewarned us, "Our enemies themselves shall judge us" (Deut. 32:31). Never did a nation molest, degrade, debase, and hate us as much as they. . . . Although we were dishonored by them beyond human endurance, and had to put up with their fabrications, yet we behaved like him who is depicted by the inspired writer, "But I am as a deaf man, I hear not, and I am as a dumb man that opens not his mouth" (Ps. 38:14). Similarly our sages instructed us to bear the prevarications and proposterousness of Ishmael in silence. . . .<sup>82</sup>

The general Sephardic stoicism and steadfast rejection of conversion to Islam in the face of constant abuse was an impressive monument to cultural and spiritual Zionism, yet in Yemen this quality was perhaps most pronounced. There the Jews were poor. The Koran has ordained "twice" (2:1; 3:112) that Jews be poor. The Muslims in Yemen and other Muslim countries took the words "literally": "Yemenite Jews . . . always were clothed like beggars . . . some of the older generation cling to this habit even in Israel" and at times "Jewish property, even houses, were taken away from them" by Muslims because "they presented a picture of wealth incompatible with the state assigned to the Jews by God."<sup>83</sup> Western culture had barely penetrated anywhere in Yemen, but Yemenite Jews were extremely clean, and their pious community sent its children to synagogue at the age of two. By the time they were three or four, they were learning the Torah (Jewish law and tradition).

The Yemenite Jews seemed, to those who visited there, to be waiting, in what they also deemed was their necessarily miserable exile, for the return to the "Perfect World"<sup>84</sup>—and, in costume, they rehearsed the celebration of their redemption on every Sabbath on which they were not forced to work. Israelis who received the Jews from Yemen upon their arrival in Israel reported that the deliriously happy Yemenites could not be dissuaded from referring to the Israeli greeters as "prophets." Some of them were disappointed that "King David" was not on hand.

For many more sophisticated Jews from the Arab centers, the drive toward Israel was based not as strictly on the mystical or religious aspect of the "return," but on their cultural identification with a "people." One young Tunisian Jew was described very succinctly in a study:

His fate . . . lies not in his birthplace, Tunisia, but in his ethnic homeland of Israel. There is no future for him in Tunisia, whereas in Israel, there is a possibility . . . of a great existential experience. "If I have only one life, I want to dedicate my life to something greater than me."<sup>85</sup>

When, in the familiar Jewish wedding tradition, the bridegroom stomps on a glass, the crushed goblet is a reminder of the destruction of the temple in Jerusalem: nowhere is this observed more passionately than among Sephardic Jews.

The identification with a Jewish homeland, a Jewish nationality, remained a strong influence even upon the young Sephardic Jews, whose education and social life broadened with the liberalizing influence of non-Arab colonials. In twentieth-century Iraq, for example, during a period when Turkish rule allowed for many young Jews to expand further into the intellectual mainstream, there was a break with many elements inherent in traditional Jewish life. Yet the Iraqi Jews continued to observe the symbolic traditions; they were still fasting on the Day of Atonement and "maintaining" various traditions "even in recent years."<sup>86</sup>

Significantly, very few of the Jews whose day-to-day religious observance has dwindled have converted.<sup>87</sup> The pattern that has evolved in the latter twentieth century, it seems—although the regular religious observance has assumed less importance as a daily ritual than it had for their forebears—is that their ethnic or cultural identification as "the Jewish people" has stood constant and perhaps even strengthened. Had the Jews from Arab countries enjoyed the same manifold freedoms and opportunities that are the right of every citizen from many Western nations, it is uncertain whether the unprecedented virtual emptying of Jews from Arab countries would have been precipitated by the re-creation of the Jewish state. Perhaps they would have continued to adhere to the pattern set by American Jews, of whom a minuscule percentage have moved to Israel.

The hardships faced by hundreds of thousands of refugees once they arrived in the embryonic Jewish state were multiple—for Jews born in Arab countries, a new language, modern Hebrew, had to be learned, and the swarms of homeless had to be housed. The refugee camps and "temporary" housing—*maabarot*—were bulging.

Raphael Patai described some of the conditions encountered by the hopeful hordes of refugees when they arrived in the "land of milk and honey":

The great majority of them were housed in tents which were drenched from above and flooded from below during the heavy rains of the winter of 1949 and 50. The original plan called for a sojourn of a few weeks only in the immigrants' camps after which each immigrant was to be sent to a permanent place of settlement. Actually, however, in view of the large number of immigrants the rate of evacuation from the camps lagged constantly behind the rate at which the new immigrants were brought into Israel, and the period of sojourn in the camps was prolonged from three months, to four months, to six months, to eight months . . .

One of the main immigrant's reception camps was that of Rosh Ha'ayin, in which at the height of its occupancy in 1950 there were some 15,000 Yemenite Jewish immigrants, all lodged in tents, fifteen of them in each tent. The few buildings in the camp were used to house the hospital and the clinics. . . . When

the immigrants arrived many of them were very weak. Mortality was high, and as many as twenty deaths occurred daily. . . . very soon, mortality decreased and generally the strength of the people increased. Practically all the immigrants (98 percent to be exact) suffered from trachoma when they arrived at Rosh Ha'ayin. After a four months' sojourn in the camp, and constant medical treatment—often administered against the wishes of the patients—this percentage sank to 20 percent. The health of the children was also in very bad shape.<sup>88</sup>

In 1951, 256,000 Jewish refugees—or one-fifth of Israel's population then, which was 1,400,000—were still living in “temporary” settlements.<sup>89</sup> Mordechai Ben Porath, an Iraqi-born Israeli, and long a member of Israel's Parliament, told of the camps in the '50s:

I arrived in Israel penniless and, in the early 1950's, directed a transit camp for tens of thousands of Jews from Arab countries. There my family and I lived with them. I saw those people housed in makeshift huts without water, without electricity, exposed to rain, wind, and even flood. Professional people were helpless: they didn't have their licenses or any other certificates with them. These had been torn to shreds by Arab officials in certain Arab countries when they left.<sup>90</sup>

The refugees had little in common with their brothers who had immigrated to the Holy Land generations before. This was particularly true of the Yemenite Jews. More than two thousand “Zionists” from Yemen had managed to get to Palestine in 1881. By the time of the refugee deluge of 1948 and onward, more than 45,000 Jews from Arab lands already were living in the country. In fact, relative to the total populations of Jews in Asia and Africa from 1919 to 1948, more Oriental Jews immigrated from the East than from Europe and America, with approximately one-third of Yemenite and Syrian Jews becoming immigrants; “as far as is known, there was no other Jewish community from which such a high percentage immigrated” to the land of Israel between 1919 and 1948.<sup>91</sup>

Carl Hermann Voss, a theologian and, in 1953, Chairman of the American Christian Palestine Committee, discussed the “125% increase of population” during Israel's first five years: “A difficult adjustment was necessary. . . . The Israel of 1948 had only meager natural resources, limited capital, and no friendly states on its borders. . . . The fabric of this swiftly growing society was strained by the heterogeneity of . . . the several hundred thousand Oriental Jews who came from Iraq, North Africa, and Yemen.”<sup>92</sup>

Voss wrote of his “memorable experience” to see Jews

coming home from lands of death and dispersal to a land of life and light . . . a fulfillment of the prophecy of Isaiah . . . for Jews who had left the caverns and cellars of North Africa or the bleak wastes of feudal Yemen.

In a Ma'abara work village on the slopes of Mt. Carmel not far from Elijah's cave, I talked to a bizarre type of Jew—a Jew from Baghdad, purportedly descended from those who did not return with Ezra and Nehemiah from the Babylonian exile to rebuild the Temple 2,500 years ago. In garb that made him almost

indistinguishable from his Arab cousin, and speaking the Arabic tongue, he seemed incongruous in this modern setting of the new Israel; yet this Iraqi Jew gave new meaning to a sentence I had learned in my youth: "Behold I shall bring them from the north country and I shall gather them from the coasts of the earth. A great company shall return thither."<sup>93</sup>

For Jews born in Arab countries, the many freedoms in Israel often had to be learned. One poignant scene was described by historian Goitein, who visited a refugee way-station camp in Aden, where Jews fleeing from Yemen were waiting to get to Israel.

[It was] in the receiving camp of Hashid near Aden in November 1949. The scene occurred between two Yemenites, one an Israeli, a man who had lived in Palestine long enough to become socially naturalized, and the other an immigrant who had arrived at the camp only a few days previously.

The Israeli Yemenite, an attendant working in the camp, of course mixed on terms of complete equality with everyone else there, with the director of the camp, the chief doctor and with a university professor. One day I was standing near him when an immigrant Yemenite ran up to him and in a fraction of a second threw himself on the ground before the attendant, kissing his feet and embracing his legs, while making some trivial request. The mere physical aspect was quite remarkable. Throwing oneself down on the ground with such force without getting hurt showed that the man must have had long practice in such matters. Yemen is, of course, one of the more backward Arab countries; still, that unforgettable little scene illustrates a tremendous contrast."<sup>94</sup>

There are Jews who sought refuge from Arab countries, who are dedicated to their Jewish homeland, but who retain many happy memories of their lives in the very communities from which they fled. Yet during long conversations, as they recalled the past, these people from different Arab lands related individual experiences so similar in their discriminatory character that, despite their distances from one another, they seemed to speak in unison. Although they never had met and probably never would meet, they narrated a collective chronicle of a buoyant, resilient, close-knit community life punctuated by fear and demerment, and by intermittent terrorizing and anti-Jewish violence.

Their ambivalent remembrances indicated a kind of nostalgia for the land and customs of their origin and childhood. For some, the nostalgic tendency is enhanced by the passage of time and tempered by dissatisfaction at the frequent conditions of austerity and hardship in Israel. However, even the mass, admittedly happier within their own Jewish nation, might wish to erase the blemish of painful memories.

But this wistful turning to the lovely scenes of their native lands, their joy in the colorful traditions they knew in their youth, and the universal, perhaps healthier tendency to prefer recollection of the sweet moments of life rather than the bitter, should not obscure the actualities. Many Iraqi or Syrian or North

African Jews have wistful and moving recollections of the streets and the rivers and the flowers they loved; they long to see Damascus or Cairo or Baghdad again. But in evaluating the nostalgia, one must remember that there were many German Jews who had similar memories of Berlin.

## Invitation Declined

... there was always some riot in Baghdad  
against the Jews, I guess just for the fun of it or something.

—Rafi, about Iraq in 1929

... if he was lucky, he was just slapped on the  
face for nothing and told, “You are a dirty Jew.”

—Shlomo, about Egypt in 1946

Only when the Syrians are free can they tell the  
truth about their life in Syria.

—Shoshana, about Syria in 1982

You can never feel equal because you don't  
know what will happen next.

—Helena, about Morocco in 1982

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**T**he preceding harsh chronicle of historical data places in perspective the Arab claims of traditional tolerance and just treatment for “their Jews.”

A number of Jewish refugees from Arab countries have been interviewed for this book—in Israel, in France, in England and in the United States—so that the tradition can be traced down to the present generation.

Some, who fled at the time of the Jewish refugees' mass exodus around 1948, described the quality of their lives *before* Israel's statehood. Other Jews, who remained in their Arab birthplaces *after* the Arab world brought war against Israel's modern re-creation in 1948, told of experiences in which their traditional demeanment as the Jewish lower-caste *dhimmi* was compounded by another ingredient: the Arab-Muslim community intensified its persecution of the Jews as “Zionists,” branded as members of an enemy fifth column, until they escaped or were expelled.

Their stories vividly indicated the probable quality of life that awaited the average Arab-born Jew who might accept the Arab governments' “invitations” to return “home.” The recollections also verified and gave individual life to the historical evidence: that the Arab world was united not against “Zionism” as such, but against any Jew, and perhaps any non-Muslim, who deemed himself or herself truly equal. Further, the accounts may offer insight into the so-called



“hard-line” attitudes of the Sephardic Jewish majority that now prevails in Israel.

Among the many powerful and moving interviews, each one of the little-recognized “other” Middle East refugees chronicled a little-known life history, and the lives of his or her family. It was wrenching to be forced to choose, from so many often-painful memories that were breathed earnestly and patiently into a tape recorder, those that would then be pressed into the pages of this book. But the scope of the subject of the “Palestine Problem” still to be discussed in following chapters dictated brevity.

The following personal experiences, as told by Jews who themselves fled from those Arab countries where they were born, are varied by each individual’s style, and by the quality of the intimidation their countries of origin practiced.

However, those selected here to describe their respective Arab birthplaces draw a sketch that is representative of experiences that were recounted time after time, in more than one hundred individual personal interviews conducted over the past several years.<sup>1</sup>

### *Rafi*

Rafi, an Iraq-born Jew, was anxious to “tear away” the “myth” that “Arabs’ hostility toward Jews began in 1948.” He recalled bitterly his childhood in Baghdad before “the family ran to Israel” in the early thirties.

When I was born, in 1923, I was the last of a big family of eleven children, and my biggest brothers had been already abroad. If a Jew was, say nineteen or twenty, and if he could afford it, he went abroad. But still they continued their ties with their family in Iraq. Things changed very drastically for the Jews when the mandate in Iraq was over and the power was turned over to the Iraqis. There was now a nationalistic attitude among the Arabs, and it coincided with the activities in Palestine at that time against the Jews.

I recall as a kid, before I left Iraq, in 1929, I was at that time about six years old. But I do recall 1929. Some riots had taken place against the Jews in Palestine. Whenever there has been any problem in Palestine—even though the British were here still—if the Jews had been attacked somewhere, there was always some riot in Baghdad against the Jews, I guess just for the fun of it or something.

Before this time, I cannot tell you out of my personal experience. I was too young. All history of the Jewish community in Iraq was all the time between, in the middle—on the one side, they were a fairly well-to-do community, a very old community, about two thousand five hundred years old, and it started with the construction of the first Temple that the Jewish community started there. Highly educated, or, in any case, much higher than the average population.

Many of the Arab leaders at that time were sent to Jewish schools, because the only schooling system that was existing at that time was Jewish. So, on the one hand, Jews were fairly well-to-do, fairly well educated, some of them with property—

Still, and always, whenever anything happened—the first to be victims were the Jews. The reason is that they were a minority from all aspects. Religious minority, national minority, and so when there is a disease all of a sudden, and

thousands of people die, it is because "the Jews did this and that," and you have the religious prejudice.

I cannot say if it's anti-Semitism, but for a Jew, if he would have touched food that was supposed to go to an Arab, it was supposed to be "poisoned." I mean all kinds of ideas and beliefs from a *religious* point of view.

Now, another thing that influenced the situation in the Arab world for the Jews was the rise of Hitler and the Nazis in Europe, which found a very encouraging area of influence in the Arab countries. This was one of the ways the power of British and the French at that time could be undermined. Apparently, the Nazis found in the Arab countries a great response to the ideas of power and the ideas of patriotism. I mean, this combination appealed very much to the Arabs at this time.

By 1933, many Jews decided that they had to leave Iraq, even though the economical situation was still good and all that. That is why my family and I came to Israel in the early thirties. I know that after that things went from bad to worse.

By the way, the first thing that Iraqis did when they got their independence [1932] was the mass pogrom of a Christian community—not Jews, but *Christians*. This was the first "act of independence" and this was a sign of what was going to happen later on. Even though the first king in Iraq was supposed to be one of the most moderate and reasonable leaders in the Arab world at that time, the superiority the Arab felt toward all minorities was immediately shown. . . .

When the War started in '48, it was absolutely out of question to run away to Israel because all the desert between Iraq and Israel was full of Arab armies and all that, so Jews started running away to Persia, which is Muslim, but not an Arab country, and lately Persia had more fairly tolerated Jews. . . .

Apparently the international conscience was a little bit better than what it looks like today, and when stories started to come out about youngsters who had just been tortured because they wanted to run away for their lives from Iraq, there was a big outcry in the United Nations, which in 1948 and '49 was different from what it looks like today. The Iraqis found themselves under a certain pressure and so they thought, "The hell with it. Whoever wants to leave the country, give them permission to give up their nationality"; they also had in mind that they can also confiscate the property, which they did, openly. It is one of the cases where you have laws issued openly like the Nazi laws, which managed to confiscate the Jews' property.

A question for Rafi: Some Arabs claim that Iraqi Jews like Rafi who are now in Israel would love to go back. They have a saying that "one day in Baghdad, and then they would be willing to die." Rafi interrupted, saying, "Yes, one day—they would not be able to survive more than that!"

I do not say that there has been no good Arabs. But there have been as many Jew refugees from the Arab countries as there has been Arab refugees from Palestine. The only difference is that the Jews' property has been openly confiscated. So help me God, I have never understood—in the ministry of foreign affairs, our delegation to the United Nations—why we Israelis never stressed this point enough. In my mind it was a stupid thing to allow the myth that "the Jews have been loved in the Arab countries, and then all of a sudden there came some evil, the evil of Hitler."

There is also the myth that only Jews are coming to this country, and sending Arabs out. But Arabs were immigrating to Israel, as much as the Jews. You have Arabs from Sudan and Arabs from Iraq, and—someone must do research on the West Bank and see who has been here more than three generations.

Why does an Arab, that did not exist here a few generations before, have more right than a Jew who has been here many generations, and sometimes his ancestors for twenty generations, in Israel? Why was this issue never raised by the Jews? It seems too great an issue to have been just shoved under the rug.

### *Shaul*

Shaul is one of many Iraqi Jews who had to escape illegally to Israel in 1950, even though the law had already been passed allowing the Jews to depart. He recalled his childhood, beginning long before the 1948 war against Israel:

I remember when I was four or five, my mother used to threaten me—"The Muslims will beat you," she said. I am conscious when I was three, four, five years old, that Muslims hate Jews. In 1931, when I was four years old, I remember from then. My parents knew from their own experience. I experienced it in some cases, when I was alone and I went to buy something in the area where Muslims are with Jews.

Shaul had to attend Muslim schools from the age of twelve because of financial reverses in his family.

We are five brothers, and if we paid the Jewish school, it was very difficult for us, so I left to go to the Muslim school in 1940 and they used to really beat me and I suffered from the students. Every Jew was a Zionist in their eyes.

One of the teachers I recall was really anti-Zionist. Even a Jewish communist group there was anti-Zionist—but that particular teacher was *particularly* anti-Zionist, and usually he was responsible for the school on Thursday, and he used to ask us to sing a song which reminds Arabs of Palestine. It was called "Palestino, Palestino" in Arabic—"Palestine, Palestine, . . . no Zionist can come to you" and so on.

He used to watch every Jew in the school to see that he was singing that. And we used to sing it. I know the Arabic verses even now, because this strikes me and I still remember. You know, for us, Zionism was even stronger than in European shtetls, in a way. We were yearning to go and see our land; yes, yearning. In our prayer it is mentioned, we cannot get rid of it. For example, even in the Jewish schools we have Solomon the King, Joseph and all this, and it reminds us of our country, so this is automatic, we want our land to come back to us. It's a way of life.

You know, before Western Zionism came to Israel, Zionism was existing in Iraq. We prayed every day, and every Passover that we are saying "Next year in Jerusalem," we are emotionally really aroused, and we *mean* it. We dream to come to Israel—but there is no government. The minute the government was established, suddenly a hundred thousand Jews of Iraq left . . .

Shaul told of two poignant experiences when an Arab saved members of his family from the violence of an inflamed Arab mob:

When I was seventeen or eighteen years I almost was killed. We were in a group and it was the last day of Passover. We were returning from the other part of town, and we were singing and so on. We were a majority of Jews in the bus, and we are singing Jewish songs and they hit one of our Jewish people. Then the Arabs threw us from the bus and we went walking the rest of the way to our area. They waited for us in the square, close to the bus stop. Not one, not two, hundreds of Arabs on the street. I'm not exaggerating. They knew we were walking down, and they gathered hundreds, hundreds, honestly.

I was able to slip away. But they caught one of my friends and beat him and beat him on the head. And I couldn't move. I saw him. I just froze. An Arab Muslim religious man said to me, "Come here my boy, poor boy," and then he took his stick and he hit me on the head, and they threw me into the street. There was no transportation any more; cars couldn't move, and they started to hit me, kick me—soldiers in their big shoes.

The soldiers cursed at us and said that the Jews cursed Muhammad. They just said that. The truth is that I sang Hebrew. Yes, and some of them listened to me. They didn't know, but they thought it was Hebrew, it must be. And I was seventeen, I was enthusiastic and so I did it. We were impudents. I sang Hebrew. Can you ask me how I was saved? A prostitute! Honestly. She came with her car. She wanted to know, she was curious to know what was going on. And suddenly she found a young boy, and all people are hitting me. "Come, my son, come," she said. And I found the door open and threw myself inside the car. She pushed them and shouted at them in Arabic and she took me home. Really, it was just a miracle.

You know, all the Arab countries are clearly hostile, not only Iraq. My sister-in-law was from Egypt. She was very beautiful. And when she used to walk, when people see someone who is fair or white in color—even though she is not Jew—they run after her saying, "She is Jew, let's do something to her."

So it happened that my sister-in-law was walking in a Cairo street and all the people ran in the street and said, "Here is a Jew, let's run after her"—all, one after the other. They shouted at each other and asked, "Who are you running after?" They answered, "After a Jew," and it happened that she was so scared that she ran into a house and ran upstairs, and the people saved her in their apartment. The crowd was waiting downstairs, and the crowd said, "If you are not going to let her come out, we will burn the building." And the people in the apartment said, "She is not a Jew, she's our cousin, she's one of us." And they saved her just by saying, "She's not a Jew."

### *Menachem*

You could live there as long as no alternative existed—where could you go? When Israel came into existence, there was someplace to go.

These were the words of Menachem, a former Iraqi Jew who escaped to Israel in 1950 when he was fifteen. His first cousin was one of those hanged in Baghdad in 1969. Why was his cousin hanged?

They needed nine and he was one of them. I heard it from his widow that he had been hanged. It was one of the Ba'ath Party factions that wanted to show

strength, and the bodies of the victims were exposed for four days. I came from a very, very wealthy family. We left everything, everything was confiscated. The regime in Iraq have always been unstable, they have always practiced the most severe persecutions of Jews. My grandfather was the chief rabbi of Baghdad, one known in our Jewish community for his judgments and his reading of the Torah. We were always involved in a spiritual Zionism.

But one of the reasons I became active was that in 1947, before Israel's partition, I was more than once beaten by Muslim children at the Hebrew school. They used to beat us up regularly, and more than once we had to be locked up for days in our house, because whenever things got hot, they took it out on the Jews.

And that was *before* Iraqi nationalism. Even if Israel was never to exist, they *never* saw us as part of the Iraqi people. We were Jews first, not as Iraqis, but as "Jews living in Iraq." When Israel came into being, we found a natural outlet for our way of life, for things we could not do in Iraq. Now there are only a few Jews left in Iraq. Old people, a few hundred Jews. You know, there is something inbuilt—you pray for Jerusalem all the time. The younger you are, the more enthusiasm you have to find the things you're denied.

I left without my family. My parents paid some Muslims a handsome amount of money to have me smuggled across the border to Iran, along with four other escapees. They took us in a bus, but not to the border. We were beaten, all five of us, by the four Muslims, who took us for ten days on horseback in the desert with little food. But we had a code word which we invented with our parents which we would only give to the Muslims after we had crossed the border—then they would go back with the code word and be paid. We were not to give them the word until after we were across the border, so we weren't murdered. It was our only way—we could not contact our family or they'd have been hanged.

### Shimon

Shimon, an Israeli who escaped from Baghdad in 1950, is now about forty-five.

My memory and my family's memory is of fear—the feeling that we were different. We left with two conditions from Iraq. We lose citizenship and possessions; we could take only clothes. Our fear is we can be beaten in the streets. My father, my mother taught me to speak Arab and have two names; my Arab name is Fouad—but we Jews *look* different.

In 1941, because the prime minister was close to the Nazis, we were in the pogroms. I was four years old; I remember. They closed the Jewish ghetto. Arabs came and killed one hundred and eighty Jews and took everything. We escaped from one roof to another for a couple of days. Yes, I remember well. Later on, when the Zionist movement became stronger, conditions were much more difficult. In 1949, searches began in homes. They took away heads of families after five-hour searches.

They found a history book of World War I and said it was a Zionist book, and they took my father, but we were lucky—he came back. Sometimes, they just picked them up and never found them again.

I loved Baghdad, and was homesick as a new immigrant here in Israel. We

were so miserable in Israel, in camps, with not enough food. But nothing will happen to you in Israel, we are Jews. We don't have to hide. I started to work at thirteen in Israel and studied at night. Some research people doing research for Hebrew University asked my father one day, "Wouldn't you like to go back? It's so bad here." I thought my father would say yes, but he said, "No—my children can go out late here." Part of Iraqi Jews left Israel for the United States, but most of us stay because it is our homeland, because we are safe.

Someday, I want to go back to Baghdad, I want to see my river, the ghetto, the synagogue. Most Jews from Muslim countries are not so orthodox, but we went to synagogue on *Shabat* [Sabbath] once a week, and then we had a Jewish community club and social life. Israel is very difficult; a Western civilization which Iraqis, with their extended family, had difficulty in understanding. In Israel we had to change. I took over because my father never recovered from the crisis of coming to Israel. Recently, my sister left our apartment in Israel, in the same city—to live alone. We didn't believe this—unheard of. This happened ten years ago and my mother never forgave her yet. I am a mixture of personality—I love the East, I learned a lot from the West.

When my father wanted to leave Iraq, my mother was pregnant. He was afraid of the Arabs. As long as he remembers, from time to time Arabs persecuted Jews. In '70 there were 4,000 Jews. Why did they remain? Part of the families had father or relative in prison and didn't want to leave them there. Others, rich with lands, were "waiting for Godot." The government took their lands, but they thought they'd get them back.

My father knew this; I admire and respect him. Since I remember, he said, "My son, we don't have any future in this country and we have to leave for Israel. They will take everything from us here." I want you to understand, my father was not a genius—he was not well educated, a common man. You're talking with an average Jew from Iraq. Things you would hear in most families there.

### *Yaacov and Shlomo*

In a conversation with a couple of ex-Egyptian Jewish men now living in Israel, the late President Sadat's avowal of Egypt's historically fair treatment of its Jews was rebutted somewhat ironically. Yaacov, a teacher, spoke first:

Sure, there was nothing to complain about. We came back alive from school . . . when we took the train to school, I have to be very careful to lock the door in my compartment or to be with other Jewish students.

And many times I had incidents, as I was ten, eleven years old—this was in 1946 to 1948 or '49. It was a fact of life. Nothing to complain about. I mean just to say, well it was raining today. So what? Nothing extraordinary. It was part of everyday life to be beaten for being a Jew; you could expect it.

Shlomo, his companion, broke in:

That is, if I can compare it with what I had as a kid, it is like being lower-class Indian. You can't do anything about it. You have been born there and you belong to disgust. You are a *dhimmi*, that's all. That is, your shadow is not holy. In India, it is clearcut; but in Egypt, it's a little bit different.

Jews as a group mix a little bit more, but still they belong to . . . you're not the same. It is not the Zionist movement or something that was creating it. It existed for a long time.

Killings, it happened once in every two years, about. You should expect that too. Every now and then, for one reason or another, though you have done nothing—I mean nothing concerning you directly—you must expect, in every two years, something like that. You try to avoid it. The same as cholera and typhoid and malaria. I must compare it to these. The Jew is the bright fellow, but yet his life is never sure. That is, tomorrow someone can get and kill him and he will not be punished as if this fellow killed the same person of his own community.

Shlomo (the Israeli name he has taken) would not give his former family name, because he has an aged relative living in Egypt. A teacher formerly, now a businessman, Shlomo insisted that the foreign colonial powers in Egypt didn't protect the Jews from demeaning treatment.

With the Turks and later on with the British, the Jews still lived in unsafety.

The Jew had to be afraid that something would happen to him. If he was lucky, he was just slapped on the face for nothing and told "You are a dirty Jew." If he was unlucky, he suffered a little bit more than that. And I think during the modern history—the war history—even though there has always been someone else who was responsible, Jews suffered, and were ill-treated and were persecuted and molested in the streets.

I can tell only of my own experiences. It was very normal for me to return back from school as a kid and to be beaten for no reason. That was in '46 and '47.

Yaacov interjected an oft-expressed observation:

There is also another aspect which we did not speak of. The Arabic wording, the Arabic life has much more value. The term "Jew" in itself, without saying "dirty Jew" is already a dirty word. There is kind of a myth that the Jews were not treated as badly in Arab countries as they were in the countries of Europe.

Arabs never killed six million Jews because they never had the chance. They could have participated—with great pleasure—in the killing of six million. You are unfair to them, because they were never given the chance. I mean, you expect them to do things they couldn't do, and there's a difference. Probably one of the things that annoyed them is that they didn't kill six million Jews.

Shlomo nodded somber agreement with his friend and added:

Let me make a point here. You see, I think that many of the Jews are very taken by the idea that in our lifetime we can see the peace and the Arabs accepting our existence and all that. But the world must put pressure on the Arabs—the Israelis are not the ones who need the pressure—we want too much that the Arabs will stop warring with us. We are a tiny and poor country—they are so rich and great. It is them—the Arabs—that the world must help to understand, that we can live together, to let us live.

## Sarah

Sarah left Egypt after the 1967 war. She told of her family's flight to Israel after her husband's arrest and imprisonment in a "concentration camp where the Jewish men from sixteen to seventy years were taken when the '67 war started."

. . . Finally, after six months my husband is in concentration camp; I tried to get him out, but I needed help. . . . So finally, I wrote this letter to my sister in France and I say, "Please, if you can, help me to do something to help my husband." . . . And finally, the French Embassy sent a letter to the Egyptian Embassy.

So after six months of working so hard we get this small paper that we can go out of Egypt. My husband and my brother, they were released like criminals. When I saw them going out, they had handcuffs on their hands. It's like they were criminals just because they were Jewish. They were not Zionists, nothing. Jews.

When my husband leaves the prison . . . they give us five dollars for each person. They tell us we never can return to Egypt.

Would Sarah go back to Egypt under peaceful conditions?

When my husband is in the concentration camp we had to sign a paper that we are not being pushed out of Egypt. I had to sign papers that I'm not going to come back to Egypt. You can never tell what would happen. With what heart would I have to go back to Egypt? You can never trust the Arab people. Never. I would never trust them after what happened to my husband . . .

. . . No, never would I go back. You see, in school, the children six, seven years old, in the playground, they are pretending to shoot the Jewish people. Starting the day having a war! And the Arab teacher teaches the kids that they should really be against the Jews—that "the Jews are killing" their people, that "the Jews are taking" their land. Giving them a very, very black view of the Jewish people. Not the *Israeli* only, but the *Jew*.

Singing songs against Jews—so figure it out, a Jewish child should be in the school, singing against his own blood? Suppose that I meet people, in Egypt, like now I am meeting you, and I don't know you. Do you think I will tell you that I am Jewish? If you ask me what religion I am, I say, "Well, I am Christian." My kids—when they were in Egypt, I say "I am Christian." Well, they can *hear* me. And they want to be proud of being Jewish!

## Mordecai

I spoke to a number of people from Libya, among them Mordecai, who gave an account often repeated:

I remember that in the 1950s, although Libya had a relatively low crime rate, I felt threatened by the man on the street.

When my family told me we hadn't any reason to worry because the Libyan leaders were sympathetic to the Jews, I became confused, because why then should I feel threatened? Possibly because just five or six years earlier—in 1945—the Jews had been the victims of a terrible pogrom. Around one hundred and



fifty Jews were killed in Tripoli. The murders were bestial and whole families were brutally massacred.

But all the Arabs who were accused by the British of these crimes were let free, and the only people who were put in prison were ten Jews—they were in prison for self-defense. They tried it again in 1948, but this time the Jews were ready for them so there was less damage, and this time, the British interrupted the violence.

Qadaffi can't really be serious when he says we should go back to Libya. After Libya became an independent country in 1951, I remember that we were no longer able to send letters or packages to Israel. The next year, they closed the Jewish schools; we had to go to either Arab schools or Christian schools, and we had to learn Arabic for two hours daily.

Since the Jews felt helpless to do anything, they did nothing, and because they were seen to be weak by the Arabs, the Arabs kept creating new laws which restricted us further. We were unable to conduct our holiday services without vandalism and disruption by the Arabs, and we couldn't get any reply when we asked the police to assist us. From 1956, we were no longer free, and at the same time, we were no longer free to leave the country. No one could leave the country with his whole family, and after a while, there were no visas available at all.

It went from bad to worse. Our Jewish girls were the victims of Arab lust and the Arabs even installed an Arab treasurer to check on the funds of the Jewish community. In 1967, after the Six-Day War, Jews were killed wantonly, thrown from balconies into the street—it was horrible—riots, burning the synagogue . . . After that debacle, I was taken together with the rest of the Jews of the country (about three thousand five hundred of us) to military camps, supposedly to protect us from the anger of the Arabs. Finally I was "allowed" out of Libya forever—with only 50 pounds sterling and my clothes.

Now I want to know why they think all of us Jews ran from Arab countries as refugees in a world that didn't understand, taking with us none of the fruits of our labors for many centuries! Fortunately, I found a homeland, the State of Israel—just as the Arab refugees could have established themselves in any number of countries among the Arab nations, twenty or twenty-one, I don't know. If the Palestinians are demanding compensation for their property, we Jews from Arab lands left more property behind—by four or five times.

## *Helena*

Helena, a woman in her late thirties from Morocco, needed no time at all to recall the anxieties of her life in Marrakesh, and her attitude toward Israel.

Zionism is a way of life. In Morocco we were born with the security of it, we grew up with it and we looked forward to one day go back to our land—because the Arabs reminded us every day, in our day-to-day living, that we were "foreigners"—no matter how many centuries we had been there [in Morocco].

If you had a fight, they would—the Arabs would still say to you, "Get out, go back to your country, go back to where the Jews are . . . This is not your country." And we would say, "But look, we have been here for centuries." And

that's the truth, because we existed there long before Muhammad started to preach Islam, and so we have more right to be Moroccan than they have.

But we never, NEVER had the full right of being Moroccans. As an example: we were under the French protection, and then we turn into Moroccan citizens. But the people, the day-to-day people that we encountered had the resentment to see us being there and every day they would say, "Well, most of you left, you Jews—what are you waiting for?" As a child, that impressed on me that I was a foreigner. If I wanted to give something to Morocco, to be of service—there was no way, because I was not part of that society.

Let's put it this way; there is no stability. [King] Hassan is really flexible, supposed to be very nice and Western and the whole thing. He has a European education and in fact he tolerated a Jewish cabinet member. Then the right-wing man came in and got rid of the Jews. Hassan is a tolerant man, but he cannot control the mass. When there is a war in Israel, the mass are crying to get vengeance on us. Oh, there have been "functionaries" in government—Jews were very much in business and commerce. But when Hassan's father was in power—Muhammad—we had our share of concentration camps. You can never feel equal, because you don't know what will happen next.

Helena married an American and lives in the United States, but she and her family are moving to Israel, because

In Morocco I was number one and first a Jew, and the only land that accepts a Jew, as far as I am concerned and so far as I have been *impressed*—is Israel. And the soonest for us—the future for me and for all my children is to assemble and go to Israel and make a life for ourselves. And that's where the migrations are going.

And really they pushed us into becoming stronger Zionists; see, if the Arabs really wanted us we could have stayed and learned to live perhaps in harmony . . . if they did not have so much prejudice. But Zionism is a way of life—Zionism is Judaism, to them.

Now that we went back to our country, "where the Jews are," like the Arabs said we should—now they say we should not be *THERE!*

I heard many conflicting opinions from Moroccans about the conditions of life for the Jews there. Some insisted that the Moroccan community should be separated from the others because "Morocco was better to the Jews than most." One man said he and his family had been free to leave whenever they wanted to go, and an older woman warned me not to write about the Jewish community in Morocco because she is "afraid of what will happen to them if King Hassan dies."

Many believed, as the Tunisian-born writer Albert Memmi suggested, that life in Morocco appeared "better" because it compared favorably to that of Jews who had lived elsewhere among the Arabs.

## A Note on the ex-Syrian Interviewees

All the Jewish refugees from Syria with whom I spoke were truly terrified lest their families behind in Damascus or Aleppo or Qamishli be identified. Because they fear that Syrian authorities would penalize their relatives for their “indiscretion,” they requested that the genders of the persons interviewed be changed in some cases, that the number and kind of their families left behind be altered, and that facts identifying shop or home locations should be as vague as possible. The statements have all been recorded on tape, with one exception: one person refused to have a rather distinctive voice recorded, despite assurances that the tapes were for convenience and for record only. The person concerned was afraid “they” would “get hold of the tapes” and abuse the relatives still held in Syria.

### *Shoshana*

An Israeli named Shoshana escaped from Syria in 1974, when she was in her mid-twenties.\* She “feels guilty” about having left her family because she remembers “the fright in the eyes” of the younger children in her family, expecting some support from her:

They wanted to know why they were being shouted at, “Jews, Jews!” and why they are different from the others. They wanted to have someone explain that to them.

The fear is that at any time of day or night the security people might knock at the door and take either the father or one of the elder brothers—and they really don’t know what is happening. I know that this is happening, I see it, but I don’t know why. Ever since I was a child, I felt there was something wrong with my life and I wasn’t getting the rights I was entitled to, and I have been living in constant fear. The teachers treat you differently, and I was being treated differently because I live in the ghetto, and I came home many times weeping too, and asked my mother, “Why are we different?”

I asked Shoshana why she felt so “different,” since she was living in a ghetto with other Jews. She said,

It is not true. In the same place where I lived there were Palestinians and other Arabs, and they knew I was Jewish. They called me “Jew.” They used to beat me. I would like to have beaten them back, but I wouldn’t dare. Because if I did that, they would bring their whole family to fight—but I couldn’t bring mine. I would go home and lock myself in and start living in my dream, crying.

It was because “the Arabs lived differently” that Shoshana “knew” that people can live differently than the way the Jews lived in Syria.

The TV reports on “60 Minutes” contradicted her own. Were there two

\*Because Shoshana preferred Hebrew, I engaged a Hebrew interpreter, who stopped Shoshana after every few sentences, for the purpose of greater accuracy. The interview lasted several hours.

separate Jewish communities? "No," Shoshana replied; she knew all the families who were on television.

They have to say what they say, because they have absolutely no choice. It would have been a terrible thing had they said other than what they did because the security people were there. They had to say that they lived well because the security people were listening, and when the television people would have gone—as they would go—then these people would have been in trouble had they spoken differently.

I know that some of that "happy family" had *escaped* from Syria. Why? Why do those escaped ones tell of misery now, if it is not true? In Syria no person must dare. If anyone—a foreigner—were to take a Syrian Jew out alone and speak to him, he would say something completely different from what he told Mike Wallace— But . . . maybe they wouldn't dare speak to someone anyhow. The police would learn of it. . . . It's pathetic. It is not possible. Only when the Syrians are free can they tell the truth about their lives in Syria.

Shoshana was imprisoned because she participated in a demonstration, which she described:

When they brought the bodies of the girls they murdered, those who tried to cross the border—three sisters who were killed were members of my family.

When the girls tried to escape—according to how *I* heard it, these sisters and their friend couldn't bear life there any longer and that's why they tried it on their own without having a boy escorting them— What happened is that a shepherd saw three men go into a cave with the four girls and he said afterward that he thought they were just out for fun. He said the reason he didn't go in after them was because the men who pushed the girls into the cave were armed.

And then, the shepherd saw the men go out alone and he didn't know what happened to the girls. But then he started to smell something burning. So he went into the cave and found the bodies burning. The Syrians told everybody that the shepherd smelled something burning and went into the cave—but they didn't say that he saw the men going in. The shepherd is an eyewitness, and he notified the police, but it was ten days afterwards that there was an announcement on the radio. Before that the parents had received a fake letter saying that the girls did make it across the border. The special office which takes care of Jews, the "Palestinian Bureau," they have a free hand where Jews are concerned.

The bodies were burned to such a state that they couldn't be identified; that's why it took ten days . . . I will never forget that day. The whole ghetto went insane when they saw how they brought back the bodies—in sacks—and threw them on the floor of the doorsteps of the families' homes. So everybody in the ghetto saw how it looked. It wasn't that they just came and looked; they were all together for the funeral and they saw the sacks with the bodies spilled out of them . . . and they just went berserk.

Before the murders, Shoshana said that many of her friends had planned to escape, but after this incident, they were

. . . scared to death that it would happen to them, so we started sitting home, in the dark—even the animals were living better than we were. We wanted to breathe the air and see the light—but to be confronted with such deaths was more than we could take. The whole community went to the synagogue to demonstrate—in the ghetto—and someone from the police came and said they would try to find the killers and bring them to trial.

We demanded to the police that we wanted freedom, we wanted to work freely, live freely. They started arresting people and there were so many that it got to the point where we didn't know whether our neighbors were at home or in prison. But we didn't dare go out to find out.

I was arrested ten days later.

Shoshana was visibly proud to have demonstrated; she said that this is something that is not done by "anyone in Syria."

We were so desperate that it really didn't matter. We knew the consequences, but I was at the point where nothing mattered—so I decided to do it. I know it's forbidden, and it's not only forbidden for the Jews; it's forbidden for everyone.

What worries me is the look on my mother's face when I went to prison, and I couldn't even ask where they were taking me. One of my parents was ill—not well. I prayed to God that I would die in prison because I couldn't take it any longer. I won't forget those three days—not one moment of those three days. I kept looking around the room for a way to kill myself; I was looking for a window to throw myself out of in jail.

She described, with great difficulty, her imprisonment:

In the van taking me from home to prison, I was put in the middle and there were two policemen on either side. All the way there they kept telling me they were going to beat me. "I'm a girl—they can do anything with me." I was scared—I was very scared.

I kept being pushed from one room to another, and in every room there was a person with a torture device. Nobody talked to me, but they kept showing me the electric chair and other things. They told me, "If you're not going to tell us that you're spying for Israel, that you're in contact with Israel, then this is what is going to happen to you."

I told them they don't even let me breathe—how could I know what Zionism was? After this, the torture started—the beatings. If these people were to see me on the street, they would stab me to death—let alone being in prison with them.

They would use the water torture: cold water dripping on her head. "Don't forget, this was winter," she said.

Even if it was an old man, they would do it to him—the water torture. And at night they came into my room. . . .

At this point, the translator attempted to comfort Shoshana, who had begun to weep quietly. After a few minutes the translator explained emotionally, "She said she's ashamed to tell us what they did to her."

After three days, they said they had made a mistake: she wasn't the girl they were looking for.

They destroyed me for life, because what I have gone through has become part of my life, and I can't get rid of it. I can't believe that my family is there and they live this kind of life.

She became angry:

I just do not understand how things like that can happen and people don't do anything about it. It's a discovery—being out of Syria—that the world is so really big and strong. Is it maybe just because we are Jews that we can't do anything?

### *Joseph*

Among the many Jewish escapees from Syria was Joseph, who "got away" in 1975 at the age of twenty-two:

After '67 they put the PLO, thousands of them, to live with the Jews in ghetto. It's more violent with the PLO living among us. Eight persons were killed two months after the '67 war, by the Palestinians.

My father was arrested three times for "making Jewish religious objects." He didn't make Jewish religious objects, but for four days he disappear. Nobody knows where he is for four days. Two men take my father in the car and some articles that, maybe they say, "look Jewish." I run after the car and then can't run any more. Nobody allowed to be out after ten in the evening. They take sometimes the family to prison, if someone is not home on time, and they are beaten. If the secret police or—not only secret police—anybody who comes to the Jews and says, "Come with me," we go, because we are afraid not to go. I get no letter now for five months from my family. Before, I got a letter each month. Since I gave a press conference and some Arabs from the Syrian embassy in Washington see me and recognize me, now I don't get mail any more. . . .

My father manufactured tourist items, but from 1970 and '71 there are no tourists allowed to see the Jews in Damascus, because Jews in Damascus may give secrets of how we live in Syria. My father was factory owner forty years, a little bit wealthy. They [the Syrian government] took all his money from the bank as of 1967. Also, no more collection of credit was allowed by Jews. We could not collect if a soldier came and took something.

Now is more worse; since 1973, when Arabs—the Palestinians mostly—hear "Jewish" they want to kill them. Part of my family is here—my parents and others are still there. The Syrian government tries to find out who is telling about them—I'm afraid. Mix up the facts, please . . . I finished high school. I couldn't get permit from secret police to go to university, because they want Jews to be low. Jews are used to learning.

It's all Jewish United States money which supports the Jewish schools in Syria, but now it goes to Muslim teachers, who teach the Koran in every class, and the secret police have their children planted in every class. A lot of times those children inform on their classmates from class talk, regarding radio programs the Jews might listen to or other communications.

Now they are afraid because they want the United States' money, so they send token Jews to this country. Just now there is one Syrian Jew sent to the United States for medical treatment. His wife and children—five children—are back in Syria. He will come and go back so they look “moderate.” They sent about five persons out this way in one and half years.

### *Moshe and the Professor*

While talking in Israel with a young ex-Syrian, Moshe, the young man was joined by a distinguished Algerian-born professor and scholar, whose special area was the history of the Jewish communities of North Africa. For a while, Moshe spoke uninterruptedly. He managed to arrive in Israel before the October 1973 war; he escaped from Syria through measures he would not describe.

I paid the man who makes for me an identity card, saying I was an Albanian. I showed my identity card and so I passed the borders. When I got out from Syria, I got out without money, and without any documents whatsoever of what I studied in Syria. And I didn't tell my parents or friends I was leaving because, you know, let's say a Jew he is arrested, there is no law that says how many . . . how long he will be in prison. The Syrians are very intelligent, I suppose, because all the restrictions of Jews—the Jews have no contact with the police. But they have contact with the Army. So all are the laws of the Army. Nobody can know what is going on with the Jews because it is secret. If I were arrested, it would be in Maza prison. It depends, maybe for one year, or two, maybe for three years.

I didn't take money with me, because I know if a Jew escapes with money it is a problem. If I take money, they'll know the Jew had escaped from Syria to go to Israel, maybe he'll be with the enemy Israeli army. And if I go with my certificate to prove that I had studied something, maybe they think these documents can be very important for Israel.

What had prompted Moshe to leave Syria?

I remember that the Moslem boys threw stones at me and I remember too the education I received in school. The Jewish school, but the majority is Muslim. I remember it is written that the Jews are evil, I don't know why. And their God is a God who wants to drink the blood of all the other peoples. This was in the Arabic book at the education system. I was taught this in the Jewish school, because I am a student and want to pass through these schools to graduate.

I remember that in 1967 Israel had a victory, so the Syrians must—maybe as a psychological reaction—they must take it out on the Jews. After that, for eight months, the Jews can't go out from their houses. I remember that in Damascus a man from the Citizen's Bureau came to our house and he was looking for a reason to take somebody to prison.

The Jewish professor, who had been quietly listening, broke in now:

It is a mistake to make something very, very tragic of the relations with the Jews and the Arabs—“No hope,” and so on . . . because if we had no hope to be on good terms with the Arabs, what is our future?

I think that the Jews were discriminated against, but the Arab countries were not founded on a democratic basis. *Everyone* was discriminated against. The Jews were not involved in politics. They were a strong organization, a community.

Moshe asked the professor whether Jews were allowed to be in politics. "No, . . . not in politics," the professor said. "But," Moshe asked, "didn't Jews—don't Jews today love politics when they are allowed?" The professor paused, then answered,

But they had no ambition. I think that we must distinguish between the people and the regime. I think that the regime are more responsible than the real Arab people.

At this point Moshe interjected,

In my Jewish school is one course in Arabic studies. A book said that the Jews were "craven" and so on, and "murderers and barbarians," and that they had a God who "preached that they must drink the blood of non-Jews." This book, this official teaching, talked only of Jews—no other minorities, only Jews. Only Jews had to have this!

Moshe asked the professor if he knew the literature of the nineteenth century that described the alleged "blood libels" of the Jews. The professor, who unbeknownst to Moshe, has published books about Jews in Arab lands, said cryptically that he was aware of them, then continued:

If we cannot live with Islam, then we have no future in this part of the world. And if I believed that . . . I should not stay in this country. I lived in Morocco and Algeria. For six centuries my family was there. My family administered in it.

"Were you average Jews there?" Moshe interrupted. The professor didn't acknowledge the question but went on:

Now the Arabs are in the driver's seat, they have no democratic cities, they have none of the modern technology that Europe has. They are not in the twentieth century.

Moshe wanted to know whether the professor agreed to the "secular democratic state" that the PLO proposed. The professor replied,

. . . with the Palestinian thinking, Israel will be finished. I am for the Arab state federated within Jordan, but in the power fight between Arabs and Arafats, they will kill us.

But then, you had a hate really deep between France and Germany. From one day to the next, they kissed and you had no problem, because the level of life was the same. The psychological level was more or less the same. And the *hate*, you can change—especially in our century. But you cannot change the fact that the Arab countries are living with two hundred dollars a year, and the Jew or the Christian cannot make a living with that. It is impossible, that is the point!



The professor left, and Moshe resumed his description of life in Syria.

I remember we received a book of prayers from New York, and we prayed a benediction written for Johnson, President Johnson, of the United States. And it was a problem for us, because the Army came to the synagogue and they asked if we pray for Johnson because he sends arms to Israel.

The journalists come from Europe and United States, especially from France, to visit our quarter, and I remember that the agent of the police came to tell us what to say. From time to time they would come back and tell us that "tomorrow at twelve o'clock, if we come to see you and they ask you about the Jews in Syria, you have to say so-and-so. If you tell them other than what we have told you, you will be in bad condition."

I asked Moshe who these police were.

The agents of the Citizens Bureau—the Department of Anti-Spies of the Syrian Army—I think that's how to say it.

From time to time they come to the houses of the Jews and take someone to prison, generally Maza prison. I remember they took our neighbor to Maza prison, and after ten months—no, after eight months—they told him, "You can go home."

That's all. You know, we have no rights—I can't tell you everything, because the Syrians have records for all Jews from fifteen years old to sixty-five. All the information about Jews, how much education, when I was at the university, I can't tell you; you know my family is there and they will persecute my family, I am sure . . .

I think that with time, maybe they will accept Israel, and accept that it is not easy to "throw Israel into the sea." Why are they so against us? Maybe they will say, "We can't throw this state away." It is better for the Arab lands one day to see that. It is more better for them to accept Israel.

## Remnant of a Tradition: The Arab-Jewish Diaspora

. . . Jewish people living in Syria today are subjected to the most pervasive and inhuman persecution. . . . Even a four-year-old has been jailed. . . .

—Ramsey Clark, 1974

One thing is certain: . . . the Syrian Jewish community . . . are not likely to complain openly. . . .

—Donald Kirk, *Chicago Tribune*, 1976

Many of our Jewish members sharply criticized us for not delineating in greater detail the harsh conditions under which that small [Syrian Jewish] community has been forced to exist. . . . After months of carefully reviewing the evidence, we have concluded that our critics were right, we erred.

—*National Geographic*, 1974

Of more than 850,000 Jews in Arab lands before Israel's statehood, fewer than 29,000 remain.<sup>1</sup>

Many of the Arab states, as illustrated in the table above, have been rendered virtually *judenrein* (free of Jews—Hitler's term).

Saudi Arabia has been excluded from the chart because Jews have long been forbidden to enter, much less live in what has been deemed "moderate" Saudi Arabia—with the notable exceptions of Henry Kissinger, when he was the United States Secretary of State; Secretary of Defense Harold Brown in 1979; and per-

**TABLE A. Estimated Jewish Population in Arab Countries**

	pre-1948	1979–1982		pre-1948	1979–1982
Iraq	125,000–135,000	200–300	Morocco	265,000	18,000
Egypt	75,000	250	Algeria	130,000–140,000	300–400
Syria	30,000	4,300–4,800	Tunisia	105,000	2,500–4,000
Yemen	55,000	1,200	Lebanon	5,000	200
Aden	8,000		Libya	38,000	15–20

haps a few selected Jewish academicians, businessmen, or journalists. Saudi Arabia, where thriving and influential communities of Arabian Jews existed at the time of Islam's creation in the seventh century,<sup>2</sup> has maintained a "moderate" policy that totally excludes Jews. As the Saudi Arabian Ambassador to The Hague said, upon Dutch Foreign Minister Max Van Der Stoel's proposed visit to Saudi Arabia in 1975,

No Jewish journalist will be allowed into Saudi Arabia to cover Mr. Van Der Stoel's visit. . . . Official policy has always been to refuse entry to Jews because they support Israel as a state.<sup>3</sup>

Noting the bigotry inherent in the Saudis' avowed institutionalized discriminatory practices, Foreign Minister Van Der Stoel cancelled that visit. He advised the Dutch Parliament that

The government of Saudi Arabia has informed me that it will not issue an entry visa for the Netherlands journalist representing *Urij Nederland*. Naturally, every government has the right to decide which foreigners it wishes to allow into its country. On the other hand, I want to emphasize that the government of the Netherlands utterly rejects any form of discrimination on the grounds of race or religion,<sup>4</sup> which might form the basis for granting such an entry permit.<sup>5</sup>

That same month, a London journalist reported that, during his visit to Saudi Arabia,

My guide insists on giving me a copy of that horrifying old forgery about the Jews' plot to conquer the Arabs: *The Protocol of the Elders of Zion*. It turns out that all visiting journalists are given it.<sup>6</sup>

The Kingdom of Jordan also has been excluded from the table, because no Jews lived there in 1948, although the Jewish presence in the major portion of Palestine—which is presently "Jordan"—had existed long before the seventh-century creation of Islam. In fact, many of the Jews who had survived Muslim-led massacres in Arabia, only to be expelled in the seventh century from their lands in the Arabian Peninsula, had fled and found refuge in the large Jewish settlements of Eastern Palestine\*—more than a thousand years before that eastern territory of mandated Palestine became perceived as a separate "kingdom" of "Transjordan" in 1922.

Jews who had dwelt on historical Palestinian terrain both east of the Jordan River and in the area called "the West Bank" were driven out of that land's Arab-dominated towns over the past half century by sporadic pogroms and pillage, so that by the 1940s the Palestinian towns in Transjordan and the West Bank were considered "purely Arab"—already purged of their former Jewish population. The Jews once living in the area of Palestine known as Jordan and the West Bank had become "Palestinian Jewish refugees" as the result of Arab violence. And the fact that there are Jewish "Palestinian refugees" of twentieth-

\*See further discussions in Chapters 8 and 12.

century vintage is overlooked even in Israel. These refugees found safety only in the predominantly Jewish-settled areas of Palestine's coastal plain, which today is Israel. By 1948, the more than seventy-five percent of Palestine that the British had allocated to the Arabs as "Transjordan" already had been efficiently purged of all Jews, through periodic Arab onslaughts upon the various long-established Jewish communities. Despite that fact, the Jordanian government's nationality law of 1954 sought to safeguard its would-be racial purity: According to that law, a "Palestinian" living in Jordan was entitled to Jordanian citizenship unless he was a Jew.<sup>7</sup>

Conditions vary within those few Arab countries where more than a token remnant of their ancient-rooted Jewish communities still persist. Life for Morocco's remaining Jewish community—by far the largest remnant with an estimated 18,000 Moroccan Jews (compared with 265,000 before 1948)—is marginal and relatively tolerable, apparently by the grace of King Hassan II.<sup>8</sup> Foreign Jews are permitted to study and travel outside the country, and American Jewish leaders have been encouraged to visit the country.<sup>9</sup> As Dr. George Gruen, Director of Middle East Affairs for the American Jewish Committee, reported in June 1981, the Moroccan Minister of Tourism pointed out that, "In contrast to such Arab countries as Syria and Jordan," which, the Minister of Tourism said, "use the Palestine problem as a pretext and as an instrument," "Morocco wished to play a "constructive, moderate role to achieve a pacific solution.'" <sup>10</sup> Morocco played an active part in secret peace negotiations between Israeli and Arab leaders, yet Morocco contributed fighting forces to both the Syrian and Egyptian fronts in their 1973 Yom Kippur War against Israel.

Jonathan Tumin, who worked with the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee in Morocco, reported in 1976 that the Jews there were not living well.

... Most of that community is impoverished. What is surprising is that at least a portion of those still there *do* live well, as they are small businessmen. However, the reason that they are still there is that they do not have enough money to persuade the right officials to allow them to leave with their possessions. . . . Discrimination makes it virtually impossible for Jews to get jobs in Arab firms. . . . Much of the Jewish community subsists on food and payments from the Joint Distribution Committee.<sup>11</sup>

In 1979, veteran *New York Times* correspondent Marvine Howe concluded an optimistic report on a note of caution: "The big problem for the Jews who have stayed is the young people. Parents are increasingly sending their children abroad . . . because their future here is restricted."<sup>12</sup>

Dr. Gruen's report two years later concluded on a somewhat similar note: "After we heard the ubiquitous Moroccan phrase 'pas de problème' (no problem), one Jew whispered to me, 'pas de problème sauf tous les problèmes' (no problem, except for all the problems!)." <sup>13</sup>

## Syria

While the quality of life may be “tolerable” in Morocco or Tunisia, the situation in Syria is intolerable. A description of the contemporary conditions for Syrian Jews, with firsthand, eyewitness reports by this writer and others, may give further insight into this special situation.

There are still some 4,500 Jews in Syria,<sup>14</sup> all forbidden to emigrate. Whatever measure of safety and well-being was provided by the Jews’ isolation in the Syrian ghettos, that isolated security is no longer because thousands of Palestinian Arab refugees are now housed in the homes left by those Jews who escaped. In the past several years, visitors to the Damascus ghetto have reported that, immediately upon arrival there, they were greeted by a kind of “surveillance” from young Arab Palestinians, who often as not led them directly to the police.<sup>15</sup>

The persons interviewed for this book spoke of their Arab neighbors with a terror that could not have been feigned.<sup>16</sup> Journalistic reports have been myriad of the tortures and imprisonments inflicted by a totalitarian S.S.-styled special Bureau of Intelligence “for Palestinians,” concerned mainly with “Jewish Affairs.” According to a 1981 report, “The government has unleashed the special Defense Brigades,” headed by the brother of Syrian President Hafez al-Assad,

and allowed the *Mukhabarat*, the secret police, to conduct a reign of terror and intimidation, including searches without warrant, detention without trial, torture, and summary execution.<sup>17</sup>

After a visit to Syria in 1980, one American scholar observed that

the *Mukhabarat* has made itself a greater menace to the citizenry than the Muslim Brotherhood ever was.<sup>18</sup>

The only candid reports available on the living conditions of the Jews in Syria have been those from the escapees—there were still escape attempts across the Lebanese border between bloodlettings in Lebanon until the Syrian takeover closed that route.

Journalists periodically have tried to learn the extent to which Jews are suffering persecution: the *London Observer*<sup>19</sup> reported in 1974 that

Syria’s Security Service arrested 11 Syrian Jewesses in Aleppo . . . and tortured them in prison until they revealed who had smuggled their children out of the country.

The *Observer*, like others, had interviewed recent refugees who escaped to give shocking testimony of torture. Less common but no less bestial have been the reports of Jews caught attempting to escape and later murdered by the Syrians, who then framed other innocent Jews for the deaths.<sup>20</sup>

Because the Syrian Jews’ condition has been reported internationally, “Syrian

Jewry's plight" became a human rights issue, and world attention has occasionally focused on the Syrian government's repressive tactics, but only sporadically and with little effect.

U Thant, as UN Director General, in 1970 deplored the situation through diplomatic means although he refused, owing to Arab pressure, to authorize a UN investigation,<sup>21</sup> despite appeals from international public figures. Alain Pöher, President of the French Senate, and the writer Jean-Paul Sartre expressed reactions similar to that of Ramsey Clark, who stated in 1974:<sup>22</sup>

. . . Jewish people living in Syria today are subjected to the most pervasive and inhuman persecution. . . . Young women and children are harassed in the streets. Old people are knocked down. Homes are stoned. Jews are barred from most employment. . . . Much of the Syrian population is forbidden to trade with Jews. . . . Even a four-year-old has been jailed. . . . Syrian Jews are rarely seen by visitors from the outside world. . . . They are forbidden to leave in peace and cannot remain in dignity. They are alone and hated.

Many have been arrested, detained, tortured and killed. Recently, four young Jewish women seeking to escape from Syria were caught, raped, murdered and mutilated. Two young Jewish men with two others were immediately arrested and charged with the atrocity. Only when they were brought to trial did world protest compel the Syrian government to change the charges. . . . The right to leave a country is a fundamental human right recognized by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. . . . The Syrian Jews are denied their . . . rights. No nation can deny its people such rights and defend its acts as a domestic policy. . . . Are human rights unimportant?

In the past, reporters' requests for interviews with Syria's Jews were summarily rejected by authorities—particularly in the Jewish Quarter. Several years ago the present leader, President Hafez al-Assad, apparently chose to practice public relations, aimed at the West. At least a half dozen articles appeared, all featuring interviews with the same Syrian-Jewish persons, all of whom repeated—with little variation—"life-is-happy-under-this-regime." A selected Jewish cast was designated for the interviews by the Syrian government to represent faithfully the proper line. To make certain, however, at least one Intelligence police escort was usually present.<sup>23</sup>

In every interview held by this writer with a refugee from Syria, it was made clear that a visitor hadn't much chance of getting a candid report inside Syria: the police in every case had visited the interviewees in advance and had made perfectly clear what was expected of them; if not a run-through of their lines, the police visit itself was tantamount to a threat. Even without the official "visit," the interviewees could be expected to do the right thing, or else. "They knew what was best for them."<sup>24</sup>

The staged interviews fooled some—in 1974 the *National Geographic* published a free-lance article on Syria that spoke of Damascus as "the city still tolerantly [embracing] significant numbers of Jews. . . ."<sup>25</sup> Some months later, after further inquiry, the *National Geographic* stated:

Many of our Jewish members sharply criticized us for not delineating in greater detail the harsh conditions under which that small community has been forced to exist since 1948. We began to wonder if we had unwittingly failed to reflect the true situation. Now, after months of carefully reviewing the evidence, we have concluded that our critics were right, we erred.<sup>26</sup>

A “60 Minutes” report of Syria from Mike Wallace in 1975<sup>27</sup> understated the severity of the repression and restraints borne by the Jews of Syria. Wallace noted that Syrian Jews could not travel in Syria or emigrate, and that they must carry identity cards stamped “Jew.” Yet the program naively implied widespread financial prosperity and religious freedom in the Syrian-Jewish community, and gave a misleading—albeit well-meaning—impression of Syrian “moderation.” Through interviews with “selected” Syrian Jews, the report tended to support indirectly the Syrian government’s claim that charges of brutality toward Syrian Jews were exaggerated.

As such, it becomes a case in point for current media coverage of Syria: the Syrians who were interviewed on “60 Minutes” could not be unaware of the consequences that candor would have brought to themselves and their families from Syria’s brutal secret police. Perhaps the seriously uncritical reporting was attributable to the government-imposed limitations; if the facts were censored in Syria, this could have been explained at the program’s beginning when it was aired in the United States—as the preordained, built-in censorship prevailing in other Arab countries, such as Egypt, could and ought to be consistently reported. If no appropriate explanation of any kind was feasible without endangering the persons interviewed, then the interviews must be dismissed as misleading. In either case, the accuracy and objectivity of the resulting report was fundamentally impaired, in a series long before and since admired for its fearless in-depth coverage.

Because of a general furor created by the program among Jews in the United States, “60 Minutes” planned a repeat visit to Syria.<sup>28</sup> In his “second look,” Wallace concluded that

Syria is a police state . . . difficult, totalitarian—and for the Jews it is more difficult than for the others.<sup>29</sup>

The second “60 Minutes” program was believed by concerned American-Jewish groups to be important and beneficial:<sup>30</sup> they pointed out that in anticipation of the imminent TV visit, one discriminatory practice—the red-inked scrawl “Musawi” (denoting Jews, followers of Moses)—began to disappear (temporarily) from Syrian identity cards “only two weeks before” the CBS staffers returned for the follow-up.<sup>31</sup>

Since then, the pettier persecutions have been amended in and out of Syrian law as the occasion arises, but the right to leave is the only right that should matter. The Syrian government has violated the international code of civil rights.<sup>32</sup> Because only the young can even attempt the rigors of an escape route,

most of the escapees have been young people—mostly men. The Syrian Jewish community has complained that there were, in fact, too many nubile young girls left behind who as a consequence would never marry. Yet the Syrian President insisted that the reason he was keeping the Jews locked in was to keep them from bolstering the Israeli enemy's army—hardly a credible claim, considering the shortage of young Jewish men, the potential army recruits, in Syria.

While Syria has been overtly and undeniably identified as a “rejectionist” or “steadfast” Arab state, and a staunch Soviet ally antagonistic to the West, at the same time Western observers and officials have frequently offered unquestioning acceptance of Syrian claims to President Assad's “moderation.” During a briefing in Damascus in 1977, one candid United States Embassy staffer there commented to this writer that the reason “President Assad and President Carter got along so well [at their 1977 Geneva meeting] was that nothing was asked from Assad,” other than the promised token release of about a score of young Syrian-Jewish women, as “proxy brides” to young men in the United States.

The charade hasn't fooled everyone: Donald Kirk of the *Chicago Tribune* reported an interview in Syria<sup>33</sup> in March of 1976:

“So many journalists write about the Jews of Damascus,” the Syrian says proudly. . . . “They see there is no discrimination. . . . We treat the Jews as we do any other Arabs. It is only Zionist propaganda that tries to make the world think we persecute them.”

Kirk then wrote his reaction:

Whatever one may think of such claims, one thing is certain: Members of the Syrian Jewish community can talk to foreigners only when escorted by Syrian information officials, and they are not likely to complain openly. . . .”

Kirk regarded the show of “15 Jewish doctors, 3 lawyers, 7 or 8 pharmacists and 7 or 8 rabbis” as “tokenism,” and he was not impressed by the Syrian government's declared intention to strike out the red scrawl—“Musawi” (Moses)—which continued to appear on Jews' identity cards. Although sometimes in black ink and computerized, by latest reports, it still does appear.

Between long moratoriums on information, the media will become rife with stories contradicting each other within a matter of months, depending on the sophistication of the journalists and the extent of Syrian repression. In any six-month period, headlines can be found that state both that “Syria Tightens Persecution of Damascus Jews” and “Syria Eases Pressure on Jews.” Both are in all probability accurate and indicate the arbitrary nature of the harshness of Jewish life in Syria. The fact is that, in the ancient tradition, pettier restrictions can be hurled at them or relieved according to official whim.



## Moderation in Damascus' Jewish Quarter

Perhaps a personal experience best serves as an illustration of that arbitrary and unpredictable bullying. In the summer of 1977, President Carter met Syria's President Assad in Europe, where they had agreed in theory that some Jewish brides might leave Syria and be married by proxy to American Jews.

Just after that meeting, I traveled with a small group of former or between-posts State Department officials, media persons and private citizens, to Syria. Our "fact-finding committee" was told by the U.S. State Department authorities at the American Embassy in Damascus that Syria had become "moderate."

One member of our mission, former Ambassador Angier Biddle Duke, requested a visit to the Jewish Quarter and was told that he was welcome to go, that the visit would present no problems, that "things had cleared up," and that we were free to visit the homes of the Syrian Jews "if they invited us."

The next day we went to the Jewish Quarter in Damascus. We had no "escort." We were told none was necessary and we were driven in our bus down to the edge of the Jewish Quarter. Beshir, our tour guide, was to wait at the bus.

We bounded off the bus with Beshir shouting after us, "Turn left and walk. It is ahead." We turned into a narrow unpaved road and passed countless dilapidated buildings with Arabic scrawls on doors, past smiling toddlers and sullen teenagers who gazed curiously as the peculiar-looking group of half a dozen enthusiastic tourists strode by. We were looking for something—we didn't know what—some sign that might tell us we were among Jews. Ambassador Duke was pleased at the chance to verify the relative well-being of the Syrian Jews, and the group was intrigued at the opportunity to tour an exotic corner and see firsthand what we'd been assured were improved living conditions for the Jews.

We scanned faded whitewashed walls and the faces of local passersby, searching for some sign. Scrutinizing the Syrians we passed, we realized somewhat sheepishly that we could never tell who among these locals were the Jews. There were Palestinian Arabs living in homes left behind by Jews who had escaped from Syria since 1948, there were Cretans and Syrians of many complexions. Finally, we stopped to question a cluster of kindergarteners who'd been observing us with great delight and amused asides to each other. One asked me to remove my sunglasses so that he could see the color of my eyes. I asked in French, "Where is the Jewish Quarter?"

They laughed, and a man walked up to offer assistance. He pointed out that the children crowding around us were Jewish, and then identified himself as a "Cretan." He asked where we were from, and we told him. Just then someone walked up to our assemblage and whispered into the Cretan's ear. The Cretan watched us, nodding as the other man was talking, and when they'd finished, he turned to us and said, "*There* is a Jewish house and they would like you to come in and talk to them." He pointed across the narrow road at a high whitewashed

wall, where a gate was being opened from within. We thanked him, walked toward the entrance, and looked in hesitantly; we were beckoned inside.

As we entered, we saw several people, mostly women, sitting around a yard directly inside the gate. It was a tiny unpaved dirt patio from which many doors led to the separate dwellings of many different families, with stairways in several directions. As we clustered in the center of the courtyard, we saw that because of the early-afternoon heat and traditional "siesta," we had caught people napping. As word of our arrival must have spread, however, the little courtyard began to fill with people who seemingly appeared from nowhere.

A couple of elderly women were quite terrified of speaking with us. As several younger people began to speak to our group, the older women harshly reprimanded them, repeating over and over, "J'ai peur" (I am afraid). The others first tried to calm them and then disregarded the warnings. They asked if we were from Israel. When we told them that we were American they asked "what kind of life" there was for Jews in America. Was it true that there were as many Jews in America as they had heard?

One attractive woman, a bookkeeper in her early thirties, told us that she had lost her job in a hotel "outside," because "they found out" she was Jewish. She explained that, although the laws had recently been amended so that Jews purportedly could work outside the Jewish Quarter, "When they found out that you were Jewish you were automatically fired." She was "desperate" to keep a job that paid enough to care for her family. Several other women expressed fear for their families' safety because of the Palestinians who lived on their doorsteps—who taunted and terrorized the Jewish children.

Some of the younger Jews were obviously fearful—and they spoke tentatively—while others were defiant and angry. All of them were determined that we learn "the truth" about the Jews who had been interviewed on "American television programs" and particularly on what they called the "Wallace program." Those Jews were "special" Jews, who appeared in most interviews conducted by the foreign press and were given "special privileges." But "they did not speak the truth," we were told. "Yes," Syrian authorities *promised* that the word *Musawi*, stamped in red ink across all Jews' identity cards, would be deleted. But some of these Jews literally ran into their homes and rushed out with their cards to show us that the red stamp had not been removed. When we told them that President Assad and President Carter had met to try to alleviate the situation for young Jewish girls, they exchanged wry grins.

One woman smirked bitterly, charging, "They'd rather see our children dead than married!" She seemed to give courage to the others and their mood snapped from reticence to anxiety—two or three spoke at once, softly but in such urgent tones that the travelers were visibly moved.

As though a dam of silence had burst, their fears poured forth and they complained of the harshness of their lives with rushing words, weeping tears of frustration that they impatiently wiped away.

As we talked, people were now crowding the courtyard. Shabbily but meticu-

lously dressed, many seemed well educated. A woman in her forties started to tell of what was obviously an unhappy incident that had involved her son, but one of the elderly who had earlier expressed concern at our visit sharply cut her off, her voice raised harshly. The younger woman mutely nodded and then remained silent. We'd been speaking for about an hour when one of the residents suggested that the authorities might wonder what we were doing there, and so we began to say our good-byes. They requested a "promise": would we try to help them? They wanted their daughters to be able to marry and there were no young men to marry them. They wanted freedom. They begged us to "tell the world" that they were "not free," and that the Jews who said they were free did so because they were afraid for their safety—for their very lives and the lives of their families—if they told the truth.

Several of them began to cry openly then, and men and women in our group were weeping with them. After some difficult moments we all shook hands warmly, waved good-byes, and the troubled visitors began to file out of the courtyard. Some headed off down the road, and two of us lagged behind for a few moments. As Ambassador Duke and I headed out of the courtyard into the street we expected to see the others but they were nowhere in sight. Just then a young man ran up to us in great agitation, speaking with difficulty in broken French. Someone had been "arrested." Ambassador Duke ran after him to find out what had happened and after ten minutes another Syrian rushed up to say that Duke was also "arrested."

At that point I made a mad dash in the other direction, toward the exit to the main street where the bus was waiting outside the Jewish Quarter. When I arrived there, Beshir, our guide, wanted no part in assisting us. "It was your own fault," he said—he didn't want to be blamed, because he had "told" us "not to go." When he was reminded that, earlier, he had cheerfully waved us off on our tour with his "blessings," Beshir shrugged uneasily and looked away.

I wanted the nearest phone. The only place to look was down a row of tiny vendors' or artisans' shops lining the street on the edge of the Jewish Quarter. Beshir said they were "not Jewish-owned" but Muslim shops. At my first stop I was coldly refused the use of the phone. I ran into a second shop where I first, hurriedly, bought two cassettes to become a "customer," and then told the Syrian proprietors—largely in sign language—that I must use a telephone. After a few minutes of conversing between themselves the two men behind the counter finally agreed. Luckily I had the list of phone numbers that the American Embassy had given us earlier in the week and, after a maddeningly long series of trial-and-errors, I finally heard an American voice on the other end—ironically, it was the official who had briefed us on the "calm" within the Jewish Quarter. When he heard that Ambassador Duke and another visitor had been arrested, his reaction was, "That's impossible. How could that happen?" My response was not to consider how or why, but to get them out of there. The American staffer said he was "mortified"; he'd do what he could, he assured me, and then he hung up.

About an hour later, Ambassador Duke and friend appeared back at the bus,

looking harassed and angry. Duke, white-faced and worn, explained that a plain-clothes Syrian agent had followed us throughout, from our entrance into the Jewish Quarter. The agent had stood outside the courtyard listening, while we were speaking with the Syrian Jews. He informed Duke of this later, in his role as one of the interrogators at the "headquarters" in the Jewish Quarter. Perhaps because Duke's irate indignation and his formidable list of titles intimidated the agents, the two Americans were released after what Duke cryptically described as "a rough time" with "some petty bullying." Although they hadn't physically molested him, Duke said he felt as though he'd been "beaten up."

That capricious police action made more poignant the travails and pleas for help of the people we had just met in the tiny courtyard, who have no titles to protect them. We were particularly uncomfortable that we had been given such positive assurances by our Embassy that "all was well in the Jewish Quarter." We left Syria the next day. At the Damascus airport Duke received a phone call from President Assad himself; Assad wanted us to stay and have lunch with him, and he promised that afterward he would charter a plane to take us to Cairo in time to keep an appointment with President Sadat in Egypt. Duke tersely declined, saying that he was "not feeling well." As a veteran State Department loyalist who believed in the soundness of State Department policies, he was more jolted than the rest of us by the fact that it had been U.S. State Department foreign service officers at the Embassy who had assured us of a condition that was totally contradicted by the facts.

In October of 1978, a year after Duke's arrest, Kevin Murphy, of the *Evening News* in London, reported that

Life for Jews living in Syria is harsh—as I soon found out. I was arrested by armed police and marched off for interrogation when I tried to talk to a rabbi in Damascus. I had been in the rabbi's home only about ten minutes when a leather-jacketed scruffy policeman—pistol clipped to his trousers—walked in and demanded to know who I was and what I was doing.

A policeman with a submachine gun stands guard at the entrance to the area. . . . There are approximately 3,000 Jews marooned in Damascus, living in a squalid rabbit warren of back alleys in the old part of the city. Ironically, they share the distressing area with the archenemy of the Israelis, the Palestinians.

According to Murphy, who had been in Syria to "examine the plight of the Jewish community in Damascus," the "police station . . . consisted of a stark gray painted room with two beds, a desk and a few wooden chairs," and there, he said, "The police demanded to know whether I had taken any photographs in the Jewish Quarter. . . ." While they were interrogating him in English, they were asking the same questions of the rabbi in Arabic, with one of the younger men in plain clothes making a "great show" of fiddling with a pistol. Murphy reported,

I was later allowed to interview the rabbi through the interpreter with the chief of police and his deputy sitting between us. The supervised answers painted a pleasant picture of Jewish life in Syria.<sup>34</sup>

In 1978, some 400 Syrian Jews, including entire families, escaped via secret routes; as a consequence, in early 1979 the Syrians increased surveillance and restrictions. In 1981, even the “handful of Jews” who could afford to hold passports found their travel documents “cancelled,” while in early 1983 some Jews were permitted to travel. Jewish property has been “seized,” and many Jews “have had to pay rent to the government to live in their own homes.”<sup>35</sup>

Since the PLO and other radical groups were reinforced by returnees from the 1982 war in Lebanon,<sup>36</sup> the Jewish community has reportedly become increasingly alarmed: according to reporter Elenore Lester, “in addition to their fear of becoming scapegoats in the crossfire between the Suni [*sic*] Muslim majority . . . and [President] Assad’s Alawite minority, the Jews fear the PLO . . . many of whom have settled in Jewish areas of Damascus and Aleppo. . . .”<sup>37</sup>

An American representative of the Syrian Jews after his visit to Syria several years ago summed up the situation as it yet remains:

The Jews are living in a jail. Most escapees are the young and agile—when they flee, the youngsters disappear overnight without telling their families, because it’s safer for their relatives not to know. What must it be like to know that you may lose your child overnight and never see him or her again?

They want to get out—they want to be free. Those few Jews who have traveled briefly abroad—who left families as hostage and could afford the huge security bond necessary—came back in shock. They had tasted a free Jewish life, and now that they *know* it exists, they want more than ever to get out of jail.<sup>38</sup>

## Egypt

In Egypt, perhaps 250 Jews are left of the ancient long-persevering Jewish community that once comprised many tens of thousands. Among the Egyptian Jews, most are aged, and some are unmarried women. They were allowed to worship in the synagogue in Cairo at the time of my visits to that city in 1974 and 1977. The quality of life for those few remaining Egyptian Jews had long been more complex in nature than that of Syria.

Since the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty was signed, however, the climate of receptivity among Egyptians for a “return” of its Jews is surely a study in ambivalence, as was the somber reception Egypt gave to Israeli Prime Minister Begin when he arrived in Cairo for the first official visit.<sup>39</sup>

Egypt had been significantly recognized as the “most moderate” of Arab states due to the uniquely publicized, precedent-breaking program of peace efforts by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, beginning with his historic visit to Israel’s capital city of Jerusalem in November 1977. Before that important gesture to the Jewish state, the Egyptian attitudes had already long been perceived by American officials and press as “moderate” with regard to acceptance of Jewish “equality” and a Jewish entity in the Middle East. Yet when President Sadat issued his invitation to former Egyptian Jews to “return” to Egypt in September 1977, the Egyptian-born Jews charged that Sadat’s “welcome” was cynical, that Jews could

never “go back,” and that Sadat “knew it”—because his “invitation” had accepted any Jews who were “Zionists.”

The invitation had been issued less than two months before Sadat’s peace journey to Jerusalem, and even after that image-changing visit the Egyptian-born Jews’ response remained adamantly negative. To understand fully the Egyptian-born Jews’ disdain for Egypt’s “invitation,” one must examine the contemporary Egyptians’ attitude toward “their Jews.”

On my first trip to Cairo, armed with high hopes and twin assignments—“moderation” and an analysis of Egypt’s population explosion, which was reportedly crippling progress and Egypt’s economy—I arrived into a community uniquely hospitable to the American journalist. Never had I been so quickly connected, never more graciously received. I had expected to find the widely publicized “new” Egyptian “moderation.”

Even before the fighting ended in the 1973 war, memory of the Egyptian-Syrian aggression against Israel was fading; President Sadat was lauded for “fighting for the sake of peace.” Reports had begun to circulate in the West about the new reasonableness in Egypt. These hopeful beginnings were accompanied by a new kind of rhetoric emanating from Egyptian officialdom in which the old bellicosity and threats of throwing Israel into the sea were replaced by announcements of a readiness and a desire for peace.

For this change of rhetoric President Sadat was hailed as “that most moderate of Arab leaders”; from that time, “Egypt” was synonymous with “moderation.” Editorials that now seem prophetic—in the *New York Times* and other important newspapers around the country—saw “clear signs that Egypt . . . has already come around to accepting the desirability of coexistence with Israel.”<sup>40</sup> The *Times*’ Henry Tanner, just four months after the 1973 October war, reported with elation that he had seen a book on self-taught Hebrew in a Cairo display window, an “illustration of the psychological and political transformation that Cairo has undergone since the war under Anwar el-Sadat’s presidency.”<sup>41</sup> Tanner, in his reports from Cairo, consistently stressed what he saw as the “psychological trend in the Arab world toward accepting the existence of Israel.” Jesse Zel Lurie wrote in the *New Leader* that he, as editor of *Hadassah* magazine, could talk politics openly with an Egyptian in the Cairo Hilton coffee shop: “Under Nasser [his Egyptian companion] would have feared [the waitress] reporting us to the secret police.”<sup>42</sup>

Ignorant at that time of the Jews’ past in Egypt, I accepted without question the prevailing notion that “before Israel,” traditional “equality” and historical “tolerance” of Jews had existed in Egypt. Consequently, before setting out for Cairo, I immersed myself in the literature attesting to the positive change in Egyptians’ attitudes toward the Jewish state—without understanding their underlying attitude toward Jews or how inextricably that traditional sentiment was woven into their hostility toward Zionists and Israel.

Once in Egypt I interviewed as representative a cross section of Egyptians as I could find—government officials, writers, academics, scientists, demographers, doctors, architects, engineers, housewives, shopkeepers, students, soldiers, sales-

men, cab drivers, waiters, women's-rights activists, secretaries, carpenters, travel agents; Communists, leftists, nationalists, and right-wing conservatives. The consensus that emerged, so far from conforming to the prevailing Western perception of Egypt, seemed rather to suggest its opposite. The views expressed, far from being provoked by the interviewer, were often fiercely intruded, whether an interview on demography, a conversation about Egyptian archaeology, or a discussion of Egyptian "moderation." Vehement anti-Israeli—and, what is more, deeply rooted anti-Jewish—sentiments were the norm among Egyptians and were characteristic of government officials at the highest levels no less than of the man in the street.

As an example, a law professor whom I had been assured was "well-informed, a man of the regime," a former politician of "common sense," and a "moderate," wanted to be of assistance in helping me to fulfill my assignments. I asked if he could arrange an informal gathering of students—young people—and he promised to try.

The meeting with Professor Ali's group\* was held after hours, in one of the offices of an old and somewhat deteriorated enclosed court building that Ali told me had once been the grand meeting place of Egypt's aristocrats. Unfortunately Ali could not remain at the meeting, but he introduced me to his friends and settled me in. Dr. Amin, a lawyer and former member of the foreign ministry, rose from behind his desk to greet me; he was a tall, powerfully built, well-dressed man with silver hair and a mustache, and a deep reverberating voice. There were only two young people, he apologized—a young man who studied at Cairo University, and Dr. Amin's secretary, a girl about nineteen. The other guests included a well-turned-out woman lawyer in her thirties, a balding former judge, and a fortyish "engineer-businessman." Comfortably ensconced in couches and chairs around Dr. Amin's desk, they exchanged a few reserved, awkward remarks, taking the official line of the "conflict" and the prospects for "peace." But after thirty minutes Dr. Amin and his guests were passionately reacting to one another—never in dispute, but in corroboration of their common position. Except for the retired judge's occasional angry lapses into French, everyone spoke English, often all at once.

The only reason for Israel's existence, the group agreed, was to "make trouble all over the world." But Israel was fated to "fade out, disappear," because "there is no real reason for it to exist." As soon as Israel became "secure"—which meant shrinking to the size of a "very small state" with "no political activities" and few resources—the world would forget about it. They expressed exasperation at America's rejection of Arafat's "secular state." Was it so impossible to accept the dissolution of the Jewish state? Dr. Amin quoted long passages from a 1970 *Foreign Affairs* article by the late, controversial Jewish personality, Nahum Goldmann—he said he knew it by heart. According to Dr. Amin, Goldmann proved that Zionism was based on fallacious premises. The Palestinians *would* have

\*The professor requested the use of fictitious names.

“their” land, and the Egyptians would get back the Sinai, which they’d held for “six thousand years”—even if it took “a hundred wars to get it.” They seemed genuinely unaware that the Sinai had come into Egypt’s possession only after World War I.

The world has “no time for religious fanatics,” they continued. Israel is “finished” because it “does no good to anybody.”

The Jews dominate England, France, the United States. Once upon a time a madman started persecuting the Jews . . . maybe he had a grudge against them. Maybe it was justified?

In fact, the Bible itself—they purported to know it well—told of “incest” and “social diseases” that Jews “like Abraham” had brought to Egypt. Jews had always “asked for trouble” and made a “show.”

When Shakespeare wrote his Shylock, he drew him well.

Shylock is the universal Jew of all time, all places . . . not just Israel.

You see, the Jews want their pound of flesh.

They passionately defended PLO terrorism:

What should matter is to kill as many Jews—as many Israelis as they can.

The terrorist attempts are never successful because the boys are not really destructive, they don’t want to be barbarians, they don’t have it in their blood, not like the Irish.

They are peaceful people, not like the cold-blooded Jews.

That is the difference between Shylock and Muhammad—the Jews are Shylock all over . . . not a peace-loving people.

Even when the Arabs were in domination of the world, they were never bloodthirsty, always peaceful, loving and idealistic [*sic*].

“Most of the time,” they affirmed, the acts of Arab Palestinian terrorism “are really maneuvered by the Jews themselves, by Israel.” It is “more than just coincidence,” they believed, that

every time the Jews . . . antagonize world opinion, the Arab commandos do something that arouses sympathy for the Jews.

The Munich massacre of Israeli Olympic players had been “maneuvered by Israel.” “They [the Jews] are very clever.”

“*Maybe the United States will force Israel into accepting a settlement,*” they suggested. “That’s why Egyptians spend so much hard hope on the United States—not on idealistic grounds.” The Arabs were all “very anxious” for a settlement, but

Israel would never sign to any borders whatsoever, because once the borders are settled, Israel won’t exist anymore. They know that and we know it better!

Everyone was laughing now, but the tension seemed unrelieved. I forced a smile, mumbled something about the lateness of the hour—we’d been “discuss-



ing” for almost three hours—and thanked them for their kind cooperation. All assured me they’d had “a very good time,” and hoped I’d “take [their] good ideas” back home with me, and “do good work.” It was very important to “do good work,” because

Jews dominate mass communications. There is no place for Arab voices to express their opinion in Europe or the United States.

During another interview, Foreign Minister Ismaïl Fahmy warned that, if I wrote “the truth,” *they* would be after me, *they* would never leave me alone. I would lose my job. Who?

The Jewish lobby in your country. I guarantee you . . . you will lose your job. *I am warning you!* I’m afraid for your future.

Yet, several Egyptians in Cairo confided quite candidly that Jewish writers from abroad were then being given “special treatment.” One former General predicted:

Once we can convince the Jews—especially the six million in the U.S.—that it is *Egypt* who is the “moderate” and *Israel* is “intransigent” and “standing in the way of peace,” we will have won the two hundred million Americans. Who among the two hundred million will be for Israel if the six million American Jews are not?

In an article about the above,<sup>43</sup> I wrote of what I found to be a significant and alarmingly “immoderate,” anti-Jewish Egypt in 1975. Later, while reading translations of Arabic religious doctrine and official Arab government educational texts of the 1960s, like those mentioned in Chapter 4, the sentiments expressed in the 1970s by the Egyptians became recognizable: their expressions in many instances were verbatim or paraphrased renditions that parroted the Muslim clergy and the schoolbooks.

In mid-1977 I returned to Egypt. There, two State Department staffers from the U.S. Embassy privately advised me, over coffee in the snack bar of a Cairo hotel, that they had “heard about” my earlier reports, and “no, nothing has changed—because Egypt hasn’t even begun” what they called “the process of socialization of an attitude of accepting a Jewish state in their midst.” During the same trip, I met with President Sadat, a few months before his precedent-breaking pilgrimage to Jerusalem. In that interview the Egyptian president acknowledged that “Seventy percent of this Arab-Israeli conflict is a psychological problem—it has only thirty percent substance.”<sup>44</sup> In all probability Sadat was planning then to change the circumstances under which, as he put it, “Both of us have no confidence in the other.”

Afterward the political relations of the two nations had alternated between the triumphs of both leaders’ visits to each other’s countries and the tribulations brought about by the hard negotiations for peace. Perhaps nobody was more surprised than the countries concerned when the on-again, off-again efforts culminated in the historic peace treaty of 1979.

Prime Minister Menachem Begin, the first Israeli leader to pay an official call on Cairo since the founding of his country, seemed impervious to the fact that he was received by a less-than-jubilant Egypt. The joyous welcome President Sadat had received from Israel upon his 1977 Jerusalem mission was conspicuously absent from Cairo during Prime Minister Begin's visit—which caused some observers to become skeptical of the Egyptians' sincerity.

Despite the peace implemented, most Egyptian-born Jewish refugees now in Israel were doubtful of the sincerity of Egypt's welcome. While they joyously and incredulously received the visit of Sadat to Jerusalem in 1977, by 1979 they expressed distrust and fear at the fact that, although Israeli Prime Minister Begin included all the Jewish-settled Sinai territory in the Israeli government's concessions to gain peace, not one Jewish resident among the thousands who had settled in the Sinai after the 1967 Israeli victory was allowed by Egypt to remain. Many such Israelis, and their refugee counterparts from other Arab states, maintained that the peace treaty was in fact no more than a "temporary" ploy used by Sadat and Egypt. These detractors argued that Egypt was merely using the Israelis' long-sought desire for the end of hostility to "take what the Israelis gave"; they claimed that the negotiations were an "apartheid truce" and not a peace treaty.

But when Begin arrived in Cairo, for many,

the most remarkable aspect of the Begin visit was . . . that it was taking place at all

amid the raising of an Israeli flag with its emblazoned blue-and-white Star of David, and accompanied by the premiere Egyptian performance of the Jewish national anthem.<sup>45</sup>

When President Sadat was murdered in 1981, his political foes and Israel's enemies hoped the assassin's bullet that cut him down would sever the flow of peace and the formal ties between Egypt and Israel. Those eager to keep the peace process alive placed their aspirations in the policies of Sadat's successor, President Hosni Mubarak; there the momentous groundwork of Sadat and Begin would lie uneasy and more fragile, stalled in the political wake of the 1980s war waged by Israel against PLO terror in Lebanon.

For the handful of Jews still in Egypt, mostly the elderly, perhaps the question is purely academic. As for the rest of Egypt's erstwhile Jewish community, as Mr. Begin said in Cairo, although

only a small remnant remains, . . . we can take solace in that most of those who are left are in the land of Israel.<sup>46</sup>

It is certain that the courage of Anwar el-Sadat changed Arab-Israeli history and established a precedent of peace; however tenuous, it was once done. Those of us who watched breathlessly in the Tel Aviv airport as Egypt's presidential plane first touched down on Jewish soil, felt tangibly the tremors of that first step in a peace path and were immeasurably moved.

No reasonable observer ought to expect that, within the Egyptians' deep-

rooted attitudes toward Jews, an abrupt change of heart can take place. Even with totalitarian-styled control, a political peace cannot artificially induce the will of a people to “love thy neighbor.” Some of the sentiments greeting Begin in the Egyptian press on his arrival in Cairo after the peace accords—including words like “Shylock” and “bloodsucker”—were uncomfortably reminiscent of a hostility I’d heard years before. And that some in our media identified those press reactions as “anti-Semitic”<sup>47</sup> reminded me of words written at another time about re-education in another context by the eminent physicist Leo Szilard: “How many years would it take . . . to be slightly malicious without being outright offensive?”<sup>48</sup> The devout desire was that such Egyptian “psychological” residue in time would diminish and disappear into the black hole of Egypt’s historical hostility toward Jews. Whether the dynamics of peace be the stronger, only time would tell.

## A Backward Glance

In truth, there is only a small fraction left throughout the entire Arab world of its once near-million Jewish population, and some of those Jews do not remain by choice. Far fewer Jews have chosen to continue living under hostile Arab rule than, for instance, Jews who remained in Germany, where—despite the officially declared anti-Jewish policy and the opportunity, albeit hazardous, to flee between 1933 and 1939—nearly two-thirds did not leave. As the German-born scholar Rabbi Joachim Prinz observed:

The Jews seem to have a perverse talent for developing an unhappy and totally uncritical patriotism for the countries in which they live. They were Frenchmen who adored the tricolor when, during the days of Dreyfus, the streets were full of mobs yelling “A bas les juifs!” They were loyal Germans and faithful Englishmen, and loving children of Russia, in spite of the storm troopers, degradation and pogroms. And by 1492 they had been Spaniards for centuries.<sup>49</sup>

There were many reasons for the difference between the mass exodus of the Arab-born Jewish refugees and the reluctant leave-taking by the German Jews who escaped from Hitler: Arab-born Jews realized that the Arab threats would be carried out, because they had lived as second-class citizens—*dhimmis*—with reminders of pogroms in their own or their families’ past experiences, whereas the German Jews felt themselves “assimilated,” part of the German mainstream. They expressed initial “disbelief” that any such bigotry as the Nazis’ could be more than a cruel political joke. It was justified disbelief—never had there occurred so massive or systematic a genocide—even of Jews—in the Western world. The German Jews’ incredulity was shared by the rest of the world—rumors of the Nazi intentions were eschewed as “Zionist” or “Jewish” propaganda, and even when unmistakable evidence filtered through of the awful truth, Western officials judged that evidence to be exaggerated.

By the time of their exodus in 1948, the Arab-born Jews had the advantage

of hindsight—not only had they learned of the Nazi holocaust, but they had lived in the Arab lands that zealously had embraced the Nazi dogma and had adopted it within their own Arab anti-Jewish *Muftism*. And the *most important difference* of all was that by 1948 Arab-born Jews had a place to go—Israel.

Why then would *any* Arab-born Jew persist in living in a hostile Arab community that avowedly views him or her an “enemy,” when there is an alternative? Unquestionably there are many surface explanations—loss of livelihood, fear of change, reluctance to abandon aged relatives who refused to uproot from familiar surroundings. The process of rejection of one’s perilous predicament, however, is nearly analogous, by its very existence, to the avoidance mechanism that Jews have employed in so many unfortunate periods of Jewish history. They avoided perhaps because the knowledge or acceptance of such history required an awareness too painful to bear—that flight for the Jews was inexorable, at some point, from everywhere, and that any haven other than Israel was only transient.

THE CREATION OF YESTERDAY:

EARLY POPULATION  
AND DEPOPULATION  
OF THE HOLY LAND



## “Palestina”: A Precedent of Prey

. . . How often in talks with Rogers, Kissinger, Sisco and others has Egypt heard the Americans say, in effect, “We’re not interested in raking over the past: let’s look at the situation as it is today.” *But today’s situation is the creation of yesterday.*\*

—Mohamed Heikal, *The Road to Ramadan*

. . . some [Jews] you slew and others you took captive. *He [Allah] made you masters of their land, their houses and their goods, and of yet another land on which you had never set foot before.*

Truly, Allah has power over all things.\*

—The Koran, The Clans, surah XXXIII

Yes, the existence of a separate Palestinian identity serves only tactical purposes. The founding of a Palestinian state is a *new* tool in the continuing battle against Israel . . .

—Zuheir Muhsin, late Military Department head of the PLO and member of its Executive Council, Dutch daily *Trouw*, March 1977

The Prophet Muhammad said, “War is deception.”

—*al-Bukhari, al-Jami al-Sahih*

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**A**lthough a politically based mythology has grown up around and smothered the documented past of the land known as “Palestine,” there is recognition among preeminent scholars of what one of them has called “the more chauvinist Arab version of the region’s history as having begun with the Arabs and Islam.”<sup>1</sup>

The claim that Arab-Muslim “Palestinians” were “emotionally tied” to “their own plot of land in Palestine”—based upon a “consistent presence” on “Arab” land for “thousands of years”<sup>2</sup>—is an important part of that recent mythology. It was contrived of late in a thus far successful Orwellian propaganda effort—an

\*Emphasis added.

appeal to the emotions that would “counter Zionism” and that “serves” tactical purposes as “a *new* tool in the continuing battle against Israel,” as the late PLO official Muhsin stated candidly in an interview, quoted at the beginning of this chapter.

In order to understand how that tool, aided by a general near-ignorance of the “unrelenting past,” has distorted the perception of the present, a look at the “yesterday” of “Palestine” is necessary.

The inspection will be focused upon completing a circle—tracing the actual conditions and events that have been glossed over or omitted from the dialogue about the Arab-Israeli conflict; they are conditions and events that shaped the real political, economic, and demographic circumstances in the area. Those circumstances in turn critically affected what “justice” really consists of—for the Jewish and Arab refugees, or the “Palestinian Problem”—for the Arab-Israeli conflict. Illuminating that situation reveals and fills in the chasm between the documented facts and the Arab claims, and gives perspective to those contentions and assumptions that have become key in interpreting what is “just” for the population in question today.

“The only Arab domination since the Conquest in 635 A.D. hardly lasted, as such, 22 years . . .,” the Muslim chairman of the Syrian Delegation attested in his remarks to the Paris Peace Conference in February 1919.<sup>3</sup>

The British Palestine Royal Commission reported in 1937 that “it is time, surely, that Palestinian ‘citizenship’ . . . should be recognized as what it is, as nothing but a legal formula devoid of moral meaning.”<sup>4</sup>

That the claim of “age-old Arab Palestinian rights to Arab Palestine” is contradicted by history has been pointed out by eminent historians and Arabists.

According to the Reverend James Parkes, “The Land was named *Palestina* by the Romans to eradicate all trace of its Jewish history. . . .”

It may seem inappropriate to have devoted so much time to “a situation which passed away two thousand years ago.” But it is only *politically* that the defeat by Rome, and the scattering of the Jewish population, made a decisive change in the history of The Land. That which had been created by more than a thousand years of Jewish history [a thousand years before A.D. 135] remained, as did that which was beginning to be created in the thoughts of the young Christian Church.\*<sup>5</sup>

Many authorities have addressed the misconceptions surrounding the word *Palestine*. The name derived from “other migrants from the northwest, the Philistines. Though the *latest arrivals*, and though they only exercised control over the whole country for a few uncertain decades, they had been the cause of its name of Palestine. These *Philistines* were an *Aegean* people, driven out of Greece and the Aegean islands around about 1300 B.C.E. They moved southward along the Asiatic coast and in about 1200 attempted to invade Egypt. Turned back, they

\*Emphasis added.



settled in the maritime plain of southern 'Palestine', where they founded a series of city-states."<sup>6</sup>

According to Bernard Lewis, an eminent authority, "The word Palestine does not occur in the Old Testament. . . . Palestine does not occur in the New Testament at all."

The official adoption of the name Palestine in Roman usage to designate the territories of the former Jewish principality of Judea seems to date from after the suppression of the great Jewish revolt of Bar-Kokhba in the year 135 C.E. . . . it would seem that the name Judea was abolished . . . and the country renamed Palestine or Syria Palestina, with the . . . intention of obliterating its historic Jewish identity. The earlier name did not entirely disappear, and as late as the 4th century C.E. we still find a Christian author, Epiphanius, referring to "Palestine, that is, Judea."

As many, including Professor Lewis, have pointed out, "From the end of the Jewish state in antiquity to the beginning of British rule, the area now designated by the name Palestine was not a country and had no frontiers, only administrative boundaries; it was a group of provincial subdivisions, by no means always the same, within a larger entity."<sup>7</sup>

In other words, it appears that Palestine never was an independent nation and the Arabs never named the land to which they now claim rights. Most Arabs do not admit so candidly that "Palestinian identity" is a maneuver "only for political reasons" as did Zuheir Muhsin. But the Arab world, until recently, itself frequently negated the validity of any claim of an "age-old Palestinian Arab" identity.

The Arabs in Judah-cum-Palestine were regarded either as members of a "pan-Arab nation," as a Muslim community, or, in a tactical ploy, as "Southern Syrians."<sup>8</sup> The beginning article of a 1919 Arab Covenant proposed by the Arab Congress in Jerusalem stated that "The Arab lands are a complete and indivisible whole, and the divisions of whatever nature to which they have been subjected are not approved nor recognized by the Arab nation."<sup>9</sup> In the same year, the General Syrian Congress had the opposite view; it expressed eagerness to stress an exclusively Syrian identity: "We ask that there should be no separation of the southern part of Syria, known as Palestine . . ."<sup>10</sup> The Arab historian George Antonius delineated Palestine in 1939 as part of "the whole of the country of that name [Syria] which is now split up into mandated territories. . . ."<sup>11</sup> As late as the 1950s, there was still a schizoid pattern to the Arab views. In 1951, the Constitution of the Arab Ba'ath Party stated:

The Arabs form one nation. This nation has the natural right to live in a single state and to be free to direct its own destiny . . . to gather all the Arabs in a single, independent Arab state.<sup>12</sup>

\*See the map "Ancient Palestine" in Appendix I.

A scant five years later, a Saudi Arabian United Nations delegate in 1956 asserted that "It is common knowledge that Palestine is nothing but Southern Syria."<sup>13</sup> In 1974, Syria's President Assad, although a PLO supporter, incorporated both claims in a remarkable definition:

. . . Palestine is not only a part of our Arab homeland, but a basic part of southern Syria.<sup>14</sup>

The one identity *never seriously* considered until the 1967 Six-Day War—and then only as a "tool"—was an "Arab Palestinian" one, and the absence was not merely disregard. Clearly there was no such age-old or even century-old "national identity." According to the British *Palestine Royal Commission Report*,

In the twelve centuries or more that have passed since the Arab conquest Palestine has virtually dropped out of history. . . . In economics as in politics Palestine lay outside the main stream of the world's life. In the realm of thought, in science or in letters, it made no contribution to modern civilization. Its last state was worse than its first.<sup>15</sup>

## Before the Arab Conquest

But long before the Arab conquest, as a British Member of Parliament pointed out in 1939,

a thousand years before the Prophet Mohammed was born, the Jew, already exiled, sitting by the waters of Babylon, was singing: "If I forget thee O Jerusalem, may my right hand forget its cunning."<sup>16</sup>

The Reverend Parkes says that the theme that "gives to Jewish history characteristics which begin by being unusual and end by being unique" is that "the religion which was developing into a universalistic ethical monotheism never lost its root in The Land."<sup>17</sup>

. . . Jewry has nowhere established another independent national centre; and, as is natural, the Land of Israel is intertwined far more intimately into the religious and historic memories of the people; for their connection with the country has been of much longer duration—in fact it has been continuous from the 2nd millenium B.C.E. up to modern times. . . . The Land therefore has provided an emotional centre which has endured through the whole of their period of "exile", and has led to constant returns or attempted returns, culminating in our own day in the Zionist Movement.<sup>18</sup>

Israel had already become a nation about 1220 B.C.—nearly two thousand years before the first Arab invasion began.<sup>19</sup> The Jews' persistent presence on the land survived periodic attempts to extinguish them throughout their history. Around the first century,

Many Diaspora Jews observed the commandments of pilgrimage, and on the High Holidays in Jerusalem one might have met Jews from such different lands as

Parthia, Media, Elam, Mesopotamia, Cappadocia, Pontus, Asia Minor, Phrygia, Pamphylia, Cyrene, Crete, Rome and Arabia.<sup>20</sup>

By the time of the Roman conquest of Judea the Jews were considered "turbulent and troublesome people to deal with," according to the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*,<sup>21</sup> when they stubbornly refused to surrender their country to Roman rule.

The Emperor Hadrian, "determined to stamp out this aggressive Jewish nationalism," ruled that henceforth Jewish traditions such as circumcision, the Sabbath, reading of the law—in fact, the beliefs of Judaism itself—were illegal and "forbidden."<sup>22</sup> Hadrian was "determined to convert the still half-ruined Jerusalem into a Roman colony." After the Jews' Temple was destroyed in A.D. 70, the revolt of Jewish leader Bar Kochba—who had "200,000 men at his command"—recaptured Jerusalem and many "strongholds and villages throughout the country." The "full-scale country-wide war . . . raged with fierce bitterness for four years, the Romans having to bring in legion after legion of reinforcements to suppress the insurgents."<sup>23</sup>

Although the Romans ultimately regained political reign, "sacked the city [of Jerusalem] . . . and expelled the bulk of the Jewish survivors from the country,"<sup>24</sup> the cost of victory was shattering—"It is said that as many as 580,000 men were slain!"—Romans as well as Jews. It was after the debacle that Hadrian changed the name of the city of Jerusalem to Aelia Capitolina, ordered the building of a temple of Jupiter on the Jewish Temple site and "forbade any Jew, on pain of death, to appear within sight of the city."<sup>25</sup>

But in the same way that the name Judea did not disappear, neither did the Jews abandon their land. A number had obstinately remained, and many others quickly returned to rebuild their world. Some Jews, however, fled the Roman conquest for other points—including Arabia, where they formed some new settlements and in many instances joined Jewish Arabian communities established at the time of release from the captivity in Babylon or existing even before then. Thus evolved the flight of the *first* "Palestinian" refugees—the Judeans, or Jews.

## The Haven in Arabia

A look at the haven where these "Palestinian" or "Judean" Jewish refugees from the Romans found sanctuary is important to understanding the "heart of the matter" in the Middle East today—the conflict between Arab and Jew. The circumstances of the Arabian Jewish communities in the Arabian Peninsula—both *before* and *after* the Arab Conquest—bear importantly upon Arab-Jewish relationships until this day, because the pattern that developed in Arabia established a tradition that has been followed ever since.

According to Arabist scholar Alfred Guillaume, Jews probably first settled in Arabia in connection with the fall of Samaria in 721 B.C.:

. . . it is almost certain that the self-contained Jewish military colony in Aswan and upper Egypt, about which the world knew nothing until a few years ago, was founded just after the fall of Samaria, and consequently it is not impossible that some Jewish settlements in Arabia were due to fugitives fleeing from the old northern capital of the Hebrews.

Guillaume is certain that "in the first and second centuries A.D., . . . Arabia offered a near asylum" to the Jews who had been victimized by the "utterly ruthless" Romans.<sup>26</sup>

In the Arabian land considered by many to be "purely Arab," the land which would spawn Islam many centuries later,

Numbers of Jewish and Christian settlements were established in different parts of Arabia, both spreading Aramaic and Hellenistic culture. The chief southern Arabian Christian centre was in Najrān, where a relatively advanced political life was developed. Jews and Judaized Arabs were everywhere, especially in Yathrib, later renamed Medina. They were mainly agriculturists and artisans. Their origin is uncertain and many different theories have been advanced.<sup>27</sup>

Although the fact is little recognized, more than one historian has affirmed that the Arab world's second holiest city, Medina, was one of the allegedly "purely Arab" cities that actually was first settled by Jewish tribes.<sup>28</sup> Bernard Lewis writes:

The city of Medina, some 280 miles north of Mecca, had originally been settled by Jewish tribes from the north, especially the Banū Nadīr and Banū Quraiza. The comparative richness of the town attracted an infiltration of pagan Arabs who came at first as clients of the Jews and ultimately succeeded in dominating them. Medina, or, as it was known before Islam, Yathrib, had no form of stable government at all. The town was torn by the feuds of the rival Arab tribes of Aus and Khazraj, with the Jews maintaining an uneasy balance of power. The latter, engaged mainly in agriculture and handicrafts, were economically and culturally superior to the Arabs, and were consequently disliked. . . . as soon as the Arabs had attained unity through the agency of Muhammad they attacked and ultimately eliminated the Jews.<sup>29</sup>

In the last half of the fifth century, many Persian Jews fled from persecution to Arabia, swelling the Jewish population there.<sup>30</sup> But around the sixth century, Christian writers reported of the continuing importance of the Jewish community that remained in the Holy Land. For the dispersed Arabian Jewish settlers, Tiberias in Judea was central. In the Kingdom of Himyar on the Red Sea's east coast in Arabia, "conversion to Judaism of influential circles" was popular, and the Kingdom's rule stretched across "considerable portions of South Arabia."

The commoners as well as the royal family adopted Judaism, and one writer reports that "Jewish priests (presumably rabbis) from Tiberias . . . formed part of the suite of King Du Noas and served as his envoys in negotiations with Christian cities."<sup>31</sup>

According to Guillaume,

At the dawn of Islam the Jews dominated the economic life of the Hijaz [Arabia]. They held all the best land . . . ; at Medina they must have formed at least half of the population. There was also a Jewish settlement to the north of the Gulf of Aqaba. . . . What is important is to note that the Jews of the Hijaz made many proselytes [or converts] among the Arab tribesmen.<sup>32</sup>

The first “Palestinian” or Judean refugees—the *Jews*—had resettled to become prosperous, influential *Arabian* settlers.

The prosperity of the Jews was due to their superior knowledge of agriculture and irrigation and their energy and industry. Homeless [Jewish] refugees in the course of a few generations became large landowners in the country, [the refugees who had come to the Hijaz when the Romans conquered Palestine] controllers of its finance and trade. . . . Thus it can readily be seen that Jewish prosperity was a challenge to the Arabs, particularly the Quraysh at Mecca and . . . [other Arab tribes] at Medina.

The Prophet Muhammad himself was a member of the Quraysh tribe, which coveted the Jews’ bounty, and

when the Muslims took up arms they treated the Jews with much greater severity than the Christians, who, until the end of the purely Arab Caliphate, were not badly treated.<sup>33</sup>

One of the reasons for “this discrimination” against the Jews is what Guillaume called “the *Qurān*’s scornful words” regarding the Jews.<sup>34</sup> The Jews’ development of land and culture was a prime source of booty in the Arabian desert peninsula. Beginning at the time of the Prophet Muhammad and Islam<sup>35</sup>—from the expulsions, depredations, extortion, forced conversions or murder of Jewish Arabians settled in Medina to the mass slaughter of Jews at Khaibar—the precedent was established among Arab-Muslims to expropriate that which belonged to the Jews. Relations between the Prophet Muhammad and the Jews were “never . . . easy”:

They had irritated him by their refusal to recognize him as a prophet, by ridicule and by argument; and of course their economic supremacy . . . was a standing irritant.<sup>36</sup>

It appears that the first “instigation” by the Prophet Muhammad himself against the Jews was an incident in which he had “one or two Jews . . . murdered and no blood money was paid to their next of kin.”

. . . Their leaders opposed his claim to be an apostle sent by God, and though they doubtless drew some satisfaction from his acceptance of the divine mission of Abraham, Moses, and the prophets, they could hardly be expected to welcome the inclusion of Jesus and Ishmael among his chosen messengers.<sup>37</sup>

. . . the existence of pockets of disaffected Jews in and around his base was a cause of uneasiness and they had to be eliminated if he [Muhammad] was to wage war without anxiety.<sup>38</sup>

Because the Jews preferred to retain their own beliefs,

a tribe of Jews in the neighborhood of Medina, fell under suspicion of treachery and were forced to lay down their arms and evacuate their settlements. Valuable land and much booty fell into the hands of the Muslims. . . . The neighboring tribe of Qurayza, who were soon to suffer annihilation, made no move to help their co-religionists, and their allies, the Aus, were afraid to give them active support.<sup>39</sup>

The Prophet Muhammad's pronouncement: "Two religions may not dwell together on the Arabian Peninsula."<sup>40</sup> This edict was carried out by Abu Bakr and Omar I, the Prophet Muhammad's successors; the entire community of Jewish settlements throughout northern Arabia was systematically slaughtered. According to Bernard Lewis, "the extermination of the Jewish tribe of Quraiza" was followed by "an attack on the Jewish oasis of Khaibar."<sup>41</sup>

Messengers of Muhammad were sent to the Jews who had escaped to the safety and comfort of Khaibar, "inviting" Usayr, the Jewish "war chief," to visit Medina for mediations.

Usayr set off with thirty companions and a Muslim escort. Suspecting no foul play, the Jews went unarmed. On the way, the Muslims turned upon the defenseless delegation, killing all but one who managed to escape. "War is deception,"<sup>42</sup> according to an oft-quoted saying of the Prophet.<sup>43</sup>

The late Israeli historian and former President, Itzhak Ben-Zvi, judged the "inhuman atrocities" of the Arabian communities as unparalleled since then:

. . . the complete extermination of the two Arabian-Jewish tribes, the Nadhir and Kainuka' by the mass massacre of their men, women and children, was a tragedy for which no parallel can be found in Jewish history until our own day. . . .<sup>44</sup>

The slaughter of Arabian Jews and the expropriation of their property became Allah's will. According to the Koran,

. . . some you slew and others you took captive. He [Allah] made you masters of their [the Jews'] *land*, their *houses* and their *goods*, and of yet *another land* [*Khaibar*] *on which you had never set foot before*. Truly, Allah has power over all things.\*<sup>45</sup>

Guillaume reports that the anti-Jewish attack at Khaibar was fiercely fought off, but "though the inhabitants fought more bravely here than elsewhere, outnumbered and caught off their guard, they were defeated."<sup>46</sup> Those who somehow survived constituted the formula for Islam's future successes. Some of the Jews, as "non-Muslims" or infidels, "retained their land," at least until Muslims could be recruited in sufficient numbers to replace the Jews. Meanwhile, the Arabian Jews paid a fifty-percent "tribute," or tax, for the "protection" of the new plun-

\*Emphasis added.

derers. As Professor Lewis writes, "The Muslim victory in Khaibar marked the first contact between the Muslim state and a conquered non-Muslim people and formed the basis for later dealings of the same type."<sup>47</sup>

Thus the Jewish *dhimmi* evolved—the robbery of freedom and political independence compounding the extortion and eventual expropriation of property. "Tolerated" between onslaughts, expulsions, and pillages from the Arab Muslim conquest onward, the non-Muslim *dhimmi*—predominantly Jewish but Christian too—provided the important source of religious revenue through the "infidel's" head tax. He became very quickly a convenient political scapegoat and whipping boy as well.

Other Jewish colonies succumbed in much the same way: "Jews were allowed to keep their land on condition that they surrendered half the produce to Medina." But, "the arrangement did not last long. . . ." Virtually all of Khaibar's and Medina's surviving Jews—along with "all the other Jews and Christians in the peninsula"—were dispossessed and expelled through the Prophet Muhammad's edict, zealously implemented by his caliph Omar.<sup>48</sup>

Much of the wealth of the country which had been concentrated in the hands of the Jews had now been seized by the Muslims, *who were no longer indigent immigrants but wealthy landowners*, men of substance, owning camels and horses and their own weapons. . . . Muhammad's fame spread far and wide, and the bedouin flocked to him in thousands.\*<sup>49</sup>

## The Precedent of Prey

Thus evolved the formation of the successful pattern that was to be perpetuated in the propagation of the Arabian Muslim creed. Those Jews who escaped with their lives became perhaps the first Arabian refugees. They were the beginning link in the long chain of Jews to be plundered by "immigrant" Muslims of the "Arab" world, who would exact their reward as their new faith permitted, even prescribed them to do.

It is likely that among the Jewish refugees fleeing from Arabia were numbers of Jews whose "Palestinian"—or Judean—ancestors had fled from the Romans. Now they returned to seventh-century Palestine, joining their Jewish brethren who had never left. Ironically, the Jewish refugees' return coincided with the introduction of the Arab conquerors from the desert; the very invaders who had forced themselves in and the Jews out of their homes in Arabia would now plunder Judah-Palestina in the identical pattern.

And the Jews who inhabited many towns of "Palestine" uninterruptedly would one day in the twentieth century be forced out as the Arabian Jews had been—by slaughter or expropriation and terrorizing. The towns would then, in the later twentieth century, be touted as "purely Arab Palestinian areas since time

\*Emphasis added.

immemorial," just as the Arabian Peninsula had come to be perceived as "purely Arab," when in fact the holy Arab Muslim city of Medina had been originally settled by Jews.

After the seventh-century invasion of Medina—the beginning of the Arab conquest in Arabia—where we have seen the settled Jews conquered by the "Arabians," Caliph Omar was ruling over the vanquished tribes when he received word from his general that Arabian invaders had conquered Alexandria:

"I have captured a city from the description of which I shall refrain. Suffice it to say that I have seized therein 4,000 villas with 4,000 baths, 40,000 *poll-tax paying Jews* and four hundred places of entertainment for the royalty."<sup>50</sup>

The Arabs who invaded Judah-cum-Palestine followed that precedent. Upon the invasion of Palestine, the "Arabians of the desert" found a Palestinian Jewish community of major proportion. Shortly after the Arab conquest, the Jews would again assert their nationalistic goals, rising in part from the infliction of the new *dhimma* restrictions and humiliations that were to become the fate of all non-Muslims.

Omar II was the religious zealot who instituted many of the restrictions. . . . These restrictions were, no doubt, responsible for the rising of the pseudo-Messiah Syrene, . . . a Syrian Jew, [who had] promised to . . . regain possession of the Holy Land for Jewish people."<sup>51</sup>

Those Jews who had remained in Roman "Palestine," together with the Jewish communities who quickly returned after the Roman conquest, had succeeded in "mould[ing] Judaism in a new stamp."<sup>52</sup> Although the revered Temple had been destroyed, the synagogue remained to "soften the blow" and Jewish leaders who had escaped from the siege of Jerusalem were permitted by Roman leaders to return, and to teach the form of Judaism that was to preserve and perpetuate the "aggressive Jewish nationalism" that finally achieved political reclaiming of the land nearly twenty centuries later.

Ironically, it was thus those very Roman leaders who had *conquered* the Jewish State and destroyed the Jewish Temple who helped unwittingly to initiate the means by which the Jewish National Liberation movement would remain intact. Had the Romans permitted the Jews to retain their sovereignty, the Jews might have been relegated to archaic history as had the Hittites, the Philistines, and other long-extinct peoples of the region. Although the tenacious Jewish history before the Romans would indicate otherwise, one might ponder the Jews' fate if the Jewish people and their way of worship had been a matter of indifference rather than the traditional object of resentment and suspicion born of imitation.

In the centuries between the Roman dismantling of the Jewish sovereign state

\*Emphasis added.



and the Arab invasion, the Jews' population had “remained as . . . before the loss of independence, primarily peasants and landowners.” The Jewish population—between five and seven million in A.D. 70, according to Josephus<sup>53</sup>—still numbered around three million, despite large numbers of Jews who were deported or had fled just before the Jewish revolt and defeat of Bar Kochba. According to Roman figures, nearly 600,000 Jews alone fell during that revolt, but the Jews managed to remain on the land and to accomplish significant achievements afterward.<sup>54</sup>

The centers of Jewish life occasionally shifted in importance—after the revolt of Bar Kochba the nucleus of the Jewish community moved to Galilee for a time.<sup>55</sup> But the Romans, because they recognized the Jewish hereditary Patriarchate as “the supreme . . . authority” for the total Jewish community in the empire, inadvertently provided the Jews with a political-religious center that had the practical effect of replacing—though never pre-empting—the grievously lost Temple.<sup>56</sup> The result was that the Jewish identity with the Jewish nation remained steadfast.

As the British Royal Commission would report in 1937, almost 2,000 years afterward,

Always . . . since the fall of the Jewish state some Jews have been living in Palestine. . . . Fresh immigrants arrived from time to time . . . [and] settled mainly in Galilee, in numerous villages spreading northwards to the Lebanon and in the towns of Safad and Tiberias.<sup>57</sup>

According to reports of the various periods of history, some of the Jewish enclaves managed to remain in their original places for thousands of years.

The Jews were numerous in Judah-cum-Palestine and the Christians proportionately few in the third and fourth centuries.<sup>58</sup> And for a rare and brief moment there was peace. The historian de Haas wrote that

The East breathed more freely, and enjoyed even a spell of real peace during the reign of Alexander Severus (222–235), . . . His predilections brought him the nickname of Archisynagogus, or rabbi. He flirted with the Jews, and his mother, Julia Mamae, protected the great church father, Origen. This catholicity was even exhibited in the imperial palace, where pictures of Orpheus, Jesus, and Abraham, hung side by side.<sup>59</sup>

But Professor Lewis reminds that

*In Palestine, the Jews, still an important element, if no longer the majority of the population, had suffered even more grievously than the heretical Christians from Byzantine repression, and had little love for their masters.”\*<sup>60</sup>*

The “bullying orthodoxy” of the growing Byzantium diminished the Jews' political, civil, and even religious rights in the fifth century. The Reverend Parkes

\*Emphasis added.

reports that, by the time the Persians invaded in A.D. 611, the Jews had been persecuted long enough so that the "Persians received substantial help from the Jews of Galilee"—an estimated 20,000 to 26,000 Jewish soldiers. The Persians' occupation ended after fifteen years.<sup>61</sup>

On the eve of the introduction of the Arabian to Palestine, the Christians briefly reoccupied Palestine in A.D. 629. Because the Jews had cooperated with the Persians, "the clergy of Jerusalem thought only of revenge," and inspired a "bloody massacre . . . of Jews."<sup>62</sup>

Neither Christian nor Jew realized that within a few years the Arabian invasion would bring Byzantine rule to an end, and many of those inhabitants who had once converted to Byzantine now would adopt the tongue, religion, and, briefly, the rule of the Arabs.

When we look back over the history of the early Caliphates—and we must do so, since the present hopes and pretensions of the Arabs, and the popular belief in their coming Renaissance rest equally on ancient history—we find the period of genuine Arab Empire extraordinarily short. Arabs governed Arabs, through Arabs on an imperial scale for much less than a century. It is just the Omayyad Caliphate—the Damascus period and no more.

Thus was the comparatively recent Arab propaganda claim of Palestine as an "Arab" country for "millennia" disproved by the historian David George Hogarth in 1877.<sup>63</sup> Hogarth was described by eminent Arab writers as "one of the greatest authorities of his time on Arabian history."<sup>64</sup>

The Reverend James Parkes has agreed that

The period during which the empire was ruled from Damascus and can be called an "Arab" empire, lasted less than a century and even in that short time it had begun to decline.<sup>65</sup>

Noting that decline, the prominent Arab historian Philip Hitti also explained how the "Arab" invaders were "diluted" by converts:

Through their intermarriages with the conquering stock they served to dilute the Arabian blood and ultimately to make that element inconspicuous amidst the mixture of varied racial strains.<sup>66</sup>

. . . the invaders from the desert brought with them no tradition of learning, no heritage of culture, to the lands they conquered.<sup>67</sup>

The "Arab" rule as such had been precluded before A.D. 750. According to Hitti,

Shortly before the middle of the eighth century a caliph ascended to the Umayyad throne who had been born of a slave mother. . . . His two successors, the last in the dynasty, were also sons of slave women. . . . That the reigning family could no longer boast pure Arab blood was symptomatic of a loosening of moral standards throughout society.<sup>68</sup>

Hitti pointed out the destructive element of tribal warfare that contributed heavily to the ravages of Palestine.

The position of the Omayyad dynasty, weakened by this decadence, was further undermined by the increasingly sharp division of North Arabian as against South Arabian tribes. *This racial tendency to separatism, apparent even in pre-Islamic days, now became complete and was the cause of boundless dispute.*\*<sup>69</sup>

The findings of even those historians most vaunted by the Arab world have been specific in their contradiction of Arab claims to historical right of sovereignty in the land of "Palestine." The Arabs never created their own name for the land they now claim as their own. Neither was there ever an independent country of Palestine, nor a "Palestinian" rule. The word "Palestine" was given to the land of Judea by the Romans when Roman conquerors unsuccessfully attempted to purge the land of the "nationalistic," obstinate Jews.

"The brevity of purely Arab Empire was determined less by the force of non-Arab elements than by the inability of Arabs themselves to develop any system of imperial administration more adequate than the Patriarchal," Hogarth determined.<sup>70</sup>

"The short . . . Meccan period was all conquest and raiding accompanied by no more organization of territories overrun than would secure their payment of tribute."<sup>71</sup>

"The long Baghdad period" was, according to Hogarth, "not . . . government of Arabs by Arabs."

If the Abbassids were Meccan, their ministers, great and often small, were Iranians or Turanians, and their trust was in mercenaries, at first Persian, then Turk, Circassian, Kurd—*any race but the Arabian.*"\*<sup>72</sup>

Hogarth found that the same "formula" applied to Egypt and North Africa, where the ruled people as well as their governors were "non-Arab."

"What we now call 'Arab civilization' was Arabian neither in its origins and fundamental structure nor in its principal ethnic aspects," according to Philip Hitti.

Throughout the whole period of the caliphate, the Syrians, the Persians, the Egyptians and others, as Moslem converts or as Christians and Jews, were the foremost bearers of the torch of enlightenment and learning, just as the subjugated Greeks were in their relation to victorious Romans. The Arab Islamic civilization was at bottom the Hellenized Aramaic and the Iranian civilizations as developed under the aegis of the caliphate and expressed through the medium of *the Arabic tongue.*"\*<sup>73</sup>

\*Emphasis added.

The “Arab identity” is in fact largely a linguistic commonality. Hitti defines “Arabs” as “*a term which in our usage would comprise all Arabic-speaking peoples, including the Arabians, that is, the inhabitants of the Arabian peninsula.*”<sup>\*74</sup>

According to Hogarth, even the “extraordinarily short” Arab rule was mechanical and not innovative.

The Omayyads alike in Syria and Spain seemed to have carried on with the machinery they found, insisting only after a time on expression in Arabic.<sup>75</sup>

To speak historically of original inhabitants of Judah-cum-Palestine as “Arab” peoples, then, is categorically inaccurate. Not only was there no country of “Palestine,” never a “Palestinian” Arab rule, there was only an “extraordinarily short” period of time—a matter of decades—when *any* Arabs ruled Arabs on that land.

The first Arabian use of the word Arab occurs in the ancient southern Arabian inscriptions, . . . dating from the late pre-Christian and early Christian centuries. In these, Arab means Bedouin, often *raider*, and is applied to the nomadic as distinct from the sedentary population. . . . *For Muhammad and his contemporaries the Arabs were the Bedouin of the desert, and in the Qur’an the term is used exclusively in this sense and never of the townfolk of Mecca, Medina and other cities.*”<sup>\*76</sup>

Islam was the “national religion and war-cry” and the new empire was “their booty” as the conquering Arabians—or Arabs—briefly invaded and ruled over “a vast variety of peoples differing in race, language and religion, among whom they [the Arabs] formed a . . . minority,” according to Professor Bernard Lewis.<sup>77</sup>

The use of the adjective Arab to describe the various facets of this civilization has often been challenged on the grounds that the contribution to “Arab medicine,” “Arab philosophy,” etc. of those who were of Arab descent was relatively small. Even the use of the word Muslim is criticized, since so many of the architects of this culture were Christians and Jews. . . .<sup>78</sup>

The Prophet Muhammad, Arabian creator of Islam, had quickly determined that, to gain followers, plunder must be bountiful.

So little was the first wave of the Arab conquest an exclusive product of religious fanaticism, offering the conquered Islam or the sword, that many of the bedouin bands who formed the armies of Islam were in all probability still pagans when they took part in the first great surge out of the [Arabian] peninsula.<sup>79</sup>

Because the “Arabian Moslems” subscribed widely to the Koranic invocation to “Make war . . . upon such of those to whom the Book has been given until they pay tribute offered on the back of their hands, in a state of humiliation” (9:29), Hitti concluded that

\*Emphasis added.

Not fanaticism but economic necessity drove the Bedouin hordes . . . beyond the confines of their arid abode to the fair lands of the north. . . . Far from being entirely the result of deliberate and cool calculation, the campaigns seem to have *started as raids* to provide new outlets for the warring spirit of the tribes now forbidden to engage in fratricidal combats, *the objective in most cases being booty and not the gaining of a permanent foothold.*"\*<sup>80</sup>

The Arabs ruled Arabs for only some decades, not millennia, and only under the Omayyads, who were the lone dynasty of "Arab" stock. The victory of Abassids was Islamic, not Arab, and "it was Islam and not Arab blood which formed the basis of unity."<sup>81</sup> Within a hundred or so years, the "successive usurpers" of power were almost entirely "of Turkish origin."<sup>82</sup>

### Depopulation of a Melting Pot

In Palestine the "small" number of Arab invaders who had been imported by the Arabian conquerors were wiped out by disease. Thus the "myth" of the "Palestinian Arab" descending "from the Arab conquerors" appears to be factually incorrect for all but perhaps a few. Supporting Hogarth, Hitti, and Lewis, the Reverend Parkes found that

During the first century after the Arab conquest the caliph and governors of Syria and The Land [Palestine] ruled almost entirely over Christian and Jewish subjects. Apart from the bedouin [nomads], in the earliest days the only Arabs west of the Jordan (not all of whom were themselves Muslims) were the garrisons. . . ."

They "were small," and were "decimated" by epidemics within two years after the capture of Jerusalem. After a law, prohibiting the Arabs from owning land there, had been rescinded, "rich Arabs" came into ownership of "a good deal of the country."<sup>83</sup>

"*But this change of owners*"\*—often through the dispossession of Christian owners—"did not involve any extensive change in the nature of the population." *Jews and Christians still worked the land*, because the Arabs had neither the desire nor the experience for agricultural toil; they "heartily despised" both the toil and "the tiller."<sup>84</sup>

In fact, during the brief time of actual Arab rule—the Omayyad from Damascus—that rule was military only.

The clerical or theological view favoring a providential interpretation of Islamic expansion, corresponding to the Old Testament interpretation of the Hebrew history and to the medieval philosophy of Christian history, *has a faulty philological basis.* . . .

*Not until the second and third centuries of the Moslem era did the bulk of the*

\*Emphasis added.

*people in Syria, Mesopotamia and Persia profess the religion of Muhammad. Between the military conquest of these regions and their religious conversion a long period intervened. And when they were converted the people turned primarily because of self-interest—to escape tribute and seek identification with the ruling class.*<sup>\*85</sup>

Islam and the Arabic language were disseminated by a multi-ethnic Muslim community that at first included “numbers of Arabians in the provinces,” but by “the tenth century onwards,” yet another “new ruling race, the Turks” joined the seemingly endless parade of conquest—a kind of periodic rape of the Holy Land.

“From the tenth century” a multi-ethnic native population, which perhaps still included some few descendants of the Arabian invaders—all together under the rule of the Turks—commingled, and the possibility of singling out the Arabs as a people became unworkable; *Arabic-speaking* people would be a more accurate term. Already in the tenth century “the word Arab reverts to its earlier meaning of Bedouin or nomad, becoming in effect a social rather than an ethnic term.”<sup>86</sup>

With the Crusaders’ slaughters—including mass murder in 1099 of all the 70,000 Muslims in Jerusalem—the deterioration of the land in Palestine accelerated.

. . . Massacres and the fear of massacre had greatly reduced the number of Jews in Palestine and Christians in Syria.<sup>87</sup>

The “vast majority” remaining in Palestine was “native Christians,” of “mixed origin . . . carelessly known as Christian Arabs.”<sup>88</sup>

Because the population was “decimated” by the endemic massacres, disease, famine, and wars, one Muslim ruler “brought in Turks and Negroes.” Another “had Berbers, Slavs, Greeks and Dailamites.” The Kurdish conqueror,<sup>89</sup> “Saladin, introduced more Turks, and some Kurds.”<sup>90</sup>

“The flower of the Saracenes who fought the Crusaders were Turks,” chronicled Philip Graves.<sup>91</sup> “The Mamluks brought armies of Georgians, and Circassians. For his personal security each monarch relied on his own purchase.”<sup>92</sup> “In the Palestinian towns Greek was the common tongue. . . .”<sup>93</sup> In 1296, 18,000 “tents”—families—of Tartars entered and settled in the land of Palestine.<sup>94</sup>

Thus, not only was Arab rule “extraordinarily short,” but the “pure Arab peoples in Palestine for millennia”—a romanticized notion discredited by serious scholars—actually consisted of a non-Arabian, multi-ethnic procession of immigrants.

In the fourteenth century, the identity was specifically a religious one. According to Bernard Lewis,

The majority belonged to . . . the community or nation of Islam. Its members thought of themselves primarily as Muslims. When further classification was

\*Emphasis added.

**TABLE B. A Partial Chronology of Judah-Cum-Palestine<sup>95</sup>**

A.D.	
70	The Romans conquer Jerusalem.
132–136	Jewish revolt under Bar Kochba; final defeat of Judah and loss of political sovereignty.
351	Jewish revolt to end foreign rule; Roman Empire adopts Christianity.
395	Palestine part of the Eastern Roman (Byzantine) Empire, still called Judea or Judah.
438	Empress Eudocia allows Jews back to Temple site, misinterpreted by Jews as return to nationhood.
614	Persian conquest under Chosroes (with the support of a Jewish army).
628	Palestine reconquered by the Byzantines.
633–637	Arab conquest; shortly afterward, attempt by Jews to restore their nation.
639	Muawiyah Arab governor.
660	Muawiyah is made the first Omayyad Caliph of Damascus.
661	Murder of Ali; Omayyad Dynasty begins.
750	Last Omayyad Caliph defeated; reign of the Abbassid Caliphs of Baghdad (Persian, Turk, Circassian, Kurd).
878	Ahmad, b. Tūlūn, a Turkish general and governor of Egypt, conquers Palestine; reign of the Tulunides (Turks).
904	The Abbassids of Baghdad reconquer Palestine.
906	Inroads of the Carmathians.
934	The Egyptian Ikhshidi princes conquer Palestine; their reign begins.
969	The Fatimid Caliphs of Cairo conquer Palestine.
969–971	War with the Carmathians.
970–976	Byzantine invasion.
1070–1080	Seljuq Turks conquer Palestine.
1099	The Crusaders conquer Jerusalem, massacre the Jewish and Muslim populations; reign in parts of Palestine until 1291.
1187	Saladin of Damascus, a Kurd, captures Jerusalem and the greater part of Palestine.
1244	The Kharezmians, instigated by Genghis Khan, invade Palestine; Jerusalem's population is slaughtered, the city sacked.
1260	Mameluk Sultans of Egypt defeat Mongols at Ain Jalut, in Palestine; their reign begins.
1260	Mongol invasion; Jerusalem sacked.
1291	End of the Latin (Crusaders) Kingdom.
1299–1303	Mongol invasion.
1516–1517	The Ottomans conquer Palestine.
1799	Napoleon conquers Palestine, but is defeated at Acre.
1831	Ibrahim Pasha, adopted son of Egypt's Viceroy, occupies Palestine.
1840	Ibrahim Pasha compelled by the Powers to leave Palestine; Turkish rule restored.
1840 on	English writers and statesmen begin to discuss the possibility of a Jewish restoration.
1871–1882	First Jewish agricultural settlements.
1909	Foundation of the all-Jewish city of Tel Aviv.
1917–1918	Allies occupy the whole of Palestine, east and west of the Jordan River; British military administration, end of Ottoman reign.
1917–1918	Balfour Declaration granting "Jewish Homeland" internationally approved.
1920	British (pre-Mandate) civil administration; Turkish sovereignty renounced, treaty includes Balfour Declaration.

**TABLE B. A Partial Chronology of Judah-Cum-Palestine (cont'd)**

AD	
1922	Palestine Mandate; Jewish National Home confirmed.
1923	Palestine Mandate comes into operation.
1923	Seventy-five percent of Palestine is set aside as an independent Arab "Palestinian" state, Transjordan.
1925	Hebrew University of Jerusalem opened.
1927	High Commissioners receive Commission for Transjordan.
1929	Arab revolt.
1936–1939	Arab revolt and civil war.
1946	Establishment of Arab state of Transjordan.
1948	End of Mandate for Palestine; establishment of State of Israel; Arab-Jewish war.
1948	Eastern Palestine—Transjordan—occupies the West Bank area of Western Palestine, becomes "Jordan," constituting over eighty percent of Palestine.

necessary, it might be territorial—Egyptians, Syrian, Iraqi—or social—townsman, peasant, nomad. It is to this last that the term Arab belongs. *So little had it retained of its ethnic meaning that we even find it applied at times to non-Arab nomads of Kurdish or Turkoman extraction.*\*<sup>96</sup>

The new Arab "identity" derives, according to Lewis, from "the impact of the West . . . in the last fifty years. . . . It is that which regards the Arabic-speaking peoples as a nation or group of sister nations in the European sense, united by a common territory, language and culture and a common aspiration to a political independence."<sup>97</sup>

Hogarth deduced:

History tells us that, in fact, Ahmad Ibn Tulun was a Turk and Saladin was a Kurd. . . . the Turk has assimilated not a few Semites, while fewer Turks have ever come to regard themselves as Arabs—probably none at all during these last four centuries of the subjection of the one race [Arabs] to the other [Turks].<sup>[98]</sup> . . . Arab civilization owes a heavy obligation to the Greek, to the Persian, to the Jewish. . . . So much for ancient history.<sup>99</sup>

When Mark Twain toured the country in the late 1860s, he bemoaned his disillusionment at confronting the realities of the Holy Land, and expressed his displeasure at having been so misled:

I am sure, from the tenor of books I have read, that many who have visited this land in years gone by . . . came seeking evidences in support of their particular creed; . . . and they had already made up their minds to find no other, though possibly they did not know it, being blinded by their zeal. . . .

Honest as these men's intentions may have been, they were full of partialities and prejudices, they entered the country with their verdicts already prepared and

\*Emphasis added.



they could no more write dispassionately and impartially about it than they could about their own wives and children. . . . These authors write pictures and frame rhapsodies. . . .

I claim the right to correct misstatements . . .<sup>100</sup>

Whatever propaganda claims to the contrary, the territory that appears qualifiable to be claimed by the Arabs as historically "Arab land" consists solely of the "Island of the Arabians," the Arabian desert peninsula; Hitti concluded that there existed "an almost unique example of uninterrupted relationship between populace and soil." Yet even in Arabia, as we have noted, historians are unambiguous when and if they deal at all with the Jews there;<sup>101</sup> the fact is clearly recorded that dominant Arabian-Jewish communities were established within a somewhat Judaized Arabian Peninsula dating from well before the time of Jewish political exile from their homeland—possibly a thousand years before the advent of the Prophet Muhammad and Islam.

The Jews were invaded, slaughtered, expelled, or converted and displaced by the conquering "Arabians." The seventh-century surviving Jewish refugees fleeing to Judah-cum-Palestine from Arabia were victims of the *dhimma* "protection" that would carry down over 1,300 years—sometimes less violent, but unaltered in concept. The Jewish refugees who fled Arab countries in 1948 were also escaping from the "protection" of Arab-Muslims—with one important difference: the seventh-century refugees found themselves bereft of their political sovereignty, while in 1948 the Jewish refugees went "home" to their restored nation.

The "chauvinist Arab version of history," then—so important to the current claim of "Palestinian" rights to "Arab Palestine," which Arab Palestinians purportedly inhabited for "thousands of years"—*omits* several relevant, *situation-altering facts*.

History did not begin with the Arab conquest in the seventh century. The people whose nation was destroyed by the Romans were the Jews. There were no Arab Palestinians then—not until seven hundred years later would an Arab rule prevail, and then briefly. And not by people known as "Palestinians." The short Arab rule would be reigning over Christians and Jews, who had been there to languish under various other foreign conquerors—Roman, Byzantine, Persian, to name just three in the centuries between the Roman and Arab conquests. The peoples who conquered under the banner of the invading Arabians from the desert were often hired mercenaries who remained on the land as soldiers—not Arabians, but others who were enticed by the promise of the booty of conquest.

From the time the Arabians, along with their non-Arabian recruits, entered Palestine and Syria, they found and themselves added to what was "ethnologically a chaos of all the possible human combinations to which, when Palestine became a land of pilgrimage, a new admixture was added."<sup>102</sup> Among the peoples who have been counted as "indigenous Palestinian Arabs" are Balkans, Greeks, Syrians, Latins, Egyptians, Turks, Armenians, Italians, Persians, Kurds, Ger-

mans, Afghans, Circassians, Bosnians, Sudanese, Samaritans, Algerians, Motawila, and Tartars.

John of Wurzburg lists for the middle era of the kingdom, Latins, Germans, Hungarians, Scots, Navarese, Bretons, English, Franks, Ruthenians, Bohemians, Greeks, Bulgarians, Georgians, Armenians, Syrians, Persian Nestorians, Indians, Egyptians, Copts, Maronites and natives from the Nile Delta. The list might be much extended, for it was the period of the great self-willed city-states in Europe, and Amalfi, Pisans, Genoese, Venetians, and Marseillais, who had quarters in all the bigger cities, owned villages, and had trading rights, would, in all probability, have submitted to any of the above designations, only under pressure. Besides all these, Norsemen, Danes, Frisians, Tartars, Jews, Arabs, Russians, Nubians, and Samaritans, can be safely added to the greatest human agglomeration drawn together in one small area of the globe.<sup>103</sup>

Greeks fled the Muslim rule in Greece, and landed in Palestine. By the mid-seventeenth century, the Greeks lived everywhere in the Holy Land—constituting about twenty percent of the population—and their authority dominated the villages.<sup>104</sup>

Between 1750 and 1766 Jaffa had been rebuilt, and had some five hundred houses. Turks, Arabs, Greeks and Armenians and a solitary Latin monk lived there, to attend to the wants of the thousands of pilgrims who had to be temporarily housed in the port before proceeding to Jerusalem.<sup>105</sup>

“In some cases villages [in Palestine] are populated wholly by settlers from other portions of the Turkish Empire within the nineteenth century. There are villages of Bosnians, Druzes, Circassians and Egyptians,” one historian has reported.<sup>106</sup>

Another source, the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 1911 edition (before the “more chauvinist Arab history” began to prevail with the encouragement of the British), finds the “population” of Palestine composed of so “widely differing” a group of “inhabitants”—whose “ethnological affinities” create “early in the 20th century a list of no less than fifty languages”<sup>\*</sup>—that “it is therefore no easy task to write concisely . . . on the ethnology of Palestine.” In addition to the “Assyrian, Persian and Roman” elements of ancient times, “the short-lived Egyptian government introduced into the population an element from that country which still persists in the villages.”

. . . There are very large contingents from the Mediterranean countries, especially Armenia, Greece and Italy . . . Turkoman settlements . . . a number of Persians and a fairly large Afghan colony . . . Motawila . . . long settled immigrants from Persia . . . tribes of Kurds . . . German “Templar” colonies . . . a Bosnian colony . . . and the Circassian settlements placed in certain centres . . . by the Turkish government in order to keep a restraint on the Bedouin

<sup>\*</sup>See a list of languages and birthplaces, circa 1931, in Chapter 11.

. . . a large Algerian element in the population . . . still maintain(s) [while] the Sudanese have been reduced in numbers since the beginning of the 20th century.

In the late eighteenth century, 3,000 Albanians recruited by Russians were settled in Acre. The *Encyclopaedia Britannica* finds "most interesting all the *non-Arab* \* communities in the country . . . the Samaritan sect in Nablus (Shechem); a gradually disappearing body" once "settled by the Assyrians to occupy the land left waste by the captivity of the Kingdom of Israel."<sup>107</sup>

The disparate peoples recently assumed and purported to be "settled Arab indigenes for a thousand years" were in fact a "heterogeneous" community<sup>108</sup> with no "Palestinian" identity, and according to an official British historical analysis in 1920, no *Arab* identity either: "The people west of the Jordan are not Arabs, but only Arabic-speaking. The bulk of the population are fellahin. . . . In the Gaza district they are mostly of Egyptian origin; elsewhere they are of the most mixed race."<sup>109</sup>

## The Land in Waste

A review of Palestine, before the era of prosperity began with the late nineteenth-century renewal of Jewish land settlement, shows that periodically Palestine was virtually laid waste, and its population suffered acute decline.

An enormous swell of Arab population could only have resulted from immigration and in-migration to the area, a movement considered at some length in the following chapters of this book. First, however, it is helpful to see the land that was virtually emptied—and why.

Dio Cassius, writing at the time, described the ruin of the land beginning with the destruction of Judah:

Of their forts the fifty strongest were razed to the ground. Nine hundred and eighty-five of their best-known villages were destroyed. . . .

Thus the whole of Judea became desert, as indeed had been foretold to the Jews before the war. For the tomb of Solomon, whom these folk celebrate in their sacred rites, fell of its own accord into fragments, and wolves and hyenas, many in number, roamed howling through their cities.<sup>110</sup>

One historian after another has reported the same findings.

In the twelve and a half centuries between the Arab conquest in the seventh century and the beginnings of the Jewish return in the 1880's, Palestine was laid waste. Its ancient canal and irrigation systems were destroyed and the wondrous fertility of which the Bible spoke vanished into desert and desolation. . . . Under the Ottoman empire of the Turks, the policy of defoliation continued; the hillsides were denuded of trees and the valleys robbed of their topsoil.<sup>111</sup>

\*Emphasis added.

In 1590 a "simple English visitor" to Jerusalem wrote, "Nothing there to be scene but a little of the old walls, which is yet Remaying and all the rest is grasse, mosse and Weedes much like to a piece of Rank or moist Grounde."<sup>112</sup>

"While Tiberias was being resettled by Jews from Papal states, whose migration was approved by a papal Bull, Nazareth was continuing its decline." A Franciscan pilgrim translated a Latin Manuscript that reported that "A house of robbers, murderers, the inhabitants are Saracens. . . . It is a lamentable thing to see thus such a town. We saw nothing more stony, full of thorns and desert."<sup>113</sup> A hundred years afterward, Nazareth was, in 1697, "an inconsiderable village. . . . Acre a few poor cottages . . . nothing here but a vast and spacious ruin." Nablus consisted of two streets with many people, and Jericho was a "poor nasty village."<sup>114</sup>

In the mid-1700s, British archaeologist Thomas Shaw wrote that the land in Palestine was "lacking in people to till its fertile soil."<sup>115</sup> An eighteenth-century French author and historian, Count Constantine François Volney, wrote of Palestine as the "ruined" and "desolate" land.

In "Greater Syria," which included Palestine,

Many parts . . . lost almost all their peasantry. In others, . . . the recession was great but not so total.<sup>116</sup>

Count Volney reported that, "In consequence of such wretched government, the greater part of the Pachilics [Provinces] in the empire are impoverished and laid waste." Using one province as an example, Volney reported that

. . . upwards of three thousand two hundred villages were reckoned; but, at present, the collector can scarcely find four hundred. Such of our merchants as have resided there twenty years have themselves seen the greater part of the environs . . . become depopulated. The traveller meets with nothing but houses in ruins, cisterns rendered useless, and fields abandoned. Those who cultivated them have fled . . .<sup>[117]</sup>

. . . And can we hope long to carry on an advantageous commerce with a country which is precipitately hastening to ruin? \*<sup>118</sup>

Another writer, describing "Syria" (and Palestine) some *sixty years later in 1843*, stated that, in Volney's day, "the land had not fully reached its last prophetic degree of desolation and depopulation."<sup>119</sup>

From place to place the reporters varied, but not the reports: J. S. Buckingham described his visit of 1816 to Jaffa, which "has all the appearances of a poor village, and every part of it that we saw was of corresponding meanness."<sup>120</sup> Buckingham described Ramle, "where, as throughout the greater part of Palestine, the ruined portion seemed more extensive than that which was inhabited."<sup>121</sup>

After a visit in 1817–1818, travelers reported that there was not "a single boat of any description on the lake [Tiberias]."<sup>122</sup> In a German encyclopedia published

\*Emphasis added.

in 1827, Palestine was depicted as “desolate and roamed through by Arab bands of robbers.”<sup>123</sup>

Throughout the nineteenth century the abandonment and dismal state of the terrain was lamented. In 1840 an observer, who was traveling through, wrote of his admiration for the Syrian “fine spirited race of men” whose “population is on the decline.”<sup>124</sup> While scorning the idea of Jewish colonization, the writer observed that the once populous area between Hebron and Bethlehem was “now abandoned and desolate” with “dilapidated towns.”<sup>125</sup> Jerusalem consisted of “a large number of houses . . . in a dilapidated and ruinous state,” and “the masses really seem to be without any regular employment.” The “masses” of Jerusalem were estimated at less than 15,000 inhabitants, of whom more than half the population were Jews.<sup>126</sup>

The British Consul in Palestine reported in 1857 that

The country is in a considerable degree empty of inhabitants and therefore *its greatest need is that of a body of population.* . . . <sup>127\*</sup>

In the 1860s, it was reported that “depopulation is even now advancing.”<sup>128</sup> At the same time, H. B. Tristram noted in his journal that

The north and south [of the Sharon plain] land is going out of cultivation and whole villages are rapidly disappearing from the face of the earth. Since the year 1838, no less than 20 villages there have been thus erased from the map [by the Bedouin] and the stationary population extirpated.<sup>129</sup>

Mark Twain, in his inimitable fashion, expressed scorn for what he called the “romantic” and “prejudiced” accounts of Palestine after he visited the Holy Land in 1867.<sup>130</sup> In one location after another, Twain registered gloom at his findings.

Stirring scenes . . . occur in the valley [Jezreel] no more. There is not a solitary village throughout its whole extent—not for thirty miles in either direction. There are two or three small clusters of Bedouin tents, but not a single permanent habitation. One may ride ten miles hereabouts and not see ten human beings.<sup>131</sup>

In fact, according to Twain, even the Bedouin raiders who attacked “so fiercely” had been imported: “provided for the occasion . . . shipped from Jerusalem,” by the Arabs who guarded each group of pilgrims.

They met together in full view of the pilgrims, after the battle, and took lunch, divided the *baksheesh* extorted in the season of danger and then accompanied the cavalcade home to the city! The nuisance of an Arab guard is one which is created by the sheikhs and the Bedouins together, for mutual profit . . .<sup>132</sup>

To find “. . . the sort of solitude to make one dreary,” one must, Twain wrote dramatically,

\*Emphasis added.

Come to Galilee for that . . . these unpeopled deserts, these rusty mounds of barrenness, that never, never, never do shake the glare from their harsh outlines, and fade and faint into vague perspective; that melancholy ruin of Capernaum: this stupid village of Tiberias, slumbering under its six funereal palms. . . . We reached Tabor safely. . . . We never saw a human being on the whole route.<sup>133</sup>

*Nazareth is forlorn. . . . Jericho the accursed lies a moldering ruin today, even as Joshua's miracle left it more than three thousand years ago; Bethlehem and Bethany, in their poverty and their humiliation, have nothing about them now to remind one that they once knew the high honor of the Savior's presence; the hallowed spot where the shepherds watched their flocks by night, and where the angels sang, "Peace on earth, good will to men," is untenanted by any living creature. . . . Bethsaida and Chorzin have vanished from the earth, and the "desert places" round about them, where thousands of men once listened to the Savior's voice and ate the miraculous bread, sleep in the hush of a solitude that is inhabited only by birds of prey and skulking foxes.* \*<sup>134</sup>

"Palestine sits in sackcloth and ashes. . . . desolate and unlovely . . .," Twain wrote with remorse. ". . . it is dreamland."<sup>135</sup>

Jaffa, a French traveler wrote late in the nineteenth century, was still a ruin.<sup>136</sup> Haifa, to the north, had 6,000 souls and "nothing remarkable about it," another Frenchman, the author of France's foremost late-nineteenth-century Holy Land guidebook, commented. Haifa "can be crossed in five minutes" on the way to the city of Acre, he judged; that magnificent port was commercially idle.<sup>137</sup>

Many writers, such as the Reverend Samuel Manning, mourned the atrophy of the coastal plain, the Sharon Plain, "the exquisite fertility and beauty of which made it to the Hebrew mind a symbol of prosperity."

*But where were the inhabitants?* This fertile plain, which might support an immense population, is almost a solitude. . . . Day by day we were to learn afresh the lesson now forced upon us, that the denunciations of ancient prophecy have been fulfilled to the very letter—"the land is left void and desolate and without inhabitants."\*<sup>138</sup>

Report followed depressing report, as the economist-historian Professor Fred Gottheil pointed out: "a desolate country";<sup>139</sup> "wretched desolation and neglect";<sup>140</sup> "almost abandoned now";<sup>141</sup> "unoccupied";<sup>142</sup> "uninhabited";<sup>143</sup> "thinly populated."<sup>144</sup>

In a book called *Heth and Moab*, Colonel C. R. Conder pronounced the Palestine of the 1880s "a ruined land." According to Conder,

so far as the Arab race is concerned, it appears to be decreasing rather than otherwise.<sup>145</sup>

Conder had also visited Palestine earlier, in 1872, and he commented on the continuing population decline within the nine or ten-year interim between his visits:

\*Emphasis added.

The Peasantry who are the backbone of the population, have diminished most sadly in numbers and wealth.<sup>146</sup>

Pierre Loti, the noted French writer, wrote in 1895 of his visit to the land: "I traveled through sad Galilee in the spring, and I found it silent. . . ." In the vicinity of the Biblical Mount Gilboa, "As elsewhere, as everywhere in Palestine, city and palaces have returned to the dust; . . . This melancholy of abandonment, . . . weighs on all the Holy Land."<sup>147</sup>

David Landes summarized the causes of the shriveling number of inhabitants:

As a result of centuries of Turkish neglect and misrule, following on the earlier ravages of successive conquerors, the land had been given over to sand, marsh, the anopheles mosquito, clan feuds, and Bedouin marauders. A population of several millions had shrunk to less than one tenth that number—perhaps a quarter of a million around 1800, and 300,000 at mid-century.<sup>148</sup>

Palestine had indeed become "sackcloth and ashes."

## The Migrants

Just as today the myths are being perpetuated about the "Palestinian Arab identity for thousands of years" and about the "golden age of Jews in Arab Lands," so public opinion of the world was swayed by Arab propaganda to blame the plight of the wretched *fellah* (peasant) driven off his land "since time immemorial"—on the "moneyed Jews of the world." The story goes: "But poor and neglected though it was, to the Arabs, who lived in it, Palestine . . . was still their country, their home, the land in which their people for centuries past had lived and left their graves."<sup>149</sup>

In fact some Arab—or Arabic-speaking—peasants *were* displaced, but they were displaced by *Arabs* beginning long before the Jews' mass restoration of the land had begun, and continuing long after Jewish settlements thrived, as we will see in other chapters. It was those peoples—peasants crippled by the corruption in Palestine and land nearby—along with migrants by tradition, and immigrants "planted" by the Turks—who would flood into the area of opportunity, the Jewish-settled areas of Western Palestine. And it was those *same* "Arabic" migrant-peasants and immigrants to the Jewish-settled areas who would later be counted as "settled" Muslims on their land "from time immemorial" who were being "displaced by the Jews."

The barrenness of the land, the bleak desolation of its disintegration from the once fertile biblical "milk and honey" to sour decay, resulted in and from the same conditions—ravages of conquest, epidemics, earthquakes, abandonment, and corruption.

As historians' findings indicate earlier in this book, the spoils system predominated from the time of the Prophet Muhammad and was regulated by his successor, Caliph Omar. According to the commandments of Allah,

Know that whenever you seize anything as a spoil, to God belongs a fifth thereof and to his Apostle. . . .<sup>150</sup>

The rest belonged to the conquering Muslims as a collective group, not to any individual.<sup>151</sup>

In the Prophet Muhammad's time, that fifth of the booty of conquest was portioned out to members of his family and purportedly to "the needy" as well. But as the booty passed to the leaders who succeeded Muhammad, it appears that patterns for an unequal distribution of wealth were set "as early as the days of Omar I."<sup>152</sup>

In the centuries that followed, as spoils became spoilage, Palestine's wide open, virtually lawless state encouraged a perpetuation of the corrupt system. The dwindling number of peasants were so heavily taxed and extorted by whatever fiefdom or feudal state existed at the particular moment that those who might have remained sedentary were compelled to join the traditional ranks of the wandering migrant population.

The fiefdom of the Mamluks (1260–1516) was replaced when the Ottomans conquered the country in 1516. The Ottoman feudal system only exacerbated the conditions of corruption. Bernard Lewis reports that

Harsh, exorbitant, and improvident taxation led to a decline in cultivation, which was sometimes permanent. The peasants, neglected and impoverished, were forced into the hands of money-lenders and speculators, and often driven off the land entirely. With the steady decline in bureaucratic efficiency during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries . . . the central government ceased to exercise any check or control over agriculture and village affairs, which were left to the unchecked rapacity of the tax-farmers, the leaseholders, and the bailiffs of court nominees.<sup>153</sup>

Another study of the land system found that

. . . Every day the law was circumvented, because the rich used to take over all the tenancies with the purpose of again letting them privately, and at a great profit to themselves, to sub-tenants, in clear contradiction to the express object of the State that the lands should remain in the hands of the actual tenants all their lifetime. These sub-tenants also endeavoured to squeeze out profit for themselves by laying an intolerable burden on the peasants.<sup>154</sup>

In 1730 reforms were attempted to abolish life tenancies, but "Various attempts made to introduce reforms in the fief system ended in failure."<sup>155</sup>

Recognized authorities of the day traveled to the country and their recorded findings were unanimous. At the end of the eighteenth century, Count Volney found a wasteland,<sup>156</sup> where ". . . nothing is more destructive to Syria, than the shameful and excessive usury customary in that country."<sup>157</sup>

Historians, sociologists, official visitors, tourists—all have described the devastating conditions of existence in the country. Tax farmers, who "were supposed to raise from the peasants only a stipulated amount . . . enjoyed great power,"



and ". . . owing to the increasing weakness and corruption of the government, the peasants had practically no legal redress. . . ." <sup>158</sup>

By the nineteenth century there was "cash farming," which prompted "a tendency for village or tribal lands to be appropriated by some powerful individual, e.g., tribal shaikhs, local landlords, or urban money lenders." <sup>159</sup>

In order that the tax-gatherers—the *multazim*—might be able to extract from their venture the money which they had paid to the Government and a profit besides, they exploited and ransacked the peasants to the last penny, robbing them of half their produce and even more. *The fellah was delivered hand and foot to the tax-collectors*, since he had not the slightest protection against their tyranny. <sup>160</sup>

As a result, most peasants were "impoverished" and "could not . . . seek a living in town for, by the 1840's, industrial production was sharply declining." The relative few among the peasantry who worked their own farms were "forced" to attempt to remain, "thus falling prey to the usurer." <sup>161</sup> And those in the towns were reported, by witnesses of the time, to be equally poor, as the inhabitants of Jerusalem, who "really seem to be without any regular employment." <sup>162</sup>

The Arabs' migratory pattern of living had long been common in the region of Palestine. Well into the twentieth century the nomadic life was still the custom. As Sir John Hope Simpson wrote in 1930, "the fellah . . . is always migrating, even at the present time." <sup>163</sup> And in 1937, Lord Ormsby-Gore, Secretary of State for the Colonies, testified that "There has always been a certain amount of migration inside the Arab world." <sup>164</sup>

The coming and going of the populace was a constant throughout the literature of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century scholars who visited the area. In the last decades of the eighteenth century there is evidence that many of the peasants migrated throughout the region in search of work. <sup>165</sup>

John Lewis Burckhardt graphically described the migratory patterns he found in the early 1800s:

The oppressions of the government on one side, and those of the Bedouins on the other, have reduced the Fellah of the Haouran to a state little better than that of the wandering Arab. Few individuals . . . die in the same village in which they were born. Families are continually moving from one place to another; in the first year of their new settlement the Sheikh acts with moderation towards them; but his vexations becoming in a few years insupportable, they fly to some other place, where they have heard that their brethren are better treated, but they soon find that the same system prevails over the whole country. . . . they are always permitted to depart. <sup>166</sup>

Burckhardt found that not only robbery but also incessant migration were largely responsible for the land's corrosion:

\*Emphasis added.

This continued wandering is one of the principal reasons why no village in the Haouran has either orchards, or fruit trees, or gardens for the growth of vegetables. "Shall we sow for strangers?" was the answer of a Fella, to whom I once spoke on the subject. . . .<sup>167</sup>

In his journal Burckhardt noted, for example, that when he passed through the village of Merjan in 1819, only one family lived there. Two years later, he returned to the village to find nearly a dozen families. Many were Druses who had come from another village, which in 1810 had many inhabitants but two years later was deserted.<sup>168</sup>

One historian noted, in passing, "the emigration of many Druzes from Lebanon to Jebel Druze [Syria],"<sup>169</sup> and another found "analogous" situations in Palestine in the 1840s, "where peasants from remote villages came to . . . grain cultivation areas." The writer "struck up an acquaintance in the region of Hebron with a peasant from the village of Bait Jala. . . ."<sup>170</sup>

The traditional roving was endemic: ". . . Trans Jordanian peasants . . . left their villages in 1847 owing to famine [and] found work in various villages near Hebron."<sup>171</sup> Peasants from Western Palestine, west of the Jordan River, moved to cultivate land in Eastern Palestine. Other "Palestinian peasants" were "brought in" by prosperous merchants to cultivate a "considerable stretch of territory" and the émigrés' efforts made the merchant "a wealthy notable."<sup>172</sup>

Such was the custom.

In 1858 a reform was attempted, with destructive results.<sup>173</sup> According to Professor Elie Kedourie, it was "a new, European-model land law."

The Land Code did not create a European-style small landed peasantry with a stake in the land. On the contrary, *the small agriculturist, whether member of a settled village community, or of a tribe which had never known individual ownership of land, found his customary rights and interests squeezed and destroyed by a law, the operation of which was made even more vicious by the corruption and malpractices that a large, unwieldy, centralized bureaucracy naturally entailed.* \*<sup>174</sup>

In the 1860s and 1870s, here is one graphic example among the myriad reports of the unrelenting ruination of the peasant:

[The tax-collectors] extort from [the peasants] nearly all the produce of their lands in return for the doubtful advantage of having them stand between them and the officers of the government. . . . The farmer [tax-farmer] of a village . . . is, in fact, a petty tyrant who takes *all* if he cannot otherwise get back what he has spent, and the iniquitous interest also.

This system of tax-gathering greatly multiplies the petty lords and tyrants who eat up the people as they eat bread.<sup>175</sup>

The oppression of the peasant swept across the traditional barriers of Islam. With regard to exploitation,

\*Emphasis added.

The line of basic demarcation ran . . . not between Muslim and Christian, Turk and non-Turk, but between ruler and ruled, oppressor and oppressed. . . .

The maligned Turkish peasant . . . was generally no better off than the ordinary non-Muslim and as much oppressed by maladministration.<sup>176</sup>

But those barriers—separating Muslim from non-Muslim infidel—were powerful forces against reform. The leaders who sought reform were faced with an "imposing obstacle"—"the conviction of superiority, which Muslim Turks possessed." It was a formidable "conviction," a bias bound to undermine a "reform based on equality of all Ottoman subjects. . . . Christians and Jews were inevitably considered second-class citizens" not only "in the light of religious revelation" but also because of "the plain fact that they had been conquered and were ruled by the Ottomans. The common term for the infidel, *gavur*, carried this implication of Muslim superiority."<sup>177</sup>

Compounding the difficulties of reform, the Muslims "opposed innovation. Cevdet Efendi (later Pasha) who began to learn French in 1846, had to do so secretly for fear of criticism."<sup>178</sup> In 1868 a Muslim writer estimated that only about two percent of the Muslim population were literate.<sup>179</sup> Another bemoaned the fact that most were "without pen and without tongue."<sup>180</sup> "Suleyman Pasa [*sic*] in the same period guessed that in the capital itself only twenty thousand Muslims could read a newspaper."<sup>181</sup>

The widespread illiteracy sustained and fed the coffers of the feudal extortionists. The peasant had to borrow to pay the taxes, and the debts he incurred from outrageous usurious rates of interest forced him to sell his land, often to the wealthy *effendis*—landlords—in the town.<sup>182</sup>

But even *after surrendering* his *property*, the peasant still had to deal with moneylenders and their viselike usury, because the unstable conditions—Bedouin raids, earthquakes, epidemics, high prices—prevented the *fellah* from supporting himself through farming.<sup>183</sup>

A writer described the moneylending, a practice that carried on into the twentieth century:

*Money lending . . . was one of the curses of Palestine. Nearly everyone borrowed money, and the rate of interest was fantastic, not because the surety for the loan was not satisfactory, but because the borrower was completely in the hands of the lender. The fellah, even if he was in a good position, had practically never a penny to bless himself with. One day the Government official turns up and demands a large sum in cash. What is the fellah to do? But here comes a merchant from the town, or a Moslem frangi (i.e., a man in European dress) happens to be walking about in the village with his pockets bulging with money, and one of them is willing to accommodate the fellah. But the lender requires not only substantial security, but a good rate of interest also—20, 25, and even 30 or 40 per cent. "What can I do," thinks to himself the needy fellah. He knows very well that just at this moment he will not be getting in any money, and if he will not be able to bribe the tax-collector and postpone the payment he will in the end be imprisoned as a defaulter. He also knows that to get out of prison will cost him a lot of money,*

much more than paying the interest to the lender, not to reckon his loss of time. On the other side it is clear to him that if the grain or olive crop is a failure he will not be able to liquidate his debt, and the interest payments which he will have to make every year will go on increasing.\*<sup>184</sup>

Another blight was the centuries-old traditional incursion by Arab raiders, which befell the few "sedentary peasant-farmers" who remained on the land.

. . . unless checked by firm government action, the nomads have always sought to thrust into the settled areas, terrorizing and exploiting the villagers and eventually causing them to give up cultivation and flee.<sup>185</sup>

One historian contrasted the "excellent roads and fortifications, . . . and judicious alliances" of Judeo-Roman times with the spoiled, debauched Ottoman-ruled land at the end of the eighteenth century, following the emigration of the 'Anza tribes from Central Arabia.<sup>186</sup> In 1785, Volney recorded the scene:

The peasants are incessantly making inroads on each others' lands, destroying their corn (durha), sesame and olive trees and carrying off their sheep, goats, and camels. . . . The Bedouin whose camps occupy the level country are continually at open hostilities with them (the Turks), of which the peasants avail themselves to resist their authority or do mischief to each other. . . . The mutual devastation of the contending parties renders the appearance of this part of Syria more wretched than that of any other.<sup>187</sup>

As a direct result of the tribal raiding, "large portions of the country went out of cultivation, and hundreds of villages were depopulated."<sup>188</sup>

In the nineteenth century a great number of Bedouin tribes continued to filter into the region. "Arabia has always periodically overpeopled herself and, at this time, the emptiness of the Syrian plains and their almost absolute lack of defenses tempted the . . . Arabia tribes. Once the movement was under way, this attraction communicated itself to other tribes." In addition, the "disturbances" in the warring Arabian plains caused still other tribes to emigrate. Tribes who lived in Syria and environs were forced, by raiding and tribal warfare among the new émigrés, to flee into the "fringes of the desert," and plundering prevailed.<sup>189</sup>

Burckhardt recorded graphically a predatory practice long common to that terrain—one that is known in the latter-twentieth-century western world as the "protection racket."

The . . . most heavy contribution paid by the peasants, is the tribute to the Arabs. . . . Constant residents in the Haouran, as well as most of the numerous tribes of Aeneze, who visit the country only in the summer, are, from remote times, entitled to certain tributes called Khone (brotherhood), from every village in the Haouran. In return for this Khone, the Arabs abstain from touching the harvest of the village, and from driving off its cattle and camels, when they meet them in their way. Each village pays Khone to one Sheikh in every tribe; the village is

\*Emphasis added.

then known as his Ukhta or Sister, as the Arabs term it, and he protects the inhabitants against all the members of his own tribe. It may easily be imagined, however, that depredations are often committed, without the possibility of redress, the depredator being unknown, or flying immediately towards the desert. The amount of the Khone is continually increasing, for the Arab Sheikh is not always contented with the quantity of corn he received in the preceding year, but asks something additional, as a present, which soon becomes a part of his accustomed dues.<sup>190</sup>

The journal of the Christian traveler H. B. Tristram was another among the plethora of documents that totally contradicted the widely believed propaganda claim by the Arabs that it was “Jewish immigration and settlement” that disrupted the Palestinians’ “tranquility and stability.” Tristram wrote in 1865 that,

A few years ago, the whole ghor (Jordan Valley) was in the hands of the Fellahin and much of it cultivated for corn. *Now the whole of it is in the hands of the bedouin*, who eschew agriculture except in a few spots, cultivated here and there by their slaves. And with the bedouin, come lawlessness, and the uprooting of all Turkish authority. No government is now acknowledged on the east side; and unless the porte acts with greater firmness and caution than is his wont . . . *Palestine will be desolated and given up to the nomads.* \*<sup>191</sup>

A French writer reported that, during travels in Palestine and Syria in the late 1870s, he found that in order to buy seeds, the peasant paid an interest rate as high as 200 to 300 percent.<sup>192</sup> According to one scholar,

This state of affairs was made possible by the *fellahin's* misery and lack of rights, which were the result of the high degree of feudal exploitation in villages.<sup>193</sup>

Not only regional rich *effendis* snatched up the land, but also enterprising foreigners saw the chance to reap the local profits.

Buyers operating in Syrian villages were usually agents of foreign merchants. Foreign capital found a fertile soil for its commercial and usurious activities in villages pressed beneath the feudal yoke.<sup>194</sup>

*And these were Arab profiteers, not Jewish settlers*, though a small number of native Jews and Yemenite Jewish immigrants were already assuming the task of developing and reclaiming future farmland. † Most of the “Palestinian” Jews were still “paupers,”<sup>195</sup> eking out an existence in the towns and villages of the “Holy Land.”<sup>196</sup> The great wave of Jewish settlement would not begin until 1882.<sup>197</sup> Meanwhile, the *effendis* were gaining from their monopolistic grip on the land.

The British Consul in Jerusalem from 1845 to 1863 reported that a group of prominent landholding families in Jerusalem, exerting the influence of their wealth, had gained control of “all the municipal offices. In consequence they hold certain villages or groups of villages in a species of serfdom.”<sup>198</sup> By the end of the

\*Emphasis added.

†See Chapter 10.

nineteenth century the political power was in the hands of those Muslim families "with names like al-Husayni, al-Khalidi and al-Nashashibi."<sup>199</sup> The "parasitic landlord class" had acquired, through the *fellahins*' ruinous indebtedness, huge landholdings, which the landlords seldom if ever visited, and almost never farmed.<sup>200</sup>

In the late 1880s, several years after the new major Jewish immigration had begun, the migratory patterns remained unchanged.

When the debts reach a certain figure the *fellah* takes his bundle of bedclothes, along with his cooking pan and water can, and if he is very fortunate, his small water jug and his shoes, and having loaded the whole on his one ass, if he has managed to retain an ass, and on to his wife, he flees on a dark night and crosses the Jordan Valley, until he reaches the Hauran or Ajlun, where he finds a tolerably secure refuge from his pursuers and oppressors.<sup>201</sup>

As late as 1908, a German historian found that the *fellah* had turned Bedouin to escape the grip of his indebtedness. If the *fellah* sensed peril, he packed his family and they fled across the Jordan, where they became members of a nomad tribe.<sup>202</sup> "The land was left without owners and without workers, and became *mahlul*"—a kind of state domain.<sup>203</sup>

So thorough was the plundering of the Bedouins, so corrupt the government and its feudal system, that despite the imported replenishment of peoples from near and far, Doughty, in his account of travels in the region, was moved to write in 1876 that

"The desert" (says the Hebrew prophet) "shall become a ploughland," so might all this good soil, . . . return to be full of busy human lives; there lacks but the defense of a strong government.<sup>204</sup>

Doughty found a "desert" that was devoid of but a few "human lives" at the precise moment when the Jews had begun to develop their settlements—on the semi-abandoned territory where one day the Arab propaganda would claim that *Jews* had crowded out, "displaced," and rendered the "Palestinian" Arabs "landless."

Thus, we are faced with the facts of the land once called Judah, Judea, and later, the Romans' "Palestina" and "Southern Syria," a once fertile "ploughland" laid waste, whose inhabitants sadly diminished in number through natural disaster—and the greed of goat and man.

The peoples who roamed the country in the nineteenth century were not the peoples who conquered, with the Prophet Muhammad's troops, the land of Judah-Palestine. Those peoples were not indigenous to the land. They did not stay on the land. Of the sparse population who were later counted as "original" settled "Arabs" in the nineteenth century when the arriving Jewish immigrants united with the native Palestinian Jewish population, many were in fact imported Muslim peoples from Turkey and other lands, whom the Turks, in many cases, had recently brought, to protect against the wandering Bedouin tribes—a kind of

landed pirates who periodically attacked that settled multi-ethnic populace. "The Land's" vicious cycle of conquest and destruction had relentlessly claimed its inhabitants. Thus each new conqueror brought his own measure of the population with him as protective force, while other thousands went in and out from lands as distant as the Caucasus.

The government was often "directly responsible" for importing immigrants to spur development.

For example, Circassian and other colonists were deliberately planted on the frontier of settlement, especially from 1870 onwards.<sup>205</sup>

About 1860 several hundred tents of the Wulda tribe crossed the Euphrates and eventually settled down about thirty miles south of Aleppo, in Jebel Samaane. Sections of other tribes, such as the Bu Shaikh, Lheib, and Aquedat also drifted west, usually after being defeated in raids or wars, half fleeing from the powerful desert tribes and half attracted by the possibilities of settlement.<sup>206</sup>

Kurds, Turcomans, Naim, and other colonists arrived in Palestine around the same time as the Jewish immigration waves began. Eighteen thousand "tents" of Tartars,<sup>207</sup> the "armies of Turks and Kurds," whole villages settled in the nineteenth century<sup>208</sup> of Bosnians and Moors and "Circassians" and "Algerians" and Egyptians, etc.—all were continually brought in to people the land called Palestine.

This melting pot will be seen in following chapters to have been counted as "original settled Muslims" in "Palestine." However, it is clear by now that the claim that a numerous "descended Arab Palestinian people" exists, with "family ties to the land for thousands of years," is historically inaccurate.

"In 1878 the first Circassians arrived. . . . Two years later a second group settled. . . . In 1885 Circassian immigrants arrived to found three villages. . . ." The Circassians "effectively fulfilled the role allotted to them: to occupy and cultivate land, to weaken and to act as a buffer against the bedouin"<sup>209</sup>—in short, to fulfill the same function as the protective forces of Ibrahim Pasha: Ibrahim, Palestine's Egyptian conqueror, had left behind him "permanent colonies of Egyptian immigrants at Beisan, Nablus, Irbid, Acre, and Jaffa, where some five hundred Egyptian soldiers' families established a new quarter"—500 alien families, at least 2,000 persons, imported at a single moment—and that was only one among countless similar situations. "With this aid and the resettlement of the Jews, which dates from 1830, Jaffa began to grow."<sup>210</sup> In another area, "The Muslims of Safed are mostly descended from . . . Moorish settlers and from Kurds. . . ." <sup>211</sup>

The land called Palestine was never considered a nation at all, and surely could not have been regarded by the later immigrants as their "ancestral" homeland, any more than a Norwegian immigrant to the United States would consider that his "ancestral" home was the United States when his ancestors were born in Norway.

As late as the time coinciding with Jewish reclamation and development, the land was so sparsely populated that “landlords [were] bringing in peasants and former semi-nomadic tribesmen” from other areas “to work on their land.” The Turkish land laws enacted in 1858 had worked to the disadvantage of the peasant, but “made it easy for landlords and speculators to gain control of disproportionately great areas of land.” When the peasants and semi-nomads “fell prey to the usurer” and lost their tenancies, they fled and were replaced by new immigrants.<sup>212</sup>

The majority of genuine “Arabs” among the sparse population in the “ruined” country when the Jewish settlers began to buy land for restoration were Arabian tribal nomads. The multi-ethnic “Arab” peasants who remained were so few—despite the consistent replenishment of peoples—and generally so impoverished that an Arab writer was prompted to sum up the harsh conditions thus:

... At the turn of this century, Palestine was no longer the land of milk and honey described by the Bible, but a poor Ottoman province, a semi-desert covered by more thorns than flowers. The Mediterranean coast and all the southern half of the country were sand, and the rare marshy plains were fens of Malaria which decimated the sparse, semi-nomadic population, clinging to slopes and bare hills.<sup>213</sup>

Much of the Muslim population that remained in the country was transient. As the Arab leader Sherif Hussein observed in 1918,

The resources of the country are still virgin soil and will be developed by the Jewish immigrants. One of the most amazing things until recent times was *that the Palestinian used to leave his country, wandering over the high seas in every direction. His native soil could not retain its hold on him* . . . \*<sup>214</sup>

How then does the profusion of evidence of an uninhabited Palestine jibe with the Arab propaganda claim of an overwhelming Arab settled population in a Palestine so crowded that the “Jews displaced the Arabs who had been there for thousands of years?” The rotation of multi-ethnic Muslims and Christians had been imported either by various conquerors or through traditional migratory patterns to Judah-cum-Palestine, where they had met with the omnipresent Jewish and Christian inhabitants—all have been abundantly documented. That they were “Arabs” who had been for “thousands of years,” or even hundreds, as a consistent presence in Palestine is known to be inaccurate. Moreover, according to the Arab writer Ameen Rihani, confusion abounded with respect to an “Arab” identity “achieved mainly by exciting the fanatical spirit of the tribes.” The Arabic-speaking peoples in Palestine were not motivated toward Palestinian nationalism or Pan-Arabism, and there were no prominent Arab negotiators in Palestine even to protest the “giveaway [of] Syria and Palestine.”<sup>215</sup>

It was the *Arabs* themselves—by tradition as well as corruption—who

\*Emphasis added.



prompted Arabic-speaking Muslims to disregard or abandon the land, and it was the *Jews* who would create a climate of opportunity that drew the peasant-migrants by the thousands to the Jewish-settled area of Palestine. But, as we will see, it was long *after, not before*, the Jews settled their new farms that the first claims of "Palestinian Arab" identity and an "age-old" tie to the land would be invented.

Even the Arabs' impressive propaganda effort could not obscure the unassailably recorded persistence of Jewish nationalism, or the lesser-known obstinate Jewish presence in Judah-cum-Palestine—a combination of historical factors that resulted in the international recognition of the Jews' renewed national liberation. So the Arab world has attempted to match the Jewish history by inventing an "identity" for the "Palestinian Arabs" that *would*, they reason, "counter Zionism." Thus has been largely accomplished the cynical rewriting of history, which in turn can only result in a perversion of "justice."

## *Dhimmi* in the Holy Land

His right derived from time immemorial in his family, to enter Jewish houses, and take toll or contributions at any time without giving account.

—A “Muslim in Hebron,” as reported by James Finn, British Consul in Jerusalem, 1858

I have learned with horror of the atrocious acts committed by bodies of ruthless and blood-thirsty evil-doers, of savage murders perpetrated upon defenseless members of the Jewish population, regardless of age or sex . . . acts of unspeakable savagery. . . .

—J. R. Chancellor, High Commissioner and Commander-in-Chief in Palestine, September 1, 1929

[The Jews] always did live previously in Arab countries with complete freedom and liberty, as natives of the country. In fact, Moslem rule has always been known for its tolerance . . . according to history Jews had a most quiet and peaceful residence under Arab rule.

—Mufti Haj Amin al-Husseini, 1937

**B**efore proceeding to the evidence and indications of the “systems” of immigration and their crucial consequence in Palestine, it is important to look at the conditions under which the Palestinian Jews lived during the generations *prior* to the “new,” late-nineteenth-century Jewish settlements.

In order to assess accurately the responsibility for the plight of the Arab refugees, the true role must be seen of the Jews in Palestine among the many ethnic groups constituting the Muslim inhabitants who are all called—and for the sake of convenience will be called here—Arabs.

Although the same as in Arab countries in some fundamental respects, the relationships in the Holy Land developed special qualitative differences. Those attitudes were the residual of a long tradition of intrinsic prejudice inflamed by cynical political manipulation. That tradition has been perpetuated for genera-

tions—and for more than three decades at the cost of the well-being of some of the Arab refugee-émigrés themselves.

The violence that the PLO's Yasser Arafat and others now claim was “only begun against Jews with the 1948 rebirth of Israel”—“Palestinian” terrorism—was actually a critical factor in the early developments that instigated the pivotal population conditions in Palestine. In their Holy Land, the Jews, as well as Christians, suffered long from harsh discrimination, persecution, and pogroms. According to the British Consulate report in 1839, the Jew's life was not “much above” that of a dog.<sup>1</sup>

The inverting of facts—*turnspeak*\*—has had the propaganda effect of perpetuating the false claim of “displaced” and “terrorized” Arabs in the Jewish-settled area of Palestine until the current time—long after the charge had been disproved by investigations. In fact, as following chapters will show, it was the Jews who were displaced by Arabs—the Arab immigrant flocks would migrate into the Jewish areas of development, filling the places that the Jews were clearing for other Jews—on land designated at that very time as the mandated “Jewish Homeland.”

Those few “Arab effendi” families—like the Husseinis and the Nashashibis and the Khalidis—who had been dispossessing and then continuing to exploit the hapless peasant-migrant in underpopulated Palestine would become threatened by the spectacle of dhimmi Jews living on the land as equals, tilling their own soil and granting previously unknown benefits to the Arabic-speaking non-Jewish worker. The Jews would undoubtedly upset the “sweets of office,” which had been accruing to the *effendis*. Thousands of peasant-migrants would be emigrating to reap the better wages, health benefits, and improvements of the Jewish communities. Although the *effendis* would charge scalper's prices for land they sold to the Jews, at the same time they would lose thousands of their former debtors who saw an escape from the stranglehold of usury and corruption prevalent in Palestine for generations.

Yet perhaps most galling of all to *effendi* leadership was the Jew who would settle the land. This was not the *dhimmi* Jew—cowering to survive, as in Arab lands—but a person who commanded equal treatment. The outrage which that insistence created, among those weaned on the tradition of Muslim supremacy, would infect the multi-ethnic Arabic-speaking Muslim workers of Palestine as well: for centuries Jews had been objects to oppress and despise.

As a Muslim in Hebron retorted when he was confronted with his theft and vandalism of Jews in 1858, “his right derived from time immemorial in his family, to enter Jewish houses, and take toll or contributions at any time without giving account.”<sup>2†</sup> This attitude and its prevalence in Palestine cannot be overlooked. It is perhaps the most powerful factor in the Middle East conflict today and cer-

\*Turnspeak—the cynical inverting or distorting of facts, which, for example, makes the victim appear as culprit.

†Emphasis added.

tainly at the core of the "Palestinian" question—the true "heart of the matter."

When the Jews' revival of their nation was still a persistent dream in the prayers of worldwide Jewry, and most "Palestinian Jews" were still clinging to their holy cities, the Koranic-inspired discriminatory practices, along with periodic pillage and slaughter of the Jew, had extended to Palestine. The myth of "harmony among Jews and Arabs," of "equality," and "fraternity" for Jews within a Muslim, Arabic-speaking Palestine has been invented, as the means to an unequal end.

Through the centuries of conquest and oppression, as the Palestine Royal Commission reported in 1937, despite seemingly insurmountable odds, "a number of . . . [Jews] clung throughout the centuries . . . to what had once been their national soil."<sup>3</sup> The history of those Jews who stubbornly survived other massacres in their homeland to confront Muslim "fraternity" is stained by the same Muslim Jew-hatred that permeated Muslim communities throughout the Arab world. The same myth of harmony that has been perpetuated about the Arab world—in Yasser Arafat's assertion that ". . . we have been living with each other in peace and fraternity, Muslims, Jews and Christians, for many centuries"<sup>4</sup>—has been engaged specifically as a weapon to attack the Jewish state. The "peaceloving Palestinians," goes the myth, were running from "Jewish terrorism."

In fact, so thorough has the rewriting of history been that some Jews themselves have accepted the allegation that the "Palestinian Arabs" are simply using "Jewish tactics" to gain statehood when the Arab terrorists attack in and outside Israel.<sup>5</sup> The Arab propaganda slogan today is that the Jews are "Nazis" in "Palestine."<sup>6</sup>

Perhaps an apt illustration of the turnspeak tactic was the protestation discussed earlier by the group in Egypt who sought to prove that the Arab terrorists' Munich massacre of Israeli Olympics athletes was "really masterminded by the Jews."<sup>7</sup>

The Arabs have faithfully followed the agitator's manifesto—the best defense is attack. Loudly and repeatedly they have attributed their own historical foul deeds to their victims while the victims were still paralyzed by those deeds, and before the victims had stopped reeling long enough to retaliate. Thus a writer who was allowed to examine the textbooks of the recruits at a Fatah terrorist training camp reported:

There are political books available: Castro, Guevara, Mao Tse-tung, Giap, Rodinson; General de Gaulle's memoirs; and also *Mein Kampf*. When I expressed surprise at the presence of this last volume, the political commissar replied that it was necessary to have read everything, and that *since the Israelis behaved like Nazis it was useful to know precisely what Nazism was.*<sup>8</sup>

—a graphic example of turnspeak, quickwitted and cunningly designed to mask the underlying attitude of the Arabic-speaking community in Palestine, whose sentiments, for somewhat different reasons, matched *Mein Kampf* and its doctrines.

Israel's attempt to destroy the PLO terror network in Lebanon brought a barrage of such rhetoric. For instance, from an important Egyptian daily, only weeks after the Israel-Egypt peace had culminated in the Israelis' return of the Sinai:

It is now clear to us from the behavior of the Nazi Zionist regime in Israel that Zionism wishes to come in the place of the fascist Nazi tyrants.<sup>9</sup>

And from the influential Egyptian magazine, *October*, on the same day:

. . . what Hitler did in 12 years cannot be compared to what Israel has done in twelve days.<sup>10</sup>

In truth, "Arab" terrorism in the Holy Land originated centuries before the recent "tool" of the "Palestinian" cause was invented. In towns where Jews lived for hundreds of years, those Jews were periodically robbed, raped, in some places massacred, and, in many instances, the survivors were obliged to abandon their possessions and run.

At the beginning of this century Jews were recorded in nearly every town<sup>11</sup> that is today considered to have been "purely Arab"—in other words, without Jewish inhabitants "from time immemorial." Those same towns decades later had been purged of their Jews through the arbitrary oppression of the Jews within the Muslim communities.<sup>12</sup> Thus, we find Jewish refugees who have not been heretofore recognized—those Palestinian Jewish refugees who were forced to flee from their homes within Palestine to other areas in Palestine. The Jews were refugees in Palestine once again: "Palestinian Jewish" refugees.

The same inversion of fact, by which today's totalitarian regimes are called "democratic," has created the corruption of the term "legitimate rights of the Palestinians." The original theme of "legitimate rights," certainly a legitimate and righteous quest, has been twisted instead into a carefully designed slogan pointing the finger of guilt at the Jews for acts that the Arab-Muslim world has committed against the Jews and against its own brothers.<sup>13</sup>

As we have seen, beginning with the Prophet Muhammad's edict demanding racial purity—that "Two religions may not dwell together . . ."—the Arab-Muslim world codified its supremacist credo, and later that belief was interpreted liberally enough to allow many non-Muslim *dhimmi*s, or infidels, to remain alive between onslaughts in the Muslim world as a means of revenue. The infidel's head tax, in addition to other extortions—and the availability of the "nonbelievers" to act as helpless scapegoats for the oft-dissatisfied masses—became a highly useful mainstay to the Arab-Muslim rulers. Thus the pronouncement of the Prophet Muhammad was altered in practice to: two religions may not dwell together *equally*. That was the pragmatic interpretation.

Thereafter, whatever reigning power after the Arab conquest, whoever the conqueror, the attitude of its Muslims toward unbelievers, and the infidel's subjugation, reinforced by terrorizing, were never abandoned in the Holy Land. The

following is a general summary that may provide some insight into the foundation that could foment a PLO.

By the time the “short” Arab rule of Palestine from Damascus had ended in the eighth century—more than eleven hundred years ago—“Muslim intolerance and even fanaticism were beginning to show . . . at the level of the street and the marketplace . . .” in Palestine.<sup>14</sup> A new Muslim assumption of superiority toward the unbeliever—Islam was then less than a hundred years old—was compounded by resentment and coveting of the prosperity and power that a small number among the predominant Christian and Jewish *dhimmi*s had managed to retain through special official protection or connections.<sup>15</sup>

Because the “Palestinian” Jewish population was prey not only to epidemics and earthquakes, but also to periodic slaughter and persecution, the constant trickle of immigration and the following of messianic exhortations to “return to the Holy Land” never boosted the total number of Jews. But a hard core persisted there and in time outnumbered the once-greater Christian population. In 1491 a Bohemian pilgrim wrote of Jerusalem:

There are not many Christians but there are many Jews, and these the Moslems persecute in various ways. Christians and Jews go about in Jerusalem in clothes considered fit only for wandering beggars.

The Moslems know that the Jews think and even say that this is the Holy Land which has been promised to them and that those Jews who dwell there are regarded as holy by Jews elsewhere, because, in spite of all the troubles and sorrows inflicted on them by the Moslems, they refuse to leave the Land.<sup>16</sup>

About the same time, another pilgrim noted that the Jews in Jerusalem spoke mainly Hebrew,<sup>17</sup> while yet another visitor recorded in his journal that the Jewish community of Jerusalem was hopeful of restoring its nation.<sup>18</sup>

From the beginning of Turkish rule in the sixteenth century, the infidel *dhimma* code of oppressions against nonbelievers was maintained in Palestine.\* The humiliation was a given; the degree of harshness of injunctions against Jews depended on the whim of the ruler, local as well as the lord of the empire. Among the constants of *dhimma* restrictions in the Holy Land:

Jews had to pass Muslims on their left side, because that was the side of Satan. They had to yield the right of way, step off the pavement to let the Arab go by, above all make sure not to touch him in passing, because this could provoke a violent response. In the same way, anything that reminded the Muslim of the presence of alternative religions, any demonstration of alternative forms of worship, had to be avoided so synagogues were placed in humble, hidden places, and the sounds of Jewish prayer carefully muted.<sup>19</sup>

When the Turks conquered the land in 1516, “Not only were governors at all times vexatious in their demands, but the Muslims were often hostile to their Jewish neighbors.”

\*See Chapter 3.

The gentleness of 'Omar was the mantle that hid the Arab-Jewish relations for three centuries, the early Othman [Turkish] hospitality obscured the actualities of Jewish life in the Near East. . . .<sup>20</sup>

The Muslims' subjection of Jewish infidel communities was heightened by the rise of the "first anti-Jewish" sultan, Murad III.<sup>21</sup> Murad decreed that all Jews throughout his empire be executed, because they were too well dressed, but a well-placed Jewish subject interceded and Murad reduced the death sentence for Jews to a law prohibiting them from wearing silk and forcing them to wear special headdresses.<sup>22</sup>

In sixteenth-century Judah-cum-Palestine—particularly in Jerusalem and Safed, two of their "holy" cities—the Jews were persecuted with zeal. "The community gradually withered; of seven hundred Jewish widows in Jerusalem, six hundred died of hunger."<sup>23</sup> The Jewish community was, however, consistently replenished by the constant influx of faithful immigrants "returning" to their country. No matter how hazardous the journey was for the Jews, they appear to have managed, even when their presence was forbidden, to keep their goal alive and their population extant.<sup>24</sup> For those European Jews who braved the journey in the Middle Ages and before, there was certain danger of

. . . the whole range of persecution from mass degradation to death after torture. For a Jew who could not and would not hide his identity to make his way from his own familiar city or village to another, from the country whose language he knew through countries foreign to him, meant to expose himself almost certainly to suspicion, insult, and humiliation, *probably to robbery and violence*, possibly to murder. *All travel was hazardous*. For a Jew in the thirteenth, fourteenth, or fifteenth century (and even later) to set out on the odyssey from Western Europe to Palestine was a heroic undertaking, which often ended in disaster.\*<sup>25</sup>

Two Christians who made a pilgrimage to Jerusalem in 1479 reported the circuitous route of travel for Jewish immigrants from Germany, starting at Nuremberg:<sup>26</sup>

Nuremberg to Posen	300 miles
Posen (Poznań) to Lublin	250 miles
Lublin to Lemberg (Lvov)	120 miles
Lemberg to Khotin	150 miles
Khotin to Akerman	150 miles
Akerman to Samsun	6 days
Samsun to Tokat	6–7 days
Tokat to Aleppo	15 days
Aleppo to Damascus	7 days
Damascus to Jerusalem	6 days

\*Emphasis added.

In 1576 Sultan Murad III enacted legislation to uproot and deport a thousand of Safed's prosperous Jews to Cyprus, where the economy needed boosting. The same order was given again a year later, although no document establishes that his dictates were followed.<sup>27</sup> Safed at that time, according to the British investigation by Lord Peel's committee, "contained as many as 15,000 Jews in the 16th century," and was "a centre of Rabbinical learning." The Jews spoke Arabic as well as Hebrew, "they were equally exposed to the raids of marauding tribesmen," and "public security deteriorated." The population generally declined.<sup>28</sup>

In the early seventeenth century a pair of Christian visitors to Safed told of life for the Jews: "Life here is the poorest and most miserable that one can imagine." Because of the harshness of Turkish rule and its crippling *dhimmi* oppressions, the Jews "pay for the very air they breathe."<sup>29</sup> Yet at the turn of the century, the Jewish population had grown from 8,000–10,000 (in 1555) to between 20,000 and 30,000 souls.<sup>30</sup>

With Murad's anti-Jewish innovations and the economic upset of the Turkish Empire came lawlessness. "Public security was undermined," and Turkey had very quickly lost—a matter of decades after its conquest—its widely heralded tolerance of Jewish infidels. "Turkey ceased to be a lodestar for exile Jewry."<sup>31</sup>

In sixteenth-century Jerusalem, the Jews' taxation was tantamount to extortion, and the last remaining synagogue—a monument from the time of Nachmanides—was expropriated in 1586. As a result, most of Jerusalem's Jewry hastened off to Hebron, Gaza, and Tiberias.<sup>32</sup>

But the marauders were everywhere—Bedouin raiders, general anarchy, tax corruption—with the additional tax burden that aimed only at Jews.<sup>33</sup> Yet the Jewish communities of Judah-cum-Palestine "still held on all over the country. . . . in Hebron . . . Gaza, Ramle, Sh'chem [Nablus], Safed, . . . Acre, Sidon, Tyre, Haifa, Irsuf, Caesarea, and El Arish; and Jews continued to live and till the soil in Galilean villages."<sup>34</sup>

Those Jews remaining in Jerusalem were "bitterly persecuted" during the seventeenth-century reign of an Arab ruler who purchased his governorship and arrested the Jewish leaders.<sup>35</sup> Under the next ruler, while the hapless Jews were "speculating on the advent of the Messiah," a great number of them were massacred.<sup>36</sup>

In 1625, the local ruler of Jerusalem persecuted the Jews mercilessly in defiance of orders from the authorities in Damascus and Constantinople. It was not unusual, when the countryside suffered from drought, for the Moslem mob to attack "Jewish sinners who drank wine and thus caused the rains to stop!" To buy off the attackers, Jews had to borrow money from rich Moslems at compound interest, under threats of further attacks if they failed to repay.<sup>37</sup>

When the Jewish community of its holy city of Safed was "massacred in 1660," and the town "destroyed by Arabs," only one Jew managed to evade death.<sup>38</sup> In 1674 Jerusalem's Jews were similarly impoverished by the oppression



of the Turkish-Muslim rule, according to the Jesuit Father Michael Naud, “paying heavily to the Turk for their right to stay here.”

. . . They prefer being prisoners in Jerusalem to enjoying the freedom they could acquire elsewhere. . . . The love of the Jews for the Holy Land, which they lost through their betrayal . . . is unbelievable. Many of them come from Europe to find a little comfort, though the yoke is heavy.<sup>39</sup>

The eighteenth century saw the increasing decline of order and the further waste of the terrain, and with it all came violence and persecution of the Jewish *dhimmi*. Yet, one ruling sheikh brought tolerance and improvements to the Jews of Galilee. Although only a brief respite, the Jews of Safed and Tiberias were given hope when the kindly sheikh welcomed a rabbi from Smyrna to “come and inherit the land of his ancestors.” The rabbi’s grandfather had been “Rabbi of Tiberias” a century earlier and his arrival in 1742 brought back the Jewish community of Tiberias, which had been virtually purged of Jews for seventy years.<sup>40</sup>

Near the end of the eighteenth century, this Galileean tolerance ended abruptly, with the fairminded sheikh’s overthrow. His successors reinforced the code of humiliation and harassment of “their” Jews as it had been maintained elsewhere in the country.<sup>41</sup>

In 1775, the anti-Jewish blood libel was spread throughout the holy Jewish city of Hebron, inciting mob violence, as that vicious canard has wrought havoc for Jews in Arab and European communities alike.<sup>42</sup> Safed’s Jewish Quarter, which had again been revived during the reign of the kindly sheikh a few decades before, “was completely sacked by the Turks” in 1799.<sup>43</sup>

The Muslims in Nablus prohibited Christians from settling in the town.<sup>44</sup> The year 1783 brought the rise of an Albanian-born Mamluk “Arab,” nicknamed “The Butcher”—*el Djezzar*—whose sadistic, wanton exploits became legend.<sup>45</sup> The Latin Patriarch’s correspondence in 1805 reports:

Mohammad Djezzar, pasha of Jerusalem and Damascus, began to take by force twenty-five thousand piastres more than it was customary to pay. This continued for seven years, during which he was at different times governor, to say nothing of other exactions with which he was incessantly harassing us. All our representations to the Porte were unavailing as this pasha obeyed none of its firmans.<sup>46</sup>

As his power grew, industry and agricultural production declined further, “so that his chief source of revenue became what he could extract out of the district of Damascus and the Palestinian churches.”<sup>47</sup> The inhabitants of his dominion—stretching at one point from Beirut to the Egyptian border<sup>48</sup>—were so intimidated that few fought off his harsh decrees. “The limit of his extensive pashalic [district] . . . might be easily known by the air of gloom and desolation with which it was overspread.”<sup>49</sup>

Hayim Farhi, the one Jew who had risen to some power in the area (about

whom more was mentioned in Chapter 3), was imprisoned by The Butcher, and some "milder forms of punishment"<sup>50</sup> were administered—"ear cropping, nose slitting and the gouging out of an eye." The Butcher branded most of his aides by one or another of the mutilations. "His cavalry scoured the country, levying tribute or committing any atrocity he was pleased to enjoin."<sup>51</sup>

He was known to travel accompanied by an executioner. When The Butcher encountered a subject who was adjudged to be misbehaving, "the criminal bowed his neck, the executioner struck, and the head fell."<sup>52</sup> The Butcher's brutality was contagious, and persecutions of many Palestinian minorities were rife under his encouragement.<sup>53</sup> At one point his popularity among the masses prompted him to pronounce an order to massacre all Christians under his authority. Thereupon Sir Sidney Smith sent The Butcher an outraged message: if one Christian head were to fall, so would The Butcher's seat of power. According to a prominent historian of the period, Sir Sidney's threat worked. "I have often heard both Turks and Christians exclaim [that Sir Sidney's word] was like God's word, it never failed."<sup>54</sup>

The Jews in Palestine had no such power—worldly or otherwise. The nineteenth century ushered in an even lower ebb to the perilous existence of "Palestinian" Jewry. Some historians believe that The Butcher's mistreatment of the French merchants in Acre and other cities under his authority—in 1791 he decreed confiscations of their property and expulsion with only a few days' notice—caused Napoleon's invasion of Palestine.<sup>55</sup>

When Napoleon Bonaparte planned his invasion of Jerusalem at the end of the eighteenth century, he tried to enlist the African and Asiatic Jews to march with him by promising to return their Holy Land and restore Jerusalem. But the Turks spread the word that the French "treated Jews particularly in a cruel manner." Thus the Jews of Jerusalem "encouraged and even assisted" the Turks to their defense buildup of the Holy City. Some believe "it was only a trick" by Bonaparte to gain the support of Hayim Farhi, the Jew who briefly rose to power in Syria.<sup>56</sup>

Farhi was assassinated in 1820. Napoleon's vision of himself as Emperor of the East had already evaporated into the dust of other conquests in the Holy Land, and his debatable "promise" of the country to the Jews was never tested.<sup>57</sup>

In the 1800s the Jews continued to suffer the same discriminatory practices as other non-Muslim "infidels,"<sup>58</sup> which "in many places throughout Syria and Palestine" meant "oppression, extortion, and violence by both the local authorities and the Muslim population."<sup>59</sup>

The Christians in their holy town of Nazareth were also forced through maltreatment into fleeing.

Even as late as 1801 Djezzar sent troops to destroy the standing crops in the environs of Nazareth. Ramleh, however, bore the brunt of the Muslim wrath. During the three days of pillage, the local Latin Christians were either murdered, or lost all their property and fled.<sup>60</sup>

But there were additional oppressions reserved for the Palestinian Jewish community. The Jews were “at the bottom”<sup>61</sup> of the heap of peoples in status.

Among the special extortions that their Holy Land extracted from the Jews, paid to “local officials, Arab notables, and Arab neighbors”:<sup>62</sup> in Jerusalem the *effendi* whose property was adjacent to the Sacred Wall on the site of the Jews’ temple dunned the Jews 300 pounds annually for the right to pray there. They paid another 100 pounds to Siloam’s inhabitants—a village on the outskirts of Jerusalem<sup>63</sup>—as protection against destruction or vandalism of the Jewish burial grounds at the Mount of Olives. Fifty pounds a year went to an Arab community to ensure against assault upon Rachel’s Tomb, and Sheikh Abu Gosh collected 10 pounds “not to molest Jewish travelers on the road to Jerusalem, though he was already paid by the Turkish government to maintain order on that road.”<sup>64</sup>

The first latter-day Jewish defense volunteers may have been the group protecting against marauders, which was described in a British Consulate correspondence in 1840:

Last year when Sir Moses Montefiore travelled through Palestine, and when the publick roads were infested with bands of Robbers and depredators, *some of the Jews of the above-mentioned villages together with others of their Brethren gallantly volunteered to conduct him safely through the Country and they accompanied him armed with swords and pistols all the way to Beyrout*, and such was the formidable and imposing appearance of this armed party that Sir Moses was in consequence distinguished by the title of King of the Jews. This armed party halted at the same quarter where I was staying, and I had the pleasure and the novelty of living in the midst of a little camp of Jewish warriors who would have proved a match for any strolling party of Arabs.\*

According to the correspondent, “the faithfulness and most probably the courage too of the Jewish soldiers” had so impressed the “Russian Despot” that he had assigned them “to form a party of his bodyguard.”<sup>65</sup>

As earlier pages have shown, extortion and *baksheesh*, or bribery, were rampant, and the Jews, who had no protection of their own as did the Christians, were most easily victimized. The historian-traveler Burckhardt recorded the unpredictability of their existence—even when their community was the “largest.” During his visit of 1810–1816 in Safed, where the Jews had been “sacked” just a decade before, Burckhardt wrote,

The town is built upon several low hills, which divide it into different quarters; of these the largest is inhabited exclusively by Jews, who esteem Szaffad as a sacred place. The whole may contain six hundred houses, of which one hundred and fifty belong to the Jews, and from eighty to one hundred to the Christians. . . . The town is governed by a Mutsellim, whose district comprises about a dozen villages. The garrison consists of Moggrebyns [North Africans]. . . .

During the life of Djazzar Pasha [the Jews] were often obliged to pay heavy fines; at present they merely pay the Kharadj. Their conduct, however, is not so

\*Emphasis added.

prudent as it ought to be, in a country where the Turks are always watching for a pretext to extort money; they sell wine and brandy to the soldiers of the town, almost publicly, and at their weddings they make a very dangerous display of their wealth.<sup>66</sup>

Despite the canards to the contrary, most Jews who clung to Judah-cum-Palestine were impoverished, and the burden of discriminatory taxes through all their insidious forms kept them poor, for the most part. Burckhardt reported that although there were some Jews of enough means in Safed to warrant their being pillaged, most young Jews who made their perilous way to Palestine were disillusioned when they came face to face with the conditions of the Holy Land for Jews. According to Burckhardt,

. . . several of them have absconded from their parents, to beg their way to Palestine, but no sooner do they arrive in one or other of the four holy cities, than they find by the aspect of all around them, that they have been deceived.<sup>67</sup>

Hardships notwithstanding, the native Jews and new immigrants alike appear to have considered themselves transcended by living in their Holy Land. One letter, written by a group of new immigrants in 1810, was perhaps particularly illustrative of the point:

Truly, how marvelous it is to live in the good country. Truly how wonderful it is to love our country. . . . Even in her ruin there is none to compare with her, even in her desolation she is unequalled, in her silence there is none like her. Good are her ashes and her stones.<sup>68</sup>

Perhaps it was that inexplicable joy at being there at all which sustained them in Palestine in the nineteenth century, and which led them to survive by forbearance where revolt would have led to extinction. In the mid-1800s James Finn, British Consul in Jerusalem, found:

It was distressing to behold the timidity which long ages of repression had engendered. Many times a poor Jew would come for redress against a native, and when he had substantiated his case, and it had been brought by the consulate before the Turkish authorities, he would, in mere terror of future possible vengeance, withdraw from the prosecution, and even deny that any harm had been done to him; or if that was too manifest, declare that he could not identify the criminal, or that the witnesses could not be produced. Still, even then, the bare fact that some notice had been taken had a deterrent effect upon the criminals who had hitherto regarded the defenseless Jews as their special prey.<sup>69</sup>

In the 1830s havoc was created during an Egyptian reign of Palestine, and the Jews were persecuted brutally throughout the small country.<sup>70</sup> The Egyptian Pasha Mehmet Ali, after his conquest of Syria and Palestine, "oppressed the inhabitants of these countries more severely even than those of his own pashalic [district] in order to fill his coffers."<sup>71</sup>

The rebellion of the Druses caused violence and pillage of the Jews in Galilee

and Safed, and when the Egyptian ruler Ibrahim Pasha levied conscription on the entire population in 1834, the inhabitants of Eastern Palestine crossed the Jordan River to join natives of Nablus, Hebron, and Bethlehem in the insurrection.

Forty thousand fellahin rushed on Jerusalem. . . . The mob entered, and looted the city for five or six days. The Jews were the worst sufferers, their homes were sacked and their women violated.<sup>72</sup>

Now the Jews became victims of the Egyptian soldiers as well as the multi-ethnic "Arab" natives. That same year the Jews of Hebron were massacred by "Egyptian soldiers who came to put down a local Muslim rebellion."<sup>73</sup> And the Safed Jewish community was once again "brutally attacked by Muslim and Druzes"<sup>74</sup> who destroyed the printing presses which the Jews had built and used for centuries. "The types were converted into bullets" by the invaders from Nablus.<sup>75</sup>

The Jews under siege were as defenseless as their counterparts in the Arabic-speaking Muslim "Arab" world and as powerless as perhaps the black slaves called "Niggers" by the Southern whites—they too "knew what was good for them," and any attempt at redress for their grievances would only result in more extreme persecution. Both had to "keep their place."

Some assistance was attempted by those among the locally headquartered foreign diplomats who were sympathetic to the plight of the luckless *dhimmi*s in Palestine.<sup>76</sup> The Christian infidels had long derived benefits from foreign protection due to the Christian dominance of the countries represented. But the Jews had to rely on the few representatives who were courageous enough to complain about the conditions and therefore confront the local authorities and interfere with the status quo. According to an eminent authority on the period, Professor M. Ma'oz, "A noticeable number of Christians and Jews, particularly children, were forced to adopt Islam,"<sup>77</sup> but even the converts were persecuted as Jews.

The earthquake that hit Safed in 1837 brought another onslaught from the surviving Muslims into the Jewish quarter, and the blood libel of Damascus in 1840 brought heightened waves of persecution and murder of Jews throughout Palestine, against which the foreign consulates could offer little protection.<sup>78</sup> But lest it be supposed that the foul canard was newly imported by the Europeans, the 1775 persecution of Jews in Hebron—which was based on the same old calumny—must be recalled.<sup>79</sup>

The receptive anti-Jewish masses who would later adopt and influence Nazism by their own *Muftism* in Palestine—calling it a "nationalistic" reaction to "Zionism"—were actually responding to centuries-long traditional religious hatred and discrimination.

For example, *before* the 1840 Damascus blood libel against the Jews, in one period of a brief few months the British Consul filed claim after lamenting claim of the unrelenting Muslim attacks on Jews. In one report, the Consul included the following complaint from a Jew, Joseph Amzalek:

As a British Subject I beg leave to address you the following statement of the manner in which I have this day been outraged by an Officer of the Pacha's Army—

About 4 o'clock this afternoon I was standing with my Son-in-law outside the door of my house which is nearly opposite the Castle—some of the miserable objects who have lately been taken here for the Army happened to be led out of the Castle—A number of Towns people collecting to look on, the Officer (of the grade of Captain) fell upon them with a large stick and drove them away—As I was standing at my own door with some other respectable persons at a considerable distance from the scene, there could have been no pretence for attacking me and yet the said officer returning from the crowd ran up and gave me such a blow with his stick as brought me to the ground, and had not Dr. Giorgio Grasso (also a British subject) who was standing by me interposed, he would have continued his blows. . . .<sup>80</sup>

Like a rape victim who is blamed for being there to be raped, in this case the victimized Jew was deemed by the British officer in charge to be the guilty party.\* The official reply to the Jerusalem consul three months later was: "I think that Mr. Amzalek was in the wrong, and in great measure brought his difficulties upon himself, and I shall not therefore interfere farther in this case."<sup>81</sup>

Thus the status quo proceeded uninterruptedly.

In May 1839, for instance, the complaints registered with the British Foreign Office by Consul Young in Jerusalem were appalling. In one day, in one report:

I think it my duty to inform you that there has been a Proclamation issued this week by the Governor in the Jewish quarter—that no Jew is to be permitted to pray in his own house under pain of being severely punished—such as want to pray are to go into the Synagogue. . . .

There has also been a punishment inflicted on a Jew and Jewess—most revolting to human nature which I think it my duty to relate—

In the early part of this week, a House was entered in the Jewish Quarter, and a robbery was committed—the House was in quarantine—and the guardian was a Jew—he was taken before the Governor—he denied having any knowledge of the thief or the circumstances. In order to compell him to confess, he was laid down and beaten, and afterwards imprisoned. The following day he was again brought before the Governor, when he still declared his innocence. He was then burned with a hot iron over his face, and in various parts of the body—and beaten on the lower parts of his body to that extent that the flesh hung in pieces from him. The following day the poor creature died. He was a young Jew of Salonica about 28 years of age—who had been here but a very short time, he had only the week before been applying to enter my service.

A young man—a Jew—having a French passport—was also suspected—he fled—his character was known to be an indifferent one—his mother an aged woman was taken under the suspicion of concealing her son—She was tied up and beaten in the most brutal way . . .

\*Consider the bombing of a Paris synagogue in 1980, where many Frenchmen perceived the Jewish victims as culprits and presented the bills for damages to the bombed-out synagogue's rabbi.

I must say I am sorry and am surprised that the Governor could have acted so savage a part—for certainly what I have seen of him, I should have thought him superior to such wanton inhumanity—but it was a Jew—without friends or protection—it serves well to show, that it is not without reason that the poor Jew, even in the nineteenth century, lives from day to day in terror of his life.<sup>82</sup>

One can only speculate unhappily about those acts of violence that went *unreported* by a predominantly intimidated Jewish society that had been long terrorized into silence.

Perhaps an account by Winston Churchill's favorite writer, A. W. Kinglake, best illustrates the climate of "protection" and "brotherhood" under which the Jews lived in Palestine "before the Zionists and Israel." It might be considered a particularly noteworthy perspective because of Kinglake's own admittedly ambivalent reactions toward Jews, vacillating between disdain and sympathy, and his delight and admiration for the "Mussulman" (Muslim) onslaught or "experiment." In the following excerpt from *Eothen*, published in 1844, Kinglake told of his own involvement with the Jews in the town of Safed sometime after the "insurrection of 1834":

. . . At length I drew near to the city of Safet. . . . It is one of the holy cities of the Talmud; and according to this authority, the Messiah will reign there for forty years before He takes possession of Sion. The sanctity and historical importance thus attributed to the city by anticipation render it a favorite place of retirement for Israelites; of these it contains, they say, about four thousand, a number nearly balancing that of the Mohammedan inhabitants. I knew by my experience of Tabarieh [Tiberias] that a "holy city" was sure to have a population of vermin somewhat proportionate to the number of its Israelites, and I therefore caused my tent to be pitched upon a green spot of ground at a respectful distance from the walls of the town.

When it had become quite dark (for there was no moon that night), I was informed that several Jews had secretly come from the city, in the hope of obtaining some help from me in circumstances of imminent danger. . . . It was arranged that the two principal men of the party should speak for the rest, and these were accordingly admitted into my tent. One of the two called himself the British Vice-Consul, and he had with him his consular cap; but he frankly said that he could not have dared to assume this emblem of his dignity in the daytime, and that nothing but the extreme darkness of the night rendered it safe for him to put it on upon this occasion. The other of the spokesmen was a Jew of Gibraltar, a tolerably well-bred person, who spoke English very fluently.

These men informed me that . . . about the beginning of that year [1834] a highly religious Mussulman called Muhammed Damoor went forth into the marketplace, crying with a loud voice and prophesying that on the fifteenth day of the following June the true Believers would rise up in just wrath against the Jews, and despoil them of their gold, and their silver, and their jewels. . . . When that day dawned, the whole Mussulman population of the place assembled in the streets, that they might see the result of the prophecy. Suddenly Mohammed Damoor rushed furious into the crowd, and the fierce shout of the prophet soon

ensured the fulfillment of his prophecy. Some of the Jews fled, and some remained, but they who fled and they who remained alike and unresistantly left their property to the hands of the spoilers. The most odious of all outrages, that of searching the women for the base purpose of discovering such things as gold and silver concealed about their persons, was perpetrated without shame. The poor Jews were so stricken with terror that they submitted to their fate, even where resistance would have been easy. In several instances a young Mussulman boy, not more than ten or twelve years of age, walked straight into the house of a Jew, and stripped him of his property before his face, and in the presence of his whole family.\* When the insurrection was put down, some of the Mussulmans (most probably those who had got no spoil wherewith they might buy immunity) were punished, but the greater part of them escaped; none of the booty was restored, and the pecuniary redress which the Pasha had undertaken to enforce for them had been hitherto so carefully delayed that the hope of ever obtaining it had grown very faint. . . . the Jews complained; and either by the protection of the British Consul at Damascus, or by some other means, had influence enough to induce the appointment of a Special Commissioner—they called him “the Modeer”—whose duty it was to watch for and prevent anything like connivance on the part of the Governor, and to push on the investigation with vigour and impartiality. . . .

. . . the result was that the investigation had made no practical advance, and that the Modeer, as well as the Governor, was living upon terms of affectionate friendship with Mohammed Damoor, and the rest of the principal spoilers.

Thus stood the chance of redress for the past, but the cause of the agonizing excitement under which the Jews of the place now laboured was recent, and justly alarming: Mohammed Damoor had again gone forth into the market-place, and lifted up his voice, and prophesied a second spoliation of the Israelites. This was grave matter; the words of such a practical and clear-sighted prophet as Mohammed Damoor were not to be despised. I fear I must have smiled visibly, for I was greatly amused, and even, I think, gratified at the account of this second prophecy. Nevertheless, my heart warmed towards the poor oppressed Israelites, and I was flattered, too, in the point of my national vanity at the notion of the far-reaching link by which a Jew in Syria, because he had been born on the rock of Gibraltar, was able to claim me as his fellow-countryman. . . . It seemed to me that the immediate arrest of Mohammed Damoor was the one thing needful to the safety of the Jews, and I felt sure (for reasons which I have already mentioned in speaking of the Nablous affair) that I should be able to obtain this result by making a formal application to the Governor. I told my applicants that I would take this very step on the following morning; they were very grateful, and were *for a moment much pleased* at the prospect of safety thus seemingly opened to them, but the *deliberation of a minute entirely altered their views, and filled them with a new terror*. They declared that any attempt or pretended attempt on the part of the Governor to arrest Mohammed Damoor would certainly produce an immediate movement of the whole Mussulman population, and a consequent massacre and robbery of the Israelites. My visitors went out, and remained I know not how long consulting of their brethren, but all at last agreed that *their present*

\*“It was after the interview which I am talking of, and not from the Jews themselves, that I learnt the fact.”



*perilous and painful position was better than a certain and immediate attack*, and that if Mohammed Damoor was seized, their second estate would be worse than their first. I myself did not think that this would be the case, but I could not, of course, force my aid upon the people against their will, and moreover the day fixed for the fulfillment of this second prophecy was not very close at hand; a little delay, therefore, in providing against the impending danger would not necessarily be fatal. The men now confessed that although they had come with so much mystery and (as they thought) at so great risk to ask my assistance, they were unable to suggest any mode in which I could aid them, except, indeed, by mentioning their grievances to the Consul-General at Damascus. This I promised to do, and this I did.

My visitors were very thankful to me for my readiness to intermeddle in their affairs, and the grateful wives of the principal Jews sent to me many compliments, with choice wines and elaborate sweetmeats.

The course of my travels soon drew me so far from Safet that I never heard how the dreadful day passed off which had been fixed for the accomplishment of the second prophecy. If the predicted spoliation was prevented, poor Mohammed Damoor must have been forced, I suppose, to say that he had prophesied in a metaphorical sense. This would be a sad falling off from the brilliant and substantial success of the first experiment.\*<sup>83</sup>

The above extract reveals not only the treatment of Jews that was tradition, but also the poignant, tenuous position of those Jewish communities who nonetheless remained in Palestine.

It was in such a predatory climate that the preposterous blood libel<sup>84</sup> against the Jews could thrive—a climate of “fraternity” and “peace” according to the Grand Mufti, his successor and relative Yasser Arafat, and even his more moderate Arab compatriots. It was that same climate that provided the life for Jews described in 1839 by British Consul Young:

... scarcely a day passes that I do not hear of some act of Tyranny and oppression against a Jew—chiefly by the soldiers, who enter their Houses and *borrow* whatever they require without asking any permission—sometimes they return the article, but more frequently not. In two instances, I have succeeded in obtaining justice for Jews against Turks—But it is quite a new thing in the eyes of these people to claim justice for a Jew—and I have good reason to think that my endeavors to protect the Jews, have been—and may be for some little time to come, *detrimental* to influence with other classes—Christians as well as Turks. . . .

Like the miserable dog without an owner he is kicked by one because he crosses his path, and cuffed by another because he cries out—to seek redress he is afraid, lest it bring worse upon him; he thinks it better to endure than to live in the expectation of his complaint being revenged upon him. Brought up from infancy to look upon his civil disabilities everywhere as a mark of degradation, his heart becomes the cradle of fear and suspicion—he finds he is trusted by none—and therefore he lives himself without confidence in any.<sup>85</sup>

\*Emphasis added.

The Muslims' anti-Jewish indoctrination began at an early age, with added incentives from other cultures: one book reported the game "Burn the Jew," a Christian-Arab children's pastime at Lent in Jaffa in the 1830s.<sup>86</sup>

The hostilities surrounding the 1840 blood libel in Damascus inflamed Muslim and Christian<sup>87</sup> equally against Jews in Palestine, and were more widely known than other similar instances. The dreaded false charge, however, was dredged up in the Holy Land "on at least nine occasions" in the same region "in the nineteenth century alone."<sup>88</sup> As a result of the violent barrage upon the Jews in the Muslim world, which went "public" with the Damascus ritual murder accusation, British Jewish leader Sir Moses Montefiore helped organize the Alliance Israelite Universelle "to do philanthropic and educational work among the Jews in Arab countries." It undoubtedly hoped to offer some protection as well.

Under Western pressure and pleas from "Jewish notables to the Sultan," the Turkish authority issued an edict, commanding "full equality of Jews before the law and strict justice for them and their property before all courts of justice."<sup>89</sup>

In Palestine, the "Evil," which made the proclamation of "equality" for Jews no more than an ironic exercise in futility for the Holy Land, was reported:

It is a fact that the Jewish Subjects . . . especially in Palestine, do not enjoy the privileges granted to them. . . . This Evil may in general be traced to the . . . following causes:

- I. To the absence of an adequate protection whereby they are more exposed to cruel and tyrannical treatment.
- II. *To the blind hatred and ignorant prejudices of a fanatical populace.*
- III. To the several peculiarities which alienate them from the other inhabitants.
- IV. To the starving state of numerous Jewish population, resident in Palestine, hitherto subsisting in a great measure upon the charity of their occidental Brethren.

The weakness of the Porte on the one hand and on the other the dispersion of the Jews throughout so manifold a population prejudiced against them, together with the want of pecuniary resources and state of despondency occasioned by the existing distress, render the removal of the aforesaid evils impracticable if the above obstacles are allowed to continue. It is therefore *necessary* to fix upon a *place* which from its situation would be beyond the reach of fanatical attacks, in contact with European civilization—easily protected by the Porte,—and a spot to which the Jews might feel themselves attracted.\*<sup>90</sup>

At the same time British Foreign Secretary Palmerston was encouraging the Sultan to allow Jews to settle on the land in Palestine. In 1840, he presented evidence to Constantinople from Jewish sources in England that,

\*Emphasis added.

. . . no sooner should there be an opening to cultivate the soil in Palestine, than the Jews from the Russian Dominions would flow into it. . . . In mentioning to them the probability of a way being opened to their Nation to return to the land of their Fathers and to become cultivators of the soil, they became almost frantic with joy and thousands of Jews would have followed . . . their leader to Jerusalem.<sup>91</sup>

Palmerston suggested that it would be “highly advantageous to the Sultan” if “scattered” Jews were “induced to go and settle in Palestine.”<sup>92</sup>

But the “Mussulman” population adamantly and “constantly manifested” its “state of feeling” in the Jerusalem environs, and the British Consul “begs aid to check this evil,” against “Christians and Jews.”

Reports from Sidon, Tyre, Acre and Caiffa [Haifa] complain of bigotry and outrages toward Christians: Confirmed by what is observed here in Jerusalem towards Christians and Jews. Executive too feeble and indifferent to act effectively.<sup>93</sup>

In 1841, just after the proclamation issuing “equal treatment” was issued to the Jews, Foreign Secretary Palmerston defended British encouragement of the new edict:

. . . the Turkish Government must know how difficult it is in any country to carry into strict effect at once or for a long time any new Laws which tend to prevent one part of the subjects of a State from oppressing another part *upon whom they have been accustomed to commit violence and injustice with impunity*; and the Turkish Ministers must also be aware *how difficult it would be for the Jews in Palestine to make their complaints known at Constantinople*, and unless the existence of abuses be brought to the knowledge of the Sovereign Power, it is impossible that any remedy can be applied to such abuses. For these reasons it is, and strictly *therefore in the interest of the Sultan himself*, that Her Majesty’s Government have made this request to the Porte, and Her Majesty’s Government cannot conceive that such an arrangement could be looked upon as in the slightest degree infringing upon the independence of the Sultan.\*<sup>94</sup>

According to Muslim law, Jews could not give evidence against Muslims, nor could Christians. Lord Palmerston exhorted the Turkish Ambassador to England to engage the Sultan’s immediate attention “for preventing the Muftis in Syria from acting on the obsolete and antiquated doctrine” of refusing to accept such evidence against Muslims.<sup>95</sup>

Emphasizing the waste of potential in Palestine, Foreign Secretary Palmerston further instructed his ambassador in Constantinople

. . . to impress upon the minds of the Turkish Ministers that it would be highly advantageous to the Sultan that the Jews who are scattered through other countries in Europe and Africa should be induced to go and settle in Palestine. . . .

\*Emphasis added.

The Jews, Palmerston wrote, would bring "wealth" and "industry," which would "tend greatly to increase" Turkish resources and "promote the progress of civilization therein."

But, Palmerston noted, the Jews would never leave the European countries' "security" [sic] for the "violence, injustice and oppression to which the Jews have hitherto been exposed in the Turkish Dominions." If the Sultan could not "give the Jews some real and tangible security, he cannot expect the benefit which their immigration into Palestine would afford him."<sup>96</sup>

Another British official, Colonel George Gawler, published a booklet entitled *Tranquilization of Syria and the East. Observations and Practical Suggestions in furtherance of the Establishment of Jewish Colonies in Palestine; the most sober and sensible remedy for the miseries of Asiatic Turkey.*

On the same theory as Lord Palmerston's, Gawler promoted Jewish agricultural settlements with local autonomy, and national control by the British Consul coordinating with the Turks. He proposed the funding be given by a number of countries, who had ungratefully persecuted the Jews despite having learned their religion from Judaism.<sup>97</sup>

As though in defiance of the edict of "equality," another false ritual murder charge was hurled against the Jewish community in Jerusalem in March of 1847. The British Consul reported:

. . . On Monday, 8th Instant—A Greek boy assaulted a Jewish boy in the street, the latter ran into a house to hide himself, but on leaving the house afterwards, found his adversary still lying in wait for him—he then threw a stone at him which cut his foot—The Greeks raised a tumult and declared that a Jewish boy had stabbed an innocent Christian with a knife. The case was brought before the Pasha, who refused to examine so childish a quarrel, and dismissed the complaint.

On Thursday however the Greeks directly, and other Christians indirectly persisted in having the enormity further investigated . . . of the horrible crime so often imputed to the Jews—The Christians pleaded that their most venerated theologians in all ages had uniformly asserted this accusation, *The Moslem Mufti, Cadi, &c. asserted that their Sacred books declared the same indirectly and by implication*,— while the Jews appealed to their divine Law and its Expositors to prove that not only is such practice not enjoined, but that the principles universally pervading those writings are diametrically opposed to it—Finally they referred to the Firman received in 1841 from His Majesty the Sultan after the dreadful cruelties exercised on this same account in Rhodes and Damascus, which Firman declares that strict search had been made into all the Jewish writings and that no trace of such practice is there to be found.<sup>98</sup>

A Jewish visitor who made a pilgrimage to Palestine in 1847 reported the sorry situation and his fellow Jews' conditioning to their plight:

They do not have any protection and are at the mercy of policemen and the pashas who treat them as they wish . . . they pay various taxes every now and then . . . their property is not at their disposal and they dare not complain about

an injury for fear of the Arabs' revenge. Their lives are precarious and subject to daily danger of death."<sup>99</sup>

The anti-Jewish sentiments sometimes took another, more devious form:

There is another species of persecution to which the Jews are subject here. . . .

So soon as the Plague is reported to be in the City, the Jews at once become the object of cupidity, to every employee in the quarantine service, who, with the Native practitioners in medicine, rob and oppress them to the last degree. From one individual alone, of the better class, they succeeded lately in obtaining 4,000 piastres, equal to L40 sterling, in bribes—his son was sick with fever—they declared it to be the Plague—set a guard on his house, deprived him of all means of obtaining medical assistance—the patient died, and then, on his refusing to satisfy their demands—they threatened to burn everything in his house. *This My Lord is not a solitary instance.*

What the Jew has to endure, at all hands, is not to be told.\*<sup>100</sup>

In 1848 about four thousand armed peasants and “numerous Bedouin allies acted as gangs for “two great chiefs,” and lawlessness spread. Hebron’s local governor was overthrown by an oppressive chief whose brutal tactics earned him the admiration of Jerusalem’s Pasha and the award of the “robe of honour.” In Hebron, one of the holy Jewish cities, Jews were still “helpless” and “plundered” and the new ruler managed to confiscate booty of those trying to flee by sending “agents to rob travellers on the road.”<sup>101</sup>

In the following few decades (1848–1878) scores of incidents involving anti-Jewish violence, persecution, and extortions filled page after page of documented reports from the British Consulate in Jerusalem. A chronology would be overwhelming, but perhaps a few extracts from those complaints will show the pattern of terror that continued right into the period of the major Jewish immigration beginning about 1878.

*May, 1848:* I have the honor to report that after the disturbance in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre Easter Eve, in beating the Jew who had imprudently entered there—The Prussian Acting Consul here, informed me that he had been told by the Pasha, and also by the Greek Patriarch, that a Firman exists, which allows Christians to beat Jews if found within that Church, or even if passing along the street in front of it—and which declares that in case of a Jew being killed under such an infliction, the price of blood should be rated at only ten paras—value about three farthings.<sup>102</sup>

*March, 1849:* Reporting the complaint of a Jew . . . of being assaulted and stabbed by a soldier, while his house was searched and his females beaten. . . .<sup>103</sup>

*September, 1850:* Last month I visited Hebron to do what I could for the protection of the Jews. . . . Abderahhman [a “brigand chief”] vexes them with irregular extortions, but in return he keeps them in security from other oppressors,

\*Emphasis added.

however He has had himself enrolled on the books of the Jewish Treasury, as a pensioner for 100 piastres a month, and always sends for his pension two days before the day of due.

During my last visit there I had a Moslem summarily bastinadoed in the open street, for pulling a Jew's beard—the Mutesellim in his eagerness to satisfy me, inflicted the punishment with his own hands, to my great astonishment. Abderrahhman was absent at Dura but one of his sons was present at the scene. This forms a strange contrast to the fact of the Austrian Jewish Agent being frequently beaten in the streets there. . . .<sup>104</sup>

*July, 1851:* It is my duty to report to Your Excellency that the Jews in Hebron have been greatly alarmed by threats of the Moslems there at the commencement of Ramadan—For several days my Cancelliere staid there with two Kawasses and obtained from the Governor Abderrahhman the punishment of some offenders: but others were released from prison on the self-same night of their condemnation.

The Cancelliere reports that the old feuds between the partisans of Abderrahhman and his brothers still exist—that the partisans of the latter steal cattle by force of arms during the night from Hebron itself, and that they did so close to his tent—also that in one day the vines were cut down from twenty feddans of vineyard—but that such proceedings are sure to cease instantly on every approach of Abderrahhman himself, which however is not frequent.

The Jews having complained that a freed slave named Saad Allah was more obnoxious to them than any other person in Hebron,—and that Abderrahhman had released him almost immediately after sentencing him to imprisonment. . . .

. . . the enormous avarice of Abderrahhman is peculiarly oppressive to them.<sup>105</sup>

*December, 1851:* . . . the murder of a Jew named Gershon ben Abraham, under English Protection, in Jerusalem, . . .

. . . the victim was extricated from the well . . . he was found to be stabbed in the throat, heart and ribs, besides injured in a horrible manner for the mere purpose of torture. . . .

A Moslem (he whose house I had examined in the morning) named Mohammed Damiatti, was immediately arrested on suspicion of having perpetrated the murder. . . .

The distress of the bereaved family is very great—it is not too much to expect that Moslems will prefer claims and swear falsely in matters of debt and credit, as the poor man carried his ledger about with him, and this has not been found—and it is remarkable that his father was some years ago murdered in a Moslem house in Saloniki, and his only brother killed in Jerusalem two years ago by a fall from a scaffold.<sup>106</sup>

*December, 1851:* . . . the Samaritans of Nablus . . . consist of about thirty-five taxable men, with a synagogue and sacred books. . . .

They have probably for many generations, and especially within the last century, been exposed to cruel persecutions from the dominant Moslems—and Nablus is always noted as an especially fanatic town. . . .

They generally contrive to have the cleverest man belonging to them em-

ployed as government Secretary for the district, by which means they have warded off much of fiscal oppression, just as Jews do in other countries, and Copts in Egypt—but even this has not been able to protect them from violence, murder and spoliation in their houses or streets in past times. . . .

I am informed by a Christian in Nablus that there is too much reason to fear evil consequences from the loss of their Secretary, as the Moslems are reviling them in the streets with menaces for the future.<sup>107</sup>

*May, 1852:* . . . I proceeded to Hebron and lodged there in a Jewish house.

The Jews were all so alarmed . . . that they would tell me nothing of news: they protested that Abderrahhman had done no harm to any one, no houses had been rifled &c. and one of the leading Rabbis implored me not to inform Abderrahhman if he should visit me, that I had come to protect the Jews, as he would inevitably punish them the more for it after my departure. . . .

As for the accusations preferred by Abderrahhman against the Effendis here—I cannot tell how true they are—but I know that these personages are constantly taking bribes in other cases, the sums however which are laid against each seem incredibly large. I should rather imagine that much of the bribery money was spent in Damascus and Beyroot.<sup>108</sup>

*November, 1852:* Having learned that the peasantry levy of 4000 men from the Nablus district had committed excesses in the houses of British protected Jews in Tiberias I repaired thither, to induce the commander to keep better order. . . . Remonstrance was made against petty thefts “and of their having brought their horses and asses during the rain into the Jewish Synagogues.”<sup>109</sup>

*July, 1853:* . . . The Christians and Jews of Jerusalem were in a state of absolute terror, and especially on the preceeding day had been announcing to each other house to house that the Moslems were to massacre them after the prayers at noon. Persons shut themselves up in their houses, and shops were closed, and some persons are still ill in bed from the effect of that day's fear.<sup>110</sup>

*October, 1853:* The Jews in their Quarter of the city have had to suffer many insults of late from town's people of which I only hear some time after their occurrence, as the subjects of the violence are afraid to acquaint me with the circumstances, lest they should draw upon themselves greater injuries by way of revenge after the Consul has obtained redress.<sup>111</sup>

*December, 1853:* [Regarding] the Algerine Jews of Caiffa [Haifa] . . . I beg to represent to Your Lordship that the blessing of British Protection is a boon of inestimable value to these people. It would be a blessing to be exempted from Turkish oppression at any time, and peculiarly so at the present period, when fanaticism is liable at any minute to break out into violence and when the local governors are endeavouring to extort money by every possible means. And these people fear that if left to Turkish rule they will be required to pay arrears of taxes for all the past years of their residence in this country. . . .

A similar renunciation of Algerine Jews has been made in Safed, Tiberias and Shefa Amer as shown in Enclosure No. 2. . . .

A peculiarity of the French Consulates as far as they have come within my observation, is that they always show a strong desire to get rid of Jewish Subjects. I have had frequent evidences of this in Jerusalem, where that desire has been often expressed to me—and in Caiffa I regret to add that the Jews have complained of direct persecution from the French and Turkish authorities combined.<sup>112</sup>

*July, 1858:* I have the honour to report that in consequence of a series of disgusting insults offered to Jews and Jewesses in Hebron, I obtained such Orders as I could from the Pasha's Agent in this city, during His Excellency's absence—which I sent by my Dragoman Rosenthal and a Kawass. . . .

The streets of the town were paraded by fanatic Durweeshes—and during my stay there a Jewish house was forcibly entered by night, iron bars of the window broken, and heavy stones thrown from invisible hands at every person approaching the place to afford help.

One of the Members of the Council affirmed that they were not obliged to obey Orders from the Pasha's Deputy—and *another declared his right derived from time immemorial in his family, to enter Jewish houses, and take toll or contributions at any time without giving account.*

When others present in the Council exclaimed against this he said—"Well then I will forbear from taking it myself, but things will happen which will compel the Jews to come and kiss my feet to induce me to take their money."<sup>\*113</sup>

*November, 1858:* . . . although the thief had previously confessed to the robbery in presence of Jews, the Kadi would not proceed without the testimony of two Moslems—when the Jewish witnesses were offered, he refused to accept their testimony—and the offensive term adopted towards Jews in former times (more offensive than Giaour for Christians) was used by the Kadi's servants.

I have no doubt of being able to set all this to rights (except perhaps the matter of Jewish testimony in that Court) but such circumstances exhibit the working of the present Turkish government in Jerusalem.<sup>114</sup>

*May, 1863:* . . . Galilee, comprising the modern towns of Nazareth, Safed and Tiberias, in which two latter places there are living upwards of 600 Jews in the enjoyment of British protection. The existence of so many protected subjects in these retired spots, residing as they do in the midst of a Moslem population, naturally gives rise to numerous questions with the local Governors who are prone to *oppress them unless their interests are constantly cared for.* My predecessor was required to make an Annual tour to those towns, in order that his appearance from time to time amongst our protected subjects there might keep within proper bounds *the ill-concealed aversion which their presence never fails to excite amongst their Moslem neighbors* . . . <sup>\*115</sup>

*March, 1864:* . . . the circumstances attending the death of the British subject Peter Meshullam, and to try Abdalla Abu Kakoora, the individual charged with his murder. . . . they declare, as the result of their enquiry, that P. Meshullam

\*Emphasis added.



died in consequence of the fall from his mare, and, consequently that Abdalla is innocent of charges preferred against him.

I confess I was hardly prepared for such a finding and verdict. . . . I addressed to His Excellency a reply conveying my entire dissent from the decision of the Commission . . .<sup>116</sup>

*June, 1864:* . . . Her Majesty's Government have little doubt that Mr. Mashulan's death was caused by violence and not by a fall from his horse. . . .<sup>117</sup>

The tradition of contemptuous "fraternity" continued—a tradition that illuminates what measure of credibility may be given to modern promises concerning a "Palestinian Arab state," which would "value people, independent of race and religion."<sup>118</sup>

Over the decades, as the nineteenth-century *dhimmi* Jews were reinforced by successive waves of Jewish pioneers, anti-Jewish violence erupted spasmodically in the Holy Land. Observers labeled these outbreaks as "European anti-Semitism," "Ottomanism," and later, "anti-Zionism."\*

British officials attributed the violence—so-called "disturbances"—to the manifestation of "Arab nationalism." The British, however, were never able to discover any manifestation of such nationalism on the part of the Arabs in Palestine other than the oppression and intolerance shown toward their *dhimmi*. This narrowly based "nationalism" of violence continued to grow as the Jews continued to struggle out of *dhimmi* status toward freedom and equality. British investigators were eventually forced to concede, and officially to note, that "Arab nationalism in Palestine has been artificially puffed up. . . . Only a little firmness is needed to deflate it."<sup>119</sup> Unlike the "insurgent nationalism elsewhere,"

in Palestine Arab nationalism is inextricably interwoven with antagonism to the Jews.<sup>120</sup>

Yet by so perverse a rationale was a movement of enmity dignified and the legend of Palestinian nationalism initiated.

\*See Chapter 10.

## The Population Under the Turks: Mid-Nineteenth Century to 1918

The same Arab politicians who protested that they cared nothing for the money the Jews brought into the country. . . . showed no such contempt for money when it came to the treatment of their own peasantry.

—The Reverend James Parkes, *Whose Land?*

The Palestinians who are today's refugees in the neighboring countries . . . know all this . . . that their present nationalist exploiters are the worthy sons of their feudal exploiters of yesterday, and that the thorns of their life are of Arab, not Jewish origin.

—Abdel Razak Kader, 1969

**W**e have seen strong evidence that the Holy Land was inhabited only sparsely in the nineteenth century. For centuries the non-Jewish, particularly the Muslim, peoples who did inhabit the land had been largely composed of a revolving immigrant population of diverse ethnic origins who could not possibly have constituted a substantial indigenous "Palestinian" population, much less a nation of inhabitants for "a thousand" or "two thousand years." Rather, the majority of those inhabitants were migrants and peasants originating from other lands, many of whom had been unscrupulously exploited by feudal or absentee landlords, moneylenders, and corrupt officials of the Turkish government. They in turn traditionally exploited and preyed upon the oppressed *dhimmi* Jewish population.

How does the history of those relationships mesh with the Arab claim that "displacement" and "landlessness" of Arab "natives" was caused by the Jews? If that claim is false, it is long-perpetuated. As such, it must be traced to its beginnings, in the Palestine of Turkish rule, when the Arab notables' charge of "Jews displacing Arabs" was devised.

It was 1878. Harsh conditions prevailed.<sup>1</sup> Into Palestine<sup>2</sup> came groups of Circassians, Algerians, Egyptians, Druses, Turks, Kurds, Bosnians, and others. One historian deduced that of 141,000 settled Muslims living in all of Palestine

(all areas) in 1882, "at least 25% of those 141,000 . . . were newcomers or descendants of those who arrived after 1831 (Egyptian conquest)."<sup>3</sup>

A prominent British official had observed as early as 1840 that the barren Palestinian land needed the collective political return of the Jews:

If we consider their return in the light of a new establishment or colonization of Palestine, we shall find it to be the cheapest and the safest mode of supplying the wastes of these depopulated Regions. . . .<sup>4</sup>

Throughout the nineteenth century Palestine's occupying government had officially settled many foreigners. The "Egyptian" conqueror Ibrahim Pasha, son of the Turkish-speaking Ottoman Muhammad Ali, had "left behind him permanent colonies of Egyptians at Beisan, Nablus, Irbid, Acre and Jaffa . . ." In Jaffa, "some five hundred Egyptian soldiers' families established a new quarter."<sup>5</sup> Into Jaffa alone, then, "at least two thousand people" had been imported.<sup>6</sup> In 1844, "the American expedition under Lynch" recorded fewer than 8,000 "Turks" in Jaffa in a population of 13,000.<sup>7</sup> In 1857, Elizabeth Finn, the wife of James Finn, British Consul in Jerusalem, reported that "Greek and Latin foreigners hostile to Turkish power are endeavoring to grasp piecemeal and occupy the Holy Land so valuable to them both. The corrupt Pashas and Effendis [notables] allow them for [*sic*] money to do so as they list."<sup>8</sup> In 1858 Consul Finn reported the "Mohammedans of Jerusalem" were "scarcely exceeding one-quarter of the whole population."<sup>9</sup>

In 1860 Algerian tribes moved from Damascus *en masse* to Safed, and the Muslims there were "mostly descended from these Moorish settlers and from Kurds who came earlier to the city."<sup>10</sup>

In that same year, the British Consul wrote:

From Caiffa [Haifa] I learn the arrival of about 6,000 of the Beni Sukhr Arabs at Tiberias (who are very seldom seen on this side of the Jordan). . . .<sup>11</sup>

. . . I have omitted to mention the increase of Mahometan agriculturalists and pastoral Arabs from countries of Barbary, forming a small colony in the district north of Lake Tiberias.<sup>12</sup>

A report on "Disturbances" noted that "The Plain of Esdraelon is full of Turkoman Bedouins. . . ."<sup>13</sup> The restored Turkish government was continuously adding its own numbers in order to replenish and guard its administration, as had the Egyptians before them, as had dozens of conquerors over the centuries.<sup>14</sup>

I have the honour to report to your Lordship that the excess of the Druses in the Lebanon remaining unchecked by The Turkish Government, the same practices are being extended southwards, among the Metawalis.

These are a sect of Mahometans differing from the orthodoxy of the Turks, inhabiting a hilly district south of the Lebanon; their creed is the same as that of the Persians, and called the Sheah.

. . . but now they are acting on their own account. They have plundered the

large village of Bassa on the verge of the plain of Acre, and plundered the village of Kefir Beraan near Safed. . . .<sup>15</sup>

Landlords imported workers to keep up their great areas, but the peasants and former nomads who came were subjected to the robbery of the usurers, until they ran off, to be replaced by new immigrants.<sup>16</sup>

Despite the constant immigration into Palestine, the land remained largely depopulated. However observers, travelers, and field workers may have differed<sup>17</sup> in their observations—one found “fertility” and “the flush of green on the desert,”<sup>18</sup> while another found Sharon and the Upper Galilee barren<sup>19</sup>—records descriptive of Palestine concur on the state of depopulation and of the official wholesale importing of newly arrived émigrés who continued to constitute a great part of the populace that did exist there.

As historians have noted, “The real source of the interest in the problem was the condition of Palestine”.<sup>20</sup> “empty”<sup>21</sup>—“silent”<sup>22</sup>—“waste”—“ruin.”<sup>23</sup> Between 1840 and 1880 “writing travellers learnt on the spot . . . to mistrust and hate the Turk and despise the Muslim population.”

The village lands belonged in reality to the crown . . . if uncultivated.<sup>24</sup> The population was hopelessly incompetent and lethargic, owing to the taxation.<sup>25</sup>

In Jerusalem, 1859, the British consul identified part of the “thinly scattered population”:<sup>26</sup>

The Mohammedans of Jerusalem are less fanatical than in many other places, owing to the circumstances of *their numbers scarcely exceeding one quarter of the whole population*—and of their being surpassed in wealth (*except among the Effendi class*) in trade and manufactures by both Jews and Christians.\*<sup>27</sup>

At the same time, an official report on “Disturbances” affirmed that “*the Mahometan population is dying out, I can scarcely say slowly,\**” and that the government had to supply a populace to “places formerly unknown.” (Note below the reference to “*not sufficient*” numbers of “Mohametans”—*Muslims*—immigrating at the same time as the “*large numbers*” of *Jews*):

Hence, for the present *we are supplied* with low-bred ignorant Turks, reigning in small towns or rural districts, and farming taxes. . . . While the Jews from Russia come also in large numbers and settle in Jerusalem and Safed . . . I cannot tell whether the recent immigration of Algerine Mohametans in the North is invited or fostered by Turkish Governors. These bring fanaticism with them, but their numbers are not sufficient as yet.\*<sup>28</sup>

However distasteful he found the impoverished Arab immigrants who were “supplied,” the British Consul complained that there were too few inhabitants of any sort in Palestine. “Palestine,” he reported, was almost “empty of inhabi-

\*Emphasis added.

tants," and urgently needed a "body of population irrespective of religious considerations."<sup>29</sup> In fact, another official British report—contradicting the alleged grounds for its own future policy\*—attested to the abandonment of the land when renewed Jewish development began. In one area, for example:

In 1878 Commission of Enquiry visited Beisan, as did another Commission 50 years later, to report on land situated there. The commission appeared to have reported that they found the lands in disorder, exposed to raids by marauding Bedouin from across the Jordan, abandoned by the cultivators and only scantily cultivated.

There is, then, evidence for assuming that it is doubtful that any of the present-day cultivators can prove their occupation before 1870.<sup>30</sup>

Meanwhile, the Jewish population had been growing. They were the majority in Safed and Tiberias by 1851,<sup>31</sup> and by the late 1850s Jews formed at least half of the population of Jerusalem. Most of them were the "class called sephardem,"<sup>32</sup> and the Jews "greatly exceed the Moslems in number."<sup>33</sup>

The Turkish Sultan had enacted laws that promised "every encouragement to the cultivation of the land."<sup>34</sup> In 1856, Sir Moses Montefiore was granted an edict by the Sultan permitting Jews to buy land in Palestine.<sup>35</sup> At mid-nineteenth century, a "considerable number" of Jewish immigrants had come and settled—in the four holy cities of Jerusalem, Safed, Hebron, and Tiberias, largely—but also on the land.<sup>36</sup> (They were not the first European, or Ashkenazi, Jews to join the native Sephardim; following the 1769 earthquake at Safed, "a new influx" of Russian Jews had refounded the town, about 1776.)<sup>37</sup>

In 1860 Sir George Gawler, a non-Jewish "Zionist," one of a group in England who had been staunchly advocating Jewish nationalism for decades, wrote:

I should be truly rejoiced to see in Palestine a strong guard of Jews established in flourishing agricultural settlements and ready to hold their own upon the mountains of Israel against all aggressors.

I can wish for nothing more glorious in this life than to have my share in helping them to do so.<sup>38</sup>

By the 1870s, despite the traditional attacks—"sometimes to death"—on Palestinian Jews by "their Muslim neighbors," the situation was reportedly more secure.<sup>39</sup> Jews had "more redress."<sup>40</sup> And foreign-born Jewish pioneers were coming to join the Jewish *fellaheen* who had clung to Palestine's soil.

The Jewish fellaheen—those who have worked the land for centuries . . . are not differentiated in their external appearance, their dress, their language or their daily life, from their non-Jewish neighbors.<sup>41</sup>

Contrary to other parts of the Ottoman Empire of the nineteenth century, in Judah-cum-Palestine Jews had remained on the Holy Land.

\*See Chapter 14 and 15.

A significant characteristic of theirs [Jews] is that, *except in Palestine*, they are almost all city dwellers.\*<sup>42</sup>

Together they were beginning the Jewish development of depopulated land, decades before Theodor Herzl's "Zionism" was implemented in 1901. The newcomers' settlement of newly purchased areas would enable many native Palestinian Jews to shed the historically persecuted, poverty-stricken *dhimmi* existence.<sup>43</sup>

But Jews had lived principally in *urban* areas of the Holy Land—their "sacred" Jewish cities.<sup>44</sup> However "preferable" it might have been to hire Jews for land development, Jewish agricultural labor was scarce. Furthermore, most who were available were totally inexperienced and nearly useless. For generations in many countries Jews had not been permitted to own land, and most Jews in the Holy Land had been relegated to accepting religious charity as a means to survive. By 1859, however, the British Consul could observe that

The Jews are increasing in numbers, and the Rabbis tightening the ecclesiastical control; yet the mechanical class among them are learning, though slowly, to work for their own living, instead of depending solely for subsistence upon alms from Europe, distributed by the Rabbis.<sup>45</sup>

The "principle of using exclusively Jewish labor" would take longer to introduce to some areas.<sup>46</sup> One pioneer supposedly commented,

The transformation of a "tribe of *schnorrs*" [beggars, Yiddish] . . . into a new breed of Spartan, self-reliant, technically accomplished tillers and reapers could not be accomplished overnight.<sup>47</sup>

In 1878, Petach Tikvah, the first modern Jewish colony, was founded, principally by native Palestinian Jews from Jerusalem.<sup>48</sup> Jews such as Edmond Rothschild believed projects should be "carried out with Jewish rather than Arab labour," even though "relatively few Jewish manual labourers could be found in Jaffa or Petach Tikva," and those were "at least twice as expensive as their Arab counterparts."<sup>49</sup> As a consequence, on the new settlement non-Jews were hired to assist for a time with the reclamation work by which the Jews would transform the country.

Many of the Arab laborers hired were new immigrants themselves. "After 1870," for instance, the Turks' "forward policy . . . included the planting of Circassian colonies" in the country.<sup>50</sup> Circassians "surrounded" the Jewish settlement of Sedjera, which had been purchased from an "absentee Arab landlord" in the late 1890s.<sup>51</sup>

At Hadera, founded in 1891, Egyptian workers were contracted because there was not enough local Arab labor, and those few locals available were not willing to run the "risk of malaria and yellow fever." At Zikhron Yaacov, founded in 1882, there were twenty-one Jewish workers to six Arab workers in 1893; five

\*Emphasis added.

years later, in 1898, there were twenty-seven Jews to twenty-one Arabs.<sup>52</sup>

And in 1889, the forty Jewish families in the Jewish settlement Rishon l'Tsion (founded in 1882) had been followed by more than ten times as many Arab families from Egypt and elsewhere. The following letter from a pioneer provides a vivid illustration:

In Rishon L'tzion, there are now forty Jewish families, and most of them are financially supported by the noble. . . . Besides this forty, more than four hundred families are settled in the areas surrounding the moshava. The Arab village of Sarafand that stood ruined to the south of the moshava (Rishon L'tzion) is now called Srefand Harib, and is a large, spreadout village; many Bedouin and Egyptian families have settled within it. Those who left their villages to come here all find work. They, along with their wives, daughters and sons have split up into a wide variety of trades and vocations. Dozens of families have gathered in Bet Dagon (Badazshak), in Yadzor, in Safria, in Srafand Amar, in Agar and elsewhere (a few thousand dunam that was, and until today is, desolate and empty and used for putting sheep and bulls out to graze). Those who have come to the area are wretchedly poverty-stricken and destitute, and came with nothing to plant. Grains (income) were taken by the government, and they were left lacking of all. About one thousand Arabs work on occasion and (during the winter in Rishon), and how many in the villages? We ourselves are giving them plough blades that are sharpened—into the hand of those who someday may stand as enemies against us.<sup>53</sup>

By 1897, at Petach Tikvah, one of the largest Jewish settlements, Jews were in a “rotating work force of some thirty-two hands” in an attempt to “avoid the need for Arab labour,” and strengthen the spirit of the settlers.<sup>54</sup> Still, in 1914, Petach Tikvah’s population would number 2,600 Jewish settlers, 600 resident Arab workers, and 1,100 “floating” Arabs.<sup>55</sup>

## Jewish Development and the Arabs

Quickly the opportunities for the Arab migrants and immigrants had become evident to three critical Arab groups: 1) the masses of traditionally “landless” impoverished wanderers who are endemic to the Middle East—in Sir John Hope Simpson’s words, “He goes to any spot where he thinks he can find work”;<sup>56</sup> 2) the former landed Arab peasants, who had been rendered landless, sucked dry by Arab moneylenders, absentee landlords, *effendis* (notables) or feudal-lord families, and Turkish taxes; 3) the *effendis*, who were selling land to the Jews at astronomical profits, and at the same time “losing the sweets of office”<sup>57</sup>—their viselike hold over the wages of the Arab migrant-peasants who made them rich. It is this last group, a disproportionately powerful few families, which would, on the one hand, encourage the Jews’ purchase of land, and, on the other hand, incite racist violence against the Jewish presence. While the *effendi* Arabs coveted the profits, they sought to prevent Jews from offering the advantages that would set free Arab laborers throughout the neighboring areas, who flooded into Jewish-settled areas as they learned of the better wages and unparalleled opportunities there.

In the early nineteenth century, particularly the 1830s, the village sheikhs and religious notables had been nearly locally autonomous under Turkish rule in Palestine. The corruption rampant in earlier centuries continued to flourish. Despite the conquest of the Egyptian Ibrahim Pasha at Acre, one historian notes, "the chiefs and religious notables . . . were the true masters of the country."<sup>58</sup> Their power was directly drawn from their role as tax collectors for the Turkish Empire, a position that was generally inherited. With the advent of Ottoman reform measures in mid-century came a new method of collecting taxes and an attempt to reduce the power of the village chiefs. The chiefs' loss was the great gain of influence by the urban Muslim first families, who not only wielded political power in their districts, but concentrated in their coffers the wealth of landed property.<sup>59</sup>

When the first wave of Jewish pioneer immigrants arrived, this small cluster of Arab notables had already ascended to power, and as their influence increased, so did the number of land parcels they controlled.<sup>60</sup> At the end of the century the *effendis*' group controlled most of the private land and "bought [additional] stretches of land" for speculation, "selling them as soon as their value went up."<sup>61</sup>

Thus an Arab capitalist from Egypt bought valuable holdings in the regions of Beisan and Samakh.<sup>62</sup>

Most of the land purchased by the Jews came from two sources. One was foreign absentee landlords:

Virtually all of the Jezreel Valley, for example, belonged in 1897 to only two persons: the eastern portion to the Turkish Sultan, and the western part to the richest banker in Syria, Sursuk "the Greek."<sup>63</sup>

The other sellers were the notables—*effendis*. The *effendis* "rarely" lived on their own lands—"The fields of Moab, for instance, belonged for the most part to rich *effendis*" from Hebron.<sup>64</sup> The *effendis* now collected taxes for the Turkish administration, and they controlled the populace from their seats on the governing councils. They were known, in Arabic, as "a'yan"—"eyes."<sup>65</sup> They were increasingly the "fist" as well.

### Turkish Restrictions: Nature and Consequences

The greatest areas of land in the country were in the state domain,<sup>66</sup> in depopulated and "abandoned" condition according to official British investigation and traveler alike. Yet by the 1870s the local Turkish ruler of the Jerusalem district enforced laws restricting the entry of Jewish immigrants into that one area which Jews were then most actively developing. In addition, he attempted to create obstacles for those Jews already in the country, blocking the sale of land and its use by Jews.<sup>67</sup>

With encouragement from the Arab notables, the Turkish government began more actively to limit Jewish immigration. At the time when Jews most needed



their own laborers so that Jews could once again become self-sufficient on what they considered their natural soil, Jewish immigration was severely restricted.<sup>68</sup> Arab laborers from impoverished areas both within Palestine east and west of the Jordan River, and from other lands—Egypt, Syria, Sudan, Libya, and others—found their way in to gain the higher wages paid by the Jews.\* While Arabs were moving in, Jews were being kept out.

Because Christians and Jews had to depend on foreign relief for their subsistence, most of Jerusalem's populace was reported in 1880 to be "mendicants and beggars."<sup>69</sup> The years 1880 to 1884 brought the Egyptian War, cholera, and other plagues, all of which contributed to a severe economic backslide.<sup>70</sup> According to the United States Consul in 1890, "depression" had become a "chronic ailment."<sup>71</sup>

It was into such sanctuary that the Jews from Russia and Rumania fled from persecution in the 1880s. The American Consul reported that not even a thousand among the estimated 40,000 Jews in Palestine in 1881 were agriculturalists,<sup>72</sup> and that there had been a "partial failure of the various Jewish colonies near [Jaffa]."<sup>73</sup> Jewish immigration was at times limited and other times totally forbidden by Turkish restrictions, already in effect in 1880–1881,<sup>74</sup> and continuing in varying degrees of harshness until the Turks' defeat in 1918 at the end of World War I by the British. The reasons given by historians for the Turks' forbidding Jews to enter in large numbers, or to buy adequate land for settlement, vary.<sup>75</sup>

The British traveler Laurence Oliphant, who had proposed a Jewish development in Palestine on the Jordan River's East Bank (now Jordan) in 1879, surmised that the anti-Jewish forces in Constantinople and the clash between Turkey and England over Egypt inspired the bans.<sup>76</sup> Palestinian Jews blamed each other for the immigration restrictions—local Sephardic Jews felt threatened by newly arrived Ashkenazi Jews, who might further upset the Muslims; pauperized Jews feared their alms would be diminished by the newcomers. They also suspected that the Mutasarrif, Rauf Pasa, had instigated the restrictions himself, since he reportedly found Jews distasteful.<sup>77</sup> According to an exhaustive study of the Ottoman policy restricting Jewish immigration, the "real reasons" were the Ottoman fear of "another national problem in the Empire," and their reluctance to allow more foreign nationals "in its domain."<sup>78</sup>

Whatever the causes, the fact remains that

every sale from local owner to Jew was subject to endless graft in Palestine and in Constantinople, and titles were withheld on one pretext or the other.<sup>79</sup>

The result was that "the purchase price of a tract of land at Atlit, near Haifa, rose eight times over between 1886 and 1892.†"<sup>80</sup>

One report in 1887 noted that

\*See Chapter 12.

†Emphasis added.

The restraints the Turkish Government makes against the Jews coming to Palestine are becoming gradually severe. When coming, they are allowed only to stay one month, and then have to return; when not returning themselves they are sent back by the police and such desiring to become Turkish subjects could formerly do so without much difficulty, now a very high tax has been imposed.<sup>81</sup>

Because of the stringent enforcement of existing laws beginning in July of 1891, barely a single Jew settled in Palestine for a whole year.<sup>82</sup> Some historians claim that Turkish restrictions anticipated and preceded Arab leaders' awareness of how the Jews' settlements might liberate the peasantry.<sup>83</sup>

Other scholars believe that it was the Arab-Muslim protests against the Jews which had provoked or incurred the following restrictions:

[Jewish] immigrants will be able to settle as scattered groups throughout the Ottoman Empire, *excluding Palestine*. They must submit to all the laws of the Empire and become Ottoman subjects.\*<sup>84</sup>

Whether the announcement of the restrictions was fostered or merely encouraged by Arab leaders' sentiment, the history of the traditional Arab-Muslim racial hostility, suspicion, and violence toward Jews in Palestine indicates that the *effendis* were not displeased by the prohibition of Jews. However, the *effendis* must have suffered mixed emotions. On one hand, by offering living wages, the infidel Jews were indeed interfering with the traditional extortionate payments that *effendis* could exact from the Arab migrants they exploited and displaced. On the other hand, the enormous profits from land sales, often transacted in some measure despite restrictions, were tantalizing to the powerful absentee landlords.

On one occasion, king of moneylenders and landowner Elias Sursuq of Beirut, was "upbraided" by a Jew "in his own office in Beirut" in 1906, for exploiting the *fellah's* oppression. The Jew, as a result of his civic concerns, paid more for less land.<sup>85</sup>

As for the Turks, in 1907 a "prominent Turkish official," when told by the British Consul in Jerusalem that there were twelve million Jews in the world, exploded, "'Good Lord! They are not all coming to Palestine, are they?'"<sup>86</sup> The Turks seem to have operated on that premise from the first. They had become "absolutely opposed to the settlement of the Jews, and the more Jews settled, the greater would be their opposition."<sup>87</sup>

One example of Turkish diligence and intentions was Constantinople's reactions to a tiny group of Russian Jewish "Lovers of Zion" (Hovevei Zion), whose boat arrived at the Turkish capital on its way to Jaffa in June 1882. The Turkish decree issued two months earlier had rendered their entry into Palestine illegal, but fourteen of them<sup>88</sup> (there had been only eighteen in all), who called themselves BILU,†<sup>89</sup> defied the law and sailed for Jaffa.<sup>90</sup> The Turkish government, on that

\*Emphasis added.

†Hebrew acronym of the Hebrew initials representing the biblical command "House of Jacob, Come you and let us go."

same day, sent word to Jerusalem, "forbidding Russian, Rumanian, and Bulgarian Jews to land at Jaffa or Haiffa,"<sup>91</sup> and prohibited the "Biluim" from entering the "holy" cities in which Palestinian Jewry was then still largely based.<sup>92</sup>

The "Biluim" hopefuls managed to remain, however, and settled first in the Jewish colony of Rishon l'Tsion.<sup>93</sup> Finally, in 1884, the BILU gave up "the ideal of a colony based on the principles of democracy . . . which would serve as a focal point in the settlement of Palestine . . ."<sup>94</sup> and nine of them settled into the Gedera colony. The Biluim, like many of the earlier idealists, had found the Turks' land obstructions, the harassment of "Arab neighbors," the extreme physical travail, and the pressure to join the established Jewish colonies all to be insurmountable.<sup>95</sup> "About sixty" members of BILU had eventually made their way to Palestine. Of those, only twenty-seven actually settled there, fourteen of whom were "farmers in the colonies."<sup>96</sup> In other words, less than half of the BILU had been able to remain in Palestine. Similarly, it is likely that the number of Jews in general who managed to remain and survive in Palestine represents at least twice as many who would have stayed on, had the obstacles they faced been less formidable.<sup>97</sup>

In 1884,

. . . only Jewish *pilgrims* could enter Palestine. Their passports were to be properly visaed by Ottoman consuls abroad; on arrival they were to hand over a deposit guaranteeing their departure, and they were to leave after thirty days.<sup>98</sup>

The Palestinian Jews could not promote new settlements,<sup>99</sup> and each group of prospective settlers that managed to "infiltrate" Palestine faced greater hardships than the last.<sup>100</sup> Because Jewish immigration was materially cut, progress on the existing settlements was painfully slow, "scarcely greater" in the 1890s "than that made in the previous decade."<sup>101</sup>

The Arab population, however, with no limits imposed, kept growing, supplemented largely by immigrants who were paid better there by far than anywhere else in the bordering or nearby lands.<sup>102</sup> The sparse local Arab population was beginning to show signs of breaking free from the bonds of the *effendis* and Arab moneylenders.

When "news" was "spread" that a new wave of Jewish immigrants was headed for Jerusalem, the city's "leading Moslems"—*effendis*—wired to "His Highness the Grand Vizier," issuing in effect a warning not to allow the Jews into Palestine.<sup>103</sup> Little more than a week later, the Grand Vizier complied with the Arab *effendis'* demands: he issued a "telegraphic Order stating, that, the Settlement of the Jews in the Sandjak of Jerusalem being forbidden, they are not to be permitted to remain in the Sandjak after they visit the country,"<sup>104</sup> nor to acquire land.<sup>105</sup>

One scholar specializing in the period places surprising emphasis on that early example of Muslim leaders pressuring Turkish authorities. He calls it "the first Arab protest against modern Jewish settlement in Palestine." His implications are susceptible of misinterpretation. To represent what was another extension of the long-manifest Muslim resentment of Jews as a singular "first Arab protest against

modern Jewish settlement in Palestine" implies a *political* protest where none is evidenced.

Further, description of the Arab leaders' telegram as a "first Arab protest" might mislead the reader about what went before between Muslims and Jews in Palestine. Without an awareness of the tradition of terror that prevailed prior to the telegram, one might misinterpret from this description that the notables—or "leading Moslems"—were manifesting their "first Arab protest" against Jews in Palestine and that it was singularly caused by the recent Jewish immigration and settlement. It is from such unintentional ambiguities that destructive myths have grown up.

Not all the Jews were Eastern European immigrants. Along with that Jewish community identified as indigenous Palestinians, the Jews in Palestine in 1914 represented the Oriental Jewish world. Besides the hundreds of Yemenite Jews who had survived their journey in 1881–1882,<sup>106</sup> there were

Persians, Kurds, Bokharians [*sic*], Babylonians, Orafalians, Moroccans, Magh-rabians, Syrians . . . , and Jews from Daghestan.<sup>107</sup>

Considering the depressed conditions of Jews living in Middle Eastern countries in general, and their particular isolation as *dhimmi*,<sup>108</sup> a surprising number of these Sephardic Jews managed to get to Palestine, particularly from Yemen and Aden, and from Persia.

They, too, were set upon by the Muslims, although most were in appearance indistinguishable from Muslims, and certainly not mistakable for "alien Europeans." A Presbyterian minister's report to the British Consul in 1892 of one such incident is particularly revealing of life in this period:

Last Tuesday at 3 P.M. there was a large crowd of Jews and others before the new stores, or shops, on the Jaffa road, in front of Fiel's Hotel, and in coming near I heard piteous female cries issuing from one of those stores. Those inside were trying hard to force the doors open, while police and a set of Moslem roughs were piling big stones against the doors, the police striking any who succeeded in putting head or hands out. I at once realized what the violent scene meant.

As you know several groups of Persian Jews, driven away, it is avowed, by persecution, have, within the last two months arrived in Jerusalem, via Jaffa. They are computed at 50, 80 and 100 families but I have found no evidence to warrant an estimate exceeding 50 to 60 at most, or of over 150 individuals, children included. . . .

. . . The Pasha . . . thereupon telegraphed to the Porte, and received orders to expel them from the country.

Accordingly the police had been all day and were still hunting for the Persian Jews on every side and driving them by blows into that extemporised store-prison, to be kept penned up like wild beasts, till all could be collected and marched away back to Jaffa to be shipped off.

I was told of a woman caught in the street and marched off by brute force, and she was shrieking piteously for the baby she left in her miserable hovel.

Another, I was assured, being "enceinte" was taken with pains under the blows which hurried her to the prison store. The scene was heart-rending and outrageous to all humane feelings.

I remonstrated with the police against this inhuman, cruel treatment of these poor exiles, particularly the women and girls, but they were too excited and frustrated, and replied roughly that they were acting by superior orders. To the question had they committed any crime, there was no reply except that it was no business of mine.<sup>109</sup>

Despite the benefits brought by Jewish settlement to Arab indigents from all over the area, "not a single colony was established without some loss of life resulting from Bedouin attacks." And the *fellahin*—peasant-migrants—appear to have continued to consider the individual Jews as legitimate prey, however important to the peasants' new well-being the Jews as a group might be.<sup>110</sup>

In 1893, before the theme of "displacement" had been adopted as a propaganda technique, grievance after grievance was filed by the bolder among the Jewish populace. Jews were "oppressed," "morally injured by being robbed of all rights, even that of defending ourselves against insult," and they protested that "false representations" by the Arab leaders were "influencing" the Turkish officials.<sup>111</sup> "Jew" was a "term of reproach" in the Holy Land, and immigrants and Jewish Palestinians alike were "generally despised . . ." A letter from the Jewish leaders to the British Consul pled for "mediation" to "bring about . . . our rights which have been . . . unjustly withheld for no other reason than 'that we are Jews.'" <sup>112</sup>

Pierre Loti described his reactions to the Jerusalem he found in the 1890s in *La Galilee*, published in 1895. Regarding the Jews' "holiest place," the Temple mount known as the "Wailing Wall," Loti found:

. . . I arrive at the foot of the Wall. Old velvet robes, gray old forelocks, old hands raised to curse, they are there, as expected, the elders of Israel, who soon will be nourishing the grass in the valley of Jehosaphat; . . . There before us, . . . there is already a band of Arab children, there to torment them: little ones disguised as animals, as dogs, under burlap sacks, coming up on all fours with wild laughs to bark at their feet. On that occasion these Jews did rouse me to profound pity, in spite of everything . . . !<sup>113</sup>

The British Consul reports of Jaffa in 1895 were indicative of the same conditions. "Offences of military officials" reported during a one-month period of 1895 in Jaffa included the following:

Abd-el-Wahad Yaseen Shaweesh beat and wounded a Jew . . . up to the present, he has not been condemned. . . .

Mahmound Effendi. . . . Forcibly entered the house of an honest Ashkinazi Jew for an indecent purpose.

Under the heading of "Offences by the Civil Officials and Officers of Justice," were such reports as the following:

Moslems are allowed to go unpunished when found in the streets at night without lanterns, while Christians and Jews are imprisoned if they go with or without lanterns.

Disorders committed by the Mussulman Inhabitants &c.

False witness always ready to appear in any accusation or claim brought by Mussulmans against Christians or Jews.<sup>114</sup>

... a Jew was murdered in the Jewish colony of Mulabas [Petach Tikvah] near Jaffa, by some Mussulmans, . . . the crime having apparently been committed without any provocation on the part of the victim.<sup>115</sup>

One exhaustive Yale University study concluded that the peasant-migrants understandably did not show "overt opposition to Jewish settlement during the first period of Zionist work in Palestine";<sup>116</sup> another source maintains that it was the large land purchases by Jews that "alarmed Arab peasants in the Tiberias region."<sup>117</sup> The presence of a more deeply rooted, traditional religious intolerance as motivation for Jews there being "molested" is erroneously overlooked.

It was not until 1896—a date by which the Jews, however hindered and oppressed, already had been in the process of resettling the Holy Land for at least a generation—that Herzl would publish *The Jewish State (Der Judenstaat)*.<sup>118</sup> Herzl's document became widely renowned as the inspiration for the Jewish national liberation movement and for the theme of establishing a homeland and haven for persecuted Jews throughout the world. If earlier "Zionists," in fact, had already begun to implement the Jews' aspirations,<sup>119</sup> the founding of the Zionist movement per se in 1897 was directly attributable to Herzl's writings. He became the head of the Zionists, and the first Zionist Congress was held the same year.<sup>120</sup>

Despite the eminent French study published in 1895 which concluded that *no more than one-tenth* of the land in Palestine had been tilled by anyone,<sup>121</sup> the portents of a first "Zionist Congress" in 1897 brought increased difficulties for the Jewish settlers.<sup>122</sup> From that time, Turkish authorities enforced the old restrictions with greater zeal than ever, and added newly devised obstacles. "Entry of foreign Israelites into Palestine was prohibited"<sup>123</sup> and instructions were given to keep them from landing.<sup>124</sup> Already native Ottoman Jews from other Turkish areas had been prohibited from entering the country.

Those Ottoman Jews who were already in Palestine were prevented from buying land in the Ottoman state domain—*miri* lands. Since the bulk of the country's land was *miri* (state-owned),<sup>125</sup> the restriction of *miri* land transfer to Jews was a formidable limitation.<sup>126</sup>

The impositions were enforced more rigorously at one time than another, depending on the extent of local corruption, susceptibility to traditional *bak-sheesh* (bribery), and the amount of influence the Arab notables could exercise over particular Turkish officials. The observance of official restrictions was often honored in the breach, since by "unofficially relaxing . . . the existing restrictions . . . [an official might gain] personal advantage."<sup>127</sup>

For instance, "red tickets"—a kind of permit for Jews "good from 30 to 90

days"—were introduced in 1899,<sup>128</sup> presumably as a method of keeping close track of Jews who entered as pilgrims or in other categories. However, this measure proved to be, in fact, a relaxation of the restrictions, since with the red tickets some Jews got in. Once having gained entry, they might remain permanently if they got protection from their local consuls, because it appears the Turkish authority was ordered "not to permit . . . problems" to develop "with foreign embassies."<sup>129</sup> Nonetheless, inconsistent or inefficient though the Turks may have been, a degree of effectiveness was achieved in the effort to keep out the Jews.

That the powerful *effendi* families could impel *local* Turkish authorities to anti-Jewish policies was predictable. However, in Constantinople too the Sultan's policies were decided with an eye to appeasing the incitable Muslim mobs: "He feared that the masses would be aroused."<sup>130</sup> The Sultan Abdulhamed thus turned down an offer by Theodor Herzl, who was willing to "pay any requested sum to the Imperial Treasury" if persecuted Jews could be permitted to settle in Palestine. The Sultan, according to a French historian, replied in "un oui negatif":

The great confidence which I have in the Jewish nation, does not prevent me from rejecting your proposal. It is probable that it will be acceptable when I shall consult my Council of Ministers on this subject, which, if it finds it is just, will prepare the means by which to give it a practical form. Are you satisfied with my answer?<sup>131</sup>

The Sultan, according to some sources, "made up his mind categorically against any agreement with the Jews."<sup>132</sup> But the Sultan himself expressed more enthusiasm to a friend, Dr. Atif Huseyin:

They [the Zionists] have a goal in our country. They want to purchase land in the area of Jaffa and Jerusalem. I think that now they can purchase. There was an editor of a paper published in Vienna. He was a Jew. He was a man of knowledge. Now he died [referring to Herzl]. Some time ago, the rich Jews sent him to me as a delegate. They wanted to purchase land in the neighborhoods of Jaffa and Jerusalem, and to settle Jews from all parts [of the world] there. They really wanted to create a government there. Their offer was to take full responsibility for the state's Public Debt. It is a good thing, since there exists a danger that if a day will come when we will not be able to pay our debts, the finance of the state will be taken under the control [of the Powers]. I then put forward some conditions to them. Afterwards this man died, the revolution broke out, and the matter remained incomplete.

The power of money can do anything. They are not going to create a government today; it is a preliminary stage. It is an aim and a hope. They will commence their work now, and after many years, even if it will be a thousand years they might be successful in their aim; and I think they will be.<sup>133</sup>

Although many who are familiar with the history of persecution calculate that the Palestinian Jews' lot improved after 1860,<sup>134</sup> when "Jews were no longer legal objects of annoyance,"<sup>135</sup> the traditional Muslim hostility, coupled with a Chris-

tian-Arab resentment toward his fellow *dhimmi*, was always there, inflammable and destructive. It was racist in nature, and could be detonated—not by political fanaticism, or fear of displacement, which they knew well was the opposite of the case—but by incitement of “deep-rooted” and “virulent racial feeling.”<sup>136</sup>

As one historian wrote of Palestine,

The trouble about the Arab is that his ruling classes, moved by interest . . . can easily inflame the Moslem masses, who add to a religious fanaticism an inborn if latent hatred of the Jew. This conflict between Jacob and Esau is as old as history: it is splitting Palestine to-day.<sup>137</sup>

Fanning the flame was the more recent Christian anti-Semitic influence, at work artificially inseminating “justification” to the Muslims for their traditional anti-Jewish violence. A native Arabic-speaking Palestinian Jew reported in 1899 that

. . . foreign missionaries and priests were heightening Arab feeling against the Jews. Protestant missionaries, aiming at conversion, indirectly spread anti-Semitism. Sapir cites as evidence, *Ben Hur*, an evangelical novel containing a passage about the death of Jesus at the hands of the Jews, which was translated into Arabic in 1897 by Dr. Cornelius van Dyke, an influential missionary and educator at the Syrian Protestant College. Much more damage . . . was being done by Catholics, especially Jesuits, through their literature and in their schools.<sup>138</sup>

But although many Christian Arabs joined Muslims in anti-Semitic campaigns and initiated attacks on their own in an effort to overcome their own “infidel” status as “non-believers,” many other Christians supported the Jewish struggle in “Syria” because they believed that strengthening the Jewish minority would help balance the Christians’ minority role amongst Muslims.

Some Christians even welcomed a Jewish majority:

We even wish that the Jews would form the majority in Palestine and succeed in establishing there a Jewish autonomy properly speaking which would split in two that compact Muslim mass which peoples such vast contiguous regions as Iraq, Syria, Egypt, the Hijaz and Yemen.<sup>139</sup>

One influential Christian Arab wrote a pamphlet praising the Palestinian Jews, particularly the Jewish settlers, for the “immense good” they did “in reviving their own barren land.”<sup>140</sup>

The Arab notables themselves were split on finer points. All might object to the long-term economic losses, and the diminution of power over the migrants and peasants that they would suffer because of Jewish settlements, but how they could still benefit from the Jewish purchases while demanding that Jewish purchases be banned—this became a problem.<sup>141</sup> One of the al-Husseini notables, Sa’id Bey, determined that while Palestine could not “support large-scale Jewish immigration,” some “small number of Jews” might still bring “advantages to Palestine.”<sup>142</sup>

A member of the al-Khalidi family was more defensive: while he allowed that



“individual Jews” might be permitted to “enter,” their “financial capacity” to purchase land threatened the Arabs.<sup>143</sup> Neville Mandel noted the “Muslim in Haifa” who spent “eighteen hours a day” thinking of the “benefits” brought by the Jews, and the other “six hours . . . he suspected them of wanting to establish a Jewish state in Palestine.”<sup>144</sup>

By 1908, Arab deputies held 60 of the 288 seats in the Parliament. The Turkish powers “could not afford to alienate” the influential Arabs, which was certain if the Turks acceded to Zionist request.<sup>145</sup> Within the next few years, the Arab notables were reported to have organized to “oppose land sales to Jews”;<sup>146</sup> they were headed by the Nashashibi family of Jerusalem.<sup>147</sup> That same year, one of the younger Nashashibis wrote an anti-Jewish story called “The Wizard and the Jew” for a Jaffa publication,<sup>148</sup> attributing his enlightenment to the “great Frenchmen . . . masters and teachers”—Edouard Drumont, writer of anti-Semitic literature, and his disciples.<sup>149</sup>

However resentful some migrant-peasants may have been, many others were infiltrating the Jewish-settled areas. The flow was persistent of Arab immigration from surrounding lands in Egypt, Transjordan, and elsewhere, as well as migration from the sections in Palestine that lay outside the area that would one day be Israel—from sections of the country that did not offer even the employment, much less the wage scale, of the Jewish-settled areas.

The Arab newcomers managed to fill those openings for workers that the Jewish settlements had to fill—places meant for Jewish refugees to come to, places which the erratic Turkish immigration restrictions had deprived Jews from taking. It was largely those Arab migrants or immigrants to the Jewish-settled areas—who never ceased but increasingly flooded those areas of opportunity under the British Mandate (1919–1948)—who would later be called, by ironic inversion, the “displaced” Arabs. In actuality, only the Jews lost their rightful places—to the unlimited, ignored flow of Arabs. The only displacement of Arabs in Palestine was and would be attributable to their fellow Arab leaders.

Throughout the definitive historical works that document this period appears the schizoid pattern of anti-Jewish action sponsored by those Arabs who are themselves selling land to Jews. However they may have objected to losing the “sweets” of stranglehold over the migrant-peasants in the long run, they coveted the shorter-range advantages to be seized from land-sale profits. Apparently, they were succeeding in keeping both.<sup>150</sup> The restrictions did take a toll, however: land sales may have continued to some extent before 1914, but “the figures of 1913 showed no advance in acreage acquired” by the Jews since 1897.<sup>151</sup>

Meanwhile, though the eastern-European pogroms had abated between 1885 and the end of the century, the Russian authorities enforced existing anti-Semitic measures such as the “May Laws” with “even greater savagery and ingenuity,”<sup>152</sup> and the twentieth century would bring a new wave of violence beginning with the “great pogrom of Kishinev” in 1903.

Thus, “in spite of the imposed restrictions, Jews were immigrating to Palestine.”<sup>153</sup> If the foreign Jews had originally imagined that life for their native

Palestinian Jewish brothers was relatively undisturbed by racial violence or religious persecution in Palestine, they might be forgiven. Most of the world outside the Middle East knew little or nothing of the subjugation of the *dhimmi* Jew or that the mandatory badge writ for Jews had not been first devised in Europe, but a hundred or hundreds of years earlier by Muslims. Yet even when the newly arrived Jewish hopefuls had learned the hazardous reality, the evidence of real Jewish progress in Palestine apparently sustained them.

Regardless of the murders and violent assault in Palestine, Jews found methods of circumventing bans or restrictions and accepted with alacrity the terms of bribery offered by the corrupt Turkish official involved. "No doubt *baksheesh* was a great power in Turkey, and the greatest men in the country were unable to resist it."<sup>154</sup> In Judah-cum-Palestine Jews might, however painful, however hazardous, join their people in settling their holy land. In Rumania or Russia, by contrast, anti-Semitism was not offset by hope. Martin Gilbert has written of a poignant example:

On 25 November 1913 Ruppin [a Jewish pioneer] received a telegram from the Galilee: "Moshe Barsky, Deganiah, murdered Saturday. Yesterday worker Joseph Salzman, Kinneret, murdered." Barsky, a boy of eighteen, had come to Deganiah from Russia. On learning of his death, Barsky's father, who was still in Russia, urged his younger son to go out to Palestine in Moshe's place, and he did so. News of this soon spread, encouraging others to go.<sup>155</sup>

From the first, ways had been found to circumvent the laws; some Jews were able to enter Palestine by land via Egypt and then might purchase land either in the names of Ottoman Jews, or local Arabs, consuls, or consular-agents, for a "consideration."<sup>156</sup> The compulsory "temporary structures" remained standing, and "dug-outs" were utilized as an alternative to the prohibited above-the-ground structures.<sup>157</sup> Russian Jews sometimes were able to obtain permits in Constantinople, allowing them to travel within the Ottoman Empire and thus enter Palestine "legally."<sup>158</sup> Since attention was focused on curtailing Jewish *settlers*, other Jews were allowed entry either as pilgrims or on business, and many simply remained; those practices continued in spite of harsher enforcement of Turkish restrictions as early as 1883.<sup>159</sup>

In 1901, the Council of Ministers ruled that, as a foreigner, the Jewish Colonization Association (JCA) President could buy land in the Vilayet of Beirut, provided that no foreign Jews were installed on it.<sup>160</sup> In fear that these new regulations would allow Jews to enter freely, the Arab *fellahin* from several villages were alerted, became "alarmed," and on "a number of occasions" molested JCA workers who had come to survey the land for sales.<sup>161</sup>

Unhampered by the *effendis'* mixed emotions, the Muslim masses would react predictably to the planted rumors and public statements by al-Khalidi, al-Hussein, al-Nashashibi, and others.<sup>162</sup> What would evolve in Arab-Muslim countries later, when Israel became a state in 1948, began now to occur in Palestine: the

Palestinian Jew began to be seen not as the traditional *dhimmi* whipping boy for Muslims, but as a Jew who would be equal.

One condition was unique to Palestine, however: it was solely in Judah-cum-Palestine that the traditional Jewish *dhimmi* not only would be equal, but he or she would 1) help wrench the *effendis'* historical hold over the peasant-migrants and 2) create independence for the Jews.

As a counter, the *effendis* would set about inflaming the entrenched Jew-hatred of the Muslim masses by instilling fear in the only way the masses understood: by ominous warnings that Jews might begin to oppress Muslims as the Muslims had for so long oppressed the Palestinian Jews. According to one account,

In all eyes the Jew is becoming . . . the traitor prepared to plunder his neighbor to take possession of his goods.<sup>163</sup>

It was in 1909, at the time when leading *effendis* felt their grip over the lives and fortunes of their erstwhile prey was getting too loose, that *effendi* Ruhi Bey al-Khalidi warned that the Jews would “displace the Arab farmers from their land and their fathers’ heritage. . . . The Jews were not here when we conquered the country.”<sup>164</sup> It mattered little that the *effendi's* argument was false. It served his group’s long-range economic interests, and at least some of his misstatements would be swallowed whole by a surprisingly large part of the world for the better part of a century.

In 1911, an Arab land official from a notable family based in Damascus charged that the Jewish settlers in Palestine wanted “solely to expel the poor Arab peasants from their land,”<sup>165</sup> while “treacherous Arab landowners” sold lands to the Jews.<sup>166</sup> In case some among the impoverished masses might question the sincerity of sudden concern shown by the Arab absentee landlord in question—whose wealth and holdings came from precisely the activities he was attributing to the Jews—a more emotional and basic appeal was added to ensure the desired mass reaction: the Damascus landlord warned that the Jews were “disloyal” Ottoman soldiers and would “later shoot the Arabs.”<sup>167</sup>

As *Jew* had been plundered by Arab, so now would *Arab* be plundered, the leaders alleged. As Arab had been stripped of land and money by Arab, so now the Jews would be blamed. Most important, as Jew was displaced by Arab in Palestine—with each restriction on Jewish immigration, Arabs were coming into the Jewish-settled areas to take places and employment that the Jews were creating for other Jews—so Arab would charge Jew with the Arab’s action. The implanted fear that the new, bolder Jews would turn the tables on the Muslims fomented the desired violent reaction. It was the same tactic that would later throw fuel on the “Palestinian refugees” flight in 1948.

The *effendis'* somewhat disingenuous tactic in 1909 may have been the first specious charge of Jews specifically “displacing” Arabs. But the same *effendi* tactic had succeeded in pressuring the Turks to halt Jewish immigration to the

Holy Land nearly thirty years before that. And the same tool would be cynically employed later by the Arabs with British support: later, "Arabs" in "Palestine" would be seen by the world as having been "displaced" and "excluded" from "their homeland" in 1948.

Despite the anti-Jewish solicitation inherent in his positions, as early as 1911 Ruhi Bey al-Khalidi proclaimed he was not an "anti-Semite, but an anti-Zionist."<sup>168</sup> It was perhaps the premiere performance of that protest of qualification that is prevalent today. One benefit accruing from prominent *effendi* al-Khalidi's pronouncement could have been that Jews might be more likely to continue to buy land surreptitiously from one who disclaimed any support of "anti-Semitism."

But the distinction was aimed only at influencing the Jews. As other non-Jews pointed out, the "masses were incapable of making the distinction" between one Jew and another.<sup>169</sup> One influential Arab writer candidly observed that there should be no distinction between "Zionists" and "non-Zionists," since all shared common goals.<sup>170</sup>

Anti-Jewish attitudes were the "daily bread in Palestine."<sup>171</sup> Sheikh Sulayman al-Taji, an "Ottomanist" patriot and landlord who, paradoxically, himself sold land to Jews, wrote a poem called "The Zionist Danger" about "Jews, the weakest of all peoples and the least of them . . . sons of clinking gold, stop your deceit . . ."<sup>172</sup> The "poem" was published in November 1913, and that same month, murders were committed in Jewish kibbutzes (kibbutzim) of the Jewish-settled area of the country.<sup>173</sup>

By the time of World War I, the active Arab anti-Semitism, whether called "Ottomanism," "anti-Zionism," or "Arab nationalism,"<sup>174</sup> had evolved into a kind of *Muftism* after Haj Amin al-Husseini, Grand Mufti and scion of the al-Husseini notables.

As Britain's Commander in Chief and Palestine's High Commissioner would conclude a generation later, in 1938, Arab "terrorism was not a national movement but bands of banditti of no genuine political significance [or] Arab peasants who are restless and anti-Jew, and who are not averse to joining violent action" for a fee. But, said the Commissioner, the "moderate" Arabs in Palestine who opposed terror feared they would become the victims if they took "a lead against the terrorists." "Other political leaders might arise," if Grand Mufti Haj Amin al-Husseini weren't "sitting just across the border."<sup>175</sup> But the terrorist leader and his *effendi* colleagues in Palestine had been "sitting" in control of the country's security for decades. As an anti-Jewish movement, *Muftism* would not only cooperate with the Nazis, but would actually succeed in efforts to cause the deaths of additional hundreds of thousands of European Jews whom the Nazis had earmarked for Palestine, as is documented later.\*

In January 1914, the Turkish authorities did away with the "red ticket" restrictions on Jewish immigration and supposedly relaxed the prohibition of land

\*See Chapter 17.

sales to Jews as well.<sup>176</sup> But the restrictions against purchase of land actually remained intact. Although the Turkish Power wanted to show “its good intentions” to the Jewish settlers, fear of “Arab reactions” had intimidated the government.<sup>177</sup>

Nevertheless, the British Consul in Jerusalem reported on the eve of World War I that the Jews’ “nationalist spirit” was manifested with “increased vigour”—particularly regarding Zionist education.<sup>178</sup> The Zionist and scholar Arthur Ruppin noted in his memoirs that

Today I succeeded in buying from Sir John Gray Hill his large and magnificently situated property on Mount Scopus, thus acquiring the first piece of ground for the Jewish university in Jerusalem.<sup>179</sup>

Ruppin was enthusiastic: “On Passover [1914] many rich Zionist” tourists “were prepared to invest money,” and “our work was increasing from day to day.”

Then World War I broke out “at the end of July,” Ruppin wrote, and “settled like a blight on our work and our hopes.” In November 1914, Baha-ud Din, the principal officer of the 4th Army Commander, returned from the Turks’ heinous mass slaughter of the Armenian people, and “openly boasted of doing much the same to the Jews if ever he got the chance.”<sup>180</sup>

On December 17, 1914, Baha-ud Din ordered all Jews in Jaffa who were not then Ottoman subjects to be immediately deported, and he had entire families thrown in jail—“nursing mothers and infants included”—by four that afternoon to set an example.<sup>181</sup> Daily life was altered: Hebrew, which had been in use for generations,<sup>182</sup> was banned—“newspapers, posters, signs and the like all had to be done away with.”<sup>183</sup> Postage stamps picturing Herzl and Nordau became illegal, as was the local money used in the largest settlements (Zikhron, Petach Tikvah and Rishon).<sup>184</sup>

The Jewish settlers were cut off from funds abroad and from import outlets for their products. New crippling “patriotic contributions” were demanded, to add to their existing stiff taxes. Thousands of Jews somehow mustered funds to buy naturalized citizenship, and those Jewish males between eighteen and fifty who couldn’t meet payments that exempted them from the hostile Turkish army (2,500 francs in gold or 10,000 in Turkish notes a year, at its peak)<sup>185</sup> were put in labor battalions as punishment.

“Epidemics of typhus and cholera, conscription to remote parts of the Caucasus or Mesopotamia, and the near-famine conditions of 1917 all took their toll,”<sup>186</sup> and all were partly responsible for the drop in population from 85,000 in 1914 to about 58,000 at the war’s end in 1918. But most of the reduction was due, predictably, to emigration; by mid-1915, already “over 11,000 had left the country, voluntarily or otherwise.”<sup>187</sup> Hospital beds and offices were confiscated for use as military quarters.<sup>188</sup>

Equipment vital to the struggling Jewish settlements—“farm carts and wagons, and the mules and oxen which pulled them”—were confiscated just before the harvest was to begin. Following the ousters and persecution at Jaffa, Petach

Tikvah and Tel Aviv were "evacuated" brutally. In a few settlements where the Jews in authority were personally friendly to the local Turkish official, "life proceeded almost as though there were no war," according to one historian,<sup>189</sup> but for most, the combination of disease, arbitrary discrimination, and panic had taken its toll on those Jews remaining in Palestine.

While the powerless Jewish community was wincing and warding off the blows once again, a few individual Jews attempted to overcome the impossible odds: led by Avshalom Feinberg, a Palestinian native, and Aaron Aaronson, a renowned scientist, in the belief that Britain was their only hope, the small group formed "Nili" in 1915,<sup>190</sup> an intelligence unit working for the British behind enemy Turkish lines. During the period of Nili's perilous activities, prominent Palestinian Jews wired a chilling message to the British Foreign Office:

During Passover the entire Jewish population of Jaffa expelled towards North. Homes, property sacked, population in flight, robbed in connivance with Turkish authorities. Jews, resisting, pillaged, hanged. Thousands wandering helplessly on roads, starving. Overcrowding of Colony increasing misery, disease. Masses of young Jerusalem Jews deported, northward, destination unknown.<sup>191</sup>

The British were advancing toward Jerusalem by 1917. They were bringing with them long-awaited encouragement to the Jews' hope for the restoration of their political independence, because many in England were resuming proposals for what was stated by the British Press as the "liberation"<sup>192</sup> of the Jews in Palestine. There, they declared, a "Zionist State under British Protection had much to commend it."<sup>193</sup> "A British Palestine must be a Jewish Palestine."<sup>194</sup>

When the British suffered defeat at Gaza, which temporarily dimmed their enthusiasm for Jewish goals, the Zionists remained undaunted. British Prime Minister Lloyd George had already "instructed" in April about "the importance of not prejudicing the Zionist movement and the possibility of its development under British auspices." Jews, he noted, could be of "more assistance than the Arabs."<sup>195</sup> Sir Mark Sykes responded that "the Arabs probably realized that there was no prospect of their being allowed any control over Palestine."<sup>196</sup>

Germany too had been wooing the Jews, because of "the war-value of Jewish sympathy." A Turkish-German "proposition" was founded to compete with the British pro-Zionist forces: "a kind of chartered company . . . for German Zionists," with "limited form of local self-government and right of immigration."<sup>197</sup> The Turks had agreed to the plan, but before Constantinople could officially accept the proposal of its German ally, Palestine was "in General Allenby's hands."<sup>198</sup>

Meanwhile, the war's ravages wracked the Holy Land, and locusts devastated the harvest in many settlements where the Turkish ruler had not. When Jews were sent loans from abroad, the money was trimmed so materially by Turkish authorities that precious little finally got to the settlers.<sup>199</sup> Some were forced to resort to the Arab moneylenders' extortion. By 1917 the previous two years' ruined harvests and prohibition from obtaining sustenance abroad brought disaster. "In

Jerusalem . . . 300 of the poor and mostly aged Jewish . . . population were dying each month," and the Turks confiscated any goods they fancied. Exemptions from the draft were beyond reach, torture was the norm upon arrest, and all the country including its new settlements had been plundered.<sup>200</sup>

The non-Jewish population in Palestine also diminished temporarily; the number of "Arabs" and other groups dropped between thirteen percent and twenty-one percent from the effects of the war, epidemics, and *traditional low natural increase*.<sup>201</sup> The Nili network was uncovered by the Turks just two months before the momentous Balfour Declaration could have afforded them the protection they had fought for.<sup>202</sup> Two Nili members were hanged in Damascus, and their bodies exhibited to the public;<sup>203</sup> one woman shot herself between torture sessions;<sup>204</sup> and many others were tortured and incarcerated. Some of the punishments were averted, however, by Britain's victory.<sup>205</sup>

The British "delayed" formal recognition of the renewed Jewish national liberation movement in Palestine "till . . . the success of General Allenby's invasion of Palestine seemed certain."<sup>206</sup> Then, on November 2, 1917, with approval from its cabinet and the United States,<sup>207</sup> the British Government published a "statement of policy" that became known as the Balfour Declaration:<sup>\*208</sup>

His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish People, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any country.

If it were not for Turkish restrictions on Jews entering and buying land, perhaps hundreds of thousands more Jews would have settled in Palestine even before the turn of the century. As it was, compared to non-Jews—called Arabs—who lived in the Jewish-settled area of Palestine, the proportion of Jews was far greater than has ever been recognized.

\*See Chapter 12.





THE POLITICAL INFLUENCE  
OF TRADITION:

IMMIGRANTS AND IN-MIGRANTS—  
RECOGNIZED AND UNRECOGNIZED



## Popular Misconceptions About the Population of “Palestine”

... a sad condition was created for the Palestinian people who were excluded from their homeland.

—Pope John Paul II, 1980

... it is very difficult to make a case out for the misery of the Arabs if at the same time their compatriots from adjoining states could not be kept from going in to share that misery.

—British Governor of the Sinai from 1922 to 1936

... the Arabs watch the immigration figures with close and anxious concern.

—*Palestine Royal Commission Report*, 1937

In October 1980 Pope John Paul II said that while “the Jewish people . . . gave birth to the state of Israel” in 1948 after “the extermination of so many sons and daughters” in the Holocaust, “at the same time, a sad condition was created for the Palestinian people who were excluded from their homeland. These are facts everyone can see.”<sup>1</sup> Emanating from the Vatican, the pontiff’s sympathetic statement of humanitarian concern is perhaps the definitive example of a perception that pervades most of the world today.

That a popular understanding and expression of the “facts” as represented above were registered officially by a body as undisputable as the Vatican and the Pope is testimony to the effectiveness of the distortions with which Arab propaganda machinery has obscured all existing evidence of the actual conditions pertaining to the Arab-Jewish conflict, now under the umbrella of the “problem of the Palestinian People.”

The image of the Arab-Israeli conflict as popularly conjured is based upon the myth that “the Jews only arrived in 1948, where they displaced a teeming Arab population from its rooted homeland since time immemorial.” What went before Israel was declared an independent state is, in the minds of most, somewhat vague. Some of us had little or no awareness that an extensive Jewish development program had in fact already been taking place for decades in Palestine by 1917,

the time the land was declared and internationally mandated as the "Jewish National Home." All the "depopulated" and "wasted" land, delineated as "Palestine" or "South Syria"—east of the Jordan River to the Hejaz (Arabia) and west of the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea—in 1917 would be pledged by League of Nations mandate to "close settlement" by the Jews for their "Jewish National Home."

Even fewer of us recognized that the development of depopulated land in Judah-cum-Palestine, in fact, had been started by Jewish pioneers decades *before* Theodor Herzl's "Zionism" was implemented in 1901, or that among the scattering of *fellahin* in the Holy Land—native peasants working the soil—were impoverished Jewish farmers.<sup>2</sup>

Before 1948, the common picture among observers was that the Jews "displaced" the "Arab heirs," in Palestine, who were "son[s] of the soil to be replaced from a land of his country," according to one British report in 1931.<sup>3</sup> A pivotal British report that supported Arab propaganda and became a justification for the heightened British restrictions against Jewish immigration to the Jewish National Home in Palestine, the Hope Simpson *Report* of 1930,<sup>4</sup> claimed that

Everywhere there is the complaint that many of the cultivators have lost their land.<sup>5</sup>

Since the inception of modern Israel in 1948, that perception has been embellished. The Jewish "aliens" came as "refugees from Europe" and "stole" land from the Arab settled population, it is claimed. No doubt the Jews did suffer from the monstrosities of the Holocaust, but Jewish suffering should not be salved by inducing the suffering of the "Palestinian people," and "excluding" or "expelling" them from their land since "time immemorial," it is thought.

Inherent in the evolution of the present Arab claim of "displacement" and "exclusion" or "expulsion"—depending on the interpretation—is that theme—that the "Arab" is the native "son of the soil" who has always been on his plot of land in Palestine and who was "increasing rapidly and has lost land." As one population expert put it, the Jew was "immigrant" and "culturally very distinct from the Arab" native.<sup>6</sup>

### **Immigration: Government Reports and Their Contradictions**

While the "Jewish population" of Palestine was "predominantly immigrant in character," according to the 1931 census of Palestine<sup>7</sup> the Muslims were assumed to be "the natural population"—"Not quite two percent of the Moslem population are immigrants." By 1945, the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry would report that, although the Jewish population had risen from 84,000 in 1922 to 554,000, and "three-fourths of this . . . [Jewish] expansion was accounted for by

immigration," the Arabs had increased "by a greater number" than the Jews. "The expansion of the Arab community *by natural increase*\* has been in fact one of the most striking features of Palestine's social history," the report stated.<sup>8</sup> The same sponsor, in an earlier report, has assessed that "the speed with which the Moslems have followed Western patterns in reduction of mortality has been very remarkable, probably more than could be expected by any observer twenty years ago."<sup>9</sup>

The Arabs allegedly were following the trends of improvements in the Jewish-settled areas and were "the gainers" from the Jews' higher health standards;<sup>10</sup> the death rate, which is central to determine the rate of natural population increase between 1922 and 1944, decreased proportionately, as would be expected, since standards improved as time passed. The Jews' death rate therefore was at its highest in 1922. Contradicting that logic, in the 1922–1944 period the death rate for the Arabs was reported at its *lowest* in 1922.<sup>11</sup> According to demographic experts, that phenomenon would have been incredible, considering the conditions in Palestine and the factors influencing the inhabitants at that time.<sup>12</sup>

Occasionally the British administration, noting "disproportions" and disparities in its data on Arab population growth, attempted to justify the conflicting assumptions in nonscientific terms, but the so-called "unprecedented"<sup>13</sup> rate of "natural increase" among the non-Jews was never satisfactorily broken down or explained.

A very great disproportion is evident between the Moslem and Jewish death-rates and has been accentuated by a steady decline in the Jewish death-rate over the period under review.<sup>14</sup>

Nevertheless, a pivotal report during the same period concluded that

It must be observed that a smaller population may overtake a larger population in numbers as time goes on. This depends on the relative age-constitutions and potential fertilities of the two communities considered. Jewish immigration adds a yearly increment to the Jewish population which is potentially highly reproductive. The time might come some scores of years ahead when the Jewish natural increase exceeded the Arab natural increase, but it would take a very long time for the Jews to obtain a majority in Palestine by that means alone.<sup>15</sup>

The various reports usually acknowledge in one place or another that the Arab population of Palestine would have remained stable at the figure—actually 300,000 to 400,000<sup>16</sup>—where it had remained for the last two centuries,<sup>17</sup> if it were not for the better conditions introduced by the Jewish settlements and/or the British administration. "Fluctuations [were] cancelled out" by war, disease, natural disasters, and so on. An official 1937 report found that "The growth in their numbers [Arab *fellahin*-peasants] has been largely due to the health services,

\*Emphasis added.

combating malaria, reducing the infant deathrate, improving water supply and sanitation," commencing with the advent of both the Jewish and the British mandatory influence.<sup>18</sup>

The actual thinly settled "existing" Arab population of the early 1900s—to which the Balfour Declaration and Mandate give testimony—would not have been "prejudiced" by immigration of Jews. But the Arabs, it is claimed, had grown "naturally" by an unprecedented number—a number greater even than the enormous swell of Jewish immigration between 1922 and 1944 could raise the Jewish population. Even Zionist historians<sup>19</sup> accepted the phenomenon of the Arabs' soaring "natural increase" without question, despite the fact that the evidence which contradicted that assumption often was noted on other pages of the same official British Government report that had made the "natural increase" assumption.

As late as the mid-1940s, the 1945–1946 *Survey of Palestine* stated that "It is probable that the high rate of natural increase of the population of Palestine is a phenomenon of the mandatory period. . . ."<sup>20</sup>

One source cited earlier—a population expert who assumed that a populous indigenous Arab community had been in Palestine for a millennium—noted elsewhere in the same chapter that, by the date of his book, 1936, well into that Mandatory period, "fall in the death-rate" was the "likely" cause of the Arabs' population increase. And yet, he contradicted his own explanation by stating that in fact by 1936, fourteen years into the Mandatory period, "Medical and sanitary progress has made little headway among the Palestinian Arabs as yet, and cannot account for any considerable fall in the death-rate." After disqualifying all other excuses, that writer was left with one rather lame possibility: that perhaps the phenomenal rate of increase among Arabs in Palestine could be attributed solely to British "administrative measures" like "quarantine!"<sup>21</sup>

In other words, the new "phenomenal" rise in the Arab population of Palestine, which had remained sparse and static for two hundred years despite constant replenishing, was attributed to a sudden, hyped natural increase of the "existing" long-settled indigenes. That phenomenon, or so went the rationalization, resulted from *new* conditions. Yet, it was *also* acknowledged that because of its recent timing, the introduction of those new conditions *could not in fact have been responsible* for the population increase in the period of time for which it was credited!

That same self-contradictory expert source was heavily relied upon by the Palestine Partition Commission in 1938, which tried to reconcile contradictory "facts": for example,

We thus have the Arab population reflecting simultaneously two widely different tendencies—a birthrate characteristic of a peasant community in which the unrestricted family is normal, and a death-rate which could only be brought about under an enlightened modern administration, with both the will and the necessary funds at its disposal to enable it to serve a population unable to help itself. It is indeed an ironic commentary on the working of the Mandate and perhaps on the science of government, that this result which so far from encouraging *has almost*

certainly hindered close settlement by Jews on the land, could scarcely have been brought about except through the appropriation of tax-revenue contributed by the Jews."<sup>22</sup>

The same report referred to "a combination of circumstances unique in modern history." For the Jews, "an unusually high (though not unprecedented) rate of immigration"<sup>23</sup> and for the "Arabs," that is, Muslims, "an abnormally high (and possibly unprecedented) rate of natural increase in the existing indigenous population."<sup>24</sup>

Note the words "*existing*" and "*indigenous*." They were not simply modifiers; their use, as we will see in following chapters, became central to our seriously uncritical acceptance of Arab propaganda's misrepresentation of migrants and immigrants as "displaced" and "landless Arabs" deprived of their homeland by the Jews.

While the Arabs were reportedly growing in number "naturally" by phenomenal leaps, the Jews were immigrating—in all but depression times—as heavily as the British immigration restrictions on Jews would allow. The 1937 *Palestine Royal Commission Report*—often called the Peel Report—noted that

The pace and extent of the development of the Jewish National Home must obviously depend on the rate and volume of Jewish immigration over a series of years. Having regard to their fear of being overwhelmed and therefore dominated by Jewish immigrants, the Arabs watch the immigration figures with close and anxious concern.<sup>25</sup>

Another practically unknown and unrecognized condition was indicated: the same report observed also that *Arab immigration* into Palestine might exist.

No accurate estimate can be made of the numbers of Arabs who have come into Palestine from neighboring Arab lands and settled there, but it may be reckoned that roughly nine-tenths of growth has been due to natural increase, and it has been a growth of over 50 percent in 17 years. Those are remarkable figures especially in view of the general belief that the population of Palestine under the Ottoman regime was more or less stationary.<sup>26</sup>

Other references reported similar observations. Some examples:

Immigration has accounted in large part for the increase of the Jewish section of the population, though the Arabs have also received some reinforcement from this source.<sup>27</sup>

The collection and compilation of the data of migration are beginning to reach a tolerable degree of precision; but in one main respect they remain incomplete since it has not yet been possible to arrange for a reasonably complete record of the movement of people to and from Trans-Jordan.<sup>28</sup>

\*Emphasis added.

4,866 travellers who entered Palestine during the year were registered as immigrants. Of these 4,114 were Jews and 752 non-Jews.<sup>29</sup>

Yet the possibility of *substantial* Arab entry into Palestine was dismissed, despite the "remarkable" growth of the Arab population compared to the admittedly "stationary" number of the "Arab" population for centuries, before and until the "Jewish National Home" was mandated.<sup>30</sup>

### Reported Arab Immigration

If there had not yet been sufficient time for the improved health standards to affect the Arabs' rate of natural increase, then another, artificial factor had to cause the otherwise scientifically unexplainable Arab population increase.

The only demographic possibility remaining was that Arabs, like the Jews, had immigrated to swell their numbers. Yet, no record of substantial Arab immigration was recorded in Palestine by the British government. According to all the reports of the period, Arab "recorded" immigration to Palestine was minimal, casual, and unquantifiable.<sup>31</sup>

Any observer at the time, however, might have found strong indications that questioned the accuracy of the government's assumptions from the beginning.

The British Department of Migration itself quite candidly acknowledged that the "records" in respect to *non-Jewish* immigration from neighboring countries such as "Syria" and "the Lebanon" were "defective"; that defect was deemed "of no great consequence," however, because, as the reports stated, the Department's records were intended to check only "*Jewish* immigration into Palestine according to the capacity of the country to absorb immigrants." The report assured, "in *that aspect* of the matter that the statistics may be held to have a high degree of accuracy."<sup>32</sup>

Thus we find that in the British immigration system there was not even a serious gauge for considering the incidence of Arab immigration into "Palestine." The verbose description of the "mandatory policy" assumed that only "*Jewish* immigration" must be measured.

Yet, in the 1931 census, at least twenty-three different languages were reported in use by "Moslems," and most of those plus an additional twenty-eight were in use by "Christians"—many of whom were known as, or represented as "Arabs"—a total of at least fifty-one languages.<sup>33</sup>

And the *non-Jews* in Palestine in 1931 listed as their "birthplaces" at least twenty-four different countries, in addition to the Americas and Europe. In Jerusalem alone, twenty different places of birth (outside the Americas and Europe) were reported by the "Moslems"; those plus another four countries were listed by "Christians."<sup>34</sup>

The "*illegal*" Jewish immigration was fastidiously reported—"One case is

\*Emphasis added.



**TABLE C. Birthplaces of Inhabitants of Jerusalem District circa 1931**

JEWS	NON-JEWS		
	<i>Moslems</i>	<i>Christians</i>	<i>Others</i>
Palestine	Palestine	Palestine	Palestine
Syria	Syria	Syria	Syria
Greek Islands	Transjordan	Transjordan	Egypt
Cyprus	Cyprus	Cyprus	Persia
Other Mediterranean Islands	Egypt	Malta	Czechoslovakia
	Hejaz-Nejd	Other Mediterranean Islands	Poland
Abyssinia	Iraq		Rumania
Egypt	Yemen	Abyssinia	Switzerland
Iraq	Other Arabian Territories	Egypt	United Kingdom
Yemen		Hejaz-Nejd	U.S.S.R.
Other Arabian Territories	Persia	Iraq	
	Turkey	Other Arabian Territories	
Persia	Central Asiatic Territories		
Turkey		Persia	
Central Asiatic Territories		Turkey	
	Indian Continent	Central Asiatic Territories	
Indian Continent			
Far Eastern Asia	Far Eastern Asia		
Other Asiatic Territories		Indian Continent	
	Algeria		
Algeria	Morocco	Far Eastern Asia	
Morocco	Tripoli		
Tripoli	Tunis	Algeria	
Tunis	Other African Territories	Morocco	
Other African Territories		Tripoli	
	Albania	Tunis	
Austria	France	Other African Territories	
	Greece		
Belgium	Spain	Albania	
Bulgaria	United Kingdom	Austria	
Czechoslovakia		Belgium	
Denmark		Bulgaria	
Estonia	U.S.S.R.	Czechoslovakia	
Finland	U.S.A.	Denmark	
France	Central & South America		
		France	
Germany		Germany	
Gibraltar	Australia		

**TABLE C. Birthplaces of Inhabitants of Jerusalem District circa 1931 (cont'd)**

JEWS	NON-JEWS		
	<i>Moslems</i>	<i>Christians</i>	<i>Others</i>
Greece		Gibraltar	
Holland		Greece	
Hungary		Holland	
Italy		Italy	
Latvia		Latvia	
Lithuania		Lithuania	
Poland		Norway	
Portugal		Poland	
Rumania		Portugal	
Spain		Rumania	
Switzerland		Spain	
United Kingdom		Sweden	
U.S.S.R.		Switzerland	
Yugoslavia		United Kingdom	
Canada			
U.S.A.		U.S.S.R.	
Central & South America		Yugoslavia	
		Canada	
Australia		U.S.A.	
		Central & South America	
		Australia	

**TABLE D. Languages in Habitual Use in Palestine circa 1931**

JEWS	NON-JEWS		
	<i>Moslem</i>	<i>Christian</i>	<i>Other</i>
Arabic	Afghan	Abyssinian	Arabic
Aramaic (Targum)	Albanian	Arabic	Czech
Armenian	Arabic	Armenian	English
Bokharian	Bosnian	Basque	French
Bulgarian	Chinese	Brazilian [ <i>sic</i> ]	German
Caucasian dialect	Circassian	Bulgarian	Hebrew
Circassian	English	Catalan	Persian
Danish	French	Chaldean	Polish
Dutch	German	Chinese	Russian
English	Greek	Circassian	Spanish
Español (Jewish dialect)	Gypsy	Czech	Yiddish
Finnish	Hebrew	Danish	
French	Hindustani	Dutch	
Georgian	Indian dialects	English	
German	Javanese	Estonian	
Greek	Kurdish	Finnish	
Hebrew	Persian	Flemish	
Hindustani	Portuguese	French	
Italian	Russian	German	
Kurdish	Spanish	Greek	

TABLE D. Languages in Habitual Use In Palestine circa 1931 (cont'd)

JEWS	NON-JEWS		
	<i>Moslem</i>	<i>Christian</i>	<i>Other</i>
Lithuanian	Sudanese	Hebrew	
Magyar	Takrurian	Hindustani	
Persian	Turkish	Indian dialects	
Polish		Irish	
Rumanian		Italian	
Russian		Kurdish	
Serbian		Latin	
Slavic		Magyar	
Swedish		Malayalam	
Swiss		Maltese	
Tatar Group		Norwegian	
Turkish		Persian	
Tuscan (Italian)		Polish	
Yiddish		Portuguese	
		Rumanian	
		Russian	
		Serbian	
		Slavic	
		Spanish	
		Sudanese	
		Swedish	
		Swiss	
		Syrian	
		Turkish	
		Welsh	

Source: *Census of Palestine—1931*, volume I, *Palestine*; Part I, *Report* by E. Mills, B.A., O.B.E., Assistant Chief Secretary Superintendent of Census (Alexandria, 1933), p. 147.

known in which a small party of Jews endeavored to enter Palestine via Trans-Jordan<sup>35</sup>—while the Arabs who immigrated illegally were addressed only when their “detection” had become “flagrant.”<sup>36</sup> The British Colonial officials were “thinking of Jews” in matters of immigration as we will see later in some detail.

But the British Government, which recorded comings and goings within Palestine, occasionally was forced by its prevalence to give mention to the “illegal Arab immigration.”<sup>37</sup> The movement, however, was underestimated and minimized, deemed “casual,” and was never introduced as a factor in determining the population increase in the portion of Palestine area being settled by the Jews:

In addition to this increase by recorded immigration, a number of persons are known to enter Palestine *illegally* from both adjacent and European countries and to remain there permanently.\*<sup>38</sup>

In fact, in some instances the conclusion that Jews were increasing through immigration while Arabs were increasing only through natural increase was

\*Emphasis added.

alleged in the same reports which observed elsewhere in their pages that "considerable" illegal Arab immigration was indeed proceeding without restriction or record from such areas as Syria, Egypt, Transjordan, and Lebanon, among others.<sup>39</sup>

Most Government acknowledgments of Arab "illegal immigration" were concealed from recognition by the cryptic nonspecific heading of "Unrecorded Illegal Immigration" or were obscured by discussion of "Jews and Arabs" together.<sup>40</sup> When "illegal entry" of *Arabs* was recognized separately in that regard, invariably the report in question would note that the volume "must be insignificant."<sup>41</sup>

Although the Jewish "illegal" immigration—comparatively small until Hitler rose to power in the 1930s—was meticulously recorded, minutely detailed, and later even estimated in advance and deducted from the government's strict Jewish quota, the references to Arab "illegal immigration" were always presented ambiguously.<sup>42</sup> Almost without exception, the matter was obscured, negated, and overwhelmed by preponderant concentration on Jewish immigration as the primary issue.

### Hints of Substantial Unrecorded Immigration

It was while studying documents pertinent to Palestine among the Winston Churchill papers<sup>43</sup> that the author first noticed a statement that challenged the very foundation of the current claim that Jewish settlement in Palestine had caused the uprooting of hundreds of thousands of Arabs.<sup>44</sup> Churchill said in 1939,

. . . So far from being persecuted, the Arabs have crowded into the country and multiplied till their population has increased more than even all world Jewry could lift up the Jewish population.<sup>45</sup>

For the British statesman—a veteran of the first days in Britain's administration of the Mandate—to make that statement, surely he had to have become aware of significant evidence to back his assertion. And indeed, buried by the more recent propaganda campaign, politically targeted "fact sheets" distributed by organs of the United Nations and the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the gospel according to the British Foreign Office, substantial evidence does exist to support Churchill's challenge of the Arab propaganda.

For example, according to the *Minutes* of the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations,<sup>46</sup> *La Syrie* had published, on August 12, 1934, an interview with Tewfik Bey El-Hurani, Governor of the Hauran. Governor El-Hurani stated that "*in the last few months* from 30,000 to 36,000 Hauranese [Syrian] had *entered Palestine* and *settled* there."<sup>47</sup>

The Mandates Commission—which was overseer to all League of Nations Mandatory Administrations—took special "note" in its *Minutes* of the fact that the Hauranese, not merely passing through, had indeed "settled." Yet no official

\*Emphasis added.

account of that important wave of Arabs who entered illegally appears in British immigration records.

In "private" and "secret" British correspondence files, however, there were innumerable references to Syrians from the Hauran district "admitted" freely to "Palestine" "without passport or visa"<sup>47</sup> from the beginning of the British Mandate after World War I and consistently into the 1940s.<sup>48</sup> British reports were at times obliged by the prevalence of "Syrian countrymen in Palestine" to acknowledge the "illegal . . . large proportion of Arab immigrants from the Hauran."<sup>49</sup>

But the data quoted from directly above were not included in any official report until after extensive evidence had been given in 1937\* and consequent pressure exerted by the Permanent Mandates Commission.<sup>50</sup> Even then, in that belated acknowledgment, the recorded "number of Hauranis illegally in the country" was grossly underestimated.<sup>51</sup> Some of them had "fled" back to Syria and elsewhere to avoid prosecution for violence in the riots of 1936—but that factor will be examined later, along with more detailed evidence of the British policy of benign blinking.

The Permanent Mandates Commission had also addressed the incidence of illegal Arab immigrants from "Trans-Jordan." Its members had spoken of "free admission of Transjordanians into Palestine," which might "lead to abuse" since a number of them "remained in the country"; the Commission had indicated Arab illegal immigration from other countries as well, all of which is addressed in following pages.

For the moment, however, we turn back to the Syrian-Haurani influx, of "thirty to thirty-six thousand" Arab illegal immigrants from one area in just "a few months" of 1934, verified by an official international document and attested to by a Syrian leader.

That is, from spring to summer of 1934, from just one area in only one of the many depressed neighboring Arab countries from which impoverished citizens were known to be emigrating into Palestine—particularly into the Jewish-settled portion of the country—an Arab official's unequivocal report indicated that *more Arabs illegally entered and remained in Palestine than the total number of Jews for twice that length of time in 1934 who were "approved" to immigrate into their designated "Jewish National Home."*<sup>52</sup> Yet the official British record of immigration to Palestine for the entire year of 1934<sup>53</sup> reports "recorded immigration" of just 1,784 "non-Jews," with only about 3,000 as "travelers remaining illegally," and those figures supposedly included *Arab immigrants* from all points into all of Palestine.

Although carefully categorized records were kept for age groups, occupations, amount of capital, etc. of those *Jews* who immigrated, there was no specific accounting of the "non-Jews" in the official reports. None except for one phenomenon—despite the mandatory government's rigorous application of immigration laws for Jews and the official winking at the incidence of Arab illicit entry, the

\*See Chapter 14.

number of "non-Jews" recorded as having been "deported for immigration offences" was more than twice as great as the number of Jews.<sup>54</sup> The question arises: if there were so many illegal Arab immigrants that even an official policy which concentrated almost solely on limiting *Jews* was forced to identify and deport more than twice as many *Arabs* as Jews, then is it not possible or even likely that the number of illegal Arab immigrants had to be so much larger than recorded that it constituted a massive wave of entry?

Yet, in autumn of 1934 the Palestine High Commissioner stated that during that year "We do not consider that the numbers of those illegal immigrants exceed 100 per month."<sup>55</sup> In 1935, the number of deportations of *non-Jews* was even more significant: in a system admittedly overlooking all but the most blatant cases of illicit Arab immigration, the 1935 Annual Report stated that of 2,455 deported, 2,152 were "*non-Jews*."<sup>56</sup>

Churchill's recognition of massive Arab immigration into Palestine was confirmed by many, including the British Governor of the Sinai from 1922 to 1936, who wryly observed that

This illegal immigration was not only going on from the Sinai, but also from Transjordan and Syria and it is very difficult to make a case out for the misery of the Arabs if at the same time their compatriots from adjoining states could not be kept from going in to share that misery.<sup>57</sup>

Nonetheless, Arab leaders and their British supporters attempted to make exactly that case. In order to appease the small but powerful Arab *effendi* community, the Mandatory power began imposing stricter limitations upon Jewish immigration.

While counting the newly arrived Arab illicit immigrants as indigenous deeply rooted Palestinians, the British explained that it was the Jews who were flooding the country beyond its "absorptive capacity" and crowding out Arabs. The Hope Simpson *Report* of 1930 announced its seminal conclusion that Arabs were being "displaced" by Jews, even though in its own pages the report revealed that there was an *uncontrolled influx of illegal Arab immigrants from Egypt, Trans-Jordan and Syria*.<sup>58</sup>

Speaking unmistakably of "*other than Jewish labour*,"\* the report states

The Chief Immigration Officer has brought to notice that illicit immigration through Syria and across the northern frontier of Palestine is material.<sup>59</sup>

Further, the *Report* speaks of "the case of the '*pseudo-traveller*' who comes in with permission for a limited time and *continues* in Palestine after the term of his permission has expired" as being "present practice," a method that was "*injustice*" to the *Jews*.<sup>60\*</sup>

The broad implications of that seemingly casual observation within the Hope

\*Emphasis added.

Simpson Report will become evident in the following pages. If large-scale Arab immigration was a recognized "practice," how could official reports justify a conclusion that only Jewish population was increasing through immigration and forcing out Arabs? If Arabs were incoming also, then might their increase in number be attributable not to the natural increase of natives present since time immemorial on the land, but instead, an increase swelled as importantly—perhaps even more importantly—by immigration than that of the Jews?

One British official conducted an investigation on the "displaced" and "landless" Arab situation. Despite an enormous unrecorded Arab influx—and even adding the illicit Arab immigrant community into the category of "native population" that had supposedly been displaced—the official concluded, after investigating the areas, that the allegation was largely inaccurate, as we will see later from excerpts of his testimony during an official investigation.<sup>61</sup>

The official would be slain shortly thereafter.<sup>62</sup> The land being cleared by Palestinian Jews, for Jewish victims of persecution in Europe, had been and still was being appropriated by Arabs. Yet the White Paper of 1939 was in the works. That legislation by the British at the instigation of the Arabs would so harshly restrict *Jewish* immigration to Palestine that hundreds of thousands of Jews would be prevented from entering what was to have been their sanctuary and thus be condemned to the fateful inferno of the Nazis. And that White Paper would be justified by the premise that the Jews were usurping the Arabs' places in "Palestine."

According to the British Government's 1937 Report to the League of Nations,<sup>63</sup> the number of Arabs in Palestine had indeed soared higher, in Churchill's words, than "even all world Jewry could lift up the Jewish population." Yet this crucial and incompatible evidence went disregarded or unrecognized and was never figured into the political equation of Palestine.<sup>64</sup>

## A Hidden Factor in Western Palestine: Arab In-Migration

The Palestinian Arabs have at present no will of their own. Neither have they ever developed any specifically Palestinian nationalism. . . . It would seem as though in existing circumstances most of the Palestinian Arabs would be quite content to be incorporated in Trans-Jordan.

—Folke Bernadotte, *To Jerusalem*, 1950–1951

The Arabs cannot say that the Jews are driving them out of their country. If not a single Jew had come to Palestine after 1918, I believe that the Arab population of [Western] Palestine today [over a million in 1938] would still have been around about the . . . figure at which it had been stable under the Turkish rule.

—Malcolm MacDonald, British Secretary of State, 1938

**T**he prevalent perception is that Jewish immigrants arrived in “Palestine” amidst a crowded Arab populace around 1917, at the time the Balfour Declaration established a “Jewish National Home.” Few Middle East observers have been aware of the extent to which the Jewish Settlement had begun to develop in the nineteenth century. The Jews, many believe, infringed upon the “natives” on “millennia”-settled “Palestinian Arab land.”

Contrary to that assumption, of the sparse Muslim population found in “Palestine” at that time, many were transient and most were landless, as we have seen. As Arab leader Sherif Hussein had commented in a 1918 article discussed in earlier pages, the “native soil” of Palestine could not keep the Arabs from “wandering . . . in every direction.”

### Defining the Native Soil: A Critical Error Identified

One of the most confusing matters of the “Palestinian problem” is the location of “Palestine.” What area in fact constituted the “native soil”? In most discussions of the Middle East today, Israel is considered equivalent to all Palestine.



But the *land* on which Israel was located contained only a fraction of the Palestine Mandate originally dedicated to the Jews as their homeland, incorporating the Balfour Declaration.<sup>1</sup> The League of Nations and the British had designated the land called “Palestine” for the “Jewish National Home”—east and west of the Jordan River from the Mediterranean to Arabia and Iraq, and north and south from Egypt to Lebanon and Syria.<sup>2</sup> Historian Arnold Toynbee observed in 1918 that the “desolate” land “which lies east of the Jordan stream,”<sup>3</sup> was

capable of supporting a large population if irrigated and cultivated scientifically. . . . The Zionists have as much right to this no-man’s land as the Arabs, or more.

Thus, the territory known variously as “Palestine,” as “South Syria,” as “Eastern and Western Palestine,” or as part of “Turkey” had been designated by international mandate as a “Jewish National Home,” concerning which the United States declared,

That there be established a separate state of Palestine. . . . placed under Great Britain as a mandatory of the League of Nations . . . that the Jews be invited to return to Palestine and settle there. . . . and being further assured that it will be the policy of the League of Nations *to recognize Palestine as a Jewish state as soon as it is a Jewish state in fact*. . . . England, as mandatory, can be relied on to give the Jews the privileged position they should have without sacrificing the [religious and property] rights of non-Jews.\*<sup>4</sup>

The Arabs of that day achieved independent Arab statehood in various lands around Palestine but not within Palestine itself. Sovereignty was granted after World War I to the Arabs in Syria and Iraq; in addition, Saudi Arabia consisted of approximately 865,000 square miles of territory that was designated as “purely Arab.”<sup>5</sup>

Considering all the “territories” that had been given to the Arabs, Lord Balfour “hoped” that the “small notch” of Palestine east and west of the Jordan River, which was “being given” to the Jewish people, would not be “grudged” to them by Arab leaders.<sup>6</sup>

But, in a strategic move, the British Government apparently felt “the need to assuage the Emir’s [Abdullah’s] feelings.”<sup>7</sup> As one of the royal sons of the Hejaz (Saudi Arabia), Abdullah was a recipient of British gratitude; the Arabians of the Hejaz had been, among all the Arab world, of singular assistance to England against the Turks.<sup>8</sup>

The insertion of Abdullah and his emirate into mandated Palestine, in the area east of the Jordan River that was part of the land allocated to the “Jewish National Home,” might be partially traced to a suggestion received by Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill from T. E. Lawrence. In a letter of January 1921, Lawrence informed Churchill that Emir Feisal (Abdullah’s brother, and Lawrence “of Arabia’s” choice to lead the Arab revolt)<sup>9</sup> had “agreed to abandon all

\*Emphasis added.

## Britain and the Palestine Mandate: the Jewish National Home



Palestine Mandate, granted to Britain in 1920 at San Remo Conference, approved 1922 by League of Nations as Jewish National Home




Separated from Palestine by Britain in 1921–1922, bestowed upon Emir Abdullah by Britain, called Transjordan



Ceded by British to French Mandate of Syria in 1923

The Mandate of Palestine: "Small Notch" in the Arab World



claim of his father to [Western] Palestine," if Feisal got in return Iraq and Eastern Palestine as Arab territories.\*

Further explanation was found in a "secret dispatch from Chief British Representative at Amman" later in 1921. He cautioned that the local "Transjordanian Cabinet" had been replaced by a "Board of Secretaries,"

responsible for all internal affairs, referring to his highness Abdullah for a decision in the event of any disagreement. . . .

All the "Board" members, according to the Eastern Palestine envoy, were

Syrian exiles, who with perhaps one exception, are more interested in designs on the French in Syria than in developing Trans-Jordania. . . . In his Highness' opinion, the allies had not dealt fairly with the Arab nation and Great Britain had not treated him as he deserved. He was one of the most chiefly instrumental in bringing about the Arab revolution and when Feisal, during the war, was inclined to accept the overtures of the Turks he had opposed that policy. . . . When he came to Trans-Jordania "with the consent of the British", he had agreed to act in accordance with Mr. Churchill's wishes and with British policy, as he did not wish to be the cause of any friction between the British and their allies, the French. . . . The allies had not dealt fairly with the Arabs because, whereas they had agreed to form one Arab nation, forming different Arab states, and even in Syria, as small as it is, they had divided that country into six or seven states. He had come to Trans-Jordania hoping for great things and now he realized that he had no hope either north or east. *If he went back from here to the Hejaz, he would look ridiculous.* †<sup>10</sup>

Winston Churchill proposed his plan for Transjordan to Prime Minister Lloyd George in March 1921:

We do not expect or particularly desire, indeed, Abdullah himself to undertake the Governorship. He will, as the Cabinet rightly apprehend, almost certainly think it too small. . . . The actual solution which we have always had in mind and for which I shall work is that which you described as follows: while preserving Arab character of area and administration to *treat it as an Arab province or adjunct of Palestine.* <sup>11</sup>

It was a British Jew, Palestine High Commissioner Sir Herbert Samuel, who supported and even extended Winston Churchill's formulations. Samuel sent a telegram to Churchill in July 1921; while discouraging Churchill from submitting to Abdullah's predicted eventual "demand" for "attachment of Trans-Jordania to the Hejaz," as being "contrary to Article V of the Mandate and open to much objection in relation to future development," High Commissioner Samuel suggested the following:

\*See Feisal-Weizmann agreement in Appendix IV.

†Emphasis added.

I concur in proposal that Abdullah should visit London and had written to you suggesting it. . . . At the end of six months, the following settlement might be arranged: (1) the Arab governor mutually agreed upon by his majesty's government and Abdullah or King Hussein. (2) British officer(s) to have real control. (3) Reserve force commanded by British officer(s), Air Force and armored cars as at present. (4) A small British garrison to be stationed in District temporarily. (5) A declaration in accordance with new article to be inserted in mandate that *Jewish National Home provisions do not apply east of Jordan*. This would *not prevent* such *Jewish immigration* as political and economic conditions allowed but without special encouragement by Government.\*<sup>12</sup>

Feisal got his wishes and became King of Iraq;<sup>13</sup> his brother Abdullah was installed in the British mandatory area as ruler of the "temporary" emirate on the land of eastern Palestine, which became known as the "Kingdom of Transjordan."

Palestine High Commissioner Harold MacMichael later offered some evidence of the original "temporary" nature of British intentions in a "private, personal and most secret" cipher; MacMichael reported in 1941 that Abdullah now harbored greater ambitions, because of

the part he [Abdullah] played in the last war, his position in the Arab world as a senior member of a royal house, [and] the purely *temporary* arrangements whereby in 1921 having narrowly missed being made King (a) of Iraq and (b) of Syria in turn, he was left to look after Trans-Jordan. . . .<sup>14</sup>

Britain nevertheless quietly gouged out roughly three-fourths of the Palestine territory mandated for the Jewish homeland<sup>15</sup> into an Arab emirate, Transjordan,<sup>16</sup> while the Mandate ostensibly remained in force but in violation of its terms.<sup>17</sup> Historians and official government documents concerned with the area continued to call it "Eastern Palestine," despite the new appellation. That seventy-five percent of the Palestine mandate was described by England's envoy to Eastern Palestine:<sup>18</sup> "a reserve of land for use in the resettlement of Arabs [from Western Palestine], once the National Home for the Jews in Palestine"† resulted in the "Jewish independent state."

The League of Nations Mandate for Palestine remained unchanged even though Britain had unilaterally altered its map and its purpose.<sup>19</sup> The Mandate included Transjordan until 1946, when that land was declared an independent state.<sup>20</sup> Transjordan had finally become the *de jure* Arab state in Palestine *just two years before* Israel gained its Jewish statehood in the remaining one-quarter of Palestine; Transjordan comprised nearly 38,000 square miles; Israel, less than 8,000 square miles.

\*Emphasis added.

†As the next chapters will illustrate, instead, Arabs poured *from* Eastern Palestine as well as from Arab areas within Western Palestine—into the *Jewish-settled areas* in Western Palestine. The course of action which followed from that unrecognized population movement brought ramifications which are as *critical* to the question of political "justice" as they are *unknown* or disregarded today.

Thus, about seventy-five percent of Palestine's "native soil," east of the Jordan River, called Jordan, is literally an independent Palestinian-Arab state located on the majority of the land of Palestine; it contains a majority of Palestinian Arabs in its army as well as its population. In April 1948,<sup>21</sup> just before the formal hostilities were launched against Israel's statehood, Abdullah of Transjordan declared:<sup>22</sup> "Palestine and Transjordan are one, for Palestine is the coastline and Transjordan the hinterland of the same country." Abdullah's policy was defended against "Arab challengers" by Prime Minister Hazza al-Majali:

We are the army of Palestine. . . . the overwhelming majority of the Palestine Arabs . . . are living in Jordan.<sup>23</sup>

Although Abdullah's acknowledgment of Palestinian identity was not in keeping with the policy of his grandson, the present King Hussein, Jordan is nonetheless undeniably Palestine, protecting a predominantly Arab Palestinian population with an army containing a majority of Arab Palestinians, and often governed by them as well. Jordan remains an independent Arab Palestinian state where a Palestinian Arab "law of return" applies: its nationality code states categorically that all Palestinians are entitled to citizenship by right unless they are Jews.<sup>24</sup> In most demographic studies, and wherever peoples are designated, including contemporary Arab studies, the term applied to citizens of Jordan is "Palestinian/Jordanian." In 1966 the Arab League's Ahmed Shukeiry declared that<sup>25</sup>

The Kingdom of Palestine must become the Palestinian Republic. . . .

Yasser Arafat has stated that Jordan is Palestine. Other Arab leaders, even King Hussein and Prince Hassan of Jordan, from time to time have affirmed that "Palestine is Jordan and Jordan is Palestine." Moreover, in 1970–1971, later called the "Black September" period, when King Hussein waged war against Yasser Arafat's Arab PLO forces, who had been operating freely in Jordan until then, it was considered not an invasion of foreign terrorists but a *civil* war. It was "a final crackdown" against those of "his people"<sup>26</sup> whom he accused of trying to establish a separate Palestinian state, under Arab Palestinian rule instead of his own, "criminals and conspirators who use the commando movement to disguise their treasonable plots," to "destroy the unity of the Jordanian and Palestinian people."<sup>27</sup>

Indeed, the "native soil" of Arab and Jewish "Palestines" each gained independence within the same two-year period, Transjordan in 1946 and Israel in 1948. Yet today, in references to the "Palestine" conflict, even the most serious expositions of the problem refer to Palestine as though it consisted only of Israel—as in the statement, "In 1948 Palestine became Israel."<sup>28</sup> The term "Israel" is commonly used as if it were the sum total of "Palestine."

However, *within* what Lord Balfour had referred to as that "small notch" sometimes called Palestine, the "Jewish National Home" had been split into *two* separate unequal Palestines: Eastern Palestine—or the Arab emirate of Transjor-

dan—and Western Palestine, which comprised less than one-fourth of the League of Nations Mandate. The portion of the “notch” of land on which the Jews settled and in which most Jews actually lived—from the 1870s and 1880s through the 1940s—was in fact only a segment of the area of *Western Palestine*.

The only part of Palestine which is pertinent to the persistent Arab allegation that Jews “displaced” Arabs is that fraction of Western Palestine where the Jews were placed, and where they settled and lived.<sup>29</sup> From the beginning of the “new” Jewish reclamation and land development during the 1870s until Israel became a state in 1948, that area of Jewish settlement remained roughly the same.

As we have seen, the corner of Palestine that eventually became Israel was sparsely inhabited by any permanent indigenous settled peoples when the Jews’ organized redevelopment is said to have commenced, in 1870–1880.<sup>30</sup> It was an underpopulated land, its revolving populace perennially depleted in number because of exploitation, reckless plundering, nomadism, endless tribal uprisings, and natural disaster.

Interestingly, Eastern Palestine’s Arab population was usually excluded from consideration as part of “Palestine’s” total population, for several reasons: 1) despite several attempts by Jewish developers and supporters of the Mandate, no Jews were permitted to settle in that eastern portion of the mandated area of “the Jewish National Home,” from the beginning of British administration of the Mandate in 1922; 2) it was politically expedient for the Arabs concerned, and their British supporters, to *eradicate* the qualifying adjective “Western.” By so doing, they would eliminate the otherwise automatic interconnection to an “Eastern” Palestine, which was already being treated as an Arab state; 3) if Western Palestine were not perceived as “all of Palestine,” then it would have been clearly recognized that Arab Palestine was a *fait accompli* in Transjordan-Jordan just as a Jewish Palestine was a *fait accompli* in Israel; and 4) the Zionists were too preoccupied with the hazards of protecting and developing the small area they had already purchased in *Western Palestine* to concentrate on the eastern territory filched from their National Home, where few if any Jews still survived.

In many areas of *Western Palestine*, Jews were prohibited from settling; in some places, they were murdered or forced to flee for their lives,\* and some areas of Western Palestine, where few if any Jews then lived, were excluded from Israel’s territory in 1949. Obviously, one cannot charge the Jews with “displacement of Arabs” in those areas of Western Palestine where there were no Jews. Yet that is precisely what is alleged and promulgated by the vagaries of today’s propaganda, assisted by the general unfamiliarity with facts about the country at the time.

When the Arab and Jewish total populations in Western Palestine at about the beginning of the twentieth century are compared to show the preponderance of non-Jews over Jews, the comparison is in every case erroneous. It is wrong because invariably the *Arab* total population figure cited takes in the *overall Arab*

\*See Chapter 9.

population of all Western Palestine, while the Jewish total population figure relates only to the Jewish-settled area.

Such a specious comparison is tantamount to describing the population of Harlem by comparing as equal situations the total population of the whites in all of New York State with the number of blacks living in Harlem—assuming for this hypothesis that blacks lived *only* in Harlem—and using the much greater number of the whites *throughout the whole state* as a basis for claiming that “the whites are the overwhelming majority in Harlem.” Keeping that in mind, note the following examples of official descriptions of Palestine’s population:

At present, however, the Jews form barely a sixth of the total population of 700,000 in Palestine. . . .<sup>31</sup>

In 1919 the total estimated population of Palestine was 590,000. The Jewish population of Palestine was 55,000 or nine per cent.<sup>32</sup>

In 1918 there had been less than 100,000 Jews in Palestine and over a half a million Arabs.<sup>33</sup>

In other words, the “less than 100,000 Jews” who all lived in the *Jewish-settled area* of Western Palestine are being compared with “over half a million Arabs” who inhabited all the territory *throughout* Western Palestine, including mostly those Arabs who lived *away* from Jews or their settlements.

As an American Presbyterian clergyman later pointed out,

Malcolm MacDonald, one of the principal authors of the Chamberlain-MacDonald White Paper of 1939 and thus no friend of the Zionists, had this significant comment to make about Jewish benefits to Arabs in Palestine (in 1939):

“The Arabs cannot say that the Jews are driving them out of their country. If not a single Jew had come to Palestine after 1918, I believe that the Arab population of [Western] Palestine today [over a million in 1938] would still have been round about the 600,000 figure at which it had been stable under the Turkish rule.”<sup>34</sup>

Even in the above statement—which was intended to illustrate that Jews were responsible not for “displacing” Arabs, but for bringing Arabs *into* Western Palestine—the cited “600,000 figure” for Arabs referred to the whole of Western Palestine, not just the relevant Jewish-settled area. Unwittingly, the statement, and others like it, have fostered false interpretations. As in the “Harlem” hypothesis, if all Arabs throughout (Western) “Palestine” are compared with the small total Jewish population, then the Arab and Jewish populations are all necessarily assumed, incorrectly, to live on the same part of the terrain. In discussions of a vast “Arab majority,” then, the Jewish-settled area is presumed to cover all of “Palestine.”

The figures cited universally for Palestine have never been broken down into an accurate assessment of how many Muslim Arabs had been living permanently and for a long period in the areas of heavy Jewish settlement, when the Jews



came to settle—that is, when, allegedly, the “natives were displaced by Jews.”

Because of the skewed statistics universally cited, the popular misconception is that Jewish settlers had arrived among a half-million “Arabs” and usurped the land from a teeming population of “native Palestinian Arabs from time immemorial” on “Palestinian Arab land for millennia.” One has gathered from that framework that 1) all those non-Jewish Arabic-speaking inhabitants have “always” been there and 2) that all of them originated in the areas of Jewish settlement in Western Palestine, where they would *have* to have lived in order to justly forward the claim that they were “displaced” by Jews. The first assumption—of a “millenary Arab-Palestinian character, nationality and population” in Palestine<sup>35</sup>—was discussed in earlier pages.<sup>36</sup>

The second assumption—that the population (as well as the land) in the Jewish-settled area of Western Palestine was synonymous with all the population in all of Western Palestine—is pivotal to the current Arab claim to Israel as the “inalienable right of the Palestinian people.” To make that assumption discards the weight of evidence available from the beginning of the period of broader Jewish agricultural settlement, dated generally as 1872–1882.

To compare the total number of Jews who all settled in a *portion* of Western Palestine with the number of Arabs *throughout* Western Palestine is incompatible and inaccurate. Moreover, to use such a comparison is to paint a falsely diabolical picture of Jews converging and taking over a crowded area where all of the larger number of Arabs were concentrated. Any survey beginning with that distorted assumption must proceed from its premise to an unfair, one-sided, and faulty conclusion—no less faulty than to assume, as in the earlier specious formula, that “whites are the majority of Harlem.”

The Jewish-settled areas have been assumed incorrectly to be *all* of Palestine, when in fact the Jewish-settled areas were only a fraction of an already-truncated Palestine,\* a Palestine of which about seventy-five percent had been already delivered to Arab control—in violation of international mandate. It is primarily because that erroneous geographical assumption has been ingrained in the dialogue and perceptions of the Middle East Arab–Israeli conflict that the claim of “Palestinian Arabs excluded from Palestine” has gained a measure of credibility.

The recorded Arab population figures in that fraction of Western Palestine which was the Jewish-settled area (later in Israel) must be examined in order to determine the nature and density of the population in that area. The only Arab population which can fairly be compared with the Jewish population is that number of the Arabs who in fact lived within the Jewish-settled area at the time of comparison: that is, when the Jews settled. Further, the only Arab population which can accurately be considered the “*existing* non-Jewish population” when the Jewish National Home was developed is that part which was settled on the land *before* the Jews’ resettlement began. Those Arabs who arrived in Jewish-settled areas *with* the Jews, or *after* the Jews arrived and had begun to develop

\*See map, p. 246.

their land in Western Palestine, obviously cannot be "indigenous millennia-settled Arab Palestinians" living on their plot of land in the Jewish-settled area "since time immemorial."

As we have seen, the later nineteenth-century Muslim population of Palestine "was continuously replenished from the tribes of the Arabian desert," with "colonies of Turkomans, Circassians, Kurds and others planted about," mainly because the "Arab race" had "diminished most sadly."<sup>37</sup> This might explain the statements by British observers and official reports that "fluctuations cancelled out" any possible increase in Western Palestine, leaving a static small number of inhabitants which had not changed "for two centuries." It was a condition that, but for the Jewish development, might have continued to "remain the same."

In the area then part of "Southern Syria," later called "Western Palestine"—and today mistaken for all of "Palestine"—the total population when Jewish colonization began (1872–1882) was between 300,000 and 400,000 souls, according to the most reliable estimates.<sup>38</sup> Thirty-four thousand were Jews, living largely in their four "holy cities."<sup>39</sup> Less than half the population was "settled" Muslim, 65,000 were Bedouin-nomadic,<sup>40</sup> and roughly 55,000 were Christians. Thus, a total of roughly 200,000 Muslims\* were living in *all* of Western Palestine in 1882.

However imprecise the estimates of population in "Palestine" or "Southern Syria" may have been, there are a few among the geographers, field workers, and researchers of that time who have been cited consistently in historical studies of the period, and whose population estimates have been generally accepted as reliable.

According to perhaps the most detailed and scientific of these, the study by the French geographer Vital Cuinet,<sup>41</sup> the population of Western Palestine by 1895 had grown to more than 450,000, of which Muslims numbered roughly 252,000 throughout Western Palestine.

1882: 141,000 "settled" Muslims†

1895: 252,000 "settled" Muslims

The above figures for the Muslim population would indicate that their number almost doubled in the thirteen years between 1882 and 1895. This hardly seems possible. Even if we assume a high *rate of natural increase*‡ of 1.5 percent per annum for that thirteen-year period, the population would not have increased to more than 170,000 or so.

The rate of natural increase we have assumed in order to reach even the 170,000 figure is unduly high by all demographic indications and observations of the time: depending on the angle of vision, reportedly the "Arab race" was "decreasing," had "diminished in number" between 1872 and 1882, or at best,

\*Settled *and* nomadic.

†Nomads excluded.

‡Natural increase = births — deaths: in other words, "natural" population growth exclusive of in-migration, out-migration, immigration, or emigration.

“fluctuations” in the population had “cancelled out,” with the result that the population figure remained static.

Even assuming that unlikely rate were accurate,<sup>42</sup> if we also assume that the 1895 figure of 252,000 is accurate, then what must be accounted for is the difference of 82,000 between the Muslims’ maximum population growth due to natural increase (170,000) and the total figure of 252,000. The only plausible answer is that at least the remainder of roughly 82,000 of the Muslim Arabic-speaking “settled” population in Palestine in 1895 had to be *immigrants* and *in-migrants*,\* whose arrival coincided exactly with the time Jewish development commenced.

As we will see, in greater detail, not only the time, but the *place*—the Jewish-settled area of Western Palestine—where the Jewish immigrants and the Arab immigrants and in-migrants were headed was the same. The Arabs were moving into the very areas where Jewish settlement had preceded them and was luring them.

The statistics from 1893 onward, which will be described in the following pages, are more definitive and solid. However, the earliest estimates for 1882–1895, although approximate, are important as a gauge to view the impact that the Jewish settlements had upon the population growth in Western Palestine *as a whole*, from the very beginning. Further, they illustrate clearly the pattern that Arab propaganda has obscured. It was a pattern so clear that it prompted unambiguous and apolitical observations such as the following in 1953 by Dr. Carl Hermann Voss, then Chairman of the American Christian Palestine Committee:

*The Arab population of Palestine was small and limited until Jewish resettlement restored the barren lands and drew to it Arabs from neighboring countries. †<sup>43</sup>*

When organized Jewish colonization began in 1882, there were fewer than 150,000 Arabs in the land. The great majority of the Arab population in recent decades were comparative newcomers—either late immigrants or descendants of persons who had immigrated into Palestine in the previous seventy years.<sup>44</sup>






## The Jewish-Settled Area: Identifying the Population


Once the layout, general population figures, and trends for the period have been established for *all* of Western “Palestine,” the *specific* area of relevance—the Jewish-settled area of Western Palestine—must be examined more close-

\*See Chapter 8. When used in this book, the term “in-migrant” means a person who moves into the Jewish-settled area of Western Palestine from another part of Western Palestine. (The term “in-migrant” might properly be applied also to those who moved from Eastern Palestine—part of the same country, in fact. However, this study used the population data to trace Western Palestine population movements exclusively in its calculations.) “Immigrant” means a person who comes into Western Palestine from a place outside Western Palestine; the term “emigrant” means a person who moves out of Western Palestine.

†Emphasis added.

# Location of Jewish-Settled Areas in Western Palestine

-  I Main areas of Jewish settlement, 98% of Jewish population 1893–1948 (included in Israel, 1949)
-  II Intermediate areas, mainly Arab, some Jews (included in Israel, 1949)
-  III Intermediate areas, some Jewish settlement (excluded from Israel, 1949–67)
-  IV Intermediate areas, some Jewish settlement (included in Israel, 1949)
-  V Main areas of Arab settlement, no Jewish settlement (excluded from Israel, 1949–67)



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ly. Therein lies the Arab claim of "displacement" and "exclusion" by Jews.\*

In order to establish the true demographic picture of Jews and Arabs in Jewish-settled territory of Western Palestine, the actual number of *non-Jews* who were settled inhabitants when modern Jewish immigration began—and not *non-Jewish in-migrants* from other areas in Western Palestine who followed the Jews for work, or *immigrants* of recent vintage—must be determined.

As Kemal Karpat, who has recently published his important analysis and findings concerning the 1893 Turkish census, observed in 1972:

Ottoman documents as well as British consular reports indicate clearly that the area to be known as Palestine was divided among several administrative subcenters. Consequently, any demographic study of Palestine shall have to deal separately with each major town and its environments included in this area in order to establish the number of people inhabiting it.<sup>45</sup>

To excavate the facts, a population breakdown of the period has been calculated. The results of that study have revealed, with greater accuracy than statistics or estimates in the past, how many non-Jews were actually inhabiting the land within the Jewish-settled area of Western Palestine when Jewish colonization began—it was that land which constituted virtually all the territory in which the Jews lived until 1948 when Israel became a state. (The barren southern half of Western Palestine, the Negev Desert, included in Israel in 1948, is not relevant, since no Jews lived on that land until a handful pioneered the area in 1944, and no Arabs had settled it before then. Also excluded are Western Galilee and the "Jerusalem corridor" where Jewish settlement was scattered.)

Before discussing the results, perhaps a review of the factors which prompted that examination would be of interest to the reader. Surely the matter of an unrecorded bloc of thirty-some thousand Arab immigrants entering Palestine illegally in only "a few months" seemed to contradict the British reports that Arab in-migration and immigration were "insignificant," and it piqued curiosity.

The "unprecedented" sudden "natural" increase among the Arabs of Western Palestine after centuries of static population figures was intriguing. That extraordinary increase was represented as a countrywide "phenomenon."

And the concept of an earlier "depopulated" and "barren" land did not jibe with the popular propaganda picture of Jews barging into the midst of a teeming Arab populace. The alleged displacement by Jews of a vast majority of "millennia-settled" Arab inhabitants in Jewish-settled areas of Western Palestine conflicts with readily available evidence; migration and landlessness among the peasantry were traditional and commonplace in that region.

There were more tangible indications that the history of the Arab population in the Jewish-settled area of Western Palestine was incomplete and therefore susceptible to misinterpretations and distortion. British reports admittedly con-

\*See map, p. 246.

centrated on quantifying *Jewish* immigration; the British obviously had not even attempted to quantify *Arab* in-migration or illegal Arab immigration, and yet their reports consistently referred to the apparently unavoidable, "unquantifiable illicit Arab immigration" from neighboring lands as a problem that needed control.

In 1939 Winston Churchill had unambiguously pointed out that "Arabs have crowded into the country" in greater numbers than Jews.<sup>46</sup> Investigations conducted by the British government—even those which were judged by others among the plethora of British reports as biased toward the Arabs<sup>47</sup>—cautioned against continuing the habit of freely allowing illegal Arab immigrants into Palestine.\*

Based upon the challenges arising from contradictory reports, and ambiguous, vague generalities used by official and expert sources to describe both the whereabouts of the Western Palestine population and the identification of what in fact was "Palestine," a series of originally uninformed questions eventually evolved through research into some revealing answers. (A map can be found on page 246; a detailed corresponding chart is in Appendix V.)

The findings have provided a logical explanation for some of the unknowns inherent in prevalent assumptions—crucial questions that somehow never have been considered—about the history of the population of "Palestine." They are questions that must be answered if the Arab-Israeli conflict is to be understood.

### Tracing the Peoples: Tools and Categories

We have extrapolated a rough breakdown of the non-Jewish population into the number of "Arabs" or non-Jews who lived inside and outside the area of Jewish settlement in Western Palestine: it was that area which constituted Jewish settlement focus during the half century before the state of Israel was established.

The basic data and statistics were primarily drawn from the 1893 Turkish census statistics<sup>48</sup> for non-Jewish population figures according to Turkish subdistricts within Western Palestine; those figures, in turn, were broken down into Jewish-settled areas. British and Arab data and British<sup>49</sup> census statistics were used for the later non-Jewish population figures according to British subdistricts (which closely corresponded to the Turkish subdistricts).

With those tools, employing traditional demographic methods,† it has been possible to calculate<sup>50</sup> the non-Jewish population that existed in the Jewish-settled areas of Western Palestine in 1893, according to the official Turkish census.‡ Also

\*See Chapter 14.

†Natural increase = births minus deaths; total population minus natural increase = immigration.

‡See description of methodology for study of population in Western Palestine in Appendix VI.

extracted from the census data was the number of the non-Jewish population *outside* the Jewish-settled areas, in the rest of Western "Palestine," where Jews were not permitted to purchase land for settlement after 1939, where the majority of Arabs lived in 1893 and afterward, and much of which was excluded from Israel in 1948.

The resulting calculations have drawn a more accurate picture of the population distribution and movement in Western "Palestine"—both in the Jewish-settled area included in Israel and in the areas within Western Palestine that, although allocated to the "Jewish National Home," were never or were only negligibly settled by Jews between 1882 and 1948.

The results have provided an answer to the following question: *at a minimum, how many of the Arab population, of whom all were counted as "indigenous existing natives" by Arab leaders and by the British government, were actually in-migrants—that is, newcomers to the Jewish-settled areas from other, "Arab areas" of Western Palestine?* The point was *not* to prove that no remnant of long-time Arab settled population existed. The purpose of the study was to determine whether in fact there was a large-scale displacement of Arab natives by Jews in Western Palestine before and at the time of the November 1947–1948 war of Arabs against Jewish independence.

What the calculations indicate is that, rather than a situation in which a teeming Arab people, present "from time immemorial," was forced off or excluded from its land, the situation is almost the exact opposite, of a people—the Jews—whose presence attracted Arab migrants, and the Jews' land, earmarked as their Home, was usurped by the arrival of these Arab in-migrants from outside Jewish-settled areas.

From this point we shall call the entire non-Jewish population "Arabs" when discussing the calculations of the study. For purposes of these discussions, which project Turkish population figures through the British period, a common criterion had to be employed, one that could most accurately trace the "Arab" population and its increase throughout the 1893–1947 span.

In spite of the fact that to identify persons accurately as "Arabs," in ethnic terms,\* requires notice and recognition of ethnic origin,<sup>51</sup> and that a great number in Western Palestine were *not* "Arab," *all* the Arabic-speaking peoples in Palestine who were *non-Jewish* were identified at times, inconsistently, as "Arabs," particularly in British records; non-Arab Muslims, Christians, and "others" were all at various times, for purposes of categorizing, listed as "Arabs."<sup>52</sup> In the British Records the categories applied were inconsistent and ambiguous. For instance, within the category of "Non-Jews" may arbitrarily fall Christians, Moslems, Armenians, Russians, Druses, and others. The inexactness of the records allows for wide interpretation of the data. More specifically, it can conceal particular data, perhaps unintentionally; for example, the use of the "Non-Jew,

\*See Chapter 8.

Jew” delineation when reporting immigration/emigration data allows for one to interpret that the proportion of Arabs and Muslims entering the country was low, relative to other non-Jewish groups. In this way, an influx of Arab immigrants might be neatly camouflaged.<sup>53</sup>

In a typical presentation following Arab propaganda claims, the Arab population is defined as Muslims plus Christians:

The combined Muslim and Christian population, that is the Arab population, of Palestine. . . .<sup>54</sup>

In the 1930s, as discussed earlier, the (Western) Palestine Department of Migration Reports explained that, if there were “defects” in the system of identifying Arab population changes, the “defects were of no great consequence . . . ,” because

. . . the consideration of the records of . . . *Jewish* immigration into Palestine according to the capacity of the country to absorb immigrants . . . may be held to have a high degree of accuracy.\*<sup>55</sup>

As another report would underscore, for the Arab population movements, “*different* considerations from those relevant to Jewish immigration” had been applied.<sup>56</sup>

In addition, Turkish and British demographic statistics employed different criteria in their data<sup>57</sup>—the Turks by religion, the British sometimes by religion, other times only by ethnic breakdown. Thus, for consistency in tracing the population movement in Western Palestine through the 1893–1948 period, the “Arab” category used in calculations was compelled to include all non-Jewish inhabitants in Western Palestine—even though not Arab—and is in fact equivalent to “non-Jewish.”

The term “Arab,” then, has been employed by this study only to simplify the logical conclusions to be drawn therefrom. But as a result, the figures that this study calculated in order to determine “Arab” population actually include a percentage of Christians who were not Arab, as well as other groups, such as Circassians, Armenians, and Druses, living in Western Palestine between 1893 and 1947–1948.

### 1893 in the Jewish-Settled Area of Western Palestine: Findings and Indications

The first finding is typical and central. In 1893 at most 92,300 non-Jews apparently lived in Jewish-settled areas of Western Palestine.† In other words, within the area where organized Jewish settlements began in 1872–1882—the area where more than ninety-eight percent of the Jews would live during the fifty or sixty

\*Emphasis added.

†See the table in Appendix V.



years between the beginning of modern settlement and Israel's independence—the entire *non-Jewish* population, Muslims, Christians and “others,” of that Jewish-settled area was little more than 92,000 in 1893.

The data indicate that the proportion of Arabs to Jews in Western Palestine was far smaller than the conventional wisdom has assumed. At that time the Jews there numbered nearly 60,000, despite Turkish restrictions against Jewish immigration, which by 1893 the Turkish government had already been enforcing for years.

There is also reliable evidence from another source that within that non-Jewish population of about 92,000, nearly 38,000 were Christians. The total of 92,300 “non-Jews,” as recorded by the Turkish census, corroborates Vital Cui-net's estimate in 1895 of roughly 93,600 “non-Jews”—37,853 Christians and 55,823 Muslims—compared to 59,431 Jews, in the Jewish-settled areas.<sup>58</sup>

In Jewish-settled areas of Palestine, then, the Jews were at least as numerous as the Muslims. However, because of the use of the categories that would correspond to both Turkish and British records in order to project population figures accurately, the projected calculations counted as “Arabs” undoubted thousands of non-Jews who were *not* in fact either “settled Muslims” or “Arab” Christians in 1893. This illustrates that what the study concludes to be the “Arab” settled indigenous population in 1893 already includes a built-in inflation of “Arab” population; it must do so, for the sake of accuracy.

In actuality, the Jewish settled area, which *today* holds the majority of the nearly four million souls in Israel, contained less than 155,000 people before the turn of the century—a decade or two after modern Jewish settlement commenced.

In fact, the true picture of the peoples in Jewish-settled Western Palestine in 1893–1895 would be likely to show that *Jews* were perhaps actually a marginal *majority* of the population in that area which nearly all of the Jews would inhabit throughout the period between that date and 1948, when Israel gained modern statehood.<sup>59</sup>

Yet, even for those who go behind the propaganda to check its charges, the fuzzy picture commonly drawn is that, around the turn of the century, the Jews intruded into a land crowded with hundreds of thousands of Arabs, and began “displacing” Arab cultivators “on their land from time immemorial.”

The unadulterated situation in 1893 was that about 92,300 non-Jews (including non-Arabs) were on the land that Jews had begun to settle *a decade earlier*. On that Jewish-settled land within Western Palestine, only 59,000 of the non-Jews were Muslim Arabs. Throughout the whole of Western Palestine, the total non-Jewish population numbered about 450,000–465,000:<sup>60</sup> only about twenty percent (92,300) of that limited non-Jewish (called “Arab”) population of Western Palestine was located in the Jewish-settled area in 1893; moreover, only 55,000 to 60,000 of that 92,300 was Arab-Muslim.<sup>61</sup>

This precisely supports the evidence of “abandonment” and “depopulated” land cited earlier. The majority of non-Jewish Arabic-speaking inhabitants who, it was later claimed, had lived consistently in *Jewish-settled* areas “since time

immemorial" were instead undoubtedly new arrivals from other Arab regions in Western Palestine who followed on the heels of the Jews.

### Another Qualifying Factor

In addition to this study's necessary inclusion, as "Arabs," of those non-Jews *other* than "Arabs," the figures for 1893 that represent "settled Arabs" also undoubtedly included earlier in-migrants and immigrants who, by the time of the Turkish census, had only recently arrived in the area of Jewish settlement. The new economic attractions of the Jewish areas had an immense pull for the poor peasant-migrants in the Middle East lands adjacent to the hitherto "deserted" Palestine; their "crushing burdens" of confiscatory taxation and extortionate loan practices, added to the bedouin raiding and tribal warfare, were all factors that had both contributed to and resulted from the migratory patterns of the inhabitants. As discussed earlier, Burkhardt had reported of the 1810–1816 period that

Few individuals . . . die in the same village in which they were born. Families are continually moving from one place to another . . . in a few years . . . they fly to some other place, where they have heard that their brethren are better treated . . .<sup>62</sup>

The 1893 Turkish census was reporting statistics that were applicable *after* the formal beginning of the first Jewish development when the Jews began to leave their four sacred cities and spread into agricultural settlements. That census was completed fifteen years after the first Palestinian Jews had left their homes in Palestine to develop the Petach Tikvah settlement in 1878.<sup>63</sup> Consequently, it can safely be assumed that even the comparatively sparse Arab population that the census reported to be in *all* of Western Palestine was not entirely an "indigenous settled Arab population" in 1893; of that the evidence leaves little doubt.

That population included, in addition, many immigrants "planted" by the Turkish government who had arrived between the 1870s and the 1893 census date.\* For example, in the Jewish settlement Rishon l'Tsion (founded in 1882), by the year 1889 the "forty Jewish families" settled there had attracted "more than four hundred Arab families," most of them "Bedouin and Egyptian." They had come to "surround the moshava" (settlement) in a "now-thriving village" that, before the founding of Rishon l'Tsion, had been Sarafand—"a forsaken ruin."<sup>64</sup>

The report from Rishon pointed out that many other Arab villages had sprouted in the same fashion.

An analogy to the 400 Arab families who followed after the Rishon l'Tsion settlement of 40 Jewish families could possibly be assumed to hold similarly true for fifteen other Jewish settlements<sup>65</sup> that were founded before 1893 (see the table on p.253): for instance, a Libyan tribe from Tripolitania "settled in the neighbor-

\*See Chapter 8.

TABLE E. Jewish Agricultural Settlements of Palestine Before 1893

Name [ <i>sic</i> ]	Founded	Population (1914)
1. Mikveh Israel	1870	100
2. Rishon l'Zion*	1882	1,500
3. Wadi Hanin (Ness Tsionah)	1882	200
4. Rehobot	1890	1,100
5. Ekron (Mazkeret Batiah)	1884	360
6. Katrah (G'derah)	1885	180
7. Petach Tikvah	1878	3,300
8. Kfar Saba	1892	100
9. Hadeirah	1891	300
10. Zichron Jacob	1882	1,000
11. Shveyah	1891	50
12. Um el Djemal	1891	80
13. Rosh Pinah	1882	700
14. Mishmar ha-Yarden	1890	100
15. Yessod ha-Malah	1883	160
16. Ain-Seitun	1891	30

\*Including the laborers' settlement Nachlat Yehudah.

Source: *Syria: an Economic Survey*, by Dr. Arthur Ruppin (translated and abridged by Nellie Straus), published by The Provisional Zionist Committee (New York, 1918), pp. 29–31.

hood” of the Jewish settlement Gedera just after its founding in 1885.<sup>66</sup> If anything like the same ratio were applied to those fifteen settlements—40 Jewish families followed by 400 Arab families—the very founding of a Jewish settlement could possibly have promoted as high as a ten-to-one ratio of Arab migrants and immigrants to the Jews in the Jewish-settled areas in question well *before* the Turkish census in 1893.

Were we to apply the ratio of one Jew followed by ten “Arabs” to the rest of the new Jewish-settled area—the pattern set by the actual condition in Rishon l'Tsion<sup>67</sup>—the additional 900 Jews on the other fifteen settlements might have been followed by 9,000 Arabs into the Jewish area by about 1890–1893.

It is intriguing to speculate whether indeed 9,000 Arabs may have followed 900 Jews,\* and could afterward have increased in number by at least a rate of immigration similar to the Jews'. In 1914 that 900-odd Jewish population had actually grown to some 7,700. Might 9,000 Arabs have increased to 77,000 by 1914? From that hypothesis—using the most conservative and favorable rate of natural increase for the Arabs in the Jewish-settled area between 1893 and 1947—that hypothetical number, or another number of Arab “informal” entrants to the Jewish-settled areas who came *after* the Jews' settlements were established, conceivably may have been counted as part of the 92,300 “original Arab settled population” in 1893, who were projected forward to 1947–1948 by this study.

If so, the possibility arises that even the study calculated for this book—whose

\*This figure even excludes the aforementioned population of Rishon l'Tsion.

purpose is to distinguish between Arab in-migrants and actual long-settled Arab inhabitants in the Jewish-settled area of Western Palestine—has counted many thousands—anywhere from 45,000 to 350,000—of Arabs as long-time “settled” population of 1893-and-their-descendants present in 1947, when in reality that group may have *followed the Jewish settlers* into Jewish-settled areas of Palestine.

The weight of evidence leaves no question that the movement of Arab migration from other parts of Western Palestine was already under way when the Ottoman census was conducted in 1893. The numbers of the above hypothesis can only be speculative; however, the speculation serves to demonstrate that the estimate of some 92,000 non-Jews drawn from that census as being in the Jewish-settled area in 1893, and thus represented here as “original settled Arab population,” is the *maximum* number possible.

### Western Palestine, 1893–1947: Explaining the “Unprecedented” Numbers

From 1893 the Arab population of Western Palestine could be more easily divided between *Jewish* and *non-Jewish* areas. The figures emerging from the study, even though conservatively drawn, were indicative of the unmistakable trend: massively supplementing the diminished “existing” Arab population there, an Arab *in-migrant* population from within Western Palestine moved to the Jewish-settled areas *with* and mostly *after* the Jews. The Jews could not be said to have “displaced” those people who only came after them.

By dividing Western Palestine into 1) those subdistricts that were heavily or mainly settled by Jews,<sup>68</sup> 2) those regions that had little Jewish development,<sup>69</sup> and 3) those areas from which Jews were being expelled, it has been possible to determine the surge of Arab in-migrants into the Jewish-settled area of Western Palestine, in the continuation of a traditional pattern—moving into “any spot where he thinks he can find work.”<sup>70</sup>

In the main areas of heaviest Jewish settlement there were a maximum 92,300 Arabs, including nomads, in 1893. In 1947 the number of non-Jews, called here “Arabs,” living in the main Jewish-settled area of Western Palestine had grown from 92,300 in 1893 to nearly 463,000—*five* times the 1893 number, or an increase of 400 percent.

In those areas in which few Jews lived, but where some did live and the areas were near Jewish settlements, the Arab population in 1947 numbered *almost two and one half* times as many as in 1893.

The main non-Jewish, or “Arab” area of Western Palestine that was not included in Israel—that is, the West Bank, Gaza, and so on—in 1893 contained 233,500 Arabs; in 1947, their population numbered 517,000, little more than two times as many as in 1893.

Thus the Arab population appears to have increased in direct proportion to

the Jewish presence.\* Surely, however, within the radius of a few miles, the Arabs' physical proximity to the Jews could not be seriously considered as a factor altering the Arabs' *natural* rate of increase. That factor could not account for the immense disparity between the rate of natural increase among Arabs *with* or *near* Jews and the rate of Arabs *away* from Jews—all within that part of Palestine falling west of the Jordan River. In fact, the Arab population *outside* the mainly Jewish-settled areas had only increased by 1947 to *about two times its 1893 total*. The Arabs there had moved into the Jewish-settled areas.

The Arabs within the Jewish-settled area should have multiplied at roughly the same rate as in all of Western Palestine (somewhat over two and one half times), because the rates of increase—*natural* increase—of a group within the same small country at the same moment do not vary by more than a marginal amount.

The 92,300 Arabs in the primarily Jewish-settled area in 1893 thus could have increased naturally by 1947 to as much as 249,000 and little more. Instead,

**TABLE F. Arab Population Within Main Jewish-Settled Area†**

1893 total	92,300
1947 total	462,900
Arab settled population (1893 population and descendants)	249,200
Arab nomads	8,800
Arab recorded "legal immigrants"	27,300
Arab recorded "illegal immigrants"	9,500
Arab unrecorded in-migrants (minimum)	168,100
1947 difference between "settled" and total Arab population	213,700
1947–1948 total Arab unrecorded immigrants and in-migrants	213,700

†See map of Jewish-settled areas in this chapter.

**TABLE G. Arab Population According to Areas of Settlement†**

Geographical area	1893	1947
Main area of Jewish settlement	92,300	462,900
Some Jews, mainly Arab	38,900	110,900
Intermediate	14,300	39,900
Intermediate	87,400	173,100
Main areas of Arab settlement—no Jewish settlement	233,500	517,000
Overall total for Arab population of Western Palestine	466,400	1,303,800

†See map of Jewish-settled areas in this chapter.

\*See map on p. 246 and population chart in Appendix V.

however, the Arab population there had grown to 462,900, *five* times as many Arab inhabitants by 1947 in the Jewish-settled areas as in 1893.

Subtract the highest possible total population by *natural* increase—249,200 by 1947 (based on the rate of natural increase of the overall *non-Jewish* Western Palestine population between 1893 and 1947)—from the *actual* population increase of non-Jews (“Arabs”) in Jewish-settled Area I—which totaled 462,900 in 1947. The remainder—213,700—*had to be* “Arabs” migrating to the Jewish-settled area. Then, if we subtract the minimal number of Arab immigrants—“legal” and “illegal” from outside Western Palestine—that the British *did* report, as well as nomads, the remainder of 170,000 is the *minimum* total of Arab in-migrants from local Arab areas to Jewish-settled areas before 1948.

In other words, *by the most conservative calculation*, 170,000 Arab immigrants were never recorded by the government, were never figured into the political equations. And yet they had moved in.

Allowing the highest rate of natural increase possible, the calculations assumed that the total populations in the Arab areas of Western Palestine were long-settled indigenes. To maintain the highest possible degree of accuracy, it had to be assumed that in the areas not settled by Jews—the “Arab” areas where Jews either did not settle or where Jews had been forced out—all the population increase was natural. That assumption was based on the fact that the Arab population increase was so much lower in those Arab areas than in the Jewish-settled areas.

But evidence provided by the British censuses indicates that, even into the non-Jewish sectors of Palestine west of the Jordan River, some *immigration* of Arabs from neighboring lands was taking place during the period of the Mandate.<sup>71</sup> Thus, for example, the figure of 249,200 that has been calculated to be the actual total of “settled Arab” population in the main Jewish-settled area in 1947 (based upon that assumed rate of natural increase from 1893) is the *highest possible* number.

In fact, if the number of Arabs counted in *non-Jewish* or “Arab” areas also included unrecorded Arab *immigrants*, as is likely, then to consider all of them as “settled” population, growing in number only by *natural* increase, is to attribute a *higher* rate of natural increase to the Arabs in Jewish-settled areas than actually existed. However low the rate of natural increase might appear to be in the Arab areas by the calculations, by applying that rate of natural increase to the Jewish-settled areas, this study has perhaps assumed a higher rate of natural increase for the Arab population in the Jewish-settled areas than held true.<sup>72</sup> It follows, then, that what the study has established as Arab in-migration gives only the *minimum* number of Arab migrants who flocked into the Jewish-settled areas from the hills of Western Palestine until 1947–1948. It is probable that the actual increase through migration is substantially greater.

In other words, the number of the “existing” Arab indigenous people from that area of Western Palestine in which the Jews lived was grossly exaggerated until now—even by conservative, less inflated estimates. Using the conventional

TABLE H. Actual Numbers of Arab Refugees—1948\*

	Arab settled population (1893 population and descendants)	Arab nomads	Arab "legal" and "illegal" immigrants, as reported by British administration†	Arab in-migrants (from main areas of Arab settlement and intermediate areas) and descendants since modern Jewish settlement began	Total
Areas included within Israel, 1949–1967					
Present in 1947	483,000	56,800	36,800	170,300	746,900
Remained in 1948 "Refugees"	140,200 342,800	19,800 37,000	— 36,800	— 170,300	160,000 586,900‡

\*See Appendix V.

†See Chapters 14–15.

‡ This total figure exceeds most reliable estimates (see Chapter 2) and may be assumed to represent the highest possible total figure. Moreover, that total for "refugees" includes Arab immigrants who were never calculated by the government, as the following pages illustrate.

built-in distortion, the vague inference that all "native" Arabs lived in Jewish-settled areas, those "natives" were reported to be reproducing "naturally" at an "unprecedented" and "phenomenal" rate, with only negligible in-migration or immigration, from the beginning of the British Mandate and before.

The stock description—"600,000 Arabs and 50,000 Jews in 1918"—was the widely mistaken image of the original population composition in "Palestine" (Western Palestine) when a high British official fatefully concluded afterward that "we could not have known how Arab *existing* population would grow."

By the same token, the number of genuine Arab refugees "excluded from their homeland" in 1948, where they had lived "since time immemorial," diminishes considerably.<sup>73</sup> According to the calculations—and *not counting unrecorded immigrants*—there were in fact at the very least 170,000 "returnees" to Arab areas in Western Palestine who were included as refugees.

Perhaps we should recount the significance of the findings thus far: if the original 1893 Arab population in the Jewish-settled area had increased proportionately to the average for the whole Arab population of all Western Palestine, the total by natural increase could have amounted to as much as 249,200 by 1947. In fact, it amounted to 462,900. The difference of 213,700 (minus reported Arab immigration and nomads) had to be in-migrants from the hill country. Some had originally shuttled back and forth, and then later made their homes in the Jewish-settled area.

Including the minimal government-reported number of "legal" and "illegal" Arab immigrants and nomads (see the population table in this chapter), a total of 213,700 Arabs who were counted as the "settled Arab population for millennia" in Jewish-settled Western Palestine were actually newcomers. Many if not all are probably counted among the refugees; it seems likely that those 140,000 Arabs who remained in the main *Jewish-settled areas* when Israel gained statehood in 1948 were the ones with the deeper and more lasting roots.

From the evidence, then, among the estimated 430,000–650,000 Arab "refugees" reported in 1948, well over 170,000 are apparently Arabs who were *returning* to "Arab areas" in Western Palestine (the West Bank or Gaza) from the Jewish-settled areas where those Arabs had recently arrived in search of better opportunities.<sup>74</sup>

That minimum figure does not include the other classification of Arab population movement: unrecorded Arab immigration. The probabilities, which are considered in the following pages, are that the combined, identifiable 170,000 Arab in-migrants and the "unquantifiable" Arab immigrants together indeed accomplished what Winston Churchill characterized as a greater "lifting up of the population than all World Jewry could raise."

What becomes startlingly clear is that in the area where more than ninety-eight percent of Jews in Palestine lived consistently throughout the 1893–1948 period, the number of "Arabs" (including all non-Jews) was little more than 92,000 in 1893, compared to 58,000–60,000 Jews.

The relevant Jewish-settled area, which today contains the majority of the



nearly four million Israeli population, contained *not* “500,000 or 600,000 existing Arabs” at the beginning of the century, but less than a hundred thousand “Arabs,” including thousands who were actually non-Arabs but were necessarily included, as “non-Jews,” to assure the accuracy of the trends revealed in these calculations.

The impact of those central facts on the present-day “Arab Palestinian” claim to the Jewish-settled area of Western Palestine must be properly recognized and fairly evaluated.

The Jewish-settled areas within Western Palestine that spawned modern Jewish development in 1878–1882 were so sparsely settled that by 1893—when the Ottoman census was taken—the Arab numbers had already been repeatedly replenished by the Turks in order to populate the area. Yet the prospective Jewish population had cynically been restricted from immigrating and adding to the population as heavily as it otherwise would have. We see graphically that the grandiose Arab claims today—that “Jews displaced Arabs” who were later “excluded from their homeland” when Israel became an independent state—cannot be the case.

What has become evident is that, instead, the Arabs migrated from the depressed areas to those places where they could gain greater economic advantage, taking the places in the Jewish-settled areas of Palestine that Jews were clearing for other Jews to pioneer or to use as a haven from outside oppression.<sup>75</sup>

It must be repeated that, in the interest of accuracy and fairness, and in order to remain consistently faithful to all the official data and sources between 1893 and 1947 that were compiled to complete the calculations, limitations were imposed:

1) All non-Jews living in the Jewish-settled area of Western Palestine—from 1893 through 1947—were counted as “Arabs” in the study’s calculations, despite the established fact that many thousands included were actually not Arabs—for example, Circassians, Druses, Turks, Armenians, Algerians, non-Arab Christians.

2) Because this study began with the Ottoman census of 1881–1893, years after Jewish settlement is said to have been “officially” launched, many who were counted as “original settled Arab population” in 1893 had arrived only shortly before 1893, attracted by the opportunities of the new Jewish development. Thus, even in this study, which attempts to differentiate, some newcomers were necessarily included as “settled Arabs” in 1893.

3) Since the Ottoman census supplied no data on births and deaths, the study applied as a rate of natural increase the *highest* possible rate—in other words, the exact rate of increase of Arabs in non-Jewish Western Palestine between 1922 and 1947—to the Jewish-settled area’s Arab population of 1893 and forward; this rate was applied despite the fact that until the end of World War I, “there is no evidence that the population increased or diminished during the last two centuries.”<sup>76</sup>

4) The rate of natural increase applied to the Arabs in the Jewish-settled area of Western Palestine was the *total* reported increase of all the Arabs throughout the rest of Western Palestine. Thus the study assumed *all* population increase

among Arabs *outside* the Jewish-settled area was *natural*. Since some immigration into those areas from other lands also took place, a number of newcomers were counted as "native" population who only increased by reproduction; consequently, that rate of "natural" increase which was applied probably is higher than the one that actually obtained.

It would be difficult to overestimate the advantages that have accrued to Arab propaganda from the representation of a miraculously explosive rate of natural increase as the explanation for the high population growth among the Arabs in the Jewish-settled areas—an alleged rate that was assumed long before improved health and other benefits from the Jews' development could actually begin to affect population growth positively or explain it to any great extent.

The population was never accurately identified by location, or analyzed according to Jewish and non-Jewish areas. All "Palestine" was assumed to be Jewish-settled and Jewish-settled Palestine was assumed to be all of "Arab Palestine."

The five-times-its-1893-population increase of Arabs within the Jewish-settled areas *always was averaged* with the lowest, less-than-two-times-its-1893-population increase in the non-Jewish or "Arab" areas where few Jews settled before 1948. By *averaging* that increase in the Arab population over the whole of Western Palestine, including the non-Jewish Arab-populated areas where there was much less than half the numerical increase of that in the Jewish-settled areas, the resultant average increase—that which was consistently officially reported—"had the effect of favoring or supporting a *higher natural* increase than that which actually took place."<sup>77</sup>

In other words, the incorrect oft-reported Arab "phenomenal natural rate of increase," generally assumed to have taken place because of improved conditions in the Jewish-settled areas, and so high that it was considered by experts to be "unprecedented," *had already been artificially lowered*.<sup>78</sup> Had the actual scope of the Arab rate of population increase in the Jewish-settled areas been differentiated and accurately reported, without reducing the appearance of increase through averaging it with the far lower rate elsewhere in Western Palestine, the "natural" rate of increase would have been recognized as not merely "unprecedented" but incredible.

Between 1893 and 1922, the "Arab" rate of increase in Jewish-settled areas of Western Palestine was so similar to the Jews' rate of increase, which was admittedly due to immigration, that the inferences from those figures alone should have posed certain questions. Moreover, the *reported* rate of "natural" increase of Arabs in Palestine—even *after* averages had lowered the appearance of increase—when compared with Arab groups in similar conditions in neighboring Arab countries, should have been suspect.

How could the far greater rate in Palestine be accepted by more scientific studies without serious question as to the incidence of other than "casual" Arab in-migration? Even considering improved standards caused by efforts and revenues of the Jews, the length of time necessary for improved conditions to substantially affect Arab health and quality of life was not sufficient to explain the

supposed “natural” rate of increase. Moreover, even in neighboring Egypt, seat of one of the world’s highest population “explosions,” applying the “unprecedented” rate of “natural increase” attributed to Palestinian Arabs between 1922 and 1947 would have been incompatible with demographic realities.<sup>79</sup>

Emphasizing the disparity between the Arab rate of increase inside Jewish-settled areas and that of non-Jewish areas in Western Palestine, the Arab population also escalated dramatically in the “three major Jewish cities”—far beyond the rate of natural increase between World War I and World War II. At the same time, in “predominantly Arab towns” the Arab population “rose only slightly (if at all)” and in one case—Gaza—actually decreased.<sup>80</sup>

Thus, first-rate scholars on the subject have figured the assumption of “9-per cent-Jews vs. vast-Arab-majority-in-Palestine” and the “unprecedented rate of natural increase of Arabs” into the demographic and political equations as “facts.” Perhaps because of the British Mandatory Government’s adoption of the myths, those numbers, as statistics often do, became sacred, immutable, somehow superseding logic.

The turnspcak has spread from authoritative and widely respected studies to political analyses. It has also extended to the major media, and even shows up frequently in letters-to-editor columns: thus the terrorism of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and “self-determination” for “the Palestinians” are still being defended and justified by the single assertion that

since 1917 . . . the population of Palestine was 90 percent Arab.<sup>81</sup>

Had the real conditions of “Palestine” surfaced and been given official currency by the British and other influential powers—1) that the Jewish-settled area was only a fraction of “Palestine”; 2) that most of the sparse “existing Arab” population “since time immemorial” was living outside and away from the Jewish settled area when Jews’ organized settlement began and afterward; 3) that, within a few years after Jewish development commenced, Jews were actually the largest religious group in the areas that they settled near the end of the nineteenth century, rather than “9%”; 4) that an Arab “Palestinian” homeland containing seventy-five percent of “Palestine” existed; 5) that a large percentage of Arabs in Jewish-settled Palestine were landless in-migrants who, like millions of their brothers in the Arab world, were understandably in search of better opportunities and were not “millennia-long natives” with a special right to Jewish-settled areas of Western Palestine, and 6) that in 1948, when Arabs fled at the time of the war, a considerable percentage was actually “returnees” and not refugees— had those conditions been revealed and properly considered, countless injustices to all peoples might have been averted.

The fact is that the Arab population of Western Palestine’s Jewish-settled area was greatly increased by Arab in-migrants from the rest of Western Palestine, the Arab areas outside the primarily Jewish-settled areas. Thus the claim that the Jews were taking away employment opportunities from the “native, indigenous” Arab population in the Jewish-settled area is insupportable. On the contrary, it

was Jewish development and the Jews' presence that attracted workers in the first place from outside the areas of Jewish settlement.

In 1947-1948, there were about 747,000 "Arabs" in Israel-to-be (including for the purposes of the calculations Areas II and IV\*, which were included in the territory of Israel but contained few Jews); of that number, about 57,000 were nomads, 37,000 were immigrants reported by the government, and 170,000 were in-migrants from Arab areas of Western Palestine. The remainder totaled about 483,000 Arabs. This figure represents the number of Arabs in Israel, then, in 1947-1948 who were neither nomads nor those immigrants who *were* reported by the British Mandatory Government. That group constituted the maximum Arab "settled" population in Israel in 1948.

During the 1948 exodus of Arab refugees, 140,000 Arabs remained in the Jewish-settled areas, becoming "Israeli Arabs." According to the calculations, then (747,000 "Arabs" were counted in the areas included in Israel minus 263,000: nomads, in-migrants, and reported immigrants), 483,000 settled Arabs were in the Jewish-settled areas in 1947. A total of 140,000 Arabs in the Jewish-settled areas remained in Israel after the 1948 war; the balance of roughly 343,000 Arabs (out of 483,000), who fled in 1948, according to the calculations, is the maximum number possible of genuine refugees—not nomads, not in-migrants originating from areas of Western Palestine outside Israel (outside "Jewish-settled areas"), and not recorded as immigrants in the British reports.

Now that the relevant areas of Western Palestine have been delineated, their populations identified, and their numbers calculated to the extent feasible, we see an Arab "settled" population of possibly 483,000 in Israel-to-be in 1947-1948<sup>82</sup>—a population present from roughly 1893. Of that 483,000, 343,000 fled in 1948. Thus only 343,000 of the Arab refugees in 1948 were fleeing from Jewish-settled territory in which they had presumably lived permanently—or since 1893, after Jewish settlement had commenced and the large Jewish immigration wave of 1872-1882 had begun. That 343,000 figure is a *maximum* number, as explained earlier: 1) because of the probable inclusion of Arab immigrants who came later, attracted by opportunities for employment in Jewish settlements, and 2) because the rate of natural increase assumed in the calculations was possibly higher than the actual rate in non-Jewish Western Palestine.

It should especially be noted that the maximum figure of 343,000 is *less than half* the number of refugees claimed by the Arabs immediately after their leaving, before the numbers were reportedly further "inflated" in the refugee camps.

What the population study could not calculate is how many among 343,000 Arab "settled population" were in fact illegal immigrants to Western Palestine, following the time-honored tradition, to get to where their brethren were better off. Arab *immigration*, unlike the in-migration, is not calculable. No comprehensive records of Arab immigration exist.<sup>83</sup> But on the basis of evidence of infectious immigration seen earlier and in following pages, illegal Arab immigrants could

\*See map on p. 246 and table in Appendix V.

account for a very substantial number among the Arabs included in the 343,000 refugee figure.

The actual historical conditions have been acknowledged by some: as Kemal Karpaz observed, there was a "convergence toward Palestine of several ethnic groups. . . . A considerable number of newcomers. . . . were *non-Arabic* speaking." These "were probably assimilated into the Arabic population," in addition to Algerians, Iraqis, Turks, Circassians, Egyptians and, others.<sup>84</sup>

Fred M. Gottheil, through his studies of economic conditions in Western Palestine, found that between 1922 and 1931 "Arab immigration comprised 36.8% of the total immigration into pre-State Israel," while "in non-Israel" areas of Western Palestine, "Arab migration was positive, but inconsequential."<sup>85</sup>

It is interesting to note that, according to the population expert Riad Tabarah, in the late 1940s, when the population growth of Kuwait rose to five percent a year as a result of the oil boom, fully half of that growth was recognized as immigrant Arab labor, and of that immigrant group most were Arabs identified as "Palestinians."<sup>86</sup> However, although in Palestine the immigrant Arab laborers somehow had been statistically absorbed into the "settled population" and the Arab sector of the population growth of Palestine was mistakenly assumed to be "almost totally due to natural increase," that *same* "Palestinian Arab" population, which supposedly was reproducing phenomenally in Jewish-settled Palestine, once it arrived in Kuwait, increased only more or less according to the norms within the region. The behavior of Palestinian Arabs in Kuwait corresponded to that of other Arabs with respect to the rate of natural increase, without being distorted by the abnormally fertile air of Palestine.

The "oil-generated economic boom" that began to prompt "heavy" immigration of Arab labor to Kuwait, "in the late 1940's,"<sup>87</sup> can be compared to the Jewish-development-generated economic boom that prompted the Arab in-migration and immigration into the Jewish-settled areas of Western Palestine beginning in the 1870s, proceeding after the First World War, and continuing through the British administration of Palestine until 1946 or 1947. In Kuwait, however, the element of immigration within the late 1940s population growth—"population growth rates reached around 5 percent a year (possibly half of which was due to immigration)"—was factored into the total Kuwaiti population picture.

In the case of Western Palestine and its own, earlier economic boom, the Arab in-migration and immigration factors were drastically overlooked.

It is ironic to recall that the only group immigration meticulously accounted for by the British was Jewish immigration, the development from which caused the boom that attracted the Arabs. To quantify the one—the Jew—without considering the other—the Arab—is tantamount to attempting to describe a game of cricket by counting the score of only one team.

### **Other Indications of Population Movement**

Recent regional studies indicate there is further reason to believe, in addition to the minimum figure of 170,000 Arab in-migrants who became, overnight, "na-

tives since time immemorial excluded from their homeland," that in Jewish-settled Western Palestine the Arab immigrant movement from other Arab lands was perhaps at least as significant.

Those regional studies were not focused on the composition of the population of Palestine or its political ramifications; the population findings were incidental to other research. Consequently the evidence revealed lends a greater degree of credibility to the indications.

The first, a geographic "survey of the Arab villages, engaged in the investigation of changes occurring therein . . . examining matters of land ownership . . . analyzing the geographic implications of the social structure . . .," was conducted in more than 200 Arab villages within Israel since 1968. This study has found that

. . . the major increase in the population of the Arab villages in the coastal plain, during the British period, had come largely from immigrants from neighboring countries.<sup>88</sup>

According to the geographer who headed the study, Professor Moshe Braver, of Tel Aviv University,

We found that in many cases these people arrived [in what is now Israel, i.e., Jewish-settled areas] in the 1930's.<sup>[89]</sup> For example, although I have lived in this country almost since my birth and I know the country quite well—the villages and all—when I investigated an Arab village in 1941, I was amazed to find that the village of Beit Girga was more Egyptian in character than Palestinian. A very substantial part of the population—especially the elders—wore Egyptian styled dress, you know, the *gallabya*. I spoke to the people of Beit Girga and found that the great majority of the village population had been born in Egypt, some of them came here toward the end of World War I, with the British army, and some of them infiltrated into Palestine later on to join members of their families or friends in Beit Girga and neighboring villages.

That is only one example. The same condition was quite evident in other villages. It was a conspicuous fact in the human landscape—that there was a substantial population which was foreign. There were Arabs from Egypt, from Jordan, from Syria and even further away—from Yemen. Now, many of those villages in which the immigrants concentrated were on the fringes of the Jewish areas, which Israel conquered during the Arab war against Israel's independence, in 1948, and these immigrants fled. The village of Beit Girga—it does not exist any more—it was ruined during the 1948 war and the villagers fled.

In addition, the Braver study "went one step further": it investigated some of the areas the immigrants had originated from, primarily "villages in Jordan." Braver explained:

I asked geographers working for German, British and other universities outside Israel, who were doing research in Jordan, to inquire in the villages whether there are any families who have relatives in refugee camps. If they have refugee relatives—who had left coastal plain of Israel where the Jews were—we wanted to estab-

lish approximately when those refugee parts of the family migrated or immigrated from Jordan.

These geographers managed to establish in at least two-to-three-hundred cases—in villages which they investigated for their own purposes—the fact that these Jordanian people had relatives who had gone to [Western] Palestine, and that those who had become refugees had migrated within their lifetime—which means within the last fifty or sixty years to “Palestine.” Some of them of course are still refugees. You see, the benefits of being refugees are so considerable that they didn’t go back to their villages, or even if they did go back to their original Jordanian villages after 1948, they went and registered as refugees when the refugee camps were established, in order to get the refugee benefits.

It became quite obvious that there was very substantial emigration from Jordan, especially from the northern part of Jordan to [Western] Palestine, during the time of the British Mandate. In fact—I cannot give you his name because he will not be allowed back into Jordan if his name is published—but only a few months ago we got information from a foreign doctoral candidate who did work on this subject. He stayed in Jordan for many months, and he established without the slightest doubt that in the Adjloun area there was very substantial immigration into Palestine during the 1920s and ’30s.<sup>90</sup>

According to Braver, Egyptians continued to come and settle, mainly in Jaffa and its neighborhood, and “in villages and towns along the coastal strip between Jaffa and Gaza,” until after the Second World War. The “final wave” of immigrants from Egypt came to fill places opened for laborers by the British war effort.

Transjordanians, Syrians, and Lebanese “poured into the country from the early 1920’s until 1947,”<sup>91</sup> Braver said.

The extent of the settlement of Arab immigrants and the format of their diffusion along the coastal plain and the hills to the east of it parallel the scope and volume of growth in the citrus industry, urban construction and other development processes. When economic growth slowed down there was a drop also in immigration from neighboring countries, while in periods of prosperity it rose again.

On the other hand, [as opposed to economic prosperity along the coastal plain], several times it was economic distress and other events in the adjacent countries which sent streams of immigrants to Palestine. A large wave of immigrants from Southern Syria (the Hauran) came in the wake of a drought and changed the complex of the population and the labor market.<sup>92</sup>

Another example among more recent works on the region is *Arab Village*, a careful sociological study of a Transjordanian peasant community by Richard T. Antoun, in which the author assumes that Kufr al-Ma—the Transjordanian village studied—was generally representative, or “traditional.” Antoun reports that a majority of the inhabitants of Kufr al-Ma had immigrated to Western Palestine for economic reasons during the British Mandatory period.<sup>93</sup> Even village *mukhtar* (chief) Muflih al-Hakim and his family had “spent much of their lives in [Western] Palestine,”<sup>94</sup> and he returned with his family to the village of his origins in 1951 after fighting against Israel in the Arab Legion.<sup>95</sup>

**TABLE I. Villages Settled Primarily by Egyptian Immigrants:  
Growth of Population in Arab Villages Along Southern Coastal Plain**

Village	Population, 1922	Population, 1944	Increase in percentage (approx.)
Beit Girga	397	940	137
Julis	481	1,030	115 [ <i>sic</i> ]
Zarnuka	967	2,380	147 [ <i>sic</i> ]
Harbiyya	1,037	2,240	116
Yibneh	1,791	5,420	203
Qubeba (near Rehovot)	519	1,720	211 [ <i>sic</i> ]
Qestina	406	890	119

Source: Moshe Braver, "Immigration as a Factor in the Growth of the Arab Village in Eretz-Israel," *Economic Review—Problems of Aliyah and Absorption*, vol. 28, no. 7–9, Jerusalem, 1975 (July–Sept.), p. 17.

**TABLE J. Villages Settled Primarily by Egyptians, Transjordanians,  
Syrians, and Others: Growth of Population in Arab Villages in the Central Coastal  
Plain**

Village	Population, 1922	Population, 1944	Increase in percentage (approx.)
Bet Dajan	1,689	3,840	127
Jaljuliyya	123	740	500
Yehudiyya	2,437	5,650	132
Yazur	1,284	4,030	214
Sawalma	70	800	1,040
Salameh	1,187	6,730	476
Safariyya	1,306	3,070	143
Saqiyya	427	1,100	157
Faja	164	1,200	630

Source: Moshe Braver, "Immigration as a Factor in the Growth of the Arab Village in Eretz-Israel," *Economic Review—Problems of Aliyah and Absorption*, vol. 28, no. 7–9, Jerusalem, 1975 (July–Sept.), p. 18.

A final example is an anthropological study led by Professor Gideon Kressel that is focused upon marriage traditions among Arabs "in the center of Israel" (the Jawarish).<sup>96</sup> It was learned, as a by-product of the investigation, that 144 of the 166 families of the community had their origins in Egypt, Libya, and Sudan. Arab immigrants—as of December 1971, the completion of the study—still "continue to arrive and camp in tents . . . while awaiting the completion of the 'rent houses.'"

For instance, one group of families arrived from Libya to the Jewish-settled area in 1885, and first "encamped" around the new Russian-Jewish pioneer settlement Gedera, where friends and family later immigrated to join them. They moved to their present village after 1949, where they number forty-nine families, and "they and their descendants are considered the social elite of the community" (as of December 1971).<sup>97</sup>

From first-person accounts within the study, as well as the map tracing the



“annals of the five Jawarish subgroups,” it becomes clear that the immigrant families have branches in cities and villages throughout southern and coastal areas, from Haifa to Gaza and Beersheba, where

The British occupation of . . . Palestine (1918) increased [the flow of western immigration] particularly after the completion of the railway across the Sinai.<sup>98</sup>

From the “representative” first-person case histories, an example:

First we were peasants in Egypt. . . . we lived in Gaza and later in Dimrah where all of us were Egyptians (Masarwah). . . . Jadalla’s father . . . used to sell his produce to the kitchen of the Kibbutz Yad Mordekhay [*sic*] . . . as far as Kibbutz Doroth. . . . Dimrah was destroyed in 1948. . . . The lands of Dimrah were split by the new border, and on the Israeli side Kibbutz Erez was established. They provided us substitute houses in Ramla or in Lod.<sup>99</sup>

While the “cultural identity of the Egyptian-fellahin apparently faded away during the recent past,” because “they lived under the patronage of Negev Bedouin,” the Libyan immigrant community—*Magharbah*—“maintained their identity of a Libyan diaspora (*ej-jaliah el-libiah*) and have continued to foster linguistic forms and traditional rituals of the original homeland,”<sup>100</sup> according to Kressel.

In an interview with this writer in the summer of 1979, Dr. Kressel described and exhibited the data of his comprehensive research project, which he began just after the 1967 Six-Day War; in the course of his exhaustive study of marriage patterns, he has conducted hundreds of interviews in Arabic with Arabs<sup>101</sup> living in Israel, and under friendly, nonpolitical conditions.

It was perhaps only under such circumstances that the true origins of the Arabs concerned could be revealed.<sup>102</sup> However proud they might be of their rightful and actual origins and family heritage, fear of extremist violence from the PLO and associated gangs would undoubtedly silence any such revelations in the context of a politically inspired interview. The tragedy of having to conceal their origins, or in the case of the twelve-year-old “Palestinian Arab,” of having his or her real identity buried by indoctrination, however, cannot be rectified by sweeping the truth under a rug of revised history.

Arab immigrants who found their way to benefits within Jewish settlements and were counted as “existing indigenous” Arab population can be accurately said to have displaced Jews whose immigration was supposed to be “facilitated” into their Jewish National Home.

If those who live in Jordan—Eastern Palestine—deny the documented history which testifies to the fact that they are Palestinian Arabs living in Arab Palestine, then they are disregarding the very “history” by which they might claim *any* “right” to Palestine. Even were we to set aside the historical evidence that contradicts the claim of a “Palestinian Arab” identity, if Arabs call upon the “Palestinian’s historical” claims to Palestine, then the Arabs must conform those claims to the actual history they invoke, not to arbitrary fictions.

They cannot both claim that history has afforded them “rights” and at the

same time deny the nature of other "historical rights" and facts—that segment of history which may contradict their claims and does not conform to their political goals. Such demands are unjust—to the Palestinian Jews in Israel, and to the Palestinian Arabs, who in fact, by virtue of their history and their numbers in Palestine-cum-Jordan, are more legitimately entitled to self-determination in what is the Jordanian three-fourths of Palestine. As with Israel, Jordan is no less Palestine because it is currently called by another name.

The historical reality is analogous to the following parable.\*

In the state of Georgia, there is a population of nearly 600,000 farmers—500,000 white farmers and 85,000 black farmers. The white farmers are sprinkled on land throughout the state. The black farmers have been permitted to dwell and buy land in a small, generally undeveloped, and abandoned coastal county of that state; they have toiled to drain and reclaim its swampland and have begun to build up its sandy wastes.

Although the majority of the state's land is state domain, the whites exert pressure and utilize violence in order to keep the Georgia administration from selling to the blacks that state territory which is their right. The Georgia government passes spuriously based legislation that has the effect of impeding the sales of state domain land to the black would-be settlers, and enacts restrictions on entry into Georgia in order to keep out the blacks. The only land left available to them is the outrageously overpriced land that the whites sell to the blacks, most of which has become dunes and swampland.

Meanwhile white migrant workers from throughout Georgia, and from neighboring states as well, begin flooding into the area that has been promised to and allocated by federal legislation for black settlement. Having been hired by the blacks to assist in development, those white migrants are then designated by the government of Georgia to be the "original settled inhabitants" of the area. Then the white so-called "original settlers" charge that the blacks are "dispossessing" the whites, and must be kept out, although all the states surrounding Georgia—as well as the majority of territory *inside* Georgia—are dominated by whites, all in areas where Klu Klux Klan persecution and lynching of blacks have been occurring with regularity. The white farmers resent the prosperity and the equality accruing to those whom they regard as their "niggers" and therefore claim that the previously deserted land was "expropriated from whites," insisting that the blacks' farms belong to the whites from time immemorial.

Would any reasonable jury today respect such a claim?

And yet, so buried by layer upon layer of propaganda is the actual historical situation of Arabs and Jews in the Jewish-settled area of Western Palestine that just such Arab demands have been given acceptance by many who, while in search of justice, lack the facts.

\*The blacks in the Georgia parable are analogous to the Jews in "Palestine"; the whites analogous to the Arabs; the federal government to the League of Nations Mandate; and the Georgia government is analogous to the British administration in Palestine.

## A Hidden Movement: Illegal Arab Immigration

Arab immigration into Palestine? Why, it did not exist. There was no such thing.

No one ever kept track of *that*.

—Veteran archivist, British Public Record Office, 1979

It is agreed that refugees who would appear to be Syrian, Lebanese or Palestinian by nationality may be admitted into Palestine without passport or visa.

—Controller of Permits, Jerusalem, 1926

Identity card system should be imposed forthwith. French did it in 15 days in 1926. Without this system control of movements of the population is impossible.

—Colonel Gilbert MacKereth, British Consul in Damascus, October, 1937

I am not sure that Col. MacKereth has always appreciated the wider issues . . . vis a vis the Arab world. . . . I think we should . . . replace him. . . .

—George W. Rendel, Head of Eastern Department of British Foreign Office, 1937

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**W**hy was illegal Arab immigration dismissed as “insignificant” or as “about 1% of the population”? One must pause here to question—how could a condition as chronic and serious in its implications as the artificial inflation of “existing” Arab population by Arab immigration into Jewish-settled areas of Western Palestine remain unchallenged and unrecorded by the British Mandatory Government? As evidenced earlier, the reports of the government might note the general condition with some alarm on one page and then dismiss it on another, within the same report.

In fact, during an extended study at the formidable archives of the Public Record Office in London’s Kew Gardens the author spent dozens of hours in the reference rooms in search of material on *Arab immigration* into Palestine. There were hundreds of references in both the Foreign Office and Colonial Office records

on *Jewish* immigration—legal and illegal. But, except for the few compulsory references filed in annual Reports to the Administration—reports that vastly underestimated Arab immigration—no category covering the incidence of incoming Arabs could be found.

When a thirty-year veteran archivist—a specialist in the Foreign Office and Colonial Office records on the Middle East for the Public Record Office—was asked to assist in finding the records on immigration to Palestine, he led briskly to the varied references on Jewish immigration and to the general “emigration-immigration” category, under which all the headings that indicated Jews’ arrival were to be found. But what of Arab immigration, illegal and otherwise, he was asked. “Arab immigration into Palestine? Why, it did not exist. There was no such thing,” he scoffed. “No one ever kept track of *that*.” When he was told of citations from Syrian, Egyptian, and British officials, which challenged his assurance, the archivist seemed genuinely astonished. “Indeed,” he pondered. “Hmnn, well, you have come up with something completely new!”

In fact, an examination of the “private” and “secret” correspondence files of the Mandatory government reveals evidence that the British were not unaware of the magnitude of illegal Arab immigration or, indeed, of the possible political ramifications of that condition should it become known.

Although explicit evidence of the prevalence of illicit Arab immigration into Palestine—particularly to the Jewish-settled area—was not catalogued or referenced so as to be easily located among the reams of documentation labeled *Jewish* immigration, the British occasionally did record that which they were forced to acknowledge.<sup>1</sup>

For example, an “Urgent” order in 1925 went from the Controller of Permits to the Northern District Commissioner (with a “copy to Chief Secretary”):

*Subject:* Refugees from Syria

... to the officer in charge at Ras-El-Nakurah. . . . Will you be so good as to . . . furnish him as speedily as possible with a mimeographed supply of the blank passes.<sup>2</sup>

January 3, 1926:

To: “Palestine Gendarmerie, Samakh”

From: Controller

*Subject:* Entry of Refugees into Palestine

So long as the Hauran and neighborhood remain disturbed it is agreed that refugees who would appear to be Syrian, Lebanese or Palestinian by nationality may be admitted into Palestine without passport or visa.<sup>3</sup>

October 25, 1926:

To: Controller of Permits, Jerusalem

From: District Offices, Nablus

*Subject:* Damascene Refugees

... many a Damascene have found their way into Palestine without a proper permit. These refugees are scattered all over Palestine. . . .<sup>4</sup>

In one 1931 memo to Chief Immigration Officer, "*Syrian Affairs*," a "Deputy Commandant" noted that although the Syrians had been provided amnesty by the French and could return "to their country of origin," many "residing in the Northern District [Safed, Haifa, and elsewhere] and others, less in number, living in other parts of Palestine are now reported to have remained in the country."<sup>5</sup>

In an Immigration memo, "*Druzes who are in Palestine without permission*," a *mukhtar* (village chief) could vouch for the illegals: "In the cases of those persons who claim that they were born in Palestine they should be called upon to produce satisfactory documentary evidence to that effect from the Mukhtar of their respective villages. . . ." From Immigration Officer, December 22, 1931.<sup>6</sup>

In the urban areas the practice was similar: in another memo, the Southern District Commissioner reported that

in the case of persons who have been unable to produce documents in authentication of their right to British Protection, I have endeavored to obtain the testimony of a prominent citizen of Jaffa that the person concerned is, in fact, a native of British Protected Territory.<sup>7</sup>

Thus Arab immigrants were apparently provided the loophole *and* the "official" fraudulent means to prevent their deportation as illegals.

An occasional conscientious official brought the condition to the attention of his seniors, unaware of British officialdom's policy of deliberately ignoring the Arab illegal immigration. A rare memorandum on "Deportation of Persons in Palestine Without Permission,"<sup>8</sup> written in June 1933, unmistakably referred to Arab or non-Jewish illegal immigrants—as well as Jews—"Syrians, Egyptians, etc.," or "native of a neighboring country. . . ." According to that memo, "deportation for illegal presence" should be processed "without delay" and the party arrested "so that (the man or woman) could not conceal himself and be untraceable. . . ."

The official complained:

This procedure has never really been applied. Consideration . . . has been spread over months during which a new crop of difficulties has arisen and at the end of which the object . . . cannot be found.

He also protested the "new practice" which "had arisen" in addition—"prosecuting instead of taking steps to deport"; the official said that as a result of that practice, "in a still greater number of cases deportation has been made impossible." Among examples given was a woman "bound over in the sum of one pound for a year. The result is . . . that the woman who was deportable when proceedings were taken against her is free to remain in the country . . . in effect as much longer as she wishes." In another example,

charge was dismissed on the ground that the offender had friends in Palestine who would look after him.<sup>9</sup>

No mention was made, no record was found either in official reports or in the correspondence files specifically concerning the "30,000–36,000 Hauranese" who had immigrated to Palestine in 1934. However, as a result of the anti-Jewish riots and strikes in 1936, "countrymen from Hauran" were among a smaller number of Arab immigrants who "applied urgently and pleadingly to be sent back to their homes for the reason that there was no work . . . and they did not wish to be involved in more trouble."<sup>10</sup>

Although the Hauranis' entry had been ignored, their hasty leavetaking to avoid trouble was noted in private correspondence in some detail. The "arrangements" were agreed to by the Chief Secretary:

providing that he obtained a written statement (that he should if he could obtain) from these men or their representatives that they were being repatriated at their own request, so that no questions would arise afterwards that we had deported them.<sup>11</sup>

A "confidential" note handwritten by the High Commissioner confirmed that every encouragement should be given to countrymen to return to their own country without compulsion. When the port is reopened fully probably none will want to go without compulsion.<sup>12</sup>

Another memo, headed simply "Hauranis," reported that "128 have left today. Many more are expected to ask to leave tomorrow . . ." Handwritten minutes responded to the report:

Dear Hall, Hauranis proper are here illegally. They are a turbulent lot. The sooner they go the better at their own request. Next week they may not want to go.

Arthur Wauchope, the High Commissioner of Palestine and Transjordan, added, As long as they go voluntarily I fear no Arab comments.<sup>13</sup>

In general there is sparse mention of any government policy toward Arab immigration in the correspondence files, and practically no record of the *numbers* of Arab immigrants<sup>14</sup> (except for the explanation of those thousands of Arab "illegal" immigrants officially imported during World War II. That practice is discussed in Chapter 16).

However, during the period following the 1936 Arab riots and strikes, the British officials in "Palestine" appear to have become suddenly preoccupied with requests for "repatriation" by numbers of Sudanese, Egyptian, Syrian, South Arabian, and Somali illegal immigrants who "entered Palestine without permission." Dozens of memos and "confidential" communications, for instance, were exchanged in the one month of May 1936, the time of the so-called "Arab Revolt." Here are representative extracts from just a few:

From: Chief Immigration Officer, Jerusalem

. . . Egyptian Authorities are willing to take at Kantara [*sic*] batches of 20

Egyptians containing not more than 10 from any one quarter. . . . *Provided, however, that documents are held by all of them for their return to Palestine if they are not admitted at Kantara.\**<sup>15</sup>

From: Minute No. 19

. . . the Egyptian Consul is prepared to grant visas to Egypt to any Soudanese sent . . . for repatriation to Soudan, on the understanding that Palestine will accept back again any persons whose Soudanese nationality is not established. There are 14–15 Soudanese, of whom 5 have Soudan passports; the remainder have apparently no documents of identity. C.M.S. will issue temporary travel documents where necessary.<sup>16</sup>

From: Minute No. 15

. . . The Soudanese and South Arabians will be dealt with as soon as C.M.S. has further particulars of their identity and travel documents.<sup>17</sup>

Telegram: . . . reporting numerous Egyptians anxious return urgently without passports stop, apply ordinary procedure reference person for interrogation stop . . . *Request provide each with travel document valid return Palestine stop. . . .\**<sup>18</sup>

It is interesting to note that the immigrants were often required by their home governments to get permission to “return” to Palestine.<sup>19</sup>

The enclosure to a memorandum in that same month, May 1936, is perhaps indicative: the names and origins of fifty Arabs who had approached the Southern District Commander in Palestine for assistance because of unemployment are listed. Not one is “Palestinian” and “in many cases they entered Palestine without permission.” Nearly half immigrated after 1930, none before World War I, from Nigeria, Sudan, Somaliland via Egypt, Syria, and the Hejaz. Many came “with the British Army,” or “with Transjordan Frontier Force,” a few as “pilgrims,” and others simply by “camel” or “on foot.”<sup>20</sup> (See examples of original British documents in Appendix VII.)

It is difficult to grasp the extent of the murderous assaults, rioting, and strikes that triggered the Arab immigrants’ temporary flight, from High Commissioner Wauchope’s cryptic description (throughout his 1936 correspondence regarding the “voluntary repatriation”)—the “*present circumstances* under which their presence may be undesirable.” Once again the long tradition of violence and terrorism must be seen in context—here, as the singularly important factor that influenced British Colonial policy in Palestine. As an essential to understand the reversal of British pledges to uphold the Mandated “Jewish homeland,” it must be underscored that the small Arab power clique’s racial incitement to terrorize, which had achieved with some effect the Turk’s restrictions against Jewish immigration and land settlement, would succeed in far greater measure during the British administration.

\*Emphasis added.

British placation of the anti-Jewish campaign of the deceptively "mild-mannered little man of great courtesy and benign expression,"<sup>21</sup> *effendi* Haj Amin al-Husseini, was an exercise in futility equaled only perhaps by the 1938 appeasement of the Nazis in Czechoslovakia. A British historian wrote that ". . . the Mufti mixed religion with politics so cleverly that it is impossible to say where the one begins and the other leaves off."<sup>22</sup>

According to documentary records submitted to the United Nations in 1947, al-Husseini was "responsible for the Arab riots in 1920."<sup>23</sup>

Savage attacks were made by Arab rioters in Jerusalem [on Easter Sunday] on Jewish lives and property. Five Jews were killed and 211 injured.<sup>24</sup>

"Cries directed against the Jews were shouted by leaders in the procession" of thousands of Muslim pilgrims at the Muslim festival of Nebi Musa in Jerusalem, "and agitators incited an attack," whereupon "marchers in the procession fell upon the Jews with sticks and knives; the Arab police remained passive or in some instances joined the rioting."<sup>25</sup>

Haj Amin, only twenty-seven in 1920, was already a longtime foe of the Jews following the tradition of his powerful forebears.<sup>26</sup> British Officer R. Meinertzhagen reported later that Haj Amin had been informed by British Colonel Waters-Taylor four days before the Easter pogrom in Jerusalem that

he had a great opportunity at Easter to show the world that the Arabs of Palestine would not tolerate Jewish domination in Palestine; that Palestine was unpopular not only with the Palestine Administration but in Whitehall; and if disturbances of sufficient violence occurred in Jerusalem at Easter, both General Bols and General Allenby would advocate the abandonment of the Jewish Home.<sup>27</sup>

Colonel Meinertzhagen, a senior British officer stationed in Palestine in 1920, a non-Jew, was charged with being "pro-Zionist" and sent back to a "desk job" in London, where he later protested British policy against the Jews:

Much has been written about injustice to the Arabs. There is nothing in a Jewish State which conflicts with Arab rights. And, moreover, be it remembered that the Arabs are the only nation in the world with at least three kings and several sovereign states. The Jews are a nation without a home.<sup>28</sup>

In fact, that outbreak was notable as the only and last act of Arab terrorism that did not directly instigate anti-Zionist policy by Great Britain: "On the contrary, it helped to expedite the decision of the Peace Conference [Paris] to grant the Mandate to Great Britain, with the responsibility of the Balfour Declaration attached."<sup>29</sup> Indirectly, however, even the 1920 Nebi Musa violence and related acts instigated by al-Husseini and his followers had their desired consequences.

Haj Amin al-Husseini's anti-Semitic *Muftism*, as we shall see in later pages, would one day ultimately insist upon and cause the "extermination program of



the Nazis” to be “carried out even in those satellite countries which were willing to permit the rescue of Jews.”<sup>30</sup>

However, even as the Mandate was embraced by Britain and Lloyd George in April 1920, with its instruction to “facilitate Jewish immigration” and “close settlement by Jews on the land, including State Lands and waste lands not required for public purposes”<sup>31</sup> to “secure the establishment of the Jewish national home,”<sup>32</sup> by August of that same year a first “Jewish immigration quota” was “fixed.”<sup>33</sup> From that time the preoccupation of Palestine’s administration would be concentrated solely upon *limiting* the immigration of the *Jews*. As a British report attested, for “Arab immigration,” a “different” set of rules applied.<sup>34</sup>

The pattern continued. From the Jewish-development-despite-*Turkish*-restrictions, followed by Arab-migrants-seeking-better-opportunities, the only change was the government setting the restrictions. But the *British* letter and enforcement would prove to be more harsh and discriminatory than those of the Turks. Britain’s enforcement was to turn justice on its head, because the British purportedly would be administering Palestine after the land had been internationally mandated as a “national home” for the Jews. And the incidence of Arab illegal immigration during the British mandatory period would grow more prevalent, following the exact same pattern as under the Turks but with its hidden numbers concealing what was evidently an immigration movement great enough to compare with admittedly immigration-based increase of the Jews.

The League of Nations’ Permanent Mandates Commission, which alone had noted officially the massive Hauranese illegal immigration of 1934, expressed concern in its role as the League’s international regulating body for Mandates: an unreasonably high number of Jews were being deducted from the Jewish immigration quota, the Commission noted, despite the fact that

. . . of 1,079 persons deported in the year 1935, 245 were Jews and 834 *other persons*. Who were those other persons?\*

Commission members asked the question of Mr. Trusted, the British representative. According to the Mandates Commission minutes,<sup>36</sup>

Mr. Trusted said that, generally speaking, they were mainly Arabs from Syria or Transjordan. . . . Some persons had also been deported to Egypt.

Reading further from the same report:<sup>37</sup>

Count de Penha Garcia asked whether the figures . . . showing that of 1,354 persons summarily deported to Syria and Egypt only 38 were Jews, meant that illegal immigration was greater among Arabs than among Jews.†<sup>38</sup>

\*Emphasis added.

†In the 1935 Report to the Administration under discussion by the Mandates Commission, only “Jewish Immigration into Palestine” was catalogued; that was the only heading, although “other persons” deported, under at least three separate categories, totaled *more than ten times* the number of Jews. Yet the predominant focus throughout that section of the report is the Jewish “illicit

If so, he felt inclined to support the suggestion of the Jewish Agency that stricter steps should be taken to prevent illegal immigration. . . .\*

Mr. Trusted said that the figures to which Count de Penha Garcia referred were simply those relating to cases of deportation. If the whole figures of illegal immigration were considered it would be seen that the proportion was very different.

. . . He agreed that the phraseology was somewhat misleading.

*M. Orts, referring to Count de Penha Garcia's question concerning illegal immigration, noted that, at its 27th session (pages 46, 47, 48 of the Minutes of that session), the Commission had been told by the accredited representative that rigorous control had been instituted in the matter of Trans-Jordanians and Haurani entering the country. If such control had been maintained, why did the 1935 report<sup>[39]</sup> . . . state that no reliable statistics are available as to the "number of Trans-Jordanians who enter Palestine and leave after the seasonal work is done"?*

His question was not unconnected with the present troubles. Certain Jewish documents complained that elements from Trans-Jordan and the Hauran had played a very active part in the Jaffa riots. Consequently, several hundreds of these individuals had been expelled. *Had they entered and remained in Palestine without the knowledge of the authorities?*

Mr. Trusted said he appreciated the difficulty of interpretation experienced by the Commission. The question centered round the fact that Trans-Jordanians were granted by law special facilities to enter the country for a specified period for seasonal work, and that other persons had in the past availed themselves of those facilities to enter Palestine surreptitiously. There was now a system of identity documents for all Trans-Jordanians entering Palestine: these documents were prepared and controlled by the local authorities in Trans-Jordan. Furthermore, as the new Statistical Department progressed it would be easier to keep an ever closer watch on persons from outside Palestine sojourning in that territory.[\*] He could assure the Commission that Trans-Jordanians were not allowed to stay beyond the specified time. The Commission could assume that this class of temporary immigrant did not present a serious problem.†<sup>40</sup>

Despite Trusted's assurances, members of the Permanent Mandates Commission (PMC) registered doubts in their reports following the meeting. Among their observations:

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settlement," which "Government has employed every means at its disposal, both through the agency of his Majesty's Consular Officers abroad and by the employment of a special preventive force on land and sea, as well as through the usual control arrangements at ports and frontiers, to prevent. . . . Deductions, corresponding to the number of illicit settlers who it is estimated will enter and remain in the country during the following period of six months, are made from the number of certificates authorized for distribution by the Jewish Agency under each Labour Schedule." It is significant that despite the rigorous application of methods described above to prevent Jewish immigration, and the institutionalized blinkered vision regarding the Arab immigration, still the number of "other" or non-Jews detected for deportation was far greater. The report, nonetheless, discussed *only* the factors relating to Jewish immigration, while the major "other" persons enumerated were ignored.

\*According to the annual report on the Administration for 1936, "The control of travel to and from Trans-Jordan is the duty of a special section of Arab Legion, etc.," p. 324.

†Emphasis added.

Illegal immigration exists, but it is not confined to Jews;<sup>41</sup> . . . convictions for illegal immigration apply much more to non-Jews than to Jews. This is a situation which deserves to be studied for, as against 283 Jews convicted for illegal entry into Palestine, there were 2,150 non-Jews.<sup>42</sup>

The “secret” handwritten comments of a British official in response to the Mandates Commission reports indicate that Government was both well aware of the “illicit” Arab immigration<sup>43</sup> and resented the challenge to its one-sided selective “system” of immigration into Western Palestine:

I think we can ignore the peevish reaction about illicit immigration in May PMC's report.<sup>44</sup>

In the year following those PMC reports, the correspondence between British officials clearly underscores an official awareness and recognition of the Arabs' illegal entry over the borders from Syria and Transjordanian Palestine into the Jewish-settled areas of Palestine.

A “secret” report in January 1937 from High Commissioner Wauchope told Britain's Colonial Secretary that

. . . the British resident in Transjordan has examined the possibility of preventing the passage of men and arms from Iraq to Palestine via Transjordan . . . at times of disturbance. . . . I shall be glad . . . if his Majesty's minister at Jeddah may be required to take up the matter with the Saudi authorities with a view to securing their agreement in principle that in the event of a situation necessitating such a measure they will prevent the passage from the KAF area into Transjordan of all persons coming from Iraq *except bonafide merchants and migrating tribes*.<sup>45</sup>

In other words, only in the “event” of “disturbance” would even the *possibility* of control be considered. And *even then* “migrating tribes” would still be exempt from the scrutiny of border authorities.

A month later, Lacy Baggallay, a British Foreign Service officer, discouraged even that diluted token effort to control Arab immigration, because it might offend the Saudis:

. . . while we appreciate the . . . desirability of controlling entrants into Transjordan . . . we much doubt whether this object will be best attained by representation to Ibn Saud at this stage. . . . to ask him now to make promises which might prove difficult or even dangerous for him about a hypothetical situation, would be putting a strain on his friendship which would be most imprudent, seeing how valuable it may be to us. . . .

If any attempt to extract these promises were made, Ibn Saud might conclude either (a) that we doubted whether he would continue to act as a good neighbor and wished to give him a hint to do so—which would be insulting, or else (b) that we took it for granted that whatever policy His Majesty's government adopted it was for him to put into force a control system on Saudi territory . . . which would be presumptuous.

\*Emphasis added.

For those reasons, we would prefer *even at the risk of losing valuable time when the emergency arises* to make no representations in advance, *although we recognize that it may be desirable and even necessary* . . . \*46

The British representative in Jeddah “shared Foreign Office views” and “strongly deprecated proposal.”<sup>47</sup>

The British officials’ comments, further, reveal that even when the illicit immigrants were “thugs” and “terrorists” entering Palestine for the purpose of wreaking terror in the officials’ own midst—imported agitators who incited mob violence—the government deemed the outbreaks “nationalism” and resisted those security measures that might have controlled the situation, for fear of offending Arab leaders.

### The Case of the Stifled Solution

There were those who insisted that the violence was criminal outbreak only loosely masquerading as “nationalism” to gain sympathy for Arabs in their attack against the Jews. Two or three British officers persisted in identifying the imported agitators as mercenaries† hired to incite mobs against the Jews and the British and proposed that force must be used to prevent further bloodshed in Palestine; they were ridiculed among their colleagues privately and their proposals to halt the Arabs’ illegal entry were generally thwarted.

The following series of “secret” communications concerns a diehard among the few dissenting British officials, Colonel Gilbert MacKereth, British Consul in Damascus. His frustrated effort is vividly illustrated. But the next pages, excerpted from “secret” and confidential correspondence, are included to the extent that they are because they offer a dramatic disclosure of the circumstances and the British attitudes that prevailed in the 1930s.

While Colonel MacKereth’s warnings were corroborated by the reports of some of his colleagues, those who at first supported him and even initiated “intensified patrolling” themselves (Shuckburgh and Battershill, for example) appear to have been persuaded later to a position of greater personal political advantage. A policy that understood or overlooked the terrorism and justified it by raising the myth of “nationalist Arab patriotism” would be more favorably looked upon by Arabs and British alike than the unromantic reality. Like “the Good Soldier Schweik,” Gilbert MacKereth became the lone dissenter, against a British administration attitude that from the beginning discouraged any “assistance” in patrolling Palestine’s borders.

The exchange begins with the Palestine High Commissioner’s request to halt the “temporary” Syrian assistance in patrolling the borders:

\*Emphasis added.

†The argument over whether “terrorism” or “guerrilla national liberation” maintains today.

To: High Commissioner, Syria  
From: High Commissioner, Palestine and Transjordan  
*July 30, 1937*

The moral and practical aid given by the presence and active patrolling of your troops has been a great service to us during the past three weeks. Now the situation has become so much more quiet that I consider there is no further need for me to ask for their further services at the present time. Our difficulties being over for the present I shall be happy if you care now to recall all those troops who have rendered us such valuable services. . . .<sup>48</sup>

To: Sir John Shuckburgh of the Colonial Office  
From: W. D. Battershill  
*October 12, 1937*

I recently discussed with the police the lack of success which they have had in tracing any terrorist from months past, and the suggestions which follow are the result of my deliberations. I put the matter to you privately in the first instance.

It is, I think, established that the terrorist gang is an offshoot of the Sheikh Kassab gang which appeared in 1930. . . . They are, I am informed, a very fanatical lot. What their numbers amount to is not known. It is believed that the actual gunmen live in Palestine scattered amongst the villages near and around Haifa and in the North generally. They are directed by some Palestinians who live in Damascus. *We have reasonably good evidence to connect the murder of [Lewis] Andrews with those who killed Khalim Basta in Haifa.* It is clear that the gunmen are well directed and take considerable pains to insure success. So much for the bare facts about the terrorist organization. I must add that few of the facts could be proved in a court of law, but nonetheless I believe them to be substantially true. . . . I feel convinced that this administration cannot stand another murder of a British official at the moment. And information which I have is that the gang will make further attempts on British officers in the near future. The morale of the administration generally is satisfactory now. But another murder of a British official will shake the administration very badly indeed. I suggest that the following suggestions might be considered.

(A) The small band of desperadoes who are living in Damascus should be ordered to leave Syria and should be handed over to our police on the border and they should be then interned in Iraq. I realize to the full the difficulties in the way of doing this but I have telegraphed about this today. If we could get these people inside Accre (prison), I think the directing hand of the gang would be removed. We are not asking for all the Palestinians in Damascus to be sent to us though I should have liked to have asked for that. There is no doubt that there are some hundreds of Palestinians there preaching open in the streets of Damascus sedition of the worst kind against H. M. G. The Syrian government which is supposed to be friendly to us and also the French seem powerless to stop this.\*<sup>49</sup>

From: W. D. Battershill  
*October 16, 1937*

. . . *the French were patrolling the frontier which they would have been*

\*Emphasis added.

*prepared to continue doing had they not been asked by this administration to stop. . . . no thanks had been given to the French in the report for all the work they had done on the frontiers in 1936. The French thought there should have been no reference to the possibility of the formation of an Arab agency. They felt that such a recommendation would make it difficult for them in Syria. . . . the French and Syria still definitely had the whiphand over the Arabs there. He thought that they would hand over to this government anyone against whom there was a warrant out provided pressure was brought to bear.\*<sup>50</sup>*

To: Sir John Shuckburgh  
From: W. D. Battershill  
October 16, 1937

. . . When I was administering the government on the occasion of the High Commissioner's visit to England just prior to the publication of the Royal Commission's Report, amongst other steps which I took at the suggestion of the police to insure that there would be no disturbances on the publication of the report was to ask the French to cooperate on the northern frontier.

The actual wording of the telegram I had drafted to the Consul General in Beirut was:—"recent reports suggest the possibility of the incursion of Syrians into Palestine after the publication of the Royal Commission's Report and the conclusions of His Majesty's government. I should therefore be grateful if the French authorities might be asked to intensify patrolling on the frontier." Actually the forces used by the French amounted to three squadrons of Circassian levies with armored cars commanded by French officers. . . .

The High Commissioner [Wauchope] on his return from England and on the question of liaison being raised wrote to [Lieut.-General] Dill [commander of the British Forces in Palestine] who replied on the 24th July stating inter alia "it was very good of the French to put out these posts but I really don't know why they did. I certainly never asked them to do it but I did write and thank General Huntziger for having so very kindly given his voluntary help."

The High Commissioner spoke to me about this matter on the 30th of July and I gather that *he thought I had made a mistake* in seeking for French cooperation of this kind and also in omitting to consult Dill. It was suggested that I should write an apologetic note to Dill which I did. The High Commissioner sent the telegram of which a copy is enclosed. I feel sure that the High Commissioner had no knowledge that the French wished to keep these arrangements in force. And the circumstances as they were then, there was no necessity to trouble the French with these additional patrols. . . .

. . . I have already telegraphed to you regarding some of our terrorists in Syria and now that the Mufti is there the question has become of the greatest importance.\*<sup>51</sup>

To: Anthony Eden, the Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs  
From: Gilbert MacKereth, British Consul in Damascus  
October 18, 1937

. . . I availed myself of the opportunity to which Jamil Mardem Bey gave me

\*Emphasis added.

of putting before him frankly my views regarding the apparent indifference of the Syrian authorities toward the active and almost open conspiracy in Syria to . . . continuance of the public disorders in Palestine.

2. I was careful to explain to Jamil Mardem and the two other members of his cabinet, Shukri Quwatli and Dr. Abdurrahman Kayali, who joined us, that I had no instructions whatever to broach this question with him officially; any formal representations which might need to be made at the present time would, of course, be made to the French authorities, with whom alone I was in direct and official contact. . . .

3. I first of all pointed out that we were fully aware, as was the whole city of Damascus, of the activities of Mahomet al Ashmar and several well known Palestinian political agitators now living here. . . . he repeated what he had frequently told me in the past, that Syria had enough troubles of her own. I said that from what I had heard, I was very skeptical about mere verbal cautions in the case of a person of al Ashmar's calibre. I told Jamil Mardem and his ministers that it was internationally intolerable that the Syrian government should not do everything in its power to stop this plotting. Pan Arabian sentiment, laudable in itself, was no excuse. I had noticed, I said, with growing concern for Syria, many outspoken articles which had been recently appearing in the *British press stating openly* and with some truth, they must admit, *that troubles in Palestine were being actively fomented in Damascus*. . . . I said I could readily conceive of a . . . reaction, were public disturbances to continue in Palestine when so much of its inspiration could be laid at the door. I allowed myself to suggest that one result of rising public opinion in England might conceivably be an uncompromising refusal to countenance the admission of Syria to the League of Nations. . . . I suggested he was possibly inclined to overestimate *Pan Syrian and Pan Arab feeling in Syria*. It was perhaps not so ardent as some people thought, nor was it so wholeheartedly interested in the Palestine problem. I did not think the security of his government really rested on it at all.

4. I believe I was successful in shaking the complacency of Shukri Quwatli, who has hitherto been in the forefront of those who have facilitated the machinations of the Palestinian agitators in Damascus. The Prime Minister was urgent in his assurances that the Government, notwithstanding its difficulties, which he knew I understood, would make a very real effort to put an end to these objectionable activities. Admittedly, these were only words, but I had left my host with a hopeful feeling that I had sown seed the real alarm in their minds which would grow and embolden them to face public opinion and to take some practical steps to stop the abuses of which I had complained. I am further fortified in my hope by learning this evening from Commandant Bonnot, head of the French Intelligence Service, that four emissaries have today been sent from Damascus to urge upon the Arabs in Palestine cessation of their terrorist activities.

I have also been informed that four Assyrians who have been engaged in Damascus to join the Palestinian bandits and who were attempting to enter TransJordan from Syria, have just been arrested by the Syrian police; a hitherto unheard of proceeding.\*<sup>52</sup>

\*Emphasis added.

To: Secretary of State, Eden  
 From: W. D. Battershill  
 October 18, 1937

In view of possible incursion of armed bands from Syria of which there are *unconfirmed rumors locally* I should be glad if French authorities could be asked to intensify their patrolling along this bare side of northern frontier of Palestine. I have not made this request direct as I should normally have done because I understand negotiations are now proceeding between His Majesty's government and French government regarding the Mufti and because such a request will have greater force coming from His Majesty's government. If however, such cooperation has only to be obtained on the understanding that we declare some form of martial law in Palestine and assume firmer control of TransJordan (see telegram number 17, foreign office from Consul at Damascus) then I would rather forego cooperation of French at present for time has not yet come for delegation of powers and *I am unable to agree that control in Trans-Jordan needs greater firmness than is in force at present*. If French find themselves unable to intensify patrols I intend to close northern frontier posts to all traffic during all hours of darkness. I found out French opinion as to this proposal last week through Consul General at Beirut and is clear that the French while not feeling able in the circumstance to oppose proposal would like to avoid its being put into force largely on account of the trade between Syria and Palestine. If on the other hand the French will cooperate fully then I shall not take step of closing frontier posts without further consultation with them. General Wavell concurs in the terms of this telegram.\*<sup>53</sup>

To: Right Honorable A. Eden, His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs  
 From: Gilbert MacKereth  
 October 19, 1937

The purpose to my telegrams numbers 14, 15, 16 and 17 concerning the activities of certain Palestinian and Syrian political agitators to commence terrorist acts in Palestine, it may now be convenient to record in greater detail recent happenings in this connection.

2. After the Bludan Congress, Palestinian and Syrian extremists held many secret meetings. The conclave which was described in annex 6 of my memorandum on the Bludan Congress was typical of them.

3. I have been in the closest touch with Mr. Kingsley Heath and from a copious exchange of information with him it soon became abundantly clear that not only was there substantial traffic in arms going on from Syria into Palestine, *but that active preparations were being made to engage unemployed Syrians for service in bands to commit acts of banditry in Palestine with the object of creating a general state of public disorder out of which the Palestine Arab irredentists hoped to achieve their political aims*. . . . These thugs, led by Shaikh Aptiweh, were able to plot unmolested in Damascus and there was strong grounds for believing that

\*Emphasis added.



they had organized at least seven recent assassinations in Palestine. They appear to have no direct connection with Mahomet al Ashmar and the Palestine agitators. Nevertheless, it was significant that when the Mufti of Jerusalem visited Damascus, Shaikh Aptiweh was frequently in touch with him. . . .

5. On the 13 September, *having obtained positive information on the recruiting of bandits at the instigation of the Arab higher committee in Jerusalem and its agents in Damascus*, notably Fakhri Abdel Hadi and Mu'in al Madi, I informed you of the fact and *suggested that the French government, who are ultimately responsible for the state of affairs in Syria, should be asked to oblige Syrian authorities to take suitable steps to prevent the Syrian, Mohamet [sic] al Ashmar, who was taking a permanent part in exhorting his compatriots to go to Palestine to fight there in the "Arab cause" from repeating his exploits of last year; leaving Syria to lead guerilla bands in Palestine.* . . .

9. By the 11th October I was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt that small bands of Syrians had been formed [with] new group leaders, had received earnest money in amounts varying between 2 and 4 Palestinian pounds, a rifle, a few rounds of ammunition, a warm Jalabieh, and a water bottle. They were only awaiting a signal from Palestine to make their way across the frontier in parties of *three or four, till they rendezvous somewhere in the Nablus Hills. I also had testimony, of which I was less sure, that some similar parties had already gone.* There were unmistakable signs of careful and concerted organization. Experience last year showed that even with active French military patrols and complete French control over the Syrian police and gendarmerie, *factors which do not obtain today, it proved impossible to prevent Syrian bandits from slipping between the frontier posts.* The only hope, therefore, of preventing Syrian participation in public disturbances in Palestine which appear again to have broken out, was to force the reluctant hand of the Syrian authorities, with whom we are not in direct relations, and to oblige them to assume responsibility for preventing these subversive activities.

10. I informed the acting high commissioner in Palestine of the state of affairs. . . . On the 12th October I called on the delegate and laid before him all the evidence in my possession, giving him four lists of persons who, according to my information, should be placed under especial restraint or observation. The lists contained respectively (1) the names of nine political agitators, (2) five terrorists, (3) 27 known bandits, who had agreed to sell their services to the Arab cause in Palestine, and (4) 47 traffickers in arms who, according to their accomplices or to intercepted messages, have been concerned recently in the sale of arms to persons in Palestine. Comte Ostrorog and M. Perisse, Chef de la Surete, who was at my request, present at the interview, expressed themselves impressed by the completeness of the evidence I was able to present to them. Comte Ostrorog promised to get in touch with High Commissioner and, with the added weight of M. deMartel's authority, again confront the Syrian Prime Minister with these grave developments.

. . . M. deMartel had received instructions from Paris to call upon the Syrian government to bring the present state of affairs to an end. This appeared most satisfactory. It came later to my notice however that the same evening Mahomet

al Ashmar had held a large political recruiting meeting in his house and had declared in public that he had retorted to the Syrian Prime Minister's admonition that he had no intention of being dictated to by the Syrian or any other government. . . .

12. The situation was, as I think you will agree, far from satisfactory, and the only other immediate course seemed to be that of direct military intervention by the French, but it did not seem to me that we were in a position to demand this in view of the fact that events in Palestine have not led us to a declaration of partial or complete martial law. Moreover, it is impossible to close our eyes to a fact which is remembered with some bitterness against us; we failed in 1925 and 1926 to show adequate sympathy with the difficulties the French had themselves in Syria at that time.

*It is a noteworthy fact that the British authorities in Palestine and particularly in TransJordan showed a hospitality to Syrian bandits and rebels which now we must truthfully regret. A sharp thorn at our side today is Mahomet al Ashmar. A bandit chief from the Jabrun mountains of Syria, who was directly responsible for the death of two French officers and three French non-commissioned officers in 1925, he had a previous criminal record and was condemned to death by French court martial. He escaped into Palestine where we insisted on treating him as a political refugee. His case like that of Fawzi Kawokji, a deserter from the French forces, was only one of many. Most of those then benefited from British asylum are now planning to go, or had already gone, to Palestine, to continue their acts of terrorism, this time directed against the British administration.*

13. You will see sir that the position is a delicate one. . . . Nevertheless, if we find it necessary to declare martial law in Palestine and what is equally important, assume a more evident control of the situation in *TransJordan* which, notwithstanding recent measures taken to improve matters in that country, *is still an open door to Palestine for arms and rebel bands*, then we should be in a position to ask the French to reassume a more direct control themselves in Syria.

14. Faced with this dilemma, I took the unusual course and opportunity provided. I'm endeavoring to frighten the Syrian government into taking steps which may prove sufficiently effective, provided the situation in Palestine itself does not markedly deteriorate. I hesitate at this stage to feel unduly sanguine, nevertheless the information I received today that a number of people, whose names were in a list I gave Comte Ostrorog, have been summoned to the Syrian police headquarters; that four Syrians bound for the Nablus Hills have been arrested by the Syrian police when about to cross the *TransJordan* frontier; and that a party of men who had left Homs yesterday stopped in Damascus, encourages that the position locally is improving. Signed Gilbert MacKereth.\*<sup>54</sup>

To: Sir George Rendel, Head of the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office  
From: J. R. Shuckburgh, Head of the Middle East Department  
October 21, 1937

In our official letter number 75156/37 of the 14th October we enclosed a copy of a telegram from Battershill in which he asks that the French government may be approached with a view to the expulsion from Syria of a number of Palestinian

\*Emphasis added.

“bad hats.” In connection with that letter I think you ought to see the enclosed extracts from a personal letter which I had from Battershill which reinforces his official telegram.<sup>55</sup>

From: Gilbert MacKereth, British Consul in Damascus

October 21, 1937

1. At present time all Syrians hired to proceed to Palestine *are going* unarmed. Efforts made to arrest them are thus rendered largely negative especially if they invariably travel by night. Syrians have caught about 20 so far but my information is that many get through.

2. *Identity card system should be imposed forthwith. French did it in 15 days in 1926. Without this system control of movements of the population is impossible. . . .*<sup>56</sup>

To: Eden, Secretary of State for the Colonies

From: Battershill, Officer Adminstrating the Government of Palestine

October 22, 1937

. . . 2. *Question of identity card system was considered and rejected some months ago for political and other reasons. Scheme is in being should it ever be decided to enforce it and village registers covering the whole of the northern frontier have been prepared. Question of curfew on roads and adjoining frontier already considered and rejected for good reasons but will come under review from time to time.*<sup>57</sup>

From: Gilbert MacKereth in Damascus

October 23, 1937

(1) I am aware of additional measures taken. I consider them insufficient in themselves.

(2) Having no information numbers of persons arrested after illegally crossing the frontier I cannot judge just how efficacious the new measures have been. I am on the other hand aware that many parties of Syrians have succeeded evading both the Syrian and Palestinian patrols during the past ten days. During this period of fairly willing cooperation by Syria some 25 have been caught attempting surreptitiously to cross the frontier to join Palestinian rebels; five have been passed to French military courts. It is impossible to stop every one but if Palestinian authorities have not been able to achieve at least equal results by their intensive activity it appears to me that method should be changed at once.

(3) I am aware of the many political and other reasons that militate against adoption of identity card system which some years ago I urged unsuccessfully in respect of illegal immigration into Palestine. Nevertheless, I am unshaken in my opinion that without it Palestine public security will always be in great danger, a danger which will increase as French control system diminishes. *The French faced with the same difficulty rapidly brought 1925–1926 revolt in Morocco to an end by instituting this system within 15 days in 1926; they then found the dreaded political consequences had been greatly exaggerated.*

\*Emphasis added.

(4) Curfew on roads is not enough as bandits easily avoid the roads. What is required is authority to hold and send for detailed examination any person found outside his house at night in the frontier zone.

(5) On the other hand if something in the nature of these measures is not done quickly all the Syrian bandits will have gained the vastnesses of Palestine hills despite all my and the French efforts. Sufficient arms are, I believe, already in Palestine to provide ample for all Assyrian and other bandits who can move about unarmed apparently innocent.\*<sup>58</sup>

Minute Written by Sir George Rendel, Head of the Eastern Department of Foreign Office

October 26, 1937

Colonel MacKereth is certainly showing great zeal and energy in trying to prevent Syria becoming a base for the operations of the Arab nationalists in Palestine. It is obviously necessary that all British should make every possible effort to bring the campaign of murder and terrorism to an end, and Colonel MacKereth has, therefore, in principle, acted quite rightly.

But I confess that I am somewhat disturbed by the threat he used with Jamil Mardem that we might veto the admission of Syria to the League when the time came, if the present situation goes on. This statement will certainly be regarded as having been made under instructions, and will probably be reported to the French as such. The French may or may not complain to us about it, but they are likely to be much annoyed, especially as we've already promised them to make things as easy as possible when the emancipation of Syria comes before the League. It might be well, therefore, to give Colonel MacKereth the word of warning.

Apart from this my only criticism of Colonel MacKereth's attitude is that he seems to regard the whole question as purely a local criminal one. The Arab rebels are something more than mere 'thugs.' The code upon which they are acting, however misguidedly, has a passionate desire to prevent territory which they regard as their own from being given—as they think, unjustly—by a third party (i.e. His Majesty's government) to an *alien invader*. \* We must clearly resist rebellion and try to stop murder. But it is merely foolish not to recognize that the rebels may be acting on at any rate explicable motives and are not necessarily all "bad hats."<sup>(1)</sup>

Queries: Copy to colonial office and quite privately to Colonel MacKereth giving him, in cautious language—so as not to discourage him unduly—the substance of the above minute.<sup>59</sup>

\*Emphasis added.

†The generally negative reaction to MacKereth's plea for stricter enforcement at borders to prevent terrorist murders in Palestine by senior foreign officer Rendel and others—"that the Arab 'rebels' have a 'passionate' desire to prevent territory which they regard as their own from being given . . . to an 'alien invader' . . . it is merely foolish not to recognize that the rebels may be acting on at any rate explicable motives"—is an attitude that approximates apologia for the terrorism. Further, the reaction of Rendel, that Jews are "alien invaders," is not unlike French minister Barre's statement in France in 1980 after the bombing raid in a Paris synagogue, that "innocent Frenchmen" were also killed or in danger because of the bombing. The implication was that the Jews were neither innocent nor French.

George Rendel's Foreign Office Memorandum Entitled:  
"Palestine. Immediate Problem"

. . . bands of Arabs from neighboring countries are waiting to take the first opportunity to cross into Palestine to assist in the guerrilla warfare which is being proposed against the Mandatory powers.

. . . we have as many enemies in Europe, and there are clear signs that the Arabs are already turning to them for help against us. Our Palestine policy will thus not only earn us the hostility of all the Arabs, both inside and outside Palestine, but is calculated to bring about increasingly close association between those Arabs and our European rivals, the consequence of which may be far-reaching and extremely serious to ourselves.

. . . no local Zionist success in Palestine could be worth the sacrifice involved.

The trouble in Palestine is political and not criminal, though naturally our political opponents are using criminal measures, since no others are at present open to them.<sup>60</sup>

To: Gilbert MacKereth, British Consul in Damascus  
From: Sir George Rendel, Head of the Eastern Dept. of Foreign Office  
October 28, 1937

. . . there is one aspect of your dispatch on which I feel I ought to send a few purely personal and private comments. . . .

3. *The Palestine problem is one of extreme complexity and is in our view, very far from being merely one of a rebellion by criminal elements against constituted authorities as such. You are of course thoroughly familiar with the aspect of the question from your reading of the Royal Commission's Report. But some of your recent references to the Arabs as "bandits," "bad hats," and "thugs" (cf. your telegram 21 of October 23rd) make me wonder whether there may not be a certain danger in regarding the Arab nationalist movement rather too much as a purely criminal outbreak, and rather too little as a manifestation of Arab feeling against the proposals to create a new state in Palestine mainly for the sake of the central European Jews, whom the Arabs, in spite of our pledges not unnaturally regard as alien invaders. . . .*

5. Finally let me repeat that I put forward these caveats *not with any intention of criticizing what you have done, but merely as a probably quite unnecessary hint of warning for your future guidance.*

*It may, of course, be wise to continue to take the line in dealing with Assyrians that any Arabs who cross into Palestine to take part in the campaign are merely ordinary criminals. But I am not sure that it will help us to get over our difficulties if we are too ready ourselves to assume that this is the case.\*<sup>61</sup>*

To: Right Honorable A. Eden, His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Office  
From: Gilbert MacKereth, British Consul at Damascus  
October 30, 1937

. . . I have the honor to enclose a translation of a letter which I received yesterday from the Black Hand, the secret terrorist society. The same day I

\*Emphasis added.

translated the original to the French delegate for such action as he considered proper to take.

2. . . . This is the third time I've been threatened by Palestinian terrorists during the past 2½ months. . . .

3. These incidents smack of melodrama, but as my latest correspondent observes, they should not be mocked at. During the past two years the astonishing inability of the Palestinian authorities to bring to book the perpetrators of a large number of political assassinations has emboldened beyond all previous measure the thugs of today, and since the French hold on Syria public security has weakened they are not as constrained as they once were in this country. Mr. Ogden and myself, the targets in Syria for Palestinian malcontents enjoying Syrian asylum, have naturally been taking all reasonable precautions. I have now made arrangements to have the consular canvasses suitably armed. Signed Gilbert MacKereth.

[*Enclosure:*] preserved as a memorandum of a threat to the Consul and his oppressive government threat in defense of the Arab countries.

To his Honor the respected Consul of Britain. An Arab salutation of note from Northern and Southern Syria. I have written these lines as a warning that you shall know what will happen. Beware of the murderous resolve of the Arabs and "Fidaiyyin" (desperados) should we decide to use violence. You must remember that you who are English are among us. You eat our vegetables, our fruit, you drink our water and enjoy your sojourn in our land under our sky.

How haughty you are you English. *We know how wickedly you deal with the Arabs of southern Syria. We know too how corrupt you are in sustaining certain people whom all the world hates and whom Allah, the all powerful, also hates.* Understand that we are a secret society that has sworn an oath that you and every Englishman in this city are liable to be slain should our Grand Mufti the Sheikh Amin al Hussani be even slightly injured. You will then be aggressors and will have caused it. This is perfectly reasonable and logical. Therefore, notify your government of this threat and of this letter.

This is, however, not enough: As soon as you receive this message ask two policemen to watch over you, for we are not afraid of the police, or of the soldiers or of any force whatever. We are "believers" who fear no one no matter how great he may be. We fear only Allah. Be assured that by the will of Allah we can carry out the threats made in this letter should the slightest harm be done to the Grand Mufti who is a refugee in this country. Bear all this in mind, reflect upon what we say and mock not at it.

Signed "Kufuf Saudeh" (black hands) tinged with blood.\*<sup>62</sup>

To: Secretary of State for the Colonies  
From: W. D. Battershill, Acting High Commissioner  
November 1, 1937

. . . 2. Between 1st October and 29th October, 288 persons of whom 188 were Arabs have been arrested after illegal crossing of frontier. A similar number of Arabs was turned back through the frontier.

3. *Identity card system would be welcomed by the general officer commanding*

\*Emphasis added.

but in order to be made effective this would have to cover an area from our northern frontiers far south of that of Akur-Safad/Tiberius Road and would entail issue of cards to all men and women over age of 16 to an estimated approximate number of 60,000 persons. . . . Apart from time involved estimated at about three months and practical difficulties involved of imposing on district administration additional duties of introducing the system when they are already so fully occupied with other security measures, *the political consequences might be considerable*. It is inferred [by MacKereth] that like the French we may find the political difficulties have been greatly exaggerated. *I disagree*. It will be maintained in spite of government assurances to the contrary that institution of this system is connected with partition and removal of population and it is possible that we should be faced with mass non-cooperation in which case enforcement must fail. At present there is very strict enforcement of bon voisinage agreement. Anyone seen crossing the frontier is asked for his bon voisinage.

If he has none he's detained until he satisfies the police as to his identity. I am assured that strangers in villages can easily be identified as such at present. Anyone moving by night in this area is at once arrested and detained for investigation. In the circumstances I do not think that identity card system should be introduced and the general officer commanding agrees though with some reluctance.\*<sup>63</sup>

Recommendation by George W. Rendel, Head of the Eastern Dept. of the Foreign Office, regarding Gilbert MacKereth:

November 1, 1937

Col. MacKereth is an admirable and extremely energetic officer who has shown enormous activity in helping the Palestine authorities in trying to keep Arab discontent under control. . . .

At the same time, I feel bound to record that I am not altogether happy about the proposal. [This refers to the transfer of MacKereth to Jerusalem] I am not sure that Col. MacKereth has always appreciated the wider issues involved in this question, which he has inevitably looked at from a somewhat *local* point of view. His very energy and enthusiasm make this loss of perspective more conspicuous than it would be in a less active man, and I think it is important that, if he goes to Jerusalem, any measures which he and the Palestine authorities may agree upon vis a vis the French should be referred to us for our approval before being embarked on. *There are questions connected with extradition of political refugees, and affecting the position of the French authorities vis a vis the Arab world which are inevitably rather beyond Col. MacKereth's immediate sphere, and which will need watching.*\*<sup>64</sup>

From: Gilbert MacKereth

November 2, 1937

From my own observations and direct experience I remain unconvinced that administrative difficulties of instituting an identity card system would be in practice as onerous as feared by Mr. Battershill. To take the case of Syria: with

\*Emphasis added.

a population three times as great as Palestine, operation was carried out with sufficient effectiveness within three weeks. It was found, on 15 days warning being given, all persons anxious to avoid being inconvenienced hastened to take out identity cards. I consider as do experienced French officials that system should be directly offered without delay to the whole of Palestine not merely limited to northern frontier zone which in my view would be of little value. Immediate additional labor would be ultimately regained by increased administrative advantages. It should not be forgotten I venture to suggest that there has been but little peace from thuggery in Palestine since 1929 quite apart from recent open revolts. The efficacy of identity card system is surely shown an advantage taken in frontier zones of *bon voisinage* passes, it is not in the frontier zones where the worst acts of terrorism have occurred but in the interior of the country.

2. If the principle is accepted the system should be instituted as an urgent measure of public security under emergency orders in council without explanation or assurances. Should massed non-cooperation, which after 16 years residence amongst Arabs and Pseudo-Arabs I do not anticipate, render measure negatory, position would merely revert.<sup>65</sup>

#### Foreign Office Memorandum

From: Rendel

*November 3, 1937*

I have heard indirectly that the colonial office are not being strongly urged to take a line that His Majesty's government should meet Arab opposition to our partition policy by pressing forward that policy as rapidly and drastically as possible. I understand that, in the view of those who are giving this advice, once Palestine Arabs understand that His Majesty's government are prepared to carry their policy through, irrespective of any agitation against it, that agitation will subside and we shall have no more trouble. . . .

The line of policy indicated above, if sufficiently ruthlessly applied, will almost certainly succeed—for a time at any rate—in Palestine itself. The Palestine Arabs are mostly poor and ignorant, and much divided among themselves. We should have the whole-hearted support of the 400,000 Jews in the country, and should command sufficient military resources to be able to hold down the other elements of the population by force without undue difficulty. We should appear to have solved the problem by "firm action," and could go to the League and to Parliament with every prospect of getting our policy endorsed.

4. But I submit that this attitude completely ignores the fact that the Middle East is an organic whole. The frontiers shown on the maps, at any rate, as between the Arabic-speaking countries, are largely artificial post-war creations, resting on no true national, geographical or ethnographical basis. Strong measures in one country are likely to produce strong reactions at its neighbors', and there are many European powers only too ready to seize on any such reactions that exploits them to our disadvantage. . . . I submit that it is not only useless, but quite extraordinarily dangerous to deal with the Palestine question in isolation. As I represent it in another paper, the Palestine problem could be effectively settled—provided we do not delay much longer—if it could be dealt with independently of that of central Europe. But to continue to look at the Palestine problem in the light of



our alleged commitments to the central European Jews, while refusing to look at it in the light of the situation, and of our vital Imperial interests, in the neighboring Arab countries and the Middle East as a whole, can only lead to a catastrophe.<sup>66</sup>

To: Foreign Office  
From: George Rendel  
*November 3, 1937*

. . . he [Ibn Saud] has *now* realized that the formation of a compact homogeneous and independent Jewish state on the Mediterranean coast of the Arab countries, with some six million Jews from Central Europe desperately trying to get into it, will mean so serious a threat to any hopes of the creation of an independent and prosperous Arabia that it is his duty, as the leading independent Arab sovereign, to make almost any sacrifice to try to prevent it.<sup>67</sup>

Minute by George Rendel, Head of Eastern Dept. of Foreign Office  
*November 4, 1937*

. . . The bands [of terrorists] may . . . operate from TransJordan, where it is very possible there might be a widespread rebellion, which it would be very difficult for us to control with our very exiguous troops. As soon as the bands begin to operate, organized assistance to the rebels and to the guerilla bands will be furnished from Syria and Iraq, however much the governments of those countries may try to prevent it. This will probably be followed soon afterward by a relaxation of the frontier control by Ibn Saud, and the *penetration of Saudi tribesmen into TransJordan and possibly across into Palestine.*

Each development will produce another on a somewhat larger scale. We shall be obligated to send out strong reinforcements which will be met in turn by more highly organized and more widespread resistance. . . .<sup>\*68</sup>

“Secret” Minutes of meeting attended by MacKereth, British Consul to Damascus, Col. Peake, the officer commanding the Arab legion, the officer administering the government, W. D. Battershill, and recorded by Mr. R. Scott, assistant Secretary.

*November 5, 1937*

Col. MacKereth stated that in some respects the situation might be said to have deteriorated, due to the fact that the French authorities who for some time have been cooperating closely with the Palestine government have now found themselves unable to move the Syrian government to adopt stronger measures against those agitators in Damascus, who aim at the promotion of a Syrian insurrection in Palestine. The Syrian Prime Minister had even threatened to resign if the High Commissioner for Syria and the Lebanon insisted on the adoption of these measures. More vigorous action could not, therefore, be expected.

The group of agitators in Damascus which have been financed with the funds of the former Arab Higher Committee was still awaiting an opportunity to proceed to Palestine for the purpose of stirring up insurrection. Col. MacKereth considered that there were numbers of persons in Syria, where there were many out of work and much poverty, who might be persuaded to come to Palestine for

\*Emphasis added.

money or loot. In particular, there were the dangerous ruffians who emanate from the Black Mountain region between Damascus and Homs. The measures to be taken by the government of Palestine have, however, made the adventure definitely more dangerous and this was recognized by the gunmen, whose price had gone up. At this point when MacKereth was asked what the government could do "short of surrounding Palestine with an electric fence" MacKereth said "When the French had been faced with the great difficulties in Syria in 1926 they had adopted a system of identity cards which were of a simpler nature than the ordinary cartes d'identite. They had found that the system enabled them to eventually catch the gang leaders and consider that this happy result was almost entirely due to the existence of a card system."<sup>69</sup>

Rendel note: Foreign Office Papers  
November 5, 1937

[Rendel noted that the "terrorists" and "thugs" of MacKereth report were actually "sincere Arab patriots."]<sup>70</sup>

George Rendel, Head of the Eastern Dept. of the Foreign Office  
Foreign Office Minute  
November 12, 1937

. . . As will be seen from the attached green papers we have for some time realized that Col. MacKereth's activities against the organizers of the campaign of violence in Palestine might expose him to serious risks. I understand that a few weeks ago he arranged to have a bulletproof waistcoat sent out to him, and I then discussed with Mr. Scott how far we were justified in continuing to allow him to take such risks.

That these risks are very serious indeed there is no doubt. Col. MacKereth has, in my opinion, misunderstood the nature of the trouble in Palestine, which he regards as nothing more than a criminal outbreak against constituted authority as such. We have reason to note, however, that the present campaign of violence is only part of a very widespread and deepseated national movement spreading to all the Arabic-speaking countries against our policy in Palestine. . . . The best service we could render Col. MacKereth and his fellow British officials in the Middle East would be to reconsider our Palestine policy. This question is to come up before the Cabinet shortly and until a decision has been reached there is no more I think that we can do.<sup>71</sup>

From: Foreign Officer in London [presumably Eden]  
November 13, 1937

I am disturbed that Mr. Rendel thinks that Col. MacKereth "is only too likely to lose his life in any case." I am not clear whether this unhappy eventuality is likely to occur because of Col. M's anti-terrorist activities or whether it is simply because he is our Consul at Damascus. If the former, and if a successor too is less likely to be assassinated, then I think that we should move Col. MacKereth and replace him by an officer who could be instructed to confine himself to pure consular work. I really do not feel that it is fair that our Consul should be exposed to this kind of risk through doing work which should be done by the Palestine

and Syrian authorities in collaboration. [Signed by foreign officer in London—possibly Eden.]<sup>72</sup>

To: George Rendel

From: Gilbert MacKereth

November 15, 1937

Thank you for your kind letter, etc. . . . I confess a glow of self-satisfaction on Wednesday when the Palestinian authorities finally adopted my persistently urged use of military courts for arms cases. It is sad however, to think that it seemed to need vile assassinations of a district commissioner and unarmed private soldiers finally to sweep away all the unsubstantial objections raised against this use of military courts. I carry on, you will see, the fight for an identity card system. When this is brought in, provided it is done quickly, tranquility in Palestine should come speedily. When terrorism is suppressed and both we and the Arabs generally will view one another with more friendly eyes. . . . It seems to me a pity that it is only when the country is in a mess and our relations with Arabs have generally been severely strained as a consequence that I, who live in the nerve center of Pan Arabism and mix intimately with many of its more active protagonists, am asked for an opinion. It is in no spirit of boastfulness that I can claim to see the Arab aspect of the Palestine problem in a more accurate perspective than the Palestine administration, with its enforced parochiality and more clearly and in greater detail than those in London. In this connection Battershill wrote to me about my visit to Jerusalem last Friday "the talk we had was of great value to me. . . ."

I much appreciated your views about the use of the word "bandit" and the like. I confess I preferred it to the Americanism "gunmen" used by the Palestine administration. The complexity of the Palestine problem holds, I think little mystery for me. *But I allow myself to wonder whether many of the difficulties are not of our own creation.*

There is one point about the present situation in Palestine where I think there's been some confusion of thought at home as well as in neighboring Arabic speaking countries. There are two aspects to it and they should, for the clearer understanding, be rigidly separated. The first, with which we can allow ourselves to sympathize, is the purely Pan Arab one. And, Palestine has centered itself on an unrelenting hostility to the Zionist movement. The second aspect, which is the one with which I have dealt with in my recent dispatches, is the thuggery which many Palestinian political leaders have deliberately encouraged and developed as a means of gaining their fairly laudable political aims. It should not be thought that the Arab nationalists, either in Palestine or Syria, offer themselves as heroes in a noble cause. Far from it. During the past two months they have been scouring the slums of Syrian towns for known criminals (many of whom already served long terms as punishment for savage assaults.) I have myself compiled in the course of my efforts to prevent them from going to Palestine a list of about 150 Syrians in Palestinians residence in Syria who have in this way been canvassed; *many have been hired and have gone to Palestine with a sordid and purely mercenary mission to create what havoc they can. So far, though I write subject to correction, not a singly honorably known Syrian or Palestinian from Syria has*

*crossed the frontier to join any of the groups of bandits who in Palestine pass their time blowing up passenger trains, menacing and murdering officials, defenseless soldiers, policemen and civilians, extorting money at the point of the revolver from Arab, Christian and Jew alike . . . and performing a hundred antisocial acts. I do not refer to Arabs generally as bandits, bad hats, and thugs, but I believe I can fully justify the use of these epithets in the cases where I have used them. . . . I would go even farther, though I have been careful not to do so in my official dispatches, and say that where the genuine nationalists (agitators and others) become accessories before and after the odious crimes I've enumerated, they earn my contempt and loathing and do the Arab cause, which I personally favor but despair over, an inestimable amount of harm. Their contribution toward it may be likened to that of Burke and Hare to medical science. The situation in Palestine is not at present a political revolt, although it may yet grow into one if it does not soon mend, but a state of terrorism started by the Mufti and his party and now continuing of its own momentum, one with a background, not of Arab nationalism, but of Islamic fanaticism. What I was striving for is not to prevent the nationalist Arabs of Palestine from drawing political assistance from Syria. It is to prevent common highwaymen and criminals being hired by Palestinian and Syrian nationalists in Damascus and sent into Palestine to raise hell there. This, I fear, may sound to you farfetched and melodramatic; it is, alas, the fact. The trouble is that the laudable and despicable aspects tend to become combined with the result that mere banditry eventually takes on a patriotic or heroic glamour as was the case of the massacre of the Syrians in 1933. There is no Syrian politician of my acquaintance who does not openly or secretly look upon that deed as noble, patriotic and requiring no justification. I would however like to stress the point that the Syrian government are fully aware of the danger, the spread of terrorism, an infectious disease, presents to them and are genuinely anxious to see it suppressed, although they fear to take too open a stand against it in Palestine. Yours forever, Gilbert MacKereth.\*<sup>73</sup>*

To: Anthony Eden

From: Gilbert MacKereth

November 16, 1937

As a result of my observations concerning the use made of TransJordan as a jumping off ground and arms depot for Syrian ruffians hired to go to Palestine, I was able to impress on Sir Henry Coggs and Col. Peake the necessity for a more strict control of the TransJordanian police to the northern district of that country. Since I first drew attention to the gravity of this matter a British officer has been stationed permanently at Irbid. I have information that the mere fact of his presence there has given pause to the activities of the arms traffic as in gang organizers. . . .

7. . . . The French High Commissioner asked me to assure Mr. Battershill of his desire to cooperate in every possible way with the Palestine government, and in particular, he offered to re-establish a military cordant along the Syrian and Lebanese frontier. I should again like to draw your attention to the sympathetic assistance I am receiving from the local French authorities. It is certainly not their

\*Emphasis added.

fault that altered political conditions in Syria make the assistance less efficacious than it might otherwise be, but it is nonetheless valuable and has undoubtedly served to stem the flood of men and arms to Palestine. In the absence of such reinforcements and supplies the efforts of the Palestinian and Syrian nationalists to raise a general insurrection, which has been and still is their aim, seems likely to prove abortive.<sup>74</sup>

RE: "Memorandum drafted by Rendel, amended and initialed by Eden and circulated to the Cabinet on 11/19/37, as though Eden himself had written it." *November 19, 1937*

It has been suggested to me that there is only one way in which we can now make our peace with the Arabs, and avoid the dangers I have indicated above, that is, by giving the Arabs some assurance that the Jews will neither become a majority in Palestine, nor be given any Palestinian territory in full sovereignty. . . .<sup>75</sup>

Perhaps because the unfortunate MacKereth admittedly "favored Arab causes" he did not perceive the full significance of the failure to institute the effective identity-card system he so earnestly sought. Afterward, Colonel MacKereth's zeal was transferred to areas outside the conflict in question. However, because he had demonstrated his penchant for fearless and vocal opposition, the Foreign Office did not make the predictable blunder of demoting him: he died as *Sir* Gilbert MacKereth, having served a distinguished and lengthy service as Ambassador to Colombia.<sup>76</sup>

The Arab immigrants' virtual free access to the Jewish-settled areas of Western Palestine—throughout the British administration of the Mandate—would have the effect of distorting critical future political and demographic assessments prevailing until today and—literally—would prevent the rescue of those tens, even hundreds, of thousands of Jews whose lives had depended upon filling the places in Palestine that the Palestinian Jews had opened for them. Those places were taken instead by Arab immigrants—whose own origins and tradition of immigration would be obliterated—since, officially, "there was no such thing as Arab immigration." The Arab newcomers, like the in-migrants from Western Palestine,\* immediately acquired the status of "indigenous native population since time immemorial," who—the British decided—would be further "displaced" by what senior official Rendel called the "alien Jewish invaders," if Jewish immigration were not severely curtailed.

\*See Chapter 12.

## Official Disregard of Arab Immigration

Such Arab entrants will quickly satisfy all demands for additional labour . . . and will thereby virtually leave no room in the labour category for Jewish immigrants from outside for Palestine.

—Palestine Partition Report, 1938

If you debar various people from Trans-Jordan, and Hauranis from coming in . . . it would give more opportunities for Jewish labour? Is that your contention?

—Palestine Royal Commission member to witness at hearings, 1936

. . . it is probably sufficient to maintain the present practice, under which he is counted against the Labour Schedule, though this method does a certain injustice to the Jewish immigrant outside the country whose place is taken by the traveller concerned.

—The Hope Simpson Report, 1930

Perhaps one of the greatest paradoxes of the history of the “Palestinian Problem” is that the Hope Simpson Report, which by itself contributed substantially to the myth of “displaced” and “landless” Arabs brought about by Jews—a myth that prevails today, although its contentions were proved false<sup>1</sup> within a short time after the report was published—also contains in its pages its own authors’ *recognition* of the evidence and factors that *contradict* and refute the very foundation of the myth.

The pivotal Hope Simpson Report literally admitted not only that it was the “present practice” of British officials to blink at all but the most “flagrant” of the thousands of Arabs immigrating into Western Palestine, but also acknowledged that the illegal Arab immigration was an “injustice” that was *displacing* the prospective *Jewish* immigrants. As the Hope Simpson Report had put it in 1930,

*Where the case is flagrant, recourse should certainly be had to expulsion. In cases of no special flagrancy, and where there is no objection to the individual, it is probably sufficient to maintain the present practice, under which he is counted against the Labour Schedule, though this method does a certain injustice to the*

*Jewish immigrant outside the country whose place is taken by the traveller concerned.\*<sup>2</sup>*

Thus we learn, as we suspected from such hard evidence as 35,000 Arabs coming unreported from the Hauran, that the elusive "secret" British correspondence that *did* deal with Arab deportation in large numbers dealt in fact only with "flagrant" cases, and that the "deportations" of Arabs annually *reported*—however large their number might be—must represent a far *larger unreported* incidence of illegal Arab immigration gone unrecorded.

Not only did the illicit Arab immigration go unrecorded, it was clearly *recognized in 1930* that by allowing the immigration of Arabs into Palestine de facto, the British were cooperating in and even fostering what Hope Simpson himself branded as "injustice" to the Jewish immigrant, whose place—cleared frantically and against powerful odds—was being taken by an illicit Arab immigrant (or by one of the 170,000-plus Arab in-migrants), in the mandated "Jewish National Home."

The Hope Simpson Report was riddled with facts that refuted its convoluted conclusions; according to that Report, evidence of Arab immigration abounded:

Egyptian labour is being employed;<sup>3</sup> unemployment lists being swollen by immigrants from Trans-Jordania;<sup>4</sup> illicit immigration through Syria and across the northern frontier of Palestine is material. . . .<sup>5</sup>

The Report described the ease with which a

number of persons evade the frontier control and enter Palestine without formality of any kind. . . . such control as exists is carried out at police posts on the roads. The immigrant who wishes to evade the control naturally leaves the road before reaching the frontier and takes the footpaths over the Hills.<sup>6</sup>

The Report suggested that "when" the illicit immigrants "are discovered"—in other pages called "flagrant"—"it should be the rule that they are at once returned to the country whence they came." Although it might be harsh, so the Report went, "unless it is understood that detection is invariably followed by expulsion the practice will not cease. It is probable that it will cease entirely as soon as it is discovered that the rule is actually in force."

This is exactly the discipline MacKereth and others urged upon the British administration seven years later, in 1937. But by 1942, the injustice persisted still. As British officials would attest in their confidential correspondence,

The police have no instructions to concentrate on picking up *Arabs* who are in Palestine illegally.\*<sup>7</sup>

\*Emphasis added.

Further, Arab unemployment was claimed when in fact such was not the case; according to the Report, Arab unemployment figures were inflated. The importance of inflating such reports was described:

Arab unemployment is liable to be used as a political pawn.

Arab politicians are sufficiently astute to realize at once what may appear an easy method of blocking that [Jewish] immigration to which they are radically averse, and attempts may and probably will be made to swell the list of Arab unemployed with names which should not be there, or perhaps to ensure the registration of an unemployed man in the books of more than one exchange. It should not prove difficult to defeat this manoeuvre.<sup>8</sup>

Yet, despite that evidence to the contrary in its own pages, the Report concluded—with no further mention of the Arabs' abuse of unemployment claims for political purposes—that it was *Jews' immigration* which was responsible for "prejudicing" the Arabs. The Report protected the so-called "existing" indigenuous Arab population, the same community that the Report itself had proved was largely composed either of immigrants or Arab in-migrants, who were not in fact indigenous or "existing" in Western Palestine's Jewish-settled areas—but it was *Jewish* immigration that, according to the Hope Simpson Report, should be reduced or "if necessary, suspend(ed)." As the Report stated,

It is evident that any interference with freedom of immigration is a limitation to the admission of Jews who desire to take part in . . . [the Jewish National] Home. Article 6 of the Mandate, however, directs that the rights and position of other sections of the population shall not be prejudiced by Jewish immigration. Clearly, in cases in which immigration of Jews results in preventing the Arab population obtaining the work necessary for its maintenance, it is the duty of the Mandatory Power under the Mandate, to reduce and if necessary, to suspend, such immigration, until immigration will not affect adversely the opportunities of the Arab for employment.<sup>9</sup>

The authors of the Hope Simpson Report had disingenuously invoked the Mandate's qualifications regarding Article 6—not prejudicing the "existing" non-Jewish population's rights—to profess fidelity to the Mandate. At the same time, in its own pages the Report had strongly indicated 1) that the Arab population for whom they invoked the Mandate's protective caveat was actually largely immigrant and not indigenous—thus not entitled to the Mandate's protection—without ever mentioning the faulty statistical assumptions\* that disguised the tens of thousands of Arab in-migrants, who became regarded as part of the "existing" population in the Jewish-settled area upon their arrival; and 2) that the condition of Arab "unemployment" was being blown up out of all semblance to reality by the Arab leaders who had indeed found the "method of blocking that [Jewish] immigration to which they are radically averse."

\*See Chapter 12.



The 1930 Hope Simpson Report, according to a later British report, was "inclined towards the Arab side."<sup>10</sup> It had been induced by the government on the heels of the 1929 Arab massacres of Jews and other widespread "disturbances," to show cause for limiting Jewish land purchases and immigration and to justify the accompanying 1930 White Paper<sup>11</sup> that—according to the official "report"—"inclined even more towards the Arab side than had either the Shaw or Hope Simpson Reports."<sup>12</sup>

It is the height of irony that the Hope Simpson Report, while testifying to the situation of Jews' places in their "National Home" being taken by illicit Arab immigrants, nonetheless became instead the official conduit for the false Arab claim that Jews were displacing "landless" Arabs. The only Hope Simpson Report findings that were acted upon were those which supported Arab demands. Thus the operative Hope Simpson "opposed . . . further Jewish immigrants as settlers on the land"<sup>13</sup> and recommended "close settlement . . . by both Arabs and Jews,"<sup>14</sup> which was the obligation of the Mandate.\* There would be "no room for a single additional [Jewish] settler,"<sup>15</sup> according to the Report.

The actions that followed from the erroneous conclusions of the Hope Simpson Report, and the like, bear importantly on subsequent and, indeed, *present* claims, charges, and conditions of the "Palestinian problem." It is for this reason that we pause here to examine briefly the results of those actions, not only as they weighed upon official disregard of the illegal Arab immigration, but as they shaped general British attitudes and policy in the years to come.

The Passfield White Paper of 1930 sought to give the right to acquire State lands—not to the Jews for their close settlement as Article 6 of the Mandate prescribed and directed—but to "landless Arab cultivators." Furthermore, the "landless Arabs" need not have owned land before, nor was it necessary that they had been inconvenienced by the Jews' land purchases.

Despite Hope Simpson's own obscured admission—that Arab unemployment was inflated for political purposes—he had correlated Arab unemployment with Jewish immigration. Therefore, ignoring the all-important factor of the *Arab*

\*John Hope Simpson wrote in 1937, "I have just reread the mandate, and cannot think that the intention was to flood Palestine with a Jewish urban population . . . it would seem (Article VI) that the Jewish immigration was to be facilitated especially with the object of close settlement on the land. . . ."

"I cannot but think that agricultural settlement was the original object of the policy announced in the Balfour Declaration and there may be some record prior to the Declaration which would elucidate this point.

"The political importance of Jewish immigration of large scale is enhanced by Mussolini's obvious attempt to constitute himself protector of the Muslims. He is following, in this, in the footsteps of the late Kaiser. But the Arabs are probably quite clever enough to use Mussolini to our detriment, if we are going to side definitely with those Zionists.

"The alternative appears to me to be (1) Give up the Mandate as unworkable. (2) Close Jewish immigration at once, on the ground that the National Home is overcrowded. Or (3) let the thing rip—encourage as many Jews to immigrate as can do so, but make them defend themselves."<sup>16</sup>

Hope Simpson's "confidential" and apparently candid view of the Jews' right to immigration and land settlement as prescribed in the Mandate is startling in light of the fact that his report cynically contended the reverse.

immigration taking place illegally, the 1930 White Paper directed that *Jewish* immigration should depend on *Arab* unemployment as well as Jewish, with no regard for the fact that "Jewish Capital was imported solely for the employment of Jewish labour. . . ." <sup>17</sup>

Jewish immigration and settlement should be suspended, according to the White Paper, until the "landless Arab" situation and primitive Arab farming methods had been improved. The Jews, who had been explicitly granted the position "as of right and not on sufferance" by international Mandate, were now being relegated to a permanent minority status. Jewish spokesmen were in a state of shock. Chaim Weizmann protested to Lord Passfield that the White Paper was "inconsistent with the terms of the mandate, and in vital particulars marks the reversal of the policy hitherto followed by His Majesty's Government in regard to the Jewish National Home." <sup>18</sup>

In 1931 Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald temporarily alleviated some of the restrictions of the Passfield White Paper by the publication of a letter to Weizmann. <sup>19</sup> Only "such Arabs" who could show that they had "been displaced from the lands which they occupied in consequence of the lands passing into Jewish hands, and who have not obtained other holdings on which they can establish themselves, or other equally satisfactory occupation" could qualify as "landless Arabs" who would be given the right to State lands by the 1930 White Paper.

Despite the government's unprecedented generosity and concern, however, the records illustrate that only a minuscule part of the Arab population of Western Palestine even registered as landless Arabs who had been displaced. In all, *less than one percent* of the rural non-Jewish population of Arabs proved to be bona fide "displaced Arabs." <sup>20</sup>

It is a curious fact that none among the "very considerable landless class" of Arabs in Transjordanian-Eastern Palestine—where no Jews were allowed to settle <sup>21</sup>—were given such an opportunity. While Hope Simpson had asserted that 29.4 percent of the Arab population of (Western) Palestine were "landless," and that "Everywhere there is the complaint that many of the cultivators have lost their land," <sup>22</sup> two salient facts were missing from consideration.

First, a "landless" condition among part of the population was common to most countries of the Middle East <sup>23</sup> and was not an indication that there was a shortage of land—as witness the British Government's very different attitude toward "Trans-Jordan" in its 1935 Annual Report:

*Except for the very limited professional and artisan classes, Trans-Jordanians are dependent for their livelihood on agriculture, but although the land is not intensively cultivated there is a very considerable landless class; these landless people in the slack times of the agricultural year obtain employment on the roads and railway and sometimes go as far as Haifa.* <sup>24</sup>

\*Emphasis added.

Second, the widespread illegal Arab immigration—which is, coincidentally, actually indicated in the above Government description concerning “Haifa” and is clearly described in other pages of Hope Simpson’s report as we have seen—could easily have accounted for at least the “29.4 percent” Hope Simpson claimed were “landless”—and more. Even had as large a “displaced” Arab population existed as Hope Simpson alleged, the above factors should not have been ignored. As it turned out,

seldom, indeed, has a report by a responsible British Commission been so completely and so soon falsified by events as the report of the Simpson Commission.<sup>25</sup>

According to the investigation by the Department of Development,

on the Arab side the number of landless Arabs has, no doubt, been exaggerated and no account has been taken of the sources of employment opened to displaced tenant-cultivators by the development of the larger towns or the increase of the area under citrus, but in my view, the real basis of the outcry was not so much the existing state of affairs, as apprehension for the future.<sup>26</sup>

For example, an “Arab expert” witness before the 1929 Shaw Commission had claimed “about” 1,746 families were affected in the Jezreel area, where most of the Arab claims were based.

By the time the matter was discussed in Parliament the number of families involved had been inflated to 10,000. The results of the Government investigation made in 1931, when every claim was closely scrutinized by a legal assessor, completely demolished all these figures.<sup>27</sup>

As a measure of the few “displaced” Arabs who took up the offers of the government, in 1934 *eleven* “new claims” were brought; the Annual Report for 1934 explained that the minuscule number of claims was due to the employment opportunities in the towns and citrus groves.<sup>28</sup> In 1935, there were altogether *thirty-five*. Those few were *not recently* “displaced” but had “delayed” filing their claims “for various reasons.” All had long been off the land. The Annual Report for 1935 stated:

*As none of the remaining registered Arabs have signified their willingness to take up holdings upon Government estates, no new schemes have been put in hand this year.* \*<sup>29</sup>

“Landless Arab Cultivators” continued to be rewarded if their transient farming employment was interrupted by the sale of land. After a year’s notice, they received either cash or land elsewhere under the various “Cultivator’s Protection Ordinances,” which began in 1929<sup>30</sup> and by 1933 had been amended and replaced to the extent that, if his animal had grazed on the area in question, an Arab must be given subsistence area or remuneration based on his landlord’s earnings.<sup>31</sup>

\*Emphasis added.

In all, "only 664" applications were "admitted" up to January of 1936 from "landless Arabs," according to the Palestine Royal Commission Report.<sup>32</sup> Those "proved displaced cultivators" either were given lands purchased by the government "at a cost of 72,240 [pounds sterling]" or they "declined the land offered them on the grounds that they were accustomed neither to the climate of the new area nor to irrigated cultivation."

In 1936, on the eve of the British Palestine Royal Commission's investigation of "disturbances," John Hope Simpson, the author of the 1930 Report on "landless" and "displaced" Arabs that had rationalized stricter British policy against Jewish immigration, had expressed the ever-widening sentiment among the British Foreign Officers: Hope Simpson wrote, "What of the Palestine Royal Commission? Are they men of independent mind? Is there any chance that the Arab case will be properly presented? One realizes clearly that the Jewish advocacy will be admirable. One of the Arab misfortunes is Ormsby-Gore's Zionist bias. Another is his Jewish vote and the Jewish wealth in England."<sup>33</sup>

That Lord Ormsby-Gore, Colonial Secretary, was *not* encumbered by a "Zionist bias" may be evidenced by a letter he wrote at the time of the Royal Commission *Report*. He rejected the "proposal" to give "a general service medal" to those "personnel of the services" who had acted to "suppress" the "disturbances" of 1936:

... I am sorry to say that I feel I must submit reasons against the proposal on political and general grounds, particularly at this stage of events.

The first point I should like to make is that if such a medal is given, *it can only be regarded as a medal for services against the Arabs*. We do not want it to go out to the world, especially the Islamic world that we have been at war with the Arabs; and politically, I should find the effect of such an award most embarrassing, more particularly at this time when we are anxious to avoid doing anything unnecessarily to provoke resentment in neighboring Arab countries. . . .<sup>34</sup>

When the Palestine Royal Commission heard public testimony that confirmed widespread illegal Arab immigration to Jewish-settled areas and other parts of Western Palestine—and the crucial political ramifications that might follow from official recognition of "the thousands" of Arabs who had, and were still, "flooding" the country—the Commission members were incredulous, as following excerpts from the December 1936 hearings illustrate:<sup>35</sup>

*Answer [Witness]:* Immigration from neighboring countries is causing a number of social and economic evils. . . . illegal immigration . . . illicit infiltration from neighboring countries. . . . The movement is continuous of people coming over. . . . There is always a large residue remaining . . . once they have come over many of them find it is better for them to stay on and work for wages

\*Emphasis added.

†In the following testimony, emphasis added.

than to go back to their fields in the Hauran and Trans-Jordan. . . . In the port of Haifa . . . about fifty percent of the Arabs working there are Trans-Jordanians. . . .

*Question* [Commission]: *Are these matters of public knowledge? Do they appear in the papers?*

*Answer:* Yes, they are matters of public knowledge.

There are cases . . . where an Arab peasant takes on a Haurani as a farm hand, leaving him in charge of the farm while he himself goes to a Jewish colony to be employed by a Jewish orange grower, in view of the difference between the wage he gets from the Jewish orange grower and the wages paid to the Haurani. In this and other ways the infiltration of Haurani labour releases an unwarrantable supply of Arab labour for Jewish employers.

Besides the Hauranis and the Trans-Jordanians there are also Egyptians scattered all over Palestine, many of whom have settled permanently. There are also Bedouin from Sinai coming into Palestine with their flocks every year, some of whom are not only present here as nomads but enter the labour market. It is not exceptional to find in Palestine Arabs who have come from as far as the Sudan, Northern Syria, the Hedjaz and the Yemen.

*Question:* As regards these people from the Sudan and so forth, have you yourself seen a Sudanese Arab in Palestine?

*Answer:* Yes. . . . I will give you an example. I was once travelling in Trans-Jordan, and in the desert between Ama'an and Ma'an: I suddenly saw from my car two people walking, and I was astonished because it was a very hot day. We stopped and asked them if they needed something. The first thing we asked them was where did they come from and they told me they had come from the Hedjaz, from Tibuk if I am not mistaken. We asked them where they were going and they said, "*We are going to Palestine; we heard from some pilgrims, Moslems going to Mecca and Medina, about the good and prosperous conditions in Palestine, so we are going there.*"

When evidence was given that Government not only knew of, but knowingly "employed and encouraged" the illegal Arab immigrants, the chairman of the Royal Commission was astonished. He asked, "Do you suggest that the Government, either directly or indirectly through contractors, employs these Hauranis at these low rates of wages that you spoke of?" The witness responded, "That is our definite suggestion. The first point is that they employ them, *well knowing they are in the country illegally*. . . . these people who come in illegally are *employed* by the Government, which is also an encouraging factor."

*Question:* As regards Government employment, of course, the Government do not employ them; Government contractors may?

*Answer:* Not only Government contractors, but Government *does* employ them in the port of Haifa for portorage.

*Question:* Hauranis?

*Answer:* Yes, for portorage. There may be Trans-Jordanians among them also, but those people are employed by the Government and the Government cannot

but know that they are in the country illegally or that they have taken work in the country illegally.

*Question:* If you debar various people from Trans-Jordan and Hauranis from coming in to work in the port, your contention is that the Government would then be able to employ Jews, it would give more opportunities for Jewish labor? Is that your contention?

*Answer:* Yes, that would be one of the effects of it. It would also mean a better position of security for Palestine.

. . . when we began discussing this with Government in 1932 and 1933, at the beginning the Government denied the existence of a serious problem; not that they denied the fact that some people were coming, but they maintained that the numbers were very few and that they were purely seasonal, that there was no residue, and that it was causing no problem at all, and we found ourselves in a controversy with the Government, first of all, on a point of fact. Our estimate of the Hauranis in Palestine was much larger than the figure the Government was prepared to accept. Then a time came when Government itself began to use figures approximating to our own and our impression was, after this had gone on for some time, that Government largely came round to our point of view and accepted our information as basically correct. Then Government said that, although this was so, it was unavoidable that there should be a certain seasonal influx . . . of people from the neighboring countries into Palestine for work in the ports and in the season of orange picking. We maintain that there is a succession of seasonal works in Palestine constituting a practically continuous chain, a *permanent capacity of absorption*, and that this capacity of absorption should really serve the purpose of allowing more Jews to come into Palestine and that the position should not be that, through an inadequate labour immigration, a vacuum should be suffered to develop in the labour market, which would suck in people from outside. So that after we had had our argument with the Government on the question of size we had a serious argument with the Government on the question of whether this was seasonal or permanent.

*Question:* That may have been a very long argument, I take it?

*Answer:* Yes, it went on for years and in the meantime *those people were coming in in their thousands.*

The Jews' introduction of the evidence of illegal Arab immigration was intended to show displacement of Jews by Arabs and the injustice inherent in the British enforcement of quotas upon only the Jewish immigrants.

*Question:* Would it be right to say this? Your contention is briefly that, unless this illicit immigration is stopped and properly stopped, it is impossible for Government to arrive at any satisfactory conclusion as to the absorptive capacity of the country for immigrants?

*Answer:* My submission is that, unless it is stopped the *absorptive capacity* of Palestine, which is continually being expanded, and which it is not always possible to estimate in advance for any length of time is *going to serve the purpose of absorbing people from the neighboring countries.*

*Question:* It comes to much of the same thing. In the matter of immigration,

you want to get, as we have been told, at the economic absorptive capacity of the country?

*Answer:* Yes, for any given period.

*Question:* Yes, for any given period. If previous to that period or during that period there has been a considerable illicit immigration, to that extent the figures must be falsified, is that not so?

*Answer:* Yes, that is so. . . . I would mention this also as one of the *proofs that Government's estimates of absorptive capacity were erroneous*, they were an underestimate, because the country actually proved itself capable of absorbing many more people than those allowed for in the schedules given us by the Government, which were supposed to exhaust the whole supply of labour immigration.

. . . our main contention is that, so far as there is an absorptive capacity in Palestine for immigrants from outside, that it should be primarily used to allow Jews to come in and get that employment.

The . . . main point is that the allotments of certificates for labour immigrants have been inadequate in the course of the last few years and continue to be so. They are not sufficient to cover the demands for labour that exist in this country.

. . . it is a very serious problem, from the point of view of the Jewish future and the future of Palestine. This happens to be the only country, in comparison with the whole of the countries surrounding it, in which development is going on at a fairly rapid pace. Development is going on and absorptive capacity is being created and, to a certain extent, it is being filled by Jewish immigration, not to the full extent by any means, and at the same time *the country is becoming a magnet for the neighboring countries*. It attracts people . . . particularly when there is a vacuum in the labour market and those people are virtually being sucked in from neighboring territories, where conditions remain much as they have always been.

*Question:* That means, of course, the labour schedule?

*Answer:* Yes.

*Question:* [Chairman] You have been talking about illicit immigration. I understand you have not the same objection to licit immigration? Supposing the absorptive capacity in any year was settled by the Government at, say, 30,000 immigrants, labour immigrants. You would not object, I suppose, or criticise the Government for allotting to those licit immigrants from Arabian countries a certain proportion of Arabs? You would not say, "We the Jews, claim the whole of the 30,000," would you?

*Answer:* We would certainly say that the Jews claim the whole of 30,000 save in exceptional cases. . . . the Government is here under obligation to facilitate Jewish immigration into Palestine and the emphasis is both on the word "facilitate" and on the word "Jewish," and it is not here to facilitate the immigration of other races into Palestine.

*Question:* That is an important interpretation. You think the words "facilitate Jewish immigration into Palestine" mean that, subject to the exceptional cases you have mentioned, the Government must not admit immigrants, we will say, from Arab countries, but that the whole of the absorptive capacity—because we are talking of the labour schedule—must be Jews? Is that so?

*Answer:* Yes. The question of immigration was mentioned in the Mandate *only*

in connection with the *Jewish* people. I submit that, in point of fact, were it not for the Jewish efforts in Palestine there would have been no Arab immigration into Palestine in any case. The problem of Arab immigration has arisen only because of the Jewish development and Jewish immigration into Palestine, which has created room for more people than the number of Jews allowed by the Government to come in.

The evidence of illicit *Arab* infiltration from other countries also served to show the real roots of the "disturbances" in Palestine—agitation perceived as "nationalism" or "patriotism"—and economic problems as a result.

*Question:* Do they employ them at that low rate or do they pay them a rate of wages more approximating to what we should call a Trade Union rate?

*Answer:* I suppose when the Hauranis are employed directly by the Government they get the current rate, but when they are employed by Government contractors Government has no control over the wages which the contractors pay.

*Question:* Are they not supposed to pay any recognised rate of wages in practice?

*Answer:* No. An interesting fact in connection with that is that there is now a strong *Arab* opposition to this great infiltration of cheap labour from neighboring countries. The labourers are appreciating the way in which it affects them and the dangers it may have for them. I can bring forward examples if necessary.

I submit that there are also undesirable elements among these immigrants from neighboring countries from the point of view of public security. Many illicit immigrants from the Hauran were prominent during the riots of 1933, especially in Haifa, and the same happened to an even larger extent at the beginning of the riots on the 19th April this year. In addition, many of the immigrants coming from the Hauran are involved in small crimes and there are frequent disorders among themselves. . . . For instance, just recently a gang of Haurani thieves was detected in Haifa and there are also cases of shop-breaking in which Hauranis are involved in Haifa, Jaffa, Tel Aviv and Tiberias.

While there was no reaction to that evidence by the Commission, regarding the "quality" of *Arabs* entering the country illegally, there was pointed questioning about "undesirables" among the "legal" *Jewish* immigrants.

*Question:* One more point and that is as regards the quality of the [Jewish] immigrants who are coming into the country. You are doing your utmost to try to see that the quality of the immigrants is a good one, that a good class of immigrant comes into the country, are you not?

*Answer:* Yes, we do that.

*Question:* I just want to ask you this question. On the occasion of the Jaffa Riots in 1921 the report says this:

"It was only when Arab discontent with Zionist manifestations and resentment against the new immigrants reached its climax that a demonstration of Bolshevik Jews became the occasion for a popular explosion. The appeal of a pamphlet circulated in Jaffa by the Bolsheviks inciting the working class to civil war, was by a cruel coincidence of causes accepted, and the co-religionists of its authors supplied the majority of the victims."



All I want to know is whether you find that there are among the immigrants who come in under the labour schedule undesirables. You do eventually find Bolsheviks and so on?

*Answer:* We exercise very considerable control over this and we go to great lengths to prevent the entrance of Communists into this country. That is a very fixed and rigid rule with us. Even if a man is only suspected of being a Communist or having Communistic affiliations his application is put aside and the case very carefully investigated. Sometimes we find that it is a mistake, to our satisfaction, but we always try to be on the safe side even at the cost of hardship to an innocent man. We say, "We have reason to doubt you. You must wait until we can clear it up."

*Question:* You do not think that there are any number of Bolshevik Jews in the country?

*Answer:* There may be people who turn Communist as they do in any other country. All I can say is that in the selection of our immigrants we take the greatest possible care to prevent people already holding Communist views coming here but I do not say there are no cases of Jews in Palestine who have turned Communist. Their proportion however must be very low.

*Question:* They might slip in as illegal immigrants?

*Answer:* They might slip in as illegal immigrants.

The "obvious" answer, that the "Jews' presence" constituted provocation, was once again employed by the British. The agitation by Sudanese, Nigerian, Syrian, Egyptian, Algerian, and other entrants was ignored.

When the Commission asked for "a remedy," the matter of identity cards was pivotal, and the arguments identical to those that would be set forward in the MacKereth-Government exchange.<sup>36</sup>

*Question:* Then the chief traffic is gunrunning and illicit immigration, is it?

*Answer:* Illicit immigration, which partly devotes itself to gun-running. Of course, there are people who go on business; there are people who go to sell their produce; there are people who go from Jerusalem or Nablus or Es Salt or Ama'an or other towns of Trans-Jordan to sell things, or to visit their relatives, and vice versa, but that is over much greater distances than just across the Jordan.

*Question:* Would you make them take out passports?

*Answer:* I do not see why they should not be made to take out a pass in order to cross. That would not mean that they would have to wait to make their visits, but they would have to call at the police post and get a pass. They could be given a pass on the bridges as they crossed them without any condition, but with the warning that they must not accept employment and that if they do so without permission they render themselves liable to punishment or deportation.

If some accounting and limit was implemented at the borders, more Jews could immigrate to the Jewish National Home in the stead of those "seasonal"-turned-permanent Arab immigrant laborers, the witness insisted:

... we would rather see a certain number of Jews unemployed in the off-season and devise some means for them to tide over the off-season than to acquiesce in

a position where the demand for seasonal labour must necessarily be covered by . . . an uncontrolled infiltration from the neighboring countries.

*Question:* You realise what you are asking for . . . ? It means practically a labour census of the whole of Palestine for Government to get at the facts, which would probably take two years, really to get all the facts and, . . . it would involve the suspension of immigration during that period so that they could absolutely get at the facts?

*Answer:* The suspension of *legal* immigration?

. . . Even if such a census were necessary then I do not see why this should not be begun in the meantime and some measures taken to strengthen the control at the frontiers, without stopping legal immigration at all. I really do not see why legal immigration should be stopped.

Ten days after the public evidence was heard, in one of several "secret" and "private" hearings,<sup>37</sup> Commission member Sir Laurie Hammond advised witness Chaim Weizmann, the preeminent Zionist leader,<sup>38</sup> that, to issue identity cards—"carte de visite"—"it means not only stopping gun-running, but stopping illicit immigration of the Arabs on the frontiers."

In order to do so, Hammond would *stop all immigration of Jews*. Why would this punitive action be justified?

Hammond answered peevishly, "Because there is a limit to what the Administration can undertake, and if they are concentrating all their energies on what I like to regard myself as making the foundations of your national home secure, if they are directing all their energies to that, you must relieve them of the great pressure of work that is thrown on them by these continual waves of immigration."

Thus the witnesses were squelched. The British had perceived the evidence and its proposed remedy as a threat to their neat "system" of immigration. The response was to defend that system with a threat of their own—an insidious threat that seems to have effectively muzzled any further serious argument over the crucial issue of illegal Arab immigration.

Arab political historian and activist George Antonius, whose 1939 book, *The Arab Awakening*,<sup>39</sup> staunchly advocated "Arab Nationalism," also testified before the Palestine Royal Commission, in January 1937.<sup>40</sup>

At that time Antonius attempted to preempt the question of Arab illegal immigration, by raising the subject himself:

There have been complaints, growing in volume in the last two or three years, about illegal immigration. The government came down with all its resources on illegal immigration and what was the result? The result was that in casting its net, it caught three times as many Arabs as it did Jews, and it deported them, at a time when the Arab population of the country was excited and up in arms because not a few hundred, but thousands of Jews, on everybody's admission, were coming into the country, and as against that, a few hundred Hauranis were coming to eke out a living and then go back; they were not coming in as illegal immigrants, they

were coming in as illegal travellers, and yet the government, having solemnly promised to do what it could to put an end to illegal immigration and to deport the illegal immigrants who were already in the country, as I say, cast its net and caught a large number of Arabs and a few Jews.

Now there may be other reasons than willful discrimination for that; I am not sure of that, but what I say is there is the net result, and that is how it appears to the Arab population here, that the Government, when they promised to put an end to illegal immigration, are behind the backs of the people and in secret working to favor it and come down on the Arab illegal travelers and deport them.

After disposing of the question by his gratuitous remarks,\* which drew no serious challenges from the Commission, Antonius also sought to deny Arab "racial hatred" of Jews:

There is no anti-Semitism in the Arab mind. The Arab mind throughout its history has been singularly free from any such thing as anti-Semitism, which, as we all know, is a European and not an Arab invention, and I am sorry to say, a European Christian invention; but the Arabs throughout their history, and more particularly the Moslems, have been entirely free from the taint of anti-Semitism, and it is a fact that *the greatest days of Jewish efflorescence* have taken place when the Jews were under *Moslem rule*, whether in Baghdad, Cordoba, or Cairo, or anywhere else where large Jewish communities were living under the rule of Moslems. Those were the days in which the Jews attained their greatest intellectual, moral and material efflorescence under the direct patronage, encouragement, and tolerance of the Moslem rulers.†

At the same sessions, Mufti Haj Amin al-Husseini, of Jerusalem, whose efforts as zealous collaborator of Adolf Hitler in the "final solution of the Jewish problem" will be outlined later, stated in testimony before the Royal Commission‡ that the Jews

always did live previously in Arab countries, with complete freedom and liberty, as natives of the country. In fact Moslem rule has always been known for its tolerance. . . . According to history, Jews had a most quiet and peaceful residence under Arab rule.<sup>41</sup>

In fact, it had been the Mufti who was considered largely responsible for the beginning of the twentieth century for organized anti-Jewish pogroms throughout Palestine. The Mufti understood—as the British only privately would acknowledge—that the attempts to form a "nationalism" among the multi-ethnics of Palestine had proved to be ineffectual—even the might and main of T. E. Lawrence had ended in his disillusionment. It was only by invoking the deeply

\*Another Arab witness contradicted Antonius's assertion that only "a few hundred Hauranis" had entered (Western) Palestine: Auni Abdul Hadi acknowledged that Hauranis and others were going to "Palestine" because of the higher wages offered there.<sup>42</sup>

†Emphasis added.

‡See the Mufti's testimony in Appendix VIII.

rooted religious prejudice of the masses against the Palestinian Jews that al-Husseini and other *effendi* families could hope to regain the extent of power that had once been allowed to the feudal barons of the country by the Turks.\*

The Palestine Royal Commission published its much-awaited report<sup>43</sup> in July 1937; it was one of the more important among the constant stream of British "investigations" that punctuated the inexorable veering of British policy away from implementing "the Jewish National Home" toward a policy that would not "be hateful to the Arabs."<sup>44</sup>

Embodied in the Report were the "axioms" evolved from Arab propaganda and perpetuated by earlier British reports issued to justify Arab claims: namely, the Jews had provoked unrest by their presence; the "vast Arab majority, indigenous" since "time immemorial," had grown through "natural increase"; the Jewish-settled area of Western Palestine was to be treated as though it were all of Palestine.

Still, the evidence of illegal Arab immigration had taken some effect. The "Arab immigrants," particularly "Hauranis" from Syria, the Report stated, "probably remain permanently in Palestine."<sup>45</sup>

But, although the number of Hauranis who illegally immigrated was "authoritatively estimated" at 10,000–11,000 during a "bad" year in the Hauran, only the unrealistically, perhaps disingenuously low Government estimate of 2,500 were concluded to be "in the country at the present time."<sup>46</sup>

The *Palestine Royal Commission Report* did enumerate several "proposed steps for dealing with illegal immigration"; it presented "suggestions" to the Government:

the following steps might be taken to prevent illegal immigration:

- (i) Legalizing of the position of illegal immigrants already in the country.
- (ii) Institution of an identity card.
- (iii) Enactment of an Immigration Ordinance placing the onus of proof on the immigrant to show that he is in the country legally.
- (iv) Creation of a special frontier control force.
- (v) A secret fund for intelligence.
- (vi) Separate naturalization of wives.

We are not sure on the evidence before us whether it is possible to enforce a system of identity cards. If the system is administratively possible, it is clear that the control of the police will be far more effective. We are, however, prepared to endorse proposals (i), (iii), (iv), (v), and (vi).<sup>47</sup>

Moreover, the Report had stated significantly, in its opening pages,

Unquestionably . . . the primary purpose of the Mandate, *as expressed in its preamble and its articles*, is to promote the establishment of the Jewish National Home.†<sup>48</sup>

\*See Chapters 8 and 10.

†Emphasis in original.

The Report further noted that the evidence “seemed to show that the Jews have been able to enlarge the economic *absorptive capacity* of the country for Jews,”\* and that the capacity to absorb Jews “need only be limited by . . . funds” provided by the Jews.

One of the unsung herculean tasks of the Palestinian Jews during the Mandatory period was their efficiency in enlarging that so-called “absorptive capacity” and the “cultivable” land area. Not only did the Zionist efforts to reclaim and develop force the British to continue the limited flow of Jews—even after it was estimated that the “absorptive capacity” had been reached and no more Jews could be allowed. In addition, that “absorptive capacity” had stretched wide enough to include the thousands upon thousands of illegal Arab immigrants who were counted as “indigenous Arab population from time immemorial.”

Despite the fact that large numbers of unacknowledged Arab *newcomers* must have been included among the claimed-to-be “Palestinian landless” Arabs, all but those “few” who brought “landless” claims at the urgings of the British Government had found work, and even among those few, many had chosen to “drift back to” the easier work in the towns.<sup>49</sup> All of that had been definitely illustrated in the evidence taken by the Palestine Royal Commission.

Yet, disregarding its own finding that the Mandate’s purpose was primarily the Jewish National Home, the *Palestine Royal Commission Report* came to the conclusion that such “expansion” was “not organic but is unnatural, since it ignores . . . the hostile attitude of the Arab inhabitants of Palestine.”<sup>50</sup>

Here was the bottom-line actuality—not that the Arabs were increasing naturally at the claimed “phenomenal” rate, but that even the supposedly limited “absorptive capacity” invented to restrict Jewish immigration had been “enlarged”—not only for Jews, but especially for the Arabs whose in-migration and immigration went largely unrecorded. It was the “hostile attitude” of the Arab inhabitants—whose number grew faster than the Jews and the Arab hostility growing commensurately—which was responsible for, and increasingly appeased by, the British administration of “Palestine.”

Thus the Royal Commission Report, in a contradiction of many of its own basic findings and a misrepresentation of the truth, recommended “partition” of “Palestine,” under which “the Arabs must acquiesce in the exclusion *from their sovereignty* of a piece of territory, long occupied and once ruled by them.”<sup>51</sup>

Among Jews, there were many who rejected anything less than the area of Palestine that had been internationally pledged to a Jewish National Home. Martin Gilbert, the biographer of Winston Churchill, has disclosed the “private” correspondence between Zionist activist Jabotinsky and Churchill, in which Jabotinsky wrote that, although the Jews may not “fully realize” all the treacherous implications of the *Palestine Royal Commission Report* recommen-

\*Emphasis added.

dation, the proposed partition "kills all their hopes."<sup>52</sup>

Others more pragmatic opposed only the fact that, within that "small notch" called Palestine, the fraction of land that the proposed partition allotted to Jews was too small to provide defensible borders or economic stability. The Jewish "non-Zionists" opposed *any* Jewish State, "still believing" that the Jewish political entity might "in some way prejudice their rights as citizens in other countries."<sup>53</sup>

Despite the "deep cleavages of opinion" among the Jews,<sup>54</sup> the Zionist Congress of August 1937 accepted the principle of partition, but they voted the proposed distribution of land "unacceptable."<sup>55</sup>

Meanwhile, however indifferent or encouraging the British policy remained toward illegal Arab immigration—which their reports and correspondence confirm in other pages—the broad scope of evidence attesting to that Arab movement which was disclosed during the Palestine Royal Commission's investigations prompted Government to take certain token measures: In January 1937, the weekly *Palestine* reported that<sup>56</sup> "Palestine Government have given instructions not to employ Arabs who enter the country illegally. These instructions are the result of Jewish testimony before Royal Commission at Haifa."

Of course, Government was not unduly altering the reality, since according to its immigration records, few Arabs entered the country illegally. Thus the system prevailed and "present practices" were continued.

And still another "Commission," the "Woodhead" Palestine Partition Commission, was sent into the area to investigate possible alternative plans for "Partition."

The Woodhead Commission was thrust upon its arrival into the midst of what its Report would call the "widespread campaign of murder and intimidation" that followed from the "Arab side's" reaction to the Palestine Royal Commission's Report.<sup>57</sup>

... the Arabs remain inflexibly hostile to partition. During our stay, no Arab came forward to submit evidence or to co-operate in any way with us: the boycott was complete.

It was little wonder that "no Arab came forward to submit evidence." Because of what the *Palestine Royal Commission Report* had called "toleration by the Government of subversive activities, more especially those of the Mufti of Jerusalem,"<sup>58</sup> not only Jews but moderate Arabs and those *effendis* engaged in a power struggle with the Mufti were murdered. As the *Palestine Royal Commission Report* had observed, with uncharacteristic indignation,

... intimidation at the point of a revolver has become a not infrequent feature of Arab politics. Attacks by Arabs on Jews, unhappily, are no new thing. The novelty in the present situation is attacks by Arabs on Arabs. For an Arab to be suspected of a lukewarm adherence to the nationalist cause is to invite a visit from a body of "gunmen." Such a visit was paid to the editor of one of the Arabic newspapers last August shortly after he had published articles in favour of calling

off the "strike." Similar visits were paid during our stay in Palestine to wealthy Arab landowners or businessmen who were believed to have made inadequate contributions to the fund which the Arab Higher Committee were raising to compensate Arabs for damage suffered during the "disturbances." Nor do the "gunmen" stop at intimidation. It is not known who murdered the Arab Acting Mayor of Hebron last August, but no one doubts that he lost his life because he had dared to differ from the "extremist" policy of the Higher Committee. The attempt to murder the Arab Mayor of Haifa, which took place a few days after we left Palestine, is also, we are told, regarded as political. It is not surprising that a number of Arabs have asked for Government protection.<sup>59</sup>

Many Christian Arabs, as well as the Muslims, opposed the Jews—now predominantly Zionists—and this common hostility toward Jews served to cool down the Muslim-versus-Christian resentments. As an example of the contributions to terror and violence directed by some among the Christian Arabs, Professor S. F. Albright cited an instance during one anti-Jewish onslaught, in which a prominent Christian Arab editor

called his little boy of five into the room and told him what he must do to a Jewish boy if he should get a chance. He even put cruel words into the little chap's mouth: "I will take a knife and stab him; I will take a pistol and shoot him."<sup>60</sup>

But the Christian Arabs were not exempt from Arab terrorism. The Christians were compelled at gunpoint to abandon their traditional head covering, the *tarbush*, and adopt the Muslim *keffiyah* instead. The compulsory Muslim veil was forced upon Christian women. Christian Arab shopkeepers were forced to close on the Muslims' Friday sabbath as well as on Sundays, thus losing a day's revenue.<sup>61</sup>

As in the past, the Arab masses responded only to "the appeal of religious fanaticism and . . . their tradition of violence which a single generation of British rule had not eradicated."<sup>62</sup> The ruling families had never pretended to any sort of reform: the *fellahin* were, in the 1930s, still plagued by "indebtedness and ruinous charges exacted from them by the Arab landowners and moneylenders."<sup>63</sup>

The *effendi*-led attacks upon Jews and their supporters still were designed 1) to keep the "sweets" of feudalism and 2) to prevent the traditional *dhimmi* Jew from an "inconceivable" elevation to equality with Muslims.<sup>64</sup> As one British eyewitness press report described the situation,<sup>65</sup>

. . . For the most part the villagers are decent law abiding folk who have no great sympathy with the Arab rebels who are fighting to stem the tide of Jewish immigration and demanding an Arab Government for Palestine.

They merely want to be left alone to sow and harvest; to marry and find the wherewithal in these troubled times to bring up their families.

Then one night a rebel band descends on the village. The rebel chief goes straight to the house of the village headman and orders him to produce 50 young men to come out on the hills to snipe at the British, and for another 100 men to tear up Government roads.

Hospitals were not exempted from the wanton violence. On June 24, 1938,

“ . . . Two Arabs working in a Jewish-owned stone quarry near Haifa were wounded by Arab raiders. The wounded men were taken to hospital, but two of the raiders entered the hospital in search of them, killing by mistake another Arab, a patient from Nablus.”<sup>66</sup>

The “collection” of contributions to fund the terrorists was equally effective, following the same traditional methods that the Arabs had applied to extract funds for “protection” against raiding. According to the Chief of Staff under Lieutenant General Dill’s command in 1936,

The collection of funds for “distressed Palestine” was carried out by methods similar to those employed by the racketeer. Large sums were collected under pressure from firms as well as from individuals. There was always the threat of the gun. At the same time pressure was exerted on individuals, and sometimes there was the use of the gun.<sup>67</sup>

Even though the Mufti had fled to Syria upon the “resurgence of violence”<sup>68</sup> that he had instigated, Jews, British, and rival or moderate Arabs alike became the objects of his continued wrath. As the *Times* of London observed a year after the Mufti’s flight,

. . . Many of the leaders of the National Defence Party [opposition to Mufti] have been murdered; others have been compelled by threats to leave the country. . . . It is certainly true that during the last four months far more Arabs than Jews or British soldiers have been killed by Arab terrorists.<sup>69</sup>

From April 1936, the Mufti’s “systematic extermination” caused the murder or flight from the country of any Arab suspected of less than total loyalty to the rebels: mayor, affiliated official, sheikh, village *mukhtar* (headman), rival Arab notable, and even prominent Muslim religious figures—all were victims.

The mayor of Hebron, Nasr el Din Nasr, murdered August 4, 1936, was a close ally of the Mufti’s chief opponent, Ragheb Bey Nashashibi; the wife and daughter of the mayor of Bethlehem were wounded July 1937; the mayor of Nablus, Suleiman Bey Toukan, who publicly warned the government of chaos if terrorism was not squelched, fled after attempted assassination in December of 1937. No fewer than eleven *mukhtars* were slain, along with family members, between February of 1937 and November of 1938.\*<sup>70</sup>

Muslim religious leaders murdered or wounded included the following:

- March 1938 Sheikh Yunis el Husseini, head of El Aqsa Mosque administration, was wounded.
- July 1938 Sheikh Ali Nur el Khatib, of El Aqsa Mosque, was murdered.

\*A similar list of “moderate” Arabs who have been exterminated recently by the PLO—the modern “Muftism”—could be compiled today.



Dec. 1938 Sheikh Dauoud Ansari, Imam of El Aqsa Mosque, was killed (after fourth attempt).

Other Sheikhs who were murdered then by Arab terrorists included:

July 1938 Sheikh Nusbi Abdul Rahim, Counsel to the Moslem Religious Court, murdered at Acre.

Sept. 1938 Sheikh Abdul el Badawi, murdered at Acre.

Nov. 1938 Sheikh El Namouri, murdered at Hebron.<sup>71</sup>

As the MacKereth-versus-British Foreign Office correspondence (cited earlier) indicated, the terrorists, or "rebels," were viewed by an increasing number of British officials and observers as "sincere Arab patriots" whose violence was "justified."

There were, however, those who resisted appeasement of the terrorist tactics for a time. One communication with a British "correspondent in Palestine," transmitted to the former Palestine High Commissioner Chancellor, expressed outrage at the reports in the London *Times* early in 1937:

. . . Who is "the Times" correspondent out here? This is obvious Arab propaganda. The Mufti has gone to Mecca with the avowed intention of getting help to continue the contest and as to objecting to violence, it is absolutely false; "Courage to disavow his own tactics"! It is their usual method always to disavow anything when convenient, and unless he wished it, it would not appear in any Arab newspaper. They are openly saying that the lawlessness will soon begin again, but if the "disavowal" is in the Arab newspapers . . . the Arabs would merely laugh knowing quite well it was said just to deceive the foolish English. It is pure bluff. The correspondent is obviously pro-Arab and against his own country and ought to be shown up. It is disgraceful. The murders continue, as you will see in the paper I am sending you.

. . . The Arabs hate civilisation and would like to keep the country in its present backward state but it is horrible to see it being spoilt. The goats are allowed to eat off all the young plants and the women take what is left for fuel. Fortunately, the Jews are enclosing their land and they are the one hope for the prosperity of the land. The Arabs don't care for taking any trouble. They talk big about *their* country but what have they ever done for it? *They tread down the poor and take bakshish and that is all they care for.*

You know all this as well as I do, but I can't help repeating it.\*<sup>72</sup>

Just before the Mufti fled to Syria, the British Commander of the Arab Legion was convinced that

the Arabs . . . are still out of hand, and in my opinion we shall have in the end to teach them a lesson. Besides the Mufti's party which is bad enough we have all the young Effendi class, products of our education, and beyond them and probably most dangerous and well-organized are the Communists. That, a few

\*Emphasis added.

weeks ago a police officer could be murdered in the middle of Haifa, and the assailants get clear away is an eye-opener; and now the same thing happens in Jerusalem. *I am quite sure that lots of people knew all about those crimes, and probably many Arab members of the police do also, but they would be murdered if they came forward with their evidence.*\*<sup>73</sup>

Upon the Mufti's arrival in Syria, a local British officer wired the Foreign Office that "Surveillance exercised over Mufti appears to be little short of a farce . . . Mufti . . . thanking French and Lebanese for their warm welcome here."<sup>74</sup>

Perhaps it was Ormsby-Gore's apparent outrage at the newest "reign of terror" that reversed his previous attitude toward offending the Arab world. Whatever the reason, in his capacity as Colonial Secretary, Ormsby-Gore wrote in a "secret Cabinet memorandum"<sup>75</sup> that although the Jewish "mini" state "may temporarily accentuate Arab hostility in the countries surrounding Palestine," the Jewish state must be supported.

Compromise with the demands of the Arab world within and without Palestine . . . involve at the best the toleration of the Jews in Palestine as a permanent minority.

The "increase" of "Arab intransigence" would be caused more by the continuation of the "present uncertainty" of the British, he asserted, than by a firm position supporting the Jewish state.

It was Ormsby-Gore who had clung to the proposed "partition" by sending forth the Woodhead Commission, which, it was rumored, in the end "would decide against partition."

In August 1938, British Secretary of State Malcolm MacDonald communicated a "secret note" to friends in the Cabinet, confiding that

Great harm had already been done in Palestine by rumours that the wisdom of Partition had been questioned in the Cabinet, which have encouraged the Arab terrorists and those behind them to believe that if only they persist in their campaign they will force us to abandon this policy.

MacDonald noted that the terrorist leaders "virtually dictate Arab Policy."<sup>76</sup>

MacDonald had resisted pleas by influential Arabs, ranging from the Egyptian Prime Minister to the head of London's Arab Centre, to "recall" the Mufti and his supporters "from their exile . . . to negotiate with them"; MacDonald insisted then that "the Mufti and his colleagues" were "in general" behind the "campaign of violence in Palestine." There was "plenty of information on that point." The terrorism was "being encouraged from a source outside Palestine. Terrorism could not continue without that encouragement. . . . I would not," MacDonald vowed, "trust the word of the leaders who had been exiled," nor would he allow them to come back.<sup>77</sup>

The Woodhead Commission, as the Arabs had anticipated, recommended

\*Emphasis added.

against partition, after which the British government abandoned the proposal.<sup>78</sup> The fact that "Arab opposition was a decisive factor in" the retraction of Government's partition plan was "generally understood," although the Woodhead Commission claimed its "rejection" to be "based . . . on practical grounds."<sup>79</sup> Malcolm MacDonald expressed the fear that if partition were implemented, "We should forfeit the friendship of the Arab world."<sup>80</sup>

The Permanent Mandates Commission complained of the British "policy of appeasement."

Mr. Van Asbeck . . . reverting . . . to the seeming leniency shown by the Palestine Government to the Arab population in suppressing the revolt, asked whether that leniency did not place other elements of the population in a very serious situation—the Jews in their agricultural settlements were particularly exposed to raids and attacks by the Arab gangsters. Further, had it not the serious effect of weakening the authority of, and lessening the respect of, the Arab population for the Government? Had it not engendered the feeling that they could be as lawless as they like without feeling the strong hand of the Government on their neck?<sup>81</sup>

PMC member Rappard in particular deplored the "Policy of appeasement" (in 1937) and "felt obliged to confess that he was himself troubled on that point; he could not help feeling that the reputation of undue leniency . . . was well established."<sup>82</sup>

Underscoring that observation, a British colonel explained to the president of the Jewish ex-officers association in Tel Aviv, "I am afraid that merely asking for justice . . . is useless. In my experience, especially in times of difficulty, governments give way only to action. . . ."<sup>83</sup>

Within the Woodhead *Palestine Partition Commission Report*, however, was the clearly marked Jewish-settled area of Western Palestine, differentiated from the rest of the country and divided according to population of Arabs and Jews. As the Report stated unequivocally,

. . . no impartial person would think the Arabs justified in claiming sovereign rights over persons and property of Jews who have settled in other parts of Palestine on the faith of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate.<sup>84</sup>

It was the *only* one of the plethora of policy papers and reports which gave more than just a hint that the Jewish-settled areas were *not* all of Western Palestine, and that the Arabs who claimed rights to those areas were neither justified nor displaced.

More importantly, the Woodhead *Partition Commission Report* posed at least the possibility—albeit presented as though it was not already a fact—that *if* no identity cards were introduced, "*unlimited numbers*" of Arab immigrants from "the Arab State" *would* "enter the Mandated Territories."

. . . such Arab entrants will quickly satisfy all demands for additional labour . . . and will thereby virtually leave no room in the labour category for Jewish immigrants from outside Palestine.<sup>85</sup>

TABLE K. Mandated "Jewish National Home": Chronology of Some Jewish Immigration/Land Restrictions and Related Factors

Year	"Disturbances" and Influences	Immigration/Land Restrictions
1920	Riots and "Nebi Musa." Mandate and Balfour Declaration for Jewish National Home internationally enforced at San Remo. Hitler's anti-Semitic "25 points" spread by speeches. Haj Amin al-Husseini appointed Mufti of Jerusalem by British High Commissioner. Arab onslaught against Jews in Jaffa, Petach Tikvah, "abetted" by "British officials" (de Haas, <i>History</i> , p. 501). Haycraft Commission Report on riots, October 1921.	Jews' immigration quota set.
1921	Eastern Palestine, Transjordan—roughly 75 percent of the Mandated Jewish National Home—separated: forms de facto Arab Palestinian state (Anglo-American Committee, <i>Survey of Palestine</i> , pp. 13–14).	Suspension of Jewish immigration.
1922	"Organic Law" provides "separate Commissions for Palestine and Transjordan respectively" ( <i>Survey of Palestine</i> , p. 14), against Mandate. Walling Wall incident—Arabs incited by Mufti Haj Amin al-Husseini and followers to anti-Jewish attacks (Gabbay, <i>Political Study</i> , p. 31; <i>Survey</i> , p. 23).	Churchill White Paper limits Jewish immigration to "capacity to absorb new arrivals"—absorptive capacity ( <i>Survey</i> , p. 20).
1928	"Ratification" of "Agreement" regarding Transjordan; Arab massacre of Jews, Safad and Hebron, rioting and assaults on Jewish settlements and in Jerusalem by "deliberate religious inflammation for which Mufti and his party bear the sole responsibility" (Parks, <i>History</i> , p. 315). High Commissioner Chancellor's Proclamation, Sept. 1, 1929.	Jews prohibited from settlement in Transjordan.
1929	"Protection of Cultivators Ordinance" enacted for "displaced" Arabs.	Shaw Commission finds Jewish immigration of 1925–26 was "excessive" and recommends restriction of Jewish immigration and land sales.
1930	Hope Simpson Report alleges Arabs rendered "landless" and unemployed by Jewish immigration. State lands allocated for "landless Arabs" instead of Jewish settlement as Art. VI of Mandate had prescribed—regardless whether Jewish purchases had caused "landlessness" and whether or not	1930 Passfield White Paper restricts Jewish immigration and land acquisition, based on "absorptive capacity."

- Arabs in question had previously possessed any land.  
 Hitler's plan for Jews of Europe gaining popularity.
- 1931 Hope Simpson findings disproved by investigation and other British studies; see Chapter 14.
- 1933 Muslims incited at Festival of Nebi Rubin by Musa Kasem Pasha al-Husseini's "violent speech against Jewish immigration" (*Survey*, p. 31). Strikes and anti-Jewish riots. Government accused of favoring Jews. Hitler comes to power.
- 1934 Influx of 30,000-35,000 Arab immigrants from the Hauran—Syria—to the Jewish-settled areas in Western Palestine, during a period of approximately three months. The population movement recognized by Syrian leadership and League of Nations Permanent Mandates Commission, but denied by and omitted from British Mandatory Government data, records, and statistics.
- 1936 Anti-Jewish pogroms, riots, Arab strikes with imported assistance of hired Syrian and Iraqi mercenaries—known as "Arab Revolt."
- 1937 Royal Commission appointed to investigate "deteriorating" Palestine conditions. Lewis Andrews, District Commissioner for Galilee, assigned to administer Commission's tour, murdered outside his church by Arab terrorists. "Moderate" Arabs murdered (Gilbert, *Exile*, p. 186; see also the periodical *Palestine*, Oct. 6, 1937, vol. XII, note 40 for list of names of Arab victims). Nearly 100 Jews, Arabs (according to Esco-Yale, *Palestine*, hereafter Esco-Yale, p. 880, 246 deaths resulted) and Government personnel murdered, around 150 wounded (*Survey*, p. 43).
- 1938 Multi-led guerrilla warfare aided by imported Arab rebels, including anti-Jewish pogroms, assassinations of other Arabs, ambushes of the military, and general sabotage
- "Protection of Cultivators' Ordinance" amended to further benefit "landless" and "displaced" Arabs (*Survey*, p. 290; also see Laws of 1929, Vol. I, p. 299; Laws of 1931, vol. I, p. 3).
- Cultivators' Ordinance of 1933 replaces earlier laws, institutes allowance of subsistence area or remuneration for any Arab "statutory tenant" not "grossly neglecting" areas of grazing or occasional presence (Cultivators' Ordinance of 1933, Drayton, vol. 1, p. 506, cited in *Survey*, pp. 290-291).
- Government institutes practice of deducting estimated numbers of illegal Jewish immigrants from Jewish immigration quotas (*Report for the Year 1934*, p. 28; *Report for the Year 1935*, p. 13; Report, Department of Migration, 1935, p. 19).
- Palestine Royal Commission Report* recommends partition into one Jewish, one Arab, state.
- Unemployment rises, Jewish immigration restrictions continued, "illegal" Jewish immigration rises

## Mandated "Jewish National Home": Chronology of Some Jewish Immigration/Land Restrictions and Related Factors (cont'd)

Year	"Disturbances" and Influences	Immigration/Land Restrictions
	<p>leading to occupation of the Old City of Jerusalem (Esco-Yale, pp. 876-889). Mufti "engaged in plan of systematic extermination of his opponents" (Esco-Yale, p. 888). "Casualties" during 1938 totaled 3,717 (Royal Institute of International Affairs, <i>Great Britain and Palestine 1915-1939</i>, p. 103). "These figures are based on a report in <i>The Times</i> of January 2, 1939. <i>The Survey of International Affairs 1938</i>, gives slightly different figures: 77 British, 98 Palestinian members of the security forces, 206 Jewish civilians and 458 Arab civilians. It does not state the number of armed rebels killed. The figures are based on a report of the Administration of Palestine (<i>Survey of International Affairs 1938</i>, vol. I, p. 414," cited in Esco-Yale, p. 880). Woodhead Commission Report advises against partition; Government abandons partition proposal. The Munich Pact between Hitler and Chamberlain is signed. Evian conference decides not to modify immigration of allied nations to accommodate German and other European Jews.</p>	
1939	<p>Violence of Husseini-Nashashibi rivalry and rebellion continues, 348 "deaths in the first quarter" of the year (Esco-Yale, p. 879). England declares war. Nazi atrocities against Jews of Europe; Arab leaders collaborate with Axis.</p>	<p>Government White Paper enforces new, rigidly pro-Arab, anti-Mandate policy: restricting Jewish immigration to a token number for five years, and afterwards at the discretion of "Arabs of Palestine."</p>
1940	<p>Land Transfer Regulations enforced by White Paper of 1940.</p>	<p>Prohibits transfers of most land in (Western) Palestine "except to a Palestinian Arab" (Great Britain, <i>Palestine Land Transfer Regulations</i>, Command Paper 6180, 1940; see Esco-Yale, p. 933 ff).</p>

The Woodhead Report attempted to dispose of the problem of "Arab entrants" by representing it as only a probability for the future, ignoring the evidence of a condition that had been recognized as prevailing nearly a decade before by the Hope Simpson Report.

While High Commissioner Wauchope asserted that the situation had worsened in 1936, and that additional measures should be taken to "protect" the small farmer as well as the tenant-cultivator, the Annual Report for 1937 noted that the total of Arabs who claimed to be dispossessed—six families—were compensated by Government lands.<sup>86</sup>

An example of how the actual conditions at the time were distorted by purportedly fair-minded "reports" is illustrated in the case of the Wadi Hawarith Arabs. As reported in the 1945–1946 Anglo-American *Survey of Palestine*, the Wadi Hawarith Arabs were "the first landless Arabs to be dealt with." Their "eviction" made it "imperative" to "find other land" for them, so Government

undertook the reclamation and deep ploughing of some 10,000 dunums of the land which it had purchased in the *Beisan* subdistrict, with a view to settling these Arabs upon it, and by the 31st of August, 1933, the major portion of the area was ready for occupation. On being evicted from the Wadi Hawarith, the Arabs, however, refused to settle on the lands prepared for them *on the grounds* that they were used neither to the climate nor to irrigated cultivation; their settlement in the Beisan subdistrict had accordingly to *be abandoned*.<sup>\*87</sup>

Yet the lands in the Beisan subdistrict that Government offered to the "landless Arabs"—whose "landless" counterparts in Transjordan, Palestine, or Egypt were offered no such benefits—had been found to be deserted and without cultivation for "a period of between 20 and 30 years" during a 1921 investigation.<sup>88</sup> As such, the lands might have become state domain, and thus would be subject to the Mandatory requirement of "close settlement" by Jewish immigrants. Yet the land was treated as "Arab land" and *still* only 43 families accepted the land, the "new houses, water and irrigation works," because, as Government explained, employment opportunities abounded elsewhere.<sup>89</sup> Those facts were omitted from the *Survey*, however.

The Royal Commission Report "regretted" that Government did not buy lands for "hired labourers" or those who had sold land to Arab moneylenders, who in turn sold to Jews—that it "only" allowed "Arabs who had lost their land as tenants and cultivators."<sup>90</sup> But a Woodhead Commission member challenged that premise the following year. Sir Alison Russell commented,

It does not appear to me that to permit an Arab to sell his land for three or four times its value, and to go with the money to a different part of the Arab world where land is cheap, can be said to "prejudice" his rights and position within the meaning of Article 6 of the Mandate for Palestine. Indeed, the attempts that have been made to prevent the sale of land by Arabs have been resisted.<sup>91</sup>

\*Emphasis added.

The Arab Palestinian notable Musa Alami pointed out that most of the Jewish purchases had been from "absentee landlords." Arab small landholders "in general would only part with their land when hopelessly in debt to moneylenders." Alami lamented that

So far all the Higher Arab Committee had done to discourage such sales was to disapprove them and bring such pressure as was possible on would-be sellers. . . .<sup>92</sup>

In fact, no blame was attached to the Jewish land purchasers by the various reports.<sup>93</sup> And as one British writer pointed out,

In point of fact, an exhaustive inquiry by the Government showed, as we have seen, that the displacement of Arabs was infinitesimal and although defenders of the Arab case deny this, they have so far produced no fact or figures to shake the statement in the Annual Report of 1935<sup>[94]</sup> *that the dispossessed Arabs represented about three-fifths of 1 percent of the rural non-Jewish population as shown by the 1931 census.* \*<sup>95</sup>

Indeed, the "ban on the sale of land to Jews," which since the anti-Jewish uprisings by the Arabs had "headed all the Arab programs," was subverted by the actions of many Arab landowners themselves. The "ban" meant partly to channel traditional intolerance and frustration into political foment among the Arab masses, "particularly the rural population." But it was assessed in 1931 as only a "slogan" to incite, while at the same time

men who, as politicians, everywhere brand the sale of land to Jews as a crime, are offering their own land for sale as landowners, like all other landowners in financial difficulties.

Because of the violence visited upon those who publicly would do business with the Jews, many of the landowners "prefer the method of indirect negotiation through dummies—out of fear of public opinion." However, there was no question that

they [Arab landowners] are ready to transfer their lands—for hard cash—to the Jews.<sup>96</sup>

Where problems existed for the peasantry,

every one of the inquiries into rural development which took place during the early '30's revealed that the real problems of the fellahin were, apart from the land system itself, indebtedness and the ruinous charges exacted from them by the Arab landowners and moneylenders—usually the same class, and often the same individuals.<sup>97</sup>

The paralyzing "burden of debt" had been perpetuated by Arab moneylenders well into the '30s.<sup>98</sup>

\*Emphasis added.



It was "not in the interest of the Arab governing classes that the Arab-fellahin and laborers should improve their economic position or learn new methods,"<sup>99</sup> which was exactly what the Jewish development offered.

A British Colonial officer, noting the Arab Executive Committee's *rejection* of Government aid for the "landless" Arabs,\* remarked,

This shows how much sympathy for displaced Arabs exists among Arab landowners, and how little displaced Arabs want to get "back to the land."<sup>100</sup>

As the Royal Commission Report noted, "the Arab peasant proprietor" was being "gradually but inevitably" absorbed—not by Jews but "by the Arab *effendi* or capitalist landlord."<sup>101</sup>

The propaganda allegations that Jewish immigration caused a shortage of Arab employment omitted carefully the fact that the Arab labor in question would have been, in great part, illegally immigrating into the Jewish-settled areas of Western Palestine. Further, in cases where no Arab laborers were hired,

The propagandists usually forget to add that in the co-operative and communal settlements . . . *no hired labor of any kind was employed*. But in any case . . . a large proportion of the Arab rural population found employment . . . such as they had never known before.†<sup>102</sup>

Wages were rising.<sup>103</sup> In 1937 land prices soared and it was solely Arab landsellers who were the beneficiaries, even while "in public" they might be helping incite the Arab peasants to anti-Jewish violence and "denouncing" the land sales.<sup>104</sup>

But while the charge that a large landless class had been created by Jewish settlers had been quickly disproved and discredited by the plethora of British studies following the Hope Simpson Report, the devices for preventing the volume of Jewish immigration that the country actually was capable of accommodating remained in force. The "absorptive capacity" was limited by "unemployment" and supposed "natural increase" of "native Arabs," while "cultivable" lands were misrepresented as "uncultivable" when estimating the number of *Jews* who could find space in Western Palestine.

When Lewis Andrews, District Commissioner and Director of Development for the Galilee, was grilled by the Palestine Royal Commission in November 1936, he debunked the alleged "displacement-by-Jews."<sup>105</sup> Several Commission members expressed disbelief at the "comparatively few complaints and applications" by "landless and displaced" Arabs that Andrews had received. Even though new Arab immigrants were doubtless being counted as long time inhabi-

\*The same attitudes that motivated the Arab Executive Committee to refuse government aid for the alleged "landless Arabs"—mostly new Arab entrants—also would be seen more than a decade later in 1948, when the Arab world adamantly rejected universally-offered funds and guidance to rehabilitate and resettle the Arab "refugees": in both cases, the real traditions and circumstances of the peoples involved, and the actual culpability for those circumstances, was disguised and then exploited—at cost to the "landless" or "refugee" Arabs themselves.

†Emphasis added.

tants (since Andrews did not make mention of Arab illegal immigration as a condition), still there were very few Arabs who took advantage of Andrews' and his assistants' invitations to come forward.

The line of questioning attempted to discern whether there were not "another number of persons who were displaced when the Jews acquired land. . . ." (Andrews had earlier testified that a number of Arabs had been "displaced in consequence of the purchase of land by *non-Jews*" but because, "under the definition [of a 'landless Arab'] he must be displaced as a result of the sale of land to *Jews*," that subject was categorically dropped from the hearings.<sup>106</sup>) Andrews said he had "no record of" another group of "complaints." When the question was repeated Andrews added, somewhat peeved, that

In fact we had a very good "scout round" to get people to put in applications and we were accused at the time of forcing people to put in applications *unnecessarily*. \*

Many Arabs who had worked on the lands had drifted to the towns, Andrews said. When his staff "put" them "back," he explained, "they had to work harder than they anticipated," so "they gradually drifted back," into what Andrews called "town life."<sup>107</sup> At the conclusion of Andrews' testimony, he was asked again "why there were so comparatively few complaints. . . ." Andrews said,

The only answer I can give is that there were not so many people displaced as we imagined.<sup>108</sup>

Lewis Andrews was murdered by Arab terrorists ten months later,<sup>109</sup> shot down as he left his church services, "where he had read the lessons."

Colonial Secretary Ormsby-Gore announced the circumstances surrounding Andrews' murder at a Cabinet meeting on September 29, 1937:

Mr. Andrews was perhaps the most promising member of the Palestine Civil Service and had been attached to the Royal Commission during their visit. It was at his house that the Royal Commission had met the Arab leaders and it was known that his name had been placed on the Mufti's black list. The circumstances of the murder were most despicable. . . .

"This murder had been accompanied by *many other murders of moderate Arabs*, and a reign of terror seems to have been inaugurated."<sup>110</sup>

Despite, or perhaps because of the terrorism, Government policy continued to "facilitate close settlement by"—Arabs: in the Jewish-settled plains, within the Jewish National Home. And the Jews were *prevented* from settling elsewhere in Palestine as compensation for the land pulled out from under them, land that had been granted "as of right." The Royal Commission Report stated that,

\*Emphasis added.

at present, and indeed for many years to come, the Mandatory Power should not attempt to facilitate the close settlement of Jews in the hilly districts generally . . .<sup>111</sup>

No land in the “hilly” or “Arab” area could be settled by Jews as compensation. Thus, as Hope Simpson’s critical, obscured observation testified, “injustice” was done “to the Jewish immigrant outside the country whose place is taken” by the Arab immigrants.

The Arabs and their supporters continued to focus on the ploys begun in Turkish times, the “landless” and “displaced Arab” myths, promoting terror to instigate policies that would prevent Jews from immigrating. Meanwhile the truth—that Arabs were in fact displacing Jews in the “Jewish National Home”—was buried in the pages of the Hope Simpson Report, put there perhaps by John Hope Simpson or his assistants as a concession to a nagging conscience. It remained generally unrecognized and ignored.

## Britain's Double Standard

I can only hope and expect that the other world, which has such deep sympathy for these criminals, will at least be generous enough to convert this sympathy into practical aid. We, on our part, are ready to put all these criminals at the disposal of these countries, for all I care, even on luxury ships.

—Adolf Hitler, 1938

If we must have preferences, let me murmur in your ear that I prefer Arabs to Jews.

—Anthony Eden, 1943

**T**he Arab population that migrated and emigrated from surrounding Arab areas to become beneficiaries of the Jews' efforts unquestionably were following a traditional pattern and a natural inclination to better themselves. But the "injustice"—as Hope Simpson observed—follows from the fact that these émigrés from other areas were allowed to flood into the new projects in such numbers that they filled the places—which the Palestinian Jews developed and reclaimed at great personal sacrifice—places meant to provide space for the hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of Jewish refugees fleeing to their homeland from oppression throughout the world.

It was because these Arab immigrants were counted, from the time of their arrival, as "original settlers" in the Jewish-settled area who would be "displaced" after "two thousand years" if more Jewish refugees entered the land—it was this claim, along with the wanton terrorist violence by Arab provocateurs, that resulted in, first, the Turkish and, eventually, the British Mandatory power's restrictions upon Jewish immigration based on the specious charge that "Arabs" were "displaced" by Jewish land purchases.

Despite all the lands with great potential for development in the Arab world, it was the deteriorated, comparatively minuscule "Jewish Homeland" in "Palestine" that the Arabs predominantly sought. Although we may understand and sympathize with the natural inclination of man and woman to better themselves, that trend cannot be justification for distorting and misrepresenting the conditions of the League of Nations Palestine Mandate, which England was legally

obligated to observe. The evidence indicates, however, that England honored its obligation in the breach.

The fact is that Jews were allowed to settle only on a very limited and restricted portion of the land. As an illustration, even if one utilized the prevalent distorted population comparison—Jews-within-Jewish-settled-areas compared with the Arabs-throughout-Western Palestine—the Jews still would have constituted 33 percent (about 400,000) of the 1935 population of Western Palestine.<sup>2</sup> Yet in 1935 Jews had acquired only 9.3 percent of the land of Western Palestine—a far smaller proportion than their population would justify even had the land of Palestine not been allotted as the “Jewish Homeland” many years before. But the land of Palestine had been recognized as the haven for Jews, where Jews would be unrestricted in their “close settlement with the land”; even preceding the Nazi holocaust the Jews had needed that haven from persecution and desolation in Arab lands and in Europe. Still, the only immigration restrictions imposed by the British, and they were vigilantly adhered to, were the restrictions on the Jews.

The “humaneness” of advocating a Jewish nation reborn had been for some a politically motivated tactic. When it failed as effective foreign policy, some among the British hoped to nullify or at least neutralize the Jewish homeland in a fruitless attempt to appease the Arab Muslim world. (It must be pointed out that this discussion bears upon the British only insofar as they were convinced by the Arabs’ intransigence and violence that there was only one course—against the Jews.<sup>3</sup>) It is not to “beat a dead horse” that the British role in assisting the Arab cause is reiterated. The British, in attempting to gain the support of the predominantly Arab-Muslim Middle East against the Nazis, mistakenly calculated that capitulation to the Arab demands would gain such support. As will be illustrated, subsequent events proved that British appeasement was to no avail.

From the beginning of the British Mandate, support from high British quarters had been given to the implementation of the Jewish homeland with which England had been charged.

International expectations for Britain’s administration of the Palestine Mandate and the purpose of the Mandate’s incorporation of the Balfour Declaration for “The Jewish National Home” were unambiguous. Against Arab demands for repudiation of the Balfour Declaration and a halt of Jewish immigration, the British Colonial Secretary, Duke of Devonshire, stated in a 1923 speech before the House of Lords,

The Mandate is not merely a national obligation, it is an international obligation, and the Balfour Declaration was the basis on which we accepted from the principal Allied Powers the position of Mandatory Power in Palestine. . . . It is not possible for us to say that we wish to reserve certain portions of the Mandate and dispense with others.<sup>4</sup>

But, also from the beginning, double and conflicting signals were evidenced in stated policy and unofficial communications, actions, and attitudes of British officials concerned.

As John Gunther observed,

From the beginning Zionism faced not only political watering down of the Mandate but deep-seated antipathy from anti-Semitic British officials. The Jews were violently discriminated against—in what was presumably to be their own country.<sup>5</sup>

What was an inbred Arab abhorrence of the *dhimmi* Jews' intimations of equality, coupled with the drive of *effendi* leadership to keep its general stranglehold over the country and those "sweets of office," found sympathy, compatibility, or both among some in England.

Compounding the effect of the Arabs' intimidation by terror on British policy was a predisposition of certain key British officers toward the Arab anti-Jewish attitudes. Certainly England's acquiescence to Arab demands of restrictions against Jews, for the oft-stated reason that the British then would gain the Arabs as long-hoped-for allies against the Axis, bore scant credibility on the basis of logical British foreign policy. The *Palestine Royal Commission Report* recalled that in World War I, among "the Arabs of Palestine . . . while some Palestinian conscripts deserted, others continued fighting in the Turkish army." None fought for the British against the Turkish and German forces. "Ten thousand Arabs and five hundred of their officers had deserted" in 1917, one German historian observed in 1926.<sup>6</sup>

The Arabs' potential "reliability" as allies must have been known to British officials: the fact was well chronicled that those who were active among the "inert"<sup>7</sup> Arab population of East and West Palestine, "far from contributing anything towards ultimate victory," had "actively opposed" the British.<sup>8</sup> David Lloyd George wrote:

No race has done better out of the fidelity with which the Allies redeemed their promises to the oppressed races than the Arabs . . . the Arabs have already won independence in Iran, Arabia, Syria and Trans-Jordania, *although most of the Arab races fought throughout the War for their Turkish oppressors*. Arabia was the only exception in that respect. *The Palestinian Arabs fought for Turkish rule.*<sup>\*9</sup>

As a grand vizier of the Turkish Empire said in 1917, "The Fatherland of a Muslim is the place where the Holy Law of Islam prevails."<sup>10</sup> Bernard Lewis observed,

. . . A Muslim Iraqi would feel far closer bonds with a non-Iraqi Muslim than with a non-Muslim Iraqi. . . the imported western idea of ethnic and territorial nationhood remains, like secularism, alien and incompletely assimilated.<sup>11</sup>

\*Emphasis added.

T. E. Lawrence "of Arabia," whose exploits in the quest to raise an Arab national movement greatly romanticized the image of the Arab world in the West, was more realistic in his private appraisals than his public expectations. In 1916 Lawrence wrote:

. . . Unless we, or our allies, make an efficient Arab empire, there will never be more than a discordant mosaic.<sup>12</sup>

There is no national feeling.<sup>13</sup>

Lawrence had come to realize that, for the Arab—whom Lawrence called "Semite"—the "ideal of national union was episodic combined resistance to an intruder. Constructive policies, an organized state, an extended empire, was not so much beyond their sight as hateful in it. They were fighting to get rid of the [Turkish] Empire, not to win it."<sup>14</sup> "Arab unity is a madman's notion."<sup>15</sup>

Lawrence "meant to make a new nation,"<sup>16</sup> but even he had his reservations. In a startling, prophetic insight, Lawrence noted,

They [the Arabs] were weak in material resources, and even after success would be, since their world was agricultural and pastoral, *without minerals*, and could never be strong in modern armaments. Were it otherwise, we should have had to pause before evoking in the strategic centre of the Middle East new national movements of such abounding vigor.\*<sup>17</sup>

Whatever the past record of the Muslim Arabs in Palestine, the Haycraft Commission of 1921 investigating anti-Jewish attacks by the Muslims in Jaffa and the violent attack on the Jews at the Khedera settlement, established a precedent that was to be inimical to the "Jewish National Home." The Haycraft Report cited the fact that in the Muslim-populated villages around the Jewish settlements, † "Jews were not tolerated," and that Muslims had spread false rumors to incite against the Jews. Nevertheless, the same report found the anti-Jewish onslaught "grossly exaggerated." The Haycraft Report attributed the action—not to scapegoating of the *dhimmi* Jew, which had long been the tradition in Southern Syria-Palestine, but to "Zionist manifestations" by "'new' Jews" and "Bolsheviks," which quite understandably, it was implied, brought "Arab discontent."<sup>18</sup>

A month after the Haycraft Report was issued, in an attempt to mollify the Arabs who charged that the British were favoring Jews, Winston Churchill told a meeting of the Deputation of Arabs that

Many of the British Officials in Palestine are very, very friendly to the Arabs, more so than to the Jews. The Jews make continued outcry on that subject, that the British officials and the British military authorities are unduly partial towards the Arabs. No one has harmed you, and no one is harming you. . . . Give the Jews their chance.<sup>19</sup>

\*Emphasis added.

†Many of the "Arabs" surrounding Khedera had immigrated to the neighborhood following founding of the Jewish settlement. See Chapter 12.

The Hope Simpson and the Palestine Royal Commission Reports, discussed earlier, are classic examples of the double signals issued throughout the British Mandatory administration; they contained both the false Arab allegations and the facts that contradicted those allegations—but the “injustice” to the Jews was disregarded. Twisted and buried among the reams of rhetoric in the various “Reports,” the crux of the population issue was there—but the Arabs refuted and fiercely denied it, alternately terrorizing and charming the British authorities into incorporating Arab propaganda charges as “facts” in the determination of British policy.

The inflammatory Arab press continued its “campaign against Jewish immigration,” stepping it up in 1933, the year Adolf Hitler came to power.<sup>20</sup> The proved facts notwithstanding, Arab newspapers accused the British Government of “flooding the country with Jews with the object of displacing Arabs from the land and depriving them of employment.”<sup>21</sup>

Despite the fact that the mythical, prohibitive “absorptive capacity”—employed solely against Jewish immigration—had been proved inaccurate many times since its invention in 1922, Arab propaganda was working its way ever more comprehensively into British perceptions. The “secret Report on the Political Situation” for October 1933, from the British Foreign Officer at Amman, Transjordan, told the Foreign Office that, according to “His Highness,” the Emir, Palestine can “hold no more” Jews

and is, indeed, over full already as is proved by the reports of those experts who have visited Palestine to examine the situation. Any further influx of Jews is therefore, he [Emir] considers, an indication that this excess is destined for neighboring Arab States, and of this these neighboring States are highly apprehensive.<sup>22</sup>

Transjordanian Palestine’s “Emir” needn’t have worried about Western Palestine’s “neighbors.” Illustrating a noticeable double standard that stood the stated purpose of the Mandated “Jewish National Home” on its head, the Transjordanian Arabs were admitted freely to *Western* Palestine with its shrunken Jewish-settled area, but the Jews, without exception, were not allowed to settle in Transjordan. The League of Nations Permanent Mandates Commission had repeatedly underlined the duty of the Mandatory power (Britain): to “provide *special* facilities for the immigration of Jews,” throughout Palestine, their “National Home.”<sup>23</sup> That included Transjordanian, or Eastern, Palestine, the “beautiful Trans-Jordanian plateaux . . . neglected and uninhabited. . . .” In 1921 it had a “total population” of “considerably less than 200,000. . . .”

Chaim Weizmann had written to Winston Churchill in 1921 that<sup>24</sup>

Eastern Palestine . . . may bulk much larger in the economic future of the Jewish National Home. . . .

The economic progress of Cis-Jordania itself is dependent upon the development of these Trans-Jordanian plains, for they form the natural granary of all Palestine and without them Palestine can never become a self-sustaining, eco-



nomic unit and a real National Home. The evidence of competent and impartial authorities . . . gives abundant proof of this. . . .

It is confidently hoped, therefore, that there will be no thought of any further diminution of the legitimate claims of Palestine when the eastern and southern frontiers come under discussion. The unsatisfactory character of the settlement on the north makes it all the more vital that the Jewish National Home be generously dealt with on the east and south.<sup>25</sup>

Over the years, the actuality restricted Jewish immigration even in the small, Jewish-settled portion of Western Palestine. "Government" forbade Jewish settlement in the eastern area of Palestine called Transjordan, while at the same time it was blinking at the broad-scale Arab in-migration and illicit Arab immigration into the Jewish-settled area of Western Palestine. The situation created was in fact diametrically opposed to the express purpose of the Jewish National Home—it facilitated instead Arab influx and imposed its restrictions only on the Jews. One member of the Permanent Mandates Commission observed,

While Trans-Jordanians might go freely into [Western] Palestine Jews were not allowed to settle in Trans-Jordan.<sup>26</sup>

Although according to the Mandates Commission, "There could be no doubt that quite a large number of Trans-Jordanians did settle in [Western] Palestine,"<sup>27</sup> the attitude prevalent among the British was that a reciprocal agreement allowing Jews into *Eastern* Palestine—or Transjordan—must be avoided. As Major J. B. Glubb, "Glubb Pasha," head of the Arab Legion, wrote in 1938,

The entry of foreigners into Trans-jordan would lead to a deterioration of law and order. . . . It would probably increase the total revenues of Trans-Jordan. It might be for the general benefit of the human race. But let us be quite clear and honest—it would not be for the benefit of the tribesmen.<sup>28</sup>

Here we can observe the typical predisposition of the British to regard the Jews, whether native or newcomer, as "foreigners," or troublemakers, and the Arabs, from however distant a place, as "tribesmen," or natives. Glubb concluded that the improvement achieved in Jewish-settled coastal Palestine was unnecessary in Transjordanian Palestine, and that "Human beings in the last resort, cannot be won by money." The anti-Semitic inference to the Jew and his money is unmistakable there, and his final statement is significant:

The introduction of foreign capital would not benefit the tribesmen of Trans-Jordan even if it gave them increased financial prosperity, because it would introduce a smiling, simple people to the hell of race-hatred. It may be necessary to do such things to gain higher or greater objects, but it is an error to suppose that it would be helpful to the Arabs of Trans-Jordan.<sup>29</sup>

Glubb's article reflects, perhaps as well as any expression might, the prevailing sentiment that governed the actions of the British Mandatory power between the two world wars and until their departure in 1948.

The “Jewish National Home,” which “His Majesty’s Government is responsible for,” may be “quite proper,” wrote a Colonial official to George Rendel, the influential future assistant and often the voice of Anthony Eden, in 1933:

But the last thing we want is to slip into the position of posing as the protector of Jews all over the world. Quite apart from any other consideration, that would lead to trouble with many countries.”<sup>30</sup>

A book published in 1937 by the Secretary of the Arab Executive, Matiel E. T. Mogannam, repeated the warning of “danger” from a “largely Arab Palestine,” invaded by the “new arrivals.” It was “*natural*,” Mogannam wrote, that the “aggressiveness of the new arrivals” and the “strong bolshevist element” should offend “Arab Palestine,” where “matters of social etiquette, decorum and tradition” were of “great importance.”<sup>31</sup>

The Arab propaganda was recited again and again to the staccato accompaniment of Mufti-led terrorist violence, strikes, and “disorder,”<sup>32</sup> until the evidence that existed to challenge the theme was effectively muted by the deafening propaganda blows. Thus, the *Palestine Royal Commission Report* also found the “Arab reactions” of violence to “all these Jewish men and women . . . quite *natural*.”<sup>33</sup> The same year, Lord Hailey, a “distinguished Colonial civil servant,” argued to the Permanent Mandates Commission at Geneva that

the British public would never with any conviction support . . . the subordination of an *indigenous Arab population* to a *new* population largely consisting of Polish and German colonists.\*<sup>34</sup>

The pivotal fact confirmed by John Hope Simpson’s report seven years before—that the Arab immigrants were an even “newer population,” following the Jewish trail—was conspicuously absent, as was the plentiful evidence of widespread Arab illegal immigration contained in the Palestine Royal Commission Notes of Evidence of 1936.

### A Crucial Moment: The Gesture

Meanwhile the prospective Jewish “colonists” in Poland, Germany, and other European lands, whom the British Government deprecated as “aliens” and rejected as immigrants to their “Home,” were by 1937–1938 victimized by riots, murder, pillage and government-approved persecution in their homes throughout Europe.<sup>35</sup>

Political anti-Semitism acquired an irresistible momentum as a force in European politics.<sup>36</sup>

Germany’s “enthusiasm for Jewish emigration” led its government to “facilitate some 40,000” German Jews’ emigration to Palestine between 1933 and 1938.

\*Emphasis added.

The German government "remained anxious to encourage Jewish emigration," and "expressed dissatisfaction with . . . the slow progress" in getting rid of the unwanted "non-Aryans."<sup>37</sup> In October of 1938, "more than fifteen thousand" Polish-born Jews who had "long" been living in Germany, were "rounded up," expelled from the Reich, and dumped at the Polish border, one of many "similar" actions.

When Hitler marched on Vienna in March of 1938, however, "there was a total of sixteen immigration certificates" for the whole Austrian Jewish community.<sup>38</sup> The late prominent Zionist activist Ehud Avriel, a Viennese-born Jew, in his book *Open the Gates* described the scene:

. . . my parents were still in Vienna when the Nazis took over. . . . when they did leave for Palestine, soon after, they did so together with the "optimists"—those who had never believed the catastrophe could occur but who now, too, were refugees.<sup>39</sup>

The Austrian Jews "overnight" were stripped of security and "in many cases also all their property." By the end of April "more than 500 Austrian Jews had committed suicide."<sup>40</sup> The Jews in Vienna, as elsewhere, "turned down by one foreign consulate after the other," were faced with the fact that "no country would take them in."<sup>41</sup>

President Franklin D. Roosevelt called an international conference at Evian, France, to be held in July 1938.<sup>42</sup> It was hailed as a humanitarian gesture of concern for the Jewish victims of Nazi persecution and promised a solution to reducing the emigration barriers of the political refugees.<sup>43</sup>

Adolf Hitler responded with alacrity to Roosevelt's announcement:

I can only hope and expect that the other world, which has such deep sympathy for these criminals, will at least be generous enough to convert this sympathy into practical aid. *We, on our part, are ready to put all these criminals at the disposal of these countries, for all I care, even on luxury ships.* \*<sup>44</sup>

Two days before the Evian Conference began, *New York Times* columnist Anne O'Hare McCormick filed this imploration:

It is heartbreaking to think of the queues of desperate human beings around our consulates in Vienna and other cities waiting in suspense for what happens at Evian. . . . It is not a question of how many unemployed this country can safely add to its own unemployed millions. It is a test of civilization . . . Can America live with itself if it lets Germany get away with this policy of extermination, allows the fanaticism of one man to triumph over reason, refuses to take up this page of battle against barbarism?<sup>45</sup>

By the opening of the Conference, according to the *Times* of London,<sup>46</sup>

\*Emphasis added.

. . . no Jewish family in the country [Austria] . . . has not one or more of its members under arrest. . . . hopelessness and panic . . . can be imagined. . . . The authorities *demand rapid and impossible emigration*. . . . Thousands stand outside the consulates of America, England, and other countries, waiting through the night for admission so that they may register their names. . . . the segregation of Jewish children from "Aryans" is complete. The youngest are not spared; infants . . . can no longer play in public parks and on the door of their school the legend is painted: "Cursed be the Jew."\*

At Evian, thirty-two countries<sup>47</sup> met to solve the problem of the refugees. Even "observers from Nazi Germany" were allowed to audit those proceedings,<sup>48</sup> which might well have influenced Hitler's ultimate decision to rid the world of the Jewish "criminals" by extermination. Jews as such, however, were not represented, because they had no state, and leading spokesman Chaim Weizmann was prohibited from speaking even in private session, because Great Britain had protested against it.

The United States set the tone. Precluding any real effect, the Conference had preordained that none of the nations "would be expected or asked to receive a greater number of immigrants than is permitted by *existing* legislation."<sup>49</sup> Upon that predetermination, America announced that it would continue to honor its legal quota, previously set up as an annual immigration maximum figure of 27,370 for Germany and Austria<sup>50</sup> combined. Thereupon Peru announced its own strict quotas, including a ban on admission of doctors and lawyers for fear of an invasion by intellectuals. The Peruvian representative praised the United States' "shining example that guided the immigration policies" of Peru.<sup>51</sup> Other countries, one by one, followed suit, although some were more candid or generous than others.<sup>52</sup>

The lone exceptions, when the conference concluded, were Santo Domingo, which offered to take in 100,000 refugees,<sup>53</sup> and Holland and Denmark, which for a time "agreed to let in refugees without restrictions."<sup>54</sup>

### Government in the Jewish National Home: The Response

The British had no room in the Colonies for the Jews. When "Palestine" was brought up at the Evian's "closing session," the British delegate announced that "only very limited immigration could be considered."<sup>55</sup> The question of the internationally mandated "Jewish National Home east and west of the Jordan River," of which only the small fraction of land that is Israel today holds nearly four million souls, never came up. Its "absorptive capacity" had been pronounced to be "full."<sup>56</sup>

The message of the Evian Conference coupled with the violence and disorder of Muftism in Palestine were the backdrop for the British Government officials'

\*Emphasis added.

scenario to turn the League of Nations Mandate upside down.\*

The twist in policy had been inexorably established in late 1937, after the violent rejection by Arab leaders of the *Palestine Royal Commission Report's* recommendation of Western Palestine's partition into a small Jewish state and a larger Arab state. British Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Anthony Eden, then aimed for another plan, "which would not give Jews any territory exclusively for their own use."<sup>57</sup>

There was little attention to inherent "justice" in Government's policy: as Eden later wrote to his private secretary,

If we must have preferences, let me murmur in your ear that I prefer Arabs to Jews.<sup>58</sup>

His secretary noted in his own diary in 1943 that

Unfortunately A.E. is immovable on the subject of Palestine. He loves Arabs and hates Jews.<sup>59</sup>

(Significantly, Eden was Foreign Secretary, 1935–38; Dominions Secretary, 1939–1940; War Secretary, 1940; Foreign Secretary, 1940–1945, and again, 1951–1955. He was England's Prime Minister from 1955–1957.)

That Eden's sentiments were prevalent among British officials† is evidenced by the statement of Neville Chamberlain, Britain's Prime Minister in that most pivotal period of the shaping of British policy, 1937–1940. Chamberlain told his cabinet that,

If we must offend one side, let us offend the Jews rather than the Arabs.<sup>60</sup>

### The 1939 White Paper

All that remained was for the British Government to justify that inclination officially. Beginning in January 1939, the oft-repeated mythical Arab claims were embodied uncritically and totally in a new British policy. Malcolm MacDonald,

\*The documents excerpted in the following pages and in the footnotes and appendix of this book are by no means a comprehensive compendium of the available data relating to the British and the Arab roles in the "Final Solution" to the "Jewish Problem." The illustrations were culled from an immense accumulation of documents, which was itself only a fraction of existing materials, only a small sampling, which hopefully would be adequate to trace the prevailing attitudes and conditions that influenced the immigration of Jewish and Arab populations in Western Palestine. The choice was a difficult one, because *never before* had this writer been aware of the extent to which Arab influence and British bias on British immigration policies in Palestine had determined the fate of countless Jewish victims of the Holocaust.

†The perfidy of British failure to carry out the Mandate, in the violation of its terms and in the history of the British administration of Palestine—this story must be dealt with in detail elsewhere. Much has already been told. What is done here is the detailing of British policy restricting Jewish immigration as compared with British laxity toward Arab immigration and the showing of some quantum of Arab immigration, which was much larger than anticipated, demonstrating the unfairness of Britain's double standard.

All of the immigration data bear on the relationship between the number of Jews and the number of Arabs in Palestine and the status of those Arabs: whether they were settled "existing" population from time immemorial or were recent immigrants to Jewish-settled areas of Western Palestine.

British Colonial Secretary, could not "continue to carry out the Balfour Declaration," he stated in a "secret cabinet memorandum" that spelled out the reversal of policy.

Arab detestation of the Jewish invasion into Palestine being what it is, it would be wholly wrong to suggest that this large Arab population should one day in their own native land and against their will come under the rule of the newly arrived Jews.<sup>61</sup>

On the one hand, the British Government stated it couldn't continue to honor the Balfour Declaration, although it was part and parcel of the Mandate; on the other hand, paradoxically, the government *justified* its White Paper of 1939 on the theory that the British *were carrying out* the "obligations" of the *Mandate* to "Arabs and Jews" by curtailing Jewish immigration, a logical extension of the myth.<sup>62</sup> The Anglo-American Committee's Chronology of Events later reported the inversion thus:

It was therefore necessary to devise an alternative policy consistent with the obligations to *Arabs* and *Jews* under the Mandate. The Statement declared unequivocally that it was not part of this policy that Palestine should become a Jewish State as this *would be contrary to the obligations to the Arabs under the Mandate*. . . .<sup>63</sup>

(Nowhere in that chronology of important "events" would it be noted that seventy-five to eighty percent of the territory under that Mandate—Eastern Palestine/Transjordan—already had been illegally bestowed upon the Arabs.)

The Arabs in Western Palestine rejected any and all additional Jewish immigration, with the "public" support of spokesmen from surrounding Arab nations. But those Arab spokesmen privately "indicated" to Malcolm MacDonald that they might consider an additional 50,000 Jews over a period of five years ". . . provided that the Arabs were in a position to veto the continuance of Jewish immigration after that date."<sup>64</sup>

Two months later, in May 1939, the White Paper codified the Arab agreement with MacDonald.

Jewish immigration during the five years beginning 1st April, 1939, would be at a rate which, if economic absorptive capacity allowed, would bring the Jewish population up to approximately one-third of the total population of the country. . . . For each of the five years a quota of 10,000 would be allowed . . . and, as a contribution towards the solution of the Jewish refugee problem, 25,000 refugees would be admitted as soon as the High Commissioner was satisfied that adequate provision for maintenance was ensured.

After the period of five years, no further Jewish immigration would be permitted unless the Arabs of Palestine were prepared to acquiesce in it.

\*Emphasis added.

Furthermore, an estimated number of the "illegal" Jewish immigrants would be "deducted from the annual quotas."<sup>65</sup>

MacDonald candidly admitted to members of the Cabinet that, had Government considered its new harsh policy on "its strict merits," with less deference to Arab "pressure," "certain points" would have been "omitted."<sup>66</sup>

Thus the myth, which had first been asserted by Arab "notables" to protect their feudal stranglehold over the sparse impoverished populace nearly fifty years before, had been fixed into British decision-making as "fact." Just as, in July of 1891, the Turkish government had halted all Jewish immigration following the ominous wire from "leading Muslims of Jerusalem" to Constantinople,<sup>67</sup>

praying that the entry of such Jews should be prohibited, as not only was the labour market over-stocked, but also the Muslims themselves would be greatly the sufferers. . . .

so did the British Government, by its 1939 White Paper, bring the Jewish immigration into the "Jewish National Home" to a relative standstill: "Government" thereby shifted the Mandated Jewish Homeland—and the reality of the demographic situation in the Jewish settled area of Western Palestine—into reverse.

Malcolm MacDonald was a principal author of the 1939 White Paper, and British Colonial Secretary at that time. He enunciated the Arabs' theme in his disapproval of the Balfour Declaration and its "establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people." Among Macdonald's criticisms, he judged that

the authors of the various declarations made to Jews and Arabs . . . were rather confused about the whole business. I doubt whether they realized fully how many Arabs were already living in Palestine at the time when they made their promise to the Jews; they certainly cannot have foreseen how formidably that Arab population would increase after the arrival of Jewish capital and development and British administration.<sup>68</sup>

It was MacDonald who was misled. The 1917 Balfour Declaration stated that the "civil and religious rights" of "*non-Jewish communities*" already "*existing*"\* in "Palestine" then would not be adversely affected by a resurgence of Jewish development. That inclusion clearly established that the "authors" had indeed considered the sparseness of population and the decay of the land "at the time when they made their promise." Then, the whole of Western Palestine as well as Eastern Palestine was considered the "Jewish National Home," not just the Jewish-settled, restricted segment of Western Palestine that later became Israel.

Had only actual "natural" increase taken place among the *existing* Arabs, without the carefully disguised Arab population increase by in-migration and illegal immigration—that matched or possibly even exceeded the Jews' immigration into their "Jewish National Home"—and had the British firmly supported

\*Emphasis added.

their own stated government policy and upheld the international League of Nations Mandate for the Jewish home, the European and Arab-born Jews might have had their sanctuary in time to save countless Jewish lives. Had the British enforced its laws against Arab *effendis'* usury, extortion, and exploitation of the peasantry, instead of defending and encouraging the *effendi*-inspired anti-Jewish racial incitements the Arabs and their British supporters called "nationalism," the "Jewish National Home" would have achieved independence perhaps sooner and certainly in a less hostile atmosphere.

The blinkered vision by which the Shaw Commission reported "excessive immigration [Jewish] of 1925 and 1926,"<sup>69</sup> and by which John Hope Simpson reported in 1930 that

It is wrong that a Jew from Poland, Lithuania or the Yemen should be admitted to fill an existing vacancy, while in Palestine there are already workmen capable of filling that vacancy. . . .<sup>70</sup>

—these blinders were still operative in 1939, as justification for the White Paper assertion that the country was crowded with citizens seeking employment and it could absorb no more.

That turnspcak has been propagated until the present time, through efforts of today's Arab extremists following the lead of Nazi-supported measures by Haj Amin al-Husseini, who in 1921 had been, ironically, appointed by Palestine High Commissioner Sir Herbert Samuel, a British Jew: Samuel empowered al-Husseini to be the most influential Arab in Palestine, Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and President of the Supreme Moslem Council.<sup>71</sup>

Britain's rationalization of its policy incorporating the Arab claim must be carefully reviewed. Because, as we have seen, the British pledged to uphold the Mandate for the Jewish Homeland, and took administration of Palestine under those conditions, then the land should be "closely settled by Jews." "Jewish immigration" was to be a primary goal, which would not be a physical imposition upon the sparsely populated migrant community inhabiting the Jewish-settled area of development in Western Palestine (as determined in earlier pages). Arab immigration was decidedly not part of the plan for the Jewish home, since *Jewish* immigration was expressly stipulated in conjunction with the "non-Jewish communities" which were then "existing." Thus, had the British officially acknowledged, much less openly encouraged, illegal Arab immigration into the Mandated Jewish homeland, that course would have been condemned as unjust by the international community. Undoubtedly such a course would have been halted by the League of Nations Permanent Mandates Commission, which appears, from the evidence of its minutes, to have had the clear intention to uphold the Mandate for the "Jewish National Home" in Palestine.\*

To recognize and give public blessing to the conversion of a Jewish National

\*In fact, four out of seven of the members protested the 1939 White Paper's violation of the Mandate on several counts.<sup>72</sup>



Home into what the British, perhaps inadvertently, had the effect of creating—a repository for itinerant Arab workers from all over the Arab independent world—would have provoked understandable outrage. Not only Jews and Zionists, but many in the world however apolitical, however unfamiliar with Jews or Judaism, sympathized with the Jewish renewal of political liberation after two millennia. (As Neville Chamberlain said, “. . . Jews aren't a loveable people; I don't care about them myself;—but that is not sufficient to explain the Pogrom.”<sup>73</sup>)

The British, then, if they were to attempt to reverse the formal Mandated declaration to suit their Arab preference, had to juggle whatever clauses the declaration itself contained, to conform to and justify the British reversal, and at the same time to maintain the appearance of fulfilling the terms of the declaration.

The word “*existing*” became operative and pivotal. Why? Because within the Balfour Declaration was the assessment that the establishment of a home for the Jews would not “prejudice the civil and religious rights of *existing* non-Jewish communities.”<sup>74</sup>

If the thousands upon thousands of illicit immigrant and in-migrant Arabs streaming in, who were counted from then on as settled population—as natives who had been on the land in their plot for “two thousand years”—had instead been truthfully identified, as were the Jewish immigrants, then their entry would have been seen to be at cross purposes with the Mandate. The Arab movement would have been condemned as unfair, as diverting places being cleared frantically by Jews for other Jews who sought to escape from persecution, while Arab itinerants, however impoverished, were free from life-threatening racial attack, free to live and migrate within the number of independent Arab states from which they had come. As Malcolm MacDonald himself once observed,\*

If the Jews had not come to Palestine, . . . the Arab population of Palestine would undoubtedly have remained fixed . . . where it had been for ages before.

However, because the Arabs who flooded into the areas of Jewish development were, on the other hand, counted as indigenous, or *existing*,<sup>75</sup> population as fast as they arrived, then all those places being made for Jewish immigrants were viewed as being taken by *existing* Arab population.

One can only speculate how zealously the Jews must have been clearing in order to make places for incoming Jews and Arabs both and enough room for all. And how many more Jews might have been able to live there—live at all—if the British and Arabs had adhered to the Mandate and encouraged Jewish immigration? What would have been the Jews' fate, had the British restricted Arab immigration and respected the rights of those “non-Jews” and Jews and their descendants who actually lived in the relevant areas of Palestine when the Mandate began—the *actual existing* population?

The restrictions against Jewish immigration had been given added weight by the Arab claim that the already limited Jewish land purchase would create a

\*See Chapter 12.

“landless Arab” class among the purported “existing” Arab population. Many authorities had proved that the “landless” claim was baseless. The tradition of “landless” peasantry throughout the Middle East had no Jewish development as its alleged cause.<sup>76</sup> Other “landless” peasants had lost their lands, if they had once possessed them, through the nefarious schemes and practices of Arab absentee landlords and moneylenders, independent of Jewish enterprises.

While the various British reports had contradicted and disproved the allegation of Jews’ “displacing” the “landless Arabs,” the British still concentrated on the concerns enunciated by Lewis French and Sir John Hope Simpson—that perhaps the Arabs would be affected “in the future.”<sup>77</sup> “Government” heeded reports<sup>78</sup> that alleged:

... owing to the *natural growth of the Arab population* and the steady sale in recent years of Arab land to Jews, there was now in certain areas . . . no room for further transfer of Arab land and expansion in close settlement of the Jews.\*<sup>79</sup>

Thus the British official record’s inclusion of the percentage of Arab population that was actually newly arrived immigrants and in-migrants into the category of “*settled indigenous Arab population,*” or *existing* population growing only by natural increase, had the direct effect of practically eliminating the Jewish immigration via the White Paper of 1939.

That action was based upon the unfounded “displacement” myth, the same myth that also spawned the now-prevalent distortion—the Arab claim that Jews “dispossessed” Arabs in Israel, beginning in 1948.

\*Emphasis added.

## Jews in Palestine as “Illegals” and as War Allies

From the beginning Zionism faced not only political watering down of the Mandate but deep-seated antipathy from anti-Semitic British officials. The Jews were violently discriminated against—in what was presumably to be their own country.

—John Gunther, 1939

Hauranis proper are here illegally. They are a turbulent lot. The sooner they go the better at their own request. Next week they may not want to go.

—Colonial Official, 1936

“Arab Revolt,” Palestine, 1936

As long as they go voluntarily, I fear no Arab comments.

—Palestine High Commissioner Wauchope,  
1936 “Arab Revolt”

It is the profound conviction of Christian America that [British Government] rescind its illegal, unjust, and indefensible partition of Palestine, to restore Trans-Jordania to its proper place as part of Palestine territory, and throw it open to Jewish Settlement.

—Conference of Protestant and  
Catholic Leaders, 1936

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**W**hile the British continued to encourage and wink at Arab immigration into the country, officials were increasingly impatient at stepped-up “illegal” Jewish immigration. Such instances as the immigration of some thirty thousand “Arabs” from the Hauran in a three-month period of 1934 had gone unreported and unrecognized by the Government at the same time Adolf Hitler had ascended to power in Germany, and Jewish immigration had sharply risen.<sup>1</sup> The government had seen to it that those “illegal” Jewish immigrants would be accounted for, however; it was in 1934 that the “Palestine Administration” had first in-

stituted the "practice of . . . deducting [a number for] illegal settlers who might enter the labour-market" on a "half-yearly" basis from the Jewish quota; it was a practice that would be rigidly applied afterward to the Arab-approved 1939 White Paper quota of Jewish immigrants to the Jewish-settled area of Western Palestine during and after World War II.<sup>2</sup>

The British officials' meticulous concern for the welfare of Arab "illegals,"\* —i.e., High Commissioner Wauchope's enjoinder that "Haurani illegals" leave only "at their own request" because "they may not want to go next week," or his revealing observation that "as long as they go voluntarily I fear no Arab comments"—that obsequiousness was in marked contrast to the official attitude toward Jews' entry in the early thirties. Regarding the Jews, High Commissioner Wauchope had been "most anxious that as many as possible of the tourists who remain should be deported . . ."

. . . advisable to inform Jewish Agency . . . all illegal settlers will be turned out whenever Government has the power to do so. *The hardship of the individual must be ignored* in order to check this illegal custom that has grown to such proportions as to damage the country, and threatens to upset our whole system of immigration.†<sup>3</sup>

The "whole system of immigration"—in the Jewish National Home, where "facilitated" Jewish immigration was mandated—long revolved around circumventing the Mandate's guarantee.

The very concept of Jewish immigration into the Jewish National Home as "illegal" did not appear in British reports until the 1930s. To be sure, from the beginning of the Mandate, the Jews' immigration had been restricted by the British administration (a condition described generally in previous pages, and evidenced by voluminous correspondence on the subject).

In 1921, for example, "a large number of immigrants were refused admission to Palestine during the temporary suspension of immigration . . .," according to Sir Wyndham Deedes, Chief Secretary to the Palestine Administration.<sup>4</sup> An extensive internal Government summary, "Memorandum on the Control of Immigration to Palestine 1920–1930," reported that "drastic action was bound to come sooner or later," but after the "outbreaks of riots in Jaffa the High Commissioner issued an order closing the Palestine ports against all Jewish immigrants." Even in 1921, thousands of "men, women and children," many with "valid visas" were already being "turned back from Palestinian ports."

In that official memorandum no reference, no recognition of any kind, was made of Arab influx into the Jewish-settled area of Western Palestine. By contrast, what was termed the "abuse" by Jews "who made it their business to force immigration into the country" was found to be "really amazing." According to the memorandum, "machinery created for control of immigration" was "inade-

\*See Chapters 13 and 14.

†Emphasis added.

quate," because of the "horrors and terrors" of "conditions in Eastern Europe," which created "a huge mass of disorganized fugitives." The writers of the memorandum expressed surprise that "the flow . . . was kept within some bounds," since "loopholes" would have allowed in "practically any Jew who desired to go to Palestine" at the beginning of the Mandatory period.<sup>6</sup>

Because of the "utter confusion" caused by "large numbers of Russian and Polish refugees—Jews who fled . . . during the reigns of terror, both White and Red—of 1919–1921 . . . when the Roumanian Government began putting its own house in order, it commenced to sort out these refugees with a view to getting rid of them in some way or other."

The British too had to find their own solution for the "confusion" of the Jews escaping to the "Jewish National Home." A British representative, Sir Wyndham Deedes, reported in 1921:

The Jews demand a 50% proportion of Jews. I . . . [say] that I hope to give them a 50% "Reliables" in this way:—30% Jews, 10% Circassians, 10% Cypriots. We cannot accept 50% Jews today. . . .<sup>8</sup>

Dr. Chaim Weizmann protested to Deedes at that time that

The real cause of all the evil is the attitude of the majority of the British in Palestine. In the opinion of Churchill himself nine-tenths of them are against us. The Arabs know that, and know further that by exercising pressure and by threatening the administration in Palestine, they can extract concessions of a political nature. . . . In June the stoppage of immigration was proclaimed without as much as giving us a warning. Then the only privilege which we have ever received viz. the issue of certificates, was withdrawn from us.

Weizmann reminded Deedes that, as Deedes' own letter attested, "The Zionist organization . . . in extraordinarily difficult circumstances . . . have not swamped the country with undesirable immigrants."

Why was the certificate system destroyed . . . and so a blow to our liberty . . . ? We have been put into a vicious circle. . . ."<sup>9</sup>

This was 1921, months before three-fourths of the "Jewish National Home" was wrenched from the country known as "Palestine" (consisting of Western and Eastern—or Transjordanian—Palestine) in violation of the Mandate, and "given" by the British to an Arab emirate.<sup>10</sup> Thus, Weizmann had continued to believe in the pledge of the Mandate as originally designated,<sup>11</sup> and accordingly, he told Deedes further "of a Jewish company which desired to do some business in TransJordania." According to Weizmann, "every obstacle" had been placed in the Jewish businessman's way:

For a year a certain political officer in Trans-Jordania has been preaching the doctrine that no Jew could ever be allowed there as the Arabs are definitely hostile. The same . . . officer . . . a violent anti-Semite and one of the patrons of the Arab delegation here, when challenged to explain how he could carry on anti-Zionist

propaganda and still be in the service of HMG which has adopted the Zionist policy, replied . . . that he hoped . . . if he stayed long enough . . . he might contribute to a reversal of this policy.<sup>12</sup>

A few days later, Deedes sent a "secret" communication to young Shuckburgh (later a high British official influential in the "handling of Colonel MacKereth's identity-card campaign to quash illegal Arab immigration). While Deedes agreed with Weizmann on some issues, he would "save" the Zionists from themselves:

The national home in Palestine has to be built up with Jews . . . the best that can be found. . . . I am perfectly well aware that the Zionist organization in Europe is placed in very great difficulties [viz. the pogroms] and has great pressure put upon it to allow immigrants to enter, but . . . it [is] the business of the administration . . . to save the Zionists from this very pressure.[\*] and . . . the day will come when they will be grateful for what I consider our greater wisdom and foresight.<sup>13</sup>

The year 1922 brought not only the illegal separation of Transjordan from "Palestine"—in addition, the policy of the "Churchill White Paper" was initiated. While continuing to declare "A Jewish National Home in Palestine," where "The Jewish people will be . . . as of right and not on sufferance," now the new policy introduced the mechanism of the "economic capacity of the country at the time to absorb new arrivals."<sup>14</sup> From that time, the official British explanation of policy regarding Jewish immigration was that it "was conducted solely according to the capacity of the country to absorb new arrivals."<sup>15</sup> Thus, in 1922, "the first steps were taken towards concentrating the effective control of immigration . . . , " instituting strict measures which were "a real deterrent" against Jewish immigration. Subsequently, according to the Immigration Memorandum, the Jews resorted to "subterfuges," but when many of the "so-called middle-class" Jews "discovered that life was also difficult in Palestine . . . these people returned to Poland and the flow became a dribble."<sup>16</sup>

Because of the general depression in 1926, Government withheld immigration certificates from qualified Jewish immigrants, including "applicants who claimed to have 500 pounds and . . . all relatives of the working and lower middle-class of 18 to 35 years of age. . . ."<sup>17</sup> (This was the same period in which the British rushed apparently unlimited "blank passes" to the northern borders, to accommodate "Syrian countrymen" wishing to leave the "troubles" in Syria.) By 1927, "the situation grew worse" for the British; despite the fact that, according to the British Immigration Memorandum, "the Palestine Zionist Executive had recognized the necessity for reducing immigration and had not in fact utilized the greater part of the Labour Schedule allotted to them . . . , " the "number of certificates"—Jewish entrants—was reduced "to an absolute minimum."<sup>18</sup>

\*The recent mode of thought among a group of diplomats and Western commentators—"How to save Israel in Spite of Herself"—is remarkably similar.

In 1928, the British found that the restrictions "were accepted in practice by neither the Jewish population nor the Zionist Executive."

Almost every case of refusal led to an appeal . . . and the decision of the Chief Immigration Officer rejecting an application overruled.

So the Government "abandoned . . . all the new conditions but a new minimum of 1000 pounds for A (1) immigrants was adopted in place of the earlier one of 500 pounds and the more recent one of 2000 pounds."<sup>19</sup>

Throughout the ten-year period between 1921 and 1931 the Immigration memoranda referred exclusively to "Jewish Agency" and "Zionist organization" matters, which clearly established that the focus was indeed limited to Jews.<sup>20</sup> In 1928, the Palestine Zionist Executive made the following request:

Powers of the Palestine Government to deport a Jewish immigrant from Palestine (under Article VIII of the Immigration Ordinance) should be cancelled, and . . . Jews entering Palestine should be treated not as foreigners, but as citizens who have returned to their country of origins. . . . The government would escape . . . injustice . . . [of] decisions based on a false conception of the facts. . . .<sup>21</sup>

The Chief Secretary, Sir Harry Luke, who in 1921 had been "Commissioner, Jaffa Riots,"<sup>22</sup> reacted to the Zionists in a "confidential" letter to Leopold Amery, Principal Secretary of State for the Colonies. Luke "cannot subscribe to this contention." Although "No doubt in the majority of cases, such an attitude would be justified," Luke warned of "some Jews who have ulterior political objects, and this Government must reserve their right of deportation, in emergency."

As for the Zionists' plea, that those Jews allotted under the "labor immigration schedule" who were "without means" might be relieved of the substantial "payment of emigration fees" for Jewish immigrants, Chief Secretary Luke "could not . . . defend" the "sacrifice of revenue which would be involved."<sup>23</sup>

However, despite the British Government's obvious annoyance at the "abuses" and "subterfuges" resorted to by the Jewish refugees and other immigrant undesirables into the Jewish National Home—such as "Jewish professional men and women"<sup>24</sup>—no Jewish immigrant or condition of Jewish immigration was found to be described as "illegal" before 1931, in any of the reports or official correspondence in Western Palestine.

The government had in fact treated the Jewish immigrants as foreigners throughout, instituting new restrictions against Jewish immigration on the heels of every broad-scaled Arab attack against Jews, a convoluted breach of the Mandate. However, the actual use of the term "illegal" apparently was not introduced until after the Hope Simpson Report of 1930. In 1931, it was first applied tentatively, as a general term to *all* "persons in Palestine *illegally*."<sup>\*25</sup> But by 1933 the British record, by inverted logic, was focused upon "illegal," or "illicit," entry of "Jewish-settlers," of "Jews."

\*Emphasis added.

One 1933 report, in self-contradiction, noted that of "illicit and unrecorded immigration into Palestine, *mostly* of Jews" (totaling 2,000 by official account) *only half* were "Jewish."\*<sup>26</sup>

The formalization of the British conception of "illegal Jewish immigration" had evolved through the series of statutory regulation and restrictions drawn up by the Palestine Mandatory administration in submission to Arab acts of terror, Arab leadership's demands, and the bias of British officials. All were directed against immigration of Jews into the "Jewish National Home"—against the Mandate.

While questions had been raised by the League of Nations Permanent Mandates Commission because of the evidence of broad-scale Arab illegal immigration, there never was anything resembling an *Arab* quota, nor would any category exist within the "system" to put such a quota. When illegal immigration was acted upon by Government, that action took the form of deductions from the *Jewish* quota for *Jewish* "illegal" immigration only.

The concept of Jews as "illegals" in their "Home" was never universally accepted, however. In 1936, the Conference of Protestant and Catholic Leaders in New York, "representative of nearly all religious denominations" and "Labor leaders," declared that the British government must uphold "its covenanted pledges to the Jewish people and to the world. . . ." It was "the profound conviction of Christian America" that the British

rescind its illegal, unjust, and indefensible partition of Palestine, to restore Transjordan to its proper place as part of the Palestine territory, and throw it open to Jewish settlement.<sup>27</sup>

In a concurrent report by United States senators, "The Report on Palestine," Senator Hastings stated that

There is room for several hundred thousand more Jews in Palestine this side of the Jordan, and several million additional Jewish fugitives could be provided for if they could cross the Jordan and be allowed to settle in the breezy and fertile uplands between it and the desert.<sup>28</sup>

### The White Paper

It was the enactment of decrees strictly curtailing the Jews' immigration into Western Palestine that was "illegal" and in violation of Article 6 of the Mandate, according to the League of Nations Permanent Mandates Commission. That Commission protested the 1939 British White Paper in June 1939 as a violation of the Palestine Mandate and its interpretations during the entire period of British administration. The Commission's Report in August confirmed the four-member majority opinion—that the newest and harshest restrictions laid down by the

\*Emphasis added.



White Paper, along with its stated recognition of imminent Arab rule, ran counter to the British Mandatory obligation of fulfillment of the Jewish National Home.<sup>29</sup>

President Franklin Roosevelt too questioned the legality of the White Paper's policy, although the State Department supported it. Roosevelt wrote,

Frankly, I do not see how the British Government reads into the original Mandate or into the White Paper of 1922 any policy that would limit Jewish immigration.

At that time he believed the new British policy to be "something that we cannot give approval to by the United States."<sup>30</sup>

The United States' policy, however, never reflected strongly Roosevelt's sentiments of that date.<sup>31</sup> The outbreak of the war in September 1939 and its subsequent pressures would result in a perpetuation of the American policy of concerned disregard that had been evidenced at Evian in 1938.

By 1939, Jewish "illegal" immigrants to the Jewish-settled area of Western Palestine had not only been conceptualized and actions increased against them, but they had become an open wound to the British.

Illegal immigration [is] a dirty, sordid, crooked business,

according to a "confidential" Colonial Office communication directed to British consular corps stationed in the United States. To the Palestine Government, "illegal" immigration had become synonymous with "Jewish" immigration. It was particularly unbecoming, the official memo observed, since it was the Palestinian Jews who had until then adhered to the law even in the face of anti-Jewish attacks and uprisings by the Arabs. Despite the "idea . . . that they are justified . . . by virtue of some super-legal higher morality," because of "the persecutions in Greater Germany and the desperate plight" of "many European Jews," the document asserted further, ". . . they, like so many other lawbreakers . . . fail to realize that what they are doing is fundamentally anti-social—as anti-social as the German persecution of which they complain."<sup>32</sup>

So committed to that strange and perverse analogy had the prevailing British sentiment become that even before the White Paper had been formally implemented, Government officials were invoking it. In its determination to prevent Jewish refugees from succeeding in their escape to the Jewish National Home and "offending the Arabs," the British Foreign Office cabled an order to its ambassador in Berlin in March of 1939; the British envoy was to inform the German government about the means of escape being utilized by Jews, and to ask the German "Authorities" to "discourage such travel. . . ."<sup>33</sup>

Not all of British officialdom was in accord with the Arab appeasement spelled out in the White Paper. In the Parliamentary debate of the new policy on May 22, Winston Churchill, soon to be the most influential of Britain's Prime Ministers, defended the Balfour Declaration once again; he had done so before the Palestine Royal Commission in 1937, and he had so done in 1920, just before

he himself was, paradoxically, instrumental in the decision to amputate three-fourths of Palestine from the Jewish National Home and transform it into an Arab emirate.

"I should feel personally embarrassed," Churchill said, "in the most acute manner if I lent myself, by silence or inaction, to what I must regard as an act of repudiation." Churchill branded one particular White Paper declaration, that Arabs must agree to any Jewish immigration after the initial five years, as "the breach";

there is the violation of the pledge; there is the abandonment of the Balfour Declaration; there is the end of the vision, of the hope, of the dream. . . .

What will our potential enemies think? What will those who have been stirring up these Arab agitators think? Will they not be encouraged by our confession of recoil? Will they not be tempted to say: "They're on the run again. This is another Munich," and be the more stimulated in their aggression by these very unpleasant reflections which they make? . . .

May not this be a contributory factor . . . now—by which our potential enemies may be emboldened to take some irrevocable action . . . ?

We urge that the reputation for fidelity of execution, strict execution, of public contracts, is a shield and buckler which the British Empire, however it may arm, cannot dispense with and cannot desire to dispense with.

Never was the need for fidelity and firmness more urgent than now. You are not going to found and forge the fabric of a grand alliance to resist aggression, except by showing continued examples of your firmness in carrying out, even under difficulties, and in the teeth of difficulties, the obligations into which you have entered.

. . . the policy which you think is a relief and an easement you will find afterwards you will have to retrieve, in suffering and greater exertions than those we are making.<sup>34</sup>

Others in Parliament shared Churchill's outrage. In the debate a day later, Member of Parliament Herbert Morrison reminded Government of the aid being given by Hitler and Mussolini to the upper-class Arab leaders in Palestine<sup>35</sup> ever since British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain had shown his partiality to "those gentlemen." By giving the Arabs the veto over Jewish immigration, as the White Paper proposed, the British were also giving the Axis that veto. Morrison pleaded with his colleagues to

stop this evil thing being done. . . . I ask them to remember the sufferings of these Jewish people all over the world. I ask them to remember that Palestine, of all places in the world, was certainly the place where they had some right to expect not to suffer or to have restrictions imposed upon them. Look at the extent of the country—this little patch of territory. Transjordan has been taken away.<sup>36</sup>

Even Neville Chamberlain apparently had not remained unaffected by the foreboding of Nazism. "I believe the persecution arose out of two motives," he wrote in a letter to a sister:

A desire to rob the Jews of their money and a jealousy of their superior cleverness. No doubt Jews aren't a loveable people; I don't care about them myself—but that is not sufficient to explain the Pogrom.<sup>37</sup>

But the White Paper was a *reinforcement* of Chamberlain's policy of appeasement; it had one year earlier culminated in the agreement in Munich, sacrificing Czechoslovakia to the Nazis to gain what Chamberlain proclaimed triumphantly on his return to Britain as "Peace in our time!"<sup>38</sup>

By similar tactics in Western Palestine the British hoped to avert further Arab terrorist violence and disruption of the sort fomented periodically from the beginning of the Mandate, and incessantly reactivated after 1936. With the implementation of the White Paper, the "Arab Revolt" would die down. Even some of the more militant Arabs were privately encouraged by what Arab writer and representative George Antonius called "a substantial advance towards the recognition of Arab rights" and the Jews called "a surrender to Arab terrorism."<sup>39</sup>

Nevertheless, the White Paper was not acceptable to the Arab Higher Committee, "directed from Beirut." The Committee issued a hostile statement, including additional demands such as an immediate halt of Jewish immigration and the right to question the authenticity as "Palestinian" of every Jew entering the country after 1918 if Jewish immigration were to be allowed to continue at all.<sup>40</sup>

The White Paper was approved, by a vote of 268 to 179. (The majority usually expected was 248; it had declined to 89 votes.) The supposedly pivotal Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations, which had protested the White Paper in August, was the last chance to reverse the policy statement. But the war intervened in the few days before that commission was to review the matter.<sup>41</sup> The meeting was to have taken place on September 8; Germany marched on Poland September 1, and Britain declared war on Germany September 3.

England's pledge to observe the tenets of the internationally mandated Jewish homeland in Palestine was unalterably betrayed by the British enforcement of the 1939 White Paper, whereby soon, "only if the Arabs are prepared to acquiesce in it," would "immigration" to "the Jewish National Home" be permitted. In fact that acquiescence to the Arabs was inherent in the White Paper itself. So restrictive was this newest in a series of political deviations that while millions of Jewish refugees would have "swum" to Palestine<sup>42</sup> to escape the Nazis, the White Paper's rigid qualifications prohibited most Jews from entering Palestine.

Thus even the relatively tiny quota for Jewish settlers—10,000 a year for five years, with a bonus of 25,000 more refugees "as soon as the High Commissioner is satisfied that adequate provision for their maintenance is ensured"—was, tragically, not exhausted at the war's end.<sup>43</sup> The places left unfilled resulted in several convenient British distortions: for example, in the Department of Migration Report for 1938, *the unfilled quota was officially interpreted as an indicator that the government's allotment of Jewish places had been ample for their needs.*<sup>44</sup>

By 1945, approximately six million Jews had been systematically slaughtered. Of the Jewish refugees who had reached Palestine, 51,000 were allowed to stay,

less than one percent. In all the years of the British Mandatory control, roughly 400,000 Jews had been allowed into the “small notch” of the Middle East that was allocated to the “Jewish National Home,” and all 400,000 of those were in only the Jewish-settled area of the “patch” called Western Palestine. Today, little more than that Jewish-settled area—which is Israel—within the “patch” holds almost *four million* souls, with room remaining for countless others.

MacDonald’s calculation for the White Paper, which originally called for 450,000 Jewish immigrants over a ten-year period (as of his expectations in July of 1938), had been initially cut to 153,000 over ten years. Eventually it was whittled down to the number approved by the Arabs. Foreign Office Eastern Department head Charles Baxter defended

the moral right of the Arabs to have some say in . . . admission of aliens into their country.<sup>45</sup>

The injustice to the Jews in the Jewish-settled area of Western Palestine had been buried. Here again was the myth of the “Arab-native” majority crowded out by the “alien” Jew. Now, however, more than a mere bias born of misconception: the myth had been incorporated as policy. That British policy, by its blinkered adherence to the popularized Arab propaganda “justice,” would propagate the explosions that reverberate today in the name of the “Palestinian Problem.”

### **Palestinian Peoples and World War II: Immigration Controlled and Uncontrolled**

If ever an argument for the necessity of a Jewish state becomes pointedly prescient, it is during a review of the actions taken to prevent that state and what happened to the Jews who tried to get to the homeland reserved for them.

In weighing the Arab efforts and ability to prevent the Jews’ rescue because there was not yet a state, several fundamental and startling propositions become self-evident. Had Arab illegal immigration and in-migration into the truncated “Jewish National Home” been checked, the actual smaller number of “existing” Arabs in the Jewish-settled area and that virtual unlimited “absorptive capacity” for Jews would have been given official recognition. Jews would have been immigrating in greater numbers and the Arab “natural” population would have been kept to only its true small number.

A larger “facilitated” Jewish population and a smaller, actual “existing” Arab population growth undoubtedly would have resulted in a Jewish majority before the Second World War. That in turn, according to the Mandate’s implications and the United States’ declaration in 1919,<sup>46</sup> would have resulted in “a Jewish State as soon as it is in fact a Jewish State”—in other words, *when there was a Jewish majority*. Thus by the time of Hitler’s offer to the world of Europe’s Jews, there might have existed *some place* on earth for them to go.

As the war progressed, Jewish “restraint” was strained thin. While the

doomed Jews were frantically fighting to get into substandard ships surreptitiously headed for the Jewish National Home, Palestine officials were devising additional measures to keep Jewish refugees out. Jews were "only racial refugees," one British officer decided.<sup>47</sup> The White Paper was stringently enforced with no modification despite the news of wholesale persecution and slaughter of the Jews. The policy adamantly remained that

His Majesty's Government are determined to check illegal immigration, and further preventive measures are being adopted. The numbers of any Jewish illegal immigrants who, despite these measures, may succeed in coming into the country and cannot be deported will be deducted from the yearly quotas.<sup>48</sup>

But it was only *Jewish* immigrants who would be "checked." The *Arab* illegal immigrants streamed in by the thousands meanwhile. Many thousands more would swarm into the country to reap the benefits of the "war effort," as the later official *Anglo-American Survey of Palestine* reported—with the knowledge, consent, and *even at the official order* of the British Government.<sup>49</sup>

In July 1940, however, when the Palestine High Commissioner learned that Polish military personnel were being shipped to Palestine, he directed the Colonial Office to "suggest that only non-Jews be regarded as acceptable," adding that "Polish authorities would be willing to arrange that only non-Jews should come to Palestine."<sup>50</sup>

Despite the Palestinian Jews' bitterness, expressed in a "few" individual violent reprisals against Arab and British hostility, according to the *Anglo-American Survey*,<sup>51</sup>

With the outbreak of war, the Jews unanimously agreed to put aside their differences with British policy and demonstrated their loyalty to the cause of the democracies.

The isolated few "Jewish terrorist acts ceased completely and the illegal broadcasting station which had previously been operating for some months closed down."<sup>52</sup> The Jewish Agency had "issued an appeal calling on all Jews in Palestine to close their ranks and offer their full assistance to Great Britain."<sup>53</sup>

As past experience had taught the British, the Jews' cooperation with the Allies could be taken for granted. They were not likely to further the Nazi cause, their cooperation with the British until then had been forthcoming, and further, the Jewish "world constituency," particularly in America, was being exposed as impotent against the victimization of its brothers in Europe.

If the Arab world was dissatisfied with near-total submission by the British, the Jews were traumatized. The British had been assured by Joseph Kennedy in April 1939 that they "ought not to over-estimate" the one community which might present problems, "Jewish influence in the United States."<sup>54</sup> That fact was central to many British officials concerned with "placating the Arabs." As one British official, the minister in Egypt, remarked, "The Jews? Let us be practical. They are anybody's game these days." Jewish immigration should cease forth-

with, suggested the Egyptian-based envoy, and "the pro-Jew element" of British Parliament could be brought "into line by pleading what is practicable as opposed to what is desirable."<sup>55</sup> According to the British historian Nicholas Bethell, in his study of the events leading to the White Paper, the Foreign Office replied that, in general, "we sympathize with all he says."<sup>56</sup>

British Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax communicated similar views of the Jewish war effort in his December 1939 letter to Chaim Weizmann:

While appreciating the Jewish offers of assistance . . . it must not be overlooked that these offers were made unconditionally and were welcomed on that footing.

Lord Halifax disregarded Weizmann's alarm at the deadly effect of the White Paper's virtual cessation of immigration, and its subjugation of Jews in the "Jewish National Home" into a permanently oppressed *dhimmi* minority at the whim of the Arab world.<sup>57</sup> Halifax assured Weizmann that by "putting our whole energy into a life-and-death struggle with Nazi Germany . . . and by ridding Europe of the present German regime," Halifax hoped "to render a supreme service to the Jewish people."<sup>58</sup>

The Jews would soon be driven into frantic realization that what was called a "supreme service to the Jewish people"—allied victory—would be celebrated too late to matter, as one 1941 Warsaw ghetto report grimly foretold:

There are pessimists who are afraid the English will finally arrive, declaring, "We have conquered. . . ."—to our graves.<sup>59</sup>

Nonetheless, nearly 26,000 "Palestinian Jews served in the British forces," according to the British War Secretary in 1945<sup>60</sup>—about half the total number of Jews, in fact, who actually managed to get to the Jewish-settled area of Western Palestine during the war. The number of Jews who served the British Allied cause would have been larger—134,000 Jews had volunteered<sup>61</sup>—but in an inexplicable gesture of "evenhandedness," the Palestinian Jews' enlistment was "held down to the Arab rate" of enlistment, which the American Christian Palestine Committee called "a rather peculiar service to the war effort on the part of the Palestine Administration." That limit was finally modified, however, as the "steadily worsening" military situation in the Middle East, the "continued pressure by Jewish volunteers," and the minimal number of Arab enlistees (according to the War Secretary, "9041 Arabs" in all) made the recruiting of Jews a necessity.<sup>62</sup>

The most "even-handed" of British Reports—even those that ultimately judged Jewish existence in the midst of Arabs as provocation "responsible" for Arab terrorism—took for granted the restraint of the Palestinian Jews. One report noted that

. . . during the troubles the Jews have behaved themselves extraordinarily well; that they have received a great deal of provocation from the Arabs and that, as a whole they have not countered that provocation; . . .<sup>63</sup>

Another report observed:

. . . indeed, throughout the whole series of outbreaks, and under very great provocation, they [the Jews] have shown a notable capacity for discipline and self-restraint.<sup>64</sup>

Even the British official who had—through some perverse logic—determined that the Jews' "illegal" attempts to get to the sanctuary were "as anti-social" as the Nazis' persecution of Jews, was himself forced to mention their "law-abiding" ways. It was not for lack of manpower or ability, as the *Palestine Royal Commission Report* had observed:<sup>65</sup>

Though it is only on rare occasions that any Jew has resorted to the use of unauthorized firearms, we were informed that, in round numbers the Jews could place in the field 10,000 combatants, trained and armed, with a second line of 40,000.

General Dill, Commander of the British Forces in Palestine, had assured his superior in 1937 that the Royal Commission Report with its then-proposed partition plan, might stir up "armed rebellion" and "political assassinations immediately" among the Arabs, but would bring no serious trouble from the Jews. While "Jewish resistance" would be "strenuous," because the Report so unevenly truncated the Jewish National Home and undercut "Zionist aspirations,"<sup>66</sup> the possibility of Jewish "armed resistance" was "unlikely." If the characteristic "Jewish restraint" shown in "reprisals" for Arab attacks did "weaken" still, Jews would "turn every political stone to undermine Report but unlikely to use force."<sup>67</sup>

British Foreign Officer Charles Baxter similarly assured anxious British officials that there was no danger of a Palestinian Jewish protest similar to the Arabs' violence. Despite the known imminent disaster for the barred prospective Jewish immigrants in Europe, despite the assumption that American Jewry was a formidable opponent, Baxter did "not think that the Jews would be so unwise" as to defy the government White Paper policy.<sup>68</sup>

### The Jewish Dilemma

But the British had not reckoned with the reaction of the Jews whose dreams they had given new hope. To the worldwide Jewish panic at the unremitting persecution and terror both in European and in the lesser-known Arab-Muslim communities was added a desperation; that desperation was remnant of the decades of enthusiasm and tenacity of a people finally within reach of regaining political freedom in the state they had nurtured relentlessly. There nobody could any more call the Jews "infidel" or "dhimmi" or "kike" or "zhid"—there an epidemic of dread diseases or a drought need not bring fear of Jews' bearing the blame. There a change in power would not prompt anxiety over the question whether the new regime was "against Jews."

British Member of Parliament Leopold Amery described the Palestinian Jews' dilemma passionately in the House of Commons debate of the White Paper:

As for the Jews . . . all the hope that they had been encouraged to hold . . . are to be dashed to the ground, all their amazing efforts wasted. . . . That is to be their reward for loyalty, for patience. . . .

Amery noted ironically that the Jews' reward for "*almost unbelievable self-restraint*"\* against the consistent onslaught of Arab atrocity and pillage was to render Palestinian Jews a "permanent minority" in the land that, "such as it is today, they have created it."<sup>69</sup>

From the enforcement of the White Paper to the end of the British Mandatory administration, the Palestinian Jews, while fighting at the side of the Allies against the Axis during the war, would simultaneously defy the British actions intended to paralyze the Palestinian Jewish community.

Different historians date the change in the Jewish attitude at different moments; one incident or another seemed to suggest the catalyst. Nicholas Bethell, in *The Palestine Triangle*, traces the White Paper's enactment in 1939 as the "blow from which" the Palestinian Jews' "friendly attitude to Britain" had "never recovered," and Bethell notes that the "first serious act of anti-British violence" by the underground Jewish resistance, Irgun Zvai Leumi, took place in August 1939, four months after the White Paper was implemented. The Irgun, a small guerrilla band, was condemned for its acts of violent reprisal thereafter by all the Jewish representative agencies. Irgun would later be denounced as "extremist" and "terrorist."<sup>†</sup>

At the same time it was pointed out that past instances of Arab terrorism had been rewarded by new concessions at the expense of the Jews. As I. F. Stone wrote, it was not strange

that some misguided Jewish youths have said to themselves, "Maybe we'd have better luck if we tried those tactics, too?"<sup>70</sup>

There were "one or two occasions" when it was said that "The *Jewish* terrorist groups . . . copied Arab Terrorism, . . . especially at [ the Arab village] Deir Yassin"<sup>‡</sup> in 1948, after the Israel War of Independence had begun in November 1947, and the Arab world had declared a "war of extermination" against the Jews and the United Nations resolution favoring a Jewish state. Reports of Jewish retaliation were broadcast in "exaggerated" accounts that

\*Emphasis added.

†It was that group—reacting against Arab terror and the brutality of British indifference to the Holocaust—which Arab propaganda would later pounce upon. It would be alleged that the PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization) had emulated the Irgun, an attempt to justify the PLO terrorist acts throughout the world that had been the tradition among the amalgam of peoples in Palestine for generations, and a diversion from the fact that the PLO was the modern offshoot of Muftism, which the Irgun had been founded to quash.

‡Emphasis added.



"helped to create the atmosphere" to "encourage flight" of the Arabs, wrote the Reverend James Parkes in his historical analysis, *Whose Land?*<sup>71</sup> Since then the West has often adopted the theme of Arab propaganda, citing "Deir Yassin" as the factor by which the world may equate Arab terrorism with "Jewish terrorism." "The Jews were terrorists too" is the not uncommon deduction. In another part of a statement noted earlier here, Albert Memmi, the Tunisian-born writer, answered that propaganda in his open letter to the Libyan strongman and terrorist supporter Muammar Qaddafi:

The error which may have been made at Deir Yassine [*sic*] is constantly being thrown in our faces. Ah, but we have undergone a hundred Deir Yassines, a thousand Deir Yassines! . . . at the hand of Arab people; yet the world had never been upset over it! (Just as I was correcting the proofs of this book, we learned of the massacre at Qiryat Shemona . . . those unfortunate people machine-gunned in their beds, those children thrown out the window were all North African refugees! "Arab Jews!" . . .)

But what do I need with these historical references and reminders? My own grandfather and father still lived in terror of the blows on the head which any Arab passerby could give them at any time. . . . Now please don't tell me that all that is the result of Zionism. That's another myth.<sup>72</sup>

The Jews of the Jewish-settled area of Western Palestine sought, with desperate zeal, to save lives and to countermand the Nazi death verdict as it was being inflicted upon the Jewish people and their tiny country through the operations of the British immigration policy, which bowed cravenly to Arab pressure. The very premises of justice and mercy must be affronted by the historical distortion, the psychological warp, and the Machiavellian propaganda that could give birth to the following twisted perceptions: that these Palestinian Jews should be equated with the terrorists of the PLO; that the Jewish settlers in Palestine should be perceived as "dispossessors" in the Jewish-settled area of Western Palestine; that the terror of the Arab PLO is "justice" while Jewish resistance to such terror is "injustice"; or that the expulsion of the Jews from the "West Bank" in 1929 and the Arab policy against their return is any different from pogroms in Europe or apartheid in South Africa.

The acceptance of such perverted perceptions may be traceable to any one or a combination of several factors: badly weighted double standards, willful refusal to examine the facts, racial or religious prejudice, reliance upon misunderstanding and misinformation, or, more prevalently, inadequate information and basic lack of awareness of the facts.

The West's "dependence on Arab oil" is said by some to be wholly responsible for such cynical selective perception. The mighty have unquestionably coveted oil power in the last four decades. Their zeal was apparently even more ardent than commonly known. At least in two instances in the 1940s, the Arabs, either under the sting of military inability to defeat the Israelis and the economic compulsion

to reduce the burden of military preparedness, or suffering from overwhelming indebtedness, gave an indication of subordinating their inbred hostility to the pressures of necessity and reality. Perhaps only remote possibilities, they were not unprecedented: it had after all been once done, when Emir Feisal and Chaim Weizmann signed their agreement in 1917.\* But in later cases, it seems one or another of the "great powers" intervened to bolster existing enmities and disregarded the actual best interests of the region.

As an example, although United States oil companies<sup>73</sup> had begun exporting oil from Saudi Arabia in the 1930s,<sup>74</sup> that underpopulated, underdeveloped terrain remained impoverished during World War II. Thus, to pay his debts in the early 1940s, owed primarily to Britain, Saudi King Ibn Saud reluctantly considered the personally repugnant possibility of borrowing money from Zionist sources, with British support. Ibn Saud might become "boss of bosses" in the Arab world, and would work out, with Chaim Weizmann, a "compromise" settlement of the Palestine dispute, the British assured him.<sup>75</sup> United States State Department officials were extremely upset at the proposal: the head of the Department's Near Eastern affairs stressed the negative result of a "Jewish ascendancy"—a Jewish majority—in Palestine. He argued that "Zionists could extend their influence and activities outside Palestine," suggesting the imposition of "economic imperialism . . ."<sup>76</sup> As Elie Kedourie observed, the words "economic imperialism, catchwords of Marxism, strike an incongruous note in the memoranda" of a "high State Department official."<sup>77</sup>

Although Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles and President Roosevelt were generally "more enthusiastic" about "Arab-Jewish detente," the Jewish loan was discredited.<sup>78</sup> Waving aside a possible Arab-Jewish rapprochement, State Department officials nonetheless drafted a letter from Roosevelt that gave Saudi Arabia full assurance that no settlement in Palestine would be adopted without first consulting "great and good friend" Ibn Saud and seeking his "agreement."<sup>79</sup> State Department officials were by that time<sup>80</sup> seemingly preoccupied with wooing and winning for themselves the predominant role in Saudi affairs. As Professor Kedourie interpreted it, ". . . if only British influence could be eliminated, a warm and exclusive American-Saudi special relationship" might prevail.<sup>81</sup>

Another example of blocking the pursuit of Arab-Israeli peace concerns the little-known but apparently strenuous British action to prevent militarily devastated Arab leaders from the possibility of dealing with Israel after the Arab world's defeat in 1948. Secret documents of 1949 reveal that British diplomats in some key Arab states had been told of the defeated leader's inclinations to discuss peace with Israel. They were discouraged by high Government officials, on the theory that Britain could lose its dominant ground if a "neutral" Arab-Israel "bloc" were to diverge from perceived British interests.<sup>82</sup>

In a "top-secret" note from Ernest Bevin, then Secretary of State for Foreign

\*See copy in Appendix IV.

Affairs, there were no such rhetorical red herrings as "economic imperialism"; the secret nature of the document was apparently sufficient to cloak British priorities from detection and criticism in pro-Israel circles. According to Bevin, Israel must not come "to the point of dominating them [the Arabs] economically and so politically, and thus perhaps imposing her own views of neutrality on the Arab world." Were the Arabs to differ with Britain under the circumstances of independence foreseen as a consequence of such a "neutral bloc," there would no longer be an Arab-Israeli dispute to divert Arabs from Britain's assertion of its ambitions in the Middle East. As Bevin stated it,

It would be too high a price to pay for the friendship of Israel to jeopardize, by estranging the Arabs, either the base in Egypt or the Middle Eastern oil.<sup>83</sup>

Having initiated, developed, and profited from the subsequent oil boom, the great powers had themselves created their own "oil-dependency." But the "dependency" that really occupied them was the actual dependency of those Arab leaders who were anti-Communist and who well understood that *they* would remain dependent upon continued Western development and patronage. It was the *prospect of Arab*—Saudi in particular—*dependency exclusively* on the United States, or Britain, or France, that motivated the apparently frenzied behavior. Had any other influence intruded—even the imaginary Zionist "expansion outside Palestine" warned against by some in the United States, or the "neutral bloc" feared by Britain, reasons given for quashing perhaps improbable but not impossible peace moves—Britain and the United States each feared that they might lose footing in the race.

In both British and American instances, the exaggeration of Arab influence and the definition of Arab desires were apparently dictated not by the real *Arab* desire but by what the Western powers shortsightedly believed to be their own individual best interest. The Arabs were told what, or what not, to want.<sup>84</sup>

The fact that oil was later a factor to exacerbate the Arab-Jewish enmity, and that much which is assumed on the subject of oil-power is not really true, are topics for greater speculation and exploration outside the focus of this volume. Many of the questions raised here have been addressed elsewhere.<sup>85</sup>

However, as this book has revealed, Arab demands were acted upon by the British *before* the United States began exporting oil in 1938. From the review of immigration, first Turkish and then British systems, the direct causal relationship between Arab violence in Palestine and official reactions against Jewish immigration has become clear. Turkish and then British mandatory government solicitation of the Arabs' favor had begun long before Arab oil became a tool, even before "Arab nationalism" was, as T. E. Lawrence described it, "raised up." By the time the leaders of the Arab world were insupportably given what amounted to veto power over what happened in "Palestine"—an area separated from the "Arab states," and internationally assigned to Britain as the Jewish National Home—British patronage was already axiomatic.

What else becomes evident is that, in the Anglo-American scuffling for prime position, the malignant result of the Mandate's inversion in Palestine went overlooked or ignored.

Reinhold Niebuhr touched on the "untouchable" in writing of Jewish immigration laws during World War II:

. . . When I say the most "generous" immigration laws, I mean, of course, "generous" only within terms of political exigencies. It must be observed that the liberals of the Western World maintain a conspiracy of silence on this point. They do not dare to work for immigration laws generous enough to cope with the magnitude of the problem which the Jewish race faces. *They are afraid of political repercussions, tacitly acknowledging that their theories do not square with the actual facts.* Race prejudice, the intolerance of a dominant group toward a minority group, is a more powerful and more easily aroused force than they dare admit.\*<sup>86</sup>

Some in the British Service rejected Chamberlain's delusion of appeasement as solution. In 1938, when Jewish "guerrilla bands" were organized "from among the 'extremists' in the Revisionist party" to defend against the intensifying Arab terror, "manifestos condemning" the Jewish defense were "issued" by the Palestinian Jewish establishment. But as an exhaustive study of "Palestine" pointed out,

the Jewish terrorists [*sic*] received moral support from some Britishers.<sup>87</sup>

Among those supporters was Colonel Josiah Wedgwood, who wrote to "the President of the Jewish ex-officers association at Tel-Aviv" that

I am afraid that merely asking for justice . . . is useless. In my experience, especially in times of difficulty, governments give way only to action. . . .<sup>88</sup>

The Palestinian Jews, even those who denounced the guerrilla movements and exhorted the Jews to fight with Britain and its allies in the war, had been mortally wounded by the White Paper, and the moderate Jewish majority felt the pain. In the wake of the first bitter demonstrations by Jews against the White Paper policy in 1939, a British policeman was killed. David Ben Gurion, then Chairman of the Jewish Agency, and personally opposed to the actions of the Irgun, nonetheless revealed his own exasperation; in his significant response to the threat by a British general that, "if rioting occurred again and . . . if blood were shed, it would be on the heads of the Jews," Ben-Gurion answered,

We deeply deplore and condemn unreservedly the fatal shooting of a British constable. With all due deference I must, however, take exception to your statement this morning that the blood which may be shed will be on the heads of the Jews. . . . *The Jewish demonstration of yesterday marked the beginning of Jewish resistance to the disastrous policy now proposed by His Majesty's Government.* The

\*Emphasis added.

Jews will not be intimidated into surrender even if their blood be shed. In our submission the responsibility for what may occur in this country in the course of enforcing the new policy will rest entirely on the Government.\*<sup>89</sup>

From that time, when in Austria, Germany, and Czechoslovakia a million Jews had already been "crushed under the heels of Nazism,"<sup>90</sup> and the British government was informing to the Nazis about the boatloads of Jewish refugees headed toward the Jewish National Home, the Palestinian Jews were totally dichotomized: until the war's bitter end, on one hand they were earnestly fighting for the Allies, and on the other hand, they found every conceivable means they could to rescue the "illegal Jewish immigrants" who were anyway being deducted from the shrunken, Arab-approved quota. They bought land in devious ways when the White Paper's land restrictions were published in 1940, prohibiting most sales of land from Arabs to Jews. By 1944, if Arabs sold lands at all,

Jews paid between \$1,000 and \$1,100 per acre in [Western] Palestine, mostly for arid or semi-arid land; in the same year, rich black soil in the state of Iowa was selling for about \$110 per acre.<sup>91</sup>

Since Jewish-related economic development was considerably diminished as Jewish immigration and land purchase and settlement were curtailed, the potential Arab labor market that had attracted Arab illegal immigration was depressed. It was, however, to be only temporary. The government and private industry would find the need for Arab employment important to the booming war industry. The policy was: jobs for immigrant Arabs, and bullets fired on the disembarking refugee Jews. As High Commissioner Wauchope had evaluated it during the Arab riots of 1936 and 1937, "in the present circumstances" the Arab immigrants' presence may be "undesirable" but "next week they may not want to leave the country."

The Arab rebellion was reported to have been "called off" by the Arab leaders upon the deference paid to their demands and the White Paper's passage. Major-General Bernard Montgomery reported that

This rebellion is now definitely and finally smashed . . . it is not possible for the rebellion to raise its head again on the scale we previously experienced.<sup>92</sup>

Once the violence was quelled, and only occasional assassinations and pillage occurred, the British hoped to gain the sympathies of the Arab world against the Axis. One British officer protested against the organizing of a Jewish Brigade for fear of offending the Arabs, because

We always have to face up to the difficulty of their [Arabs'] susceptibility to German propaganda, which has been extremely successful.<sup>93</sup>

The Arabs in general, however, and the Mufti in particular, had already been committed to Hitler.

\*Emphasis added.

## “Muftism” and Britain’s Contribution to the “Final Solution”

The greatest contemporary hero [in the Arab world] is Hitler.

—John Gunther, *Inside Asia*, 1939

The Arab riots of 1936 in Palestine were carried out by the Mufti with funds supplied by the Nazis.

—American Christian Palestine Committee, 1947

The British were apparently prepared to accept the probable death of thousands of Jews in enemy territory because of “the difficulties of disposing of any considerable number of Jews should they be rescued.”

—Henry Morgenthau, United States Secretary of the Treasury to President Roosevelt, 1944

I can assure you that the British forces in Palestine would not try to oppose or fight the Arabs, because Britain is a real friend of the Arabs.

—Fadel al-Jamali, Iraqi Foreign Minister, in Cairo, 1948

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**T**he one collaboration during the Second World War that has been clearly overlooked was the symbiotic relationship between Muftism and Nazism. In 1920, when Adolf Hitler was still reciting his diatribes in beerhalls,<sup>1</sup> Haj Amin al-Husseini had already fled from Jerusalem to escape from his ten-year sentence for instigating anti-Jewish violence.<sup>2</sup> Five months later he returned by “special pardon,” where he would be appointed Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and elected President of the Supreme Muslim Council within the next two years, free to incite the “racial” manifestations of the future with his supporters throughout Palestine.<sup>3</sup>

The Mufti understood that crucial element which the British would tacitly recognize and occasionally acknowledge officially, regardless of Government’s

frequent apologies and attributions to "displacement" or "nationalism": that only by invoking the deeply rooted religious prejudice of the masses in Palestine—and that with outside agitation—could al-Husseini's and other notable families hope to keep the reins that they enjoyed under the Turks.

As one historian after another has observed, in "Palestine"

. . . Arab . . . ruling classes . . . can easily inflame the Moslem masses, who add to a religious fanaticism an inborn if latent hatred of the Jew.<sup>4</sup>

In a documented account, "The Arab War Effort," published in 1947<sup>5</sup> by the American Christian Palestine Committee, both the "pre-war links with the Axis" and a country-by-country description of the Arab efforts and collaboration with the Axis forces were traced. The purpose of the Christians' publication was to "reach the general public" with "material which [it] otherwise would almost certainly never" see, the "documented evidence" that

. . . The [Arab] leaders often cooperated directly with the Axis, . . . *Fascist and Nazi ideologies were not so much imitated as paralleled in the Arab world,*<sup>\*</sup>

where "they fitted into modes of thought already in being and were taken up" by already organized "political organs." These "facts," while not a "revelation" to the Christians' Committee, and while undisputed "in any responsible quarter," were by 1947 being "ignored—as no longer politically relevant." That was "an unfortunate tendency," the Christians' Committee observed. Now

those peoples have become full-fledged members of the United Nations. Their voices are heard in all international deliberations.

By an "amazing perversion of history," the report observed, "recent" Middle East "discussions omit or slur over" the "Arab collaboration with the Axis," and

Arab spokesmen [who] believe that the true facts of Arab pro-Nazi activity have been forgotten, . . . are now actually claiming reward for the help which they say the Arabs gave democracies.

Many original documents were reproduced in the American Christian publications, but as the group noted,

Of the long list of hundreds of Arab agents on the German payroll, only a few are mentioned. Of the numerous cases of sabotage, only a few are recorded. . . . Of the thousands of available documents, fewer than a dozen are published here.<sup>6</sup>

Glubb Pasha, Commander of the Transjordan Arab Legion, reflecting later about the Iraqi revolt of 1941, underscored that evidence:

The British of course always knew we were going to win the war, but at the time of these operations every Arab was perfectly convinced that Britain was

<sup>\*</sup>Emphasis added.

finished forever, and that it could only be a question of weeks before Germany took over Arabia. The Iraqis were perfectly sure of this or they would not have declared war on us. . . .

In brief, during the six weeks before the fall of Baghdad, every Arab was convinced that we were done for. Every Arab force previously organized by us mutinied and refused to fight for us or faded away in desertions.<sup>7</sup>

In fact, Mufti Haj Amin al-Husseini issued a *fatwa*—"summons to a holy war against Britain"\* in May 1941.<sup>8</sup> The Mufti's widely heralded proclamation against Britain was declared in Iraq, where he was instrumental in "the pro-Nazi" coup.<sup>9</sup> Yet the British Government inexplicably was reported by the *Manchester Guardian* several months later to be "readmitting to Palestine former supporters of the Mufti of Jerusalem. It is prepared, apparently, to go to bail for them," the article surmised.<sup>10</sup>

It was the *Jewish immigrants*, attempting to get to Palestine by shiploads at the same time, who were driven off by the Government of Palestine, while, as the *Guardian* put it,

. . . readmitting former supporters of the Mufti . . . it passes understanding why the victims of Axis brutalities, the shattered fugitives from butcher-states like Roumania, should be thrust back from safety in the home of their race.<sup>11</sup>

The government's justification for considering "wholesale expulsions" of "illegal" Jewish refugees and even "firing on illegal immigrant ships in order to drive them away from Palestinian ports" was set forth in many government communications, discussed later in this chapter.<sup>12</sup> There was, the British claimed, "the possibility of there being agents of the German Government amongst them and the consequent danger to the internal security of Palestine."<sup>13</sup>

Never was a single "German agent" found to justify that fear. Nevertheless, British officialdom put forward such "threats" to defend extreme British actions in forcing shiploads of Jewish refugee families back into the Black Sea,<sup>14</sup> despite the extensive access that British Intelligence gained to information concerning the actual nature of the spy networks in the Middle East.<sup>15</sup>

It was the same double standard by which illegal Arab immigrants' entry into "The Jewish National Home" had been winked at earlier by the British Government, while "Illegal Jewish Immigration" had been considered a "dirty, sordid affair" that had to be prevented by every possible measure, "ignoring the hardship of the individual."

In accordance with that defiance of fairness or reason, while the "threat of enemy agents" among Jewish refugees fleeing from the Nazis was proved to be a "red herring," the reports that "the Arab riots of 1936 in Palestine were carried

\*Emphasis added.

†See the *fatwa* and examples of original communications between the Mufti and the Nazis in Appendix IX.



out by the Mufti with funds supplied by the Nazis"<sup>16</sup> were smothered. The files of the German High Command in Flensburg, Germany, indicated that

Only through funds made available by Germany to the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem was it possible to carry out the revolt in Palestine.<sup>17</sup>

The Grand Mufti himself operated at first from headquarters set up in Transjordan, Syria, and Iraq, after he fled Western Palestine at the onset of the revolt he inspired. Then he moved between Teheran and Rome, until November 1941, when he was "established" in Berlin by the Nazis, "with branches organized later in other parts of Germany and Italy"; his "activities"—in espionage, propaganda, establishment of pro-Axis Muslim military units, training of Arabs as Nazi agents, and personal collaboration with Adolf Hitler—have been documented, along with data describing the Nazi collaboration of other *effendi* scions, such as Rasem al-Khalidi, Jamal al-Husseini, Wasef Kamal, and others.<sup>18</sup>

The Grand Mufti of Jerusalem—an inspiration for Arab anti-Jewish "nationalistic" pogroms in Palestine, staunch friend of Hitler and coordinator with Germany in the "final solution" to the "Jewish Problem"—was personally responsible for the concentration camp slaughter of hundreds of thousands of Jews, if not more.<sup>19</sup> (See pages 372–373.)

Among other instances, *when the Mufti learned that the Hungarian government was planning to allow "900 Jewish children" to escape from the Nazis to Palestine, he heatedly demanded they reverse the plan. Because, as the Mufti warned, the Arabs were important to the Nazi effort, his demand was met: the Jewish children were sent instead to the extermination camps in Poland.*<sup>20</sup>

Just before World War II ended, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Lebanon would finally declare war on Germany in February 1945, when Allied victory was assured. Although none participated in "direct military operations," the *formality* of declaring war on the Axis before March 1, 1945, *was required* of any country wanting to join the newly organized United Nations.<sup>21</sup>

Britain had been "deserted" and "betrayed" by the Arabs' "most strategic part of the world by people whose friendship she had strained herself to win," a fact that Britain and the United States had already forgotten, the Christian Committee reminded in 1947. The Committee's New York chairman observed, "Now . . . we seem to be returning to the policy of appeasement," which Britain has not altered since 1939 despite "the failure of appeasement" when "dealing with precisely those Arab leaders who did their utmost to aid the Axis powers."<sup>22</sup>

A young friend of the author's, in reading the preceding account, responded surprisingly—she was "amazed that the Jews were still loyal fighting forces under the British—and that there was not *much more* Jewish defense—or terrorism or . . . whatever." She asked "Why?"

As has been pointed out earlier in this book, the Jews had been uncritically patriotic citizens of unfriendly Spanish, French, and German regimes in other days—they had believed themselves to be considered by others as countrymen of



At the eve of the "final solution" to the "Jewish Problem," the Mufti and Adolf Hitler confer in Berlin, November 21, 1941.

their various places of birth, as they indeed considered themselves. Throughout the Mandatory period administered by the British, the prevailing Jewish establishment had viewed cooperation with the British as their best interests, even when the dissenting Jewish voices pointed out such factors as Arab "illegal" immigration, British double standards, leniency toward Arab terror, and the British enactment of laws treating Jews as the "illegals" and Arabs as the "natural" population—in the Jewish National Home. There was surely no chance of the Jews joining Axis powers and aiding the avowed "final solution to the Jewish problem" of the Nazis, as the British well understood.

Moreover, the Jews had nowhere else in the world to go. The irony was that the very loss of their nation had become the source of much of the anti-Jewish antagonism. The Jews could be pushed around or held suspect, because they weren't "from" any place and no place totally accepted them. The more they clung to their beliefs, the more they seemed to stand out. Conversely, they stood out because the only place the Jews could rightfully "put" their nationality was now withheld by a hostile, artificially increased "majority." In Palestine, their "Home," a slim hope remained that the British might yet relent and recognize that the one place where Jews were to be "as of right and not on sufferance" was available as an alternative "final solution"—which, indeed, it could have been.

### **The Frantic Forties: British Sympathies**

Perhaps the reaction of a group of Rumanian Jews in Bucharest to "a BBC broadcast in Roumanian" is instructive: by 1940 Jews hoping to escape from Europe *knew* that the British were acting to prevent foreign governments from releasing shiploads of Jewish refugees fleeing to the Jewish-settled area of Western Palestine. Yet the "British Embassy in Bucharest . . . warned" that a British broadcast had "been interpreted by local Jews to mean that they will all be immediately received [in] some British colony for duration of war.'"<sup>23</sup> Bernard Wasserstein noted, however, that the "primary British object [of the warning] was to prevent, not to stimulate, such an exodus. . . ." <sup>24</sup>

Toward that end, the boatloads of Jews "who had already passed through Dachau and Buchenwald" concentration camps to reach the shores of the "Jewish National Home" were deported.<sup>25</sup> This was 1940, before Nazi policy instituted the Hitlerian "Final Solution" that permitted Jewish exit exclusively through extermination—and the would-be Jewish immigrants had just arrived at what they believed was freedom. The following is an excerpt from the "eye-witness account" of one "deportation" by the British authorities, among the many documents cited in Bernard Wasserstein's study. According to the account, the refugees

had decided to resist by refusing to pack their few belongings and by refusing to dress: both males and females lay down naked on their beds and did not get up. [British] policemen, armed with sticks, entered the barracks in strength, bela-

boured some of the men with blows, and carried them naked on blankets to waiting lorries. . . .<sup>26</sup>

"They brought out over a hundred of the first batch of people, all of them wounded, completely naked . . . The remaining young people walked, quite naked, pushed from behind by the British police, until they reached the lorry, and they were then flung into it . . . One immigrant was pushed while he was naked and clasping a fiddle in his hand . . . Many of the old men fell on the ground and kissed it. They pleaded with tears before the police officers . . . to have pity on them, that they had already passed through Dachau and Buchenwald. And the officers paid no heed to them . . . A British military officer turned very pale, and left the place in anger."<sup>27</sup>

1,580 Jewish refugees—men, women, and 116 children who were "taken to the port of Haifa," and who had actually *already become* Jewish immigrants in the Jewish National Home—were deported to concentration-camp-like facilities on the island of Mauritius; their "suspicious" possessions—like utensils, razor blades, and so on—had been taken and their personal possessions, including cameras, had been "confiscated" and "sold, the proceeds being retained by the Government of Palestine."\* Many refugees died of the typhoid that the British had known was incubating among them, and which might have been treated had the refugees been allowed to remain in Palestine a few days longer. "But the Government did not wait until . . . the disease had subsided." There were forty-one immediate casualties, nineteen from "privations suffered in the early stages of the voyage"<sup>29</sup> and twenty-two deaths from typhoid. Most of the 1,310 survivors of the detention were finally allowed to return to Haifa after the war ended in August 1945.<sup>30</sup>

Those immigrants were among the fortunate 9,000 Jewish passengers who had eventually made it "home" in the "little ships" by the end of the war. The list is long of the dilapidated ships whose desperate passengers perished.

But the events of one, the *Struma*, indicated the unmitigated lengths to which the British would extend their influence to enforce their policy against the "illegal" Jewish immigrants fleeing from Hitler's war against them. The government had been ever more rigid in its watch against the little refugee ships, lest

it will be spread all over Arab world that Jews have again successfully challenged decision of British Government and that policy of White Paper is being reversed.

This undoubtedly would be followed, according to the "most immediate" cable from the British Commander in Chief in the Middle East, by "widespread disorders in Palestine," which could "greatly enhance influence of Mufti" and create general distrust among other Arab countries such as Egypt, which was already heavily engaged in "anti-British propaganda and fifth column activities."<sup>31</sup>

\*In 1944 the "threat of unfavorable publicity" in the United States over the sale prompted the British to, as they put it in one communication, "come clean about it." They eventually paid 3,000 pounds, "about eighteen percent of the amount claimed."<sup>28</sup>

The *Struma* incident occurred against the background of 1) ever-tightening Nazi maneuvers to prevent the Jews' escape in Europe; 2) the readmission into Western Palestine of the Mufti's collaborators; 3) the continuous Arab in-migration to the Jewish-settled areas; and 4) the wholesale immigration to Western Palestine of Arabs from surrounding Arab states, which will be detailed in following pages.

According to the official Anglo-American chronology in its evasive, compressed logging of events,<sup>32</sup> the *Struma* was a "motor vessel" that "arrived at Istanbul [Turkey] with some 750 Jewish refugees from Roumania on board," on December 20, 1941. The Turkish government, according to the terse paragraph in the Report describing the incident, "was unwilling to permit these people to land in Turkey and enquired whether they would be admitted into Palestine." "For security reasons," the Report stressed, ". . . a ban on the admission of persons from Axis and Axis-controlled territory" was in force, hence "the Turkish Government was informed that the 'Struma' passengers would not be admitted to Palestine." However,

the Palestine Administration ascertained that, given reasonable weather, the vessel should be fit to undertake a Mediterranean voyage.

The Anglo-American chronology continued: when "the Jewish Agency . . . asked that [the security ban] be raised generally and in respect of the 'Struma' passengers," they were "notified that the security ban could not be removed, but that children between the ages of 11 and 16 from the *Struma* would be admitted to Palestine."

The Report informed its readers of the *Struma*'s tragic end, two months after its arrival at Istanbul, by the following:

It was later learnt that, before the relevant arrangements had been completed, the Turkish authorities returned the vessel to the Black Sea. It sank on the 24th February as the result of an explosion, with a loss of 760 Jewish passengers.

The Report's bloodless, banal recitation of its version of events up to that point became noticeably less detached thereafter, as this heated description of the aftermath of the *Struma*'s sinking illustrates:

As soon as the news reached Palestine a violent campaign was launched by the Jews against Government; violently abusive pamphlets and manifestos condemning the "murder" of the passengers by the Palestine Government, demanded the removal of the restrictions on immigration.

Throughout, the abbreviated official account seems to reflect a helpless but blameless British role. Other documents provide another version.

Regarding the Turkish government's reactions, for example: more fully documented accounts of the *Struma* catastrophe show that the Turks were *willing to allow* "and even assist" the ship to Palestine, but the British Ambassador in

Ankara said that his government "did not want these people in Palestine." On December 20, he suggested an alternative:

If the Turkish Government must interfere with the ship . . . let her rather go toward the Dardanelles. . . . if they reached Palestine, they might despite their illegality receive humane treatment.<sup>33</sup>

London was "dismayed" by the Ambassador's advice—not because it was brutal to send the worn old ship away, but because he had indicated that the refugees on board the *Struma* would perhaps "receive humane treatment." As one Colonial officer complained,

. . . the first occasion on which . . . the Turkish Government . . . help in frustrating these illegal immigrant ships, and the Ambassador then goes and spoils the whole effect on absurdly misjudged humanitarian grounds.<sup>34</sup>

Others, including High Commissioner MacMichael and Colonial Secretary Lord Moyne, were in ardent agreement. Moyne asserted his prime rationale for turning back every Jewish refugee, although not one instance was ever found—"preventing the influx of Nazi agents under the cloak of refugees." Moyne felt it "difficult to write with moderation about this occurrence, which," he reminded, was

. . . in flat contradiction of established Government policy and . . . urge that Turkish authorities should be asked to send the ship back to the Black Sea, as they originally proposed."<sup>35</sup>

Regarding the two months when the Jewish Agency begged the British to reconsider the "security" ban while the *Struma* was docked near Istanbul: in that period the Rumanian Jews were attempting to escape from what the United States minister in Bucharest reported were wholesale slayings of Jews whose bodies were hung and displayed on "butcher's hooks."<sup>36</sup> At the same time, British intelligence had unearthed "not a single case" of "any Jewish refugee acting as an enemy agent in Palestine" that might justify Lord Moyne's anxiety.<sup>37</sup> Both Palestine and Home Office officials confirmed that none was ever known to exist, and that "the Jews themselves" would have turned on a Nazi agent.<sup>38</sup>

High Commissioner MacMichael added a further argument against this boatload: that most of the passengers were "professional people" and would be an "unproductive element in the population."<sup>39</sup> MacMichael had failed to fathom what the Nazis knew and utilized in the concentration camps on an insidiously temporary basis—that able-bodied persons, Jews or otherwise, whatever their former vocation, made productive laborers when their lives depended upon it.

Regarding the rescue of the children on board the *Struma*: the Report's cryptic comment implied that the Turks interfered with British "arrangements" for transferring the youngest refugees to safety. The facts were less unequivocal. Documented accounts tracing the plight of the ill-fated, unequipped boat—origi-

nally built in 1867 and designed to hold one hundred rather than the nearly eight hundred souls aboard—indeed found that even the children, without their parents, would not be permitted by the Turkish government to be transported over Turkish land to Palestine.

The British, however, *would* be allowed to send a boat that was in the area to pick up the children from the *Struma*. But no boat was found by the British to rescue them. The possibility of the British rerouting a nearby ship to rescue the Jewish refugee children apparently was never a serious consideration, since a British foreign officer, writing the day after the Turkish ultimatum, enumerated the choices of his government without ever mentioning that measure. Further, he "imagined" that "selecting the children and taking them from their parents off the *Struma*"—even if the British "got the Turks to agree" to overland transfer—"would be . . . extremely distressing." The Foreign Office official continued, asking,

Who . . . should undertake it, and has the possibility of the adults refusing to let the children go been considered?<sup>40</sup>

One survivor, David Stoliar,\* made an official deposition three months later. Stoliar described the Turkish police boarding the ship "in force" and the Jews' impotent resistance to the orders to go back to Rumania:

. . . some of the passengers . . . came to blows with the police, but the police overpowered them and there were some 100 to 200 policemen. They took the ship some ten kilometres from the coast and left us . . . early in the morning . . . an explosion occurred.

Stoliar and "the second Captain . . . jumped into the sea" when "the ship started to sink." The explosion had been "caused by a torpedo which he [the second Captain] saw." Although the ship—only ten kilometers offshore—was visible from the Turkish coast, as the coast was visible to Stoliar,

Nobody came to our help from ashore. The second Captain who was with me in the sea disappeared about a quarter of an hour before the saving boat arrived.<sup>42</sup>

Turkish Naval Intelligence corroborated the report that the ship was sunk by torpedo.

David Stoliar, after hospitalization and imprisonment,<sup>43</sup> eventually was allowed, along with the other survivor, Medea Salamovici, into Western Palestine through "an act of clemency." But not until High Commissioner MacMichael had been overruled in his objection to the two survivors' entry: MacMichael held the view, shared by so many of his British colleagues, that if these two immigrants were permitted into Palestine, the "floodgate" would "open" and "completely undermine our whole policy regarding illegal immigrants."<sup>44</sup> Who fired the tor-

\*There was one other survivor—a pregnant woman who managed to escape from the ship to Istanbul, where her baby died. Her husband drowned with the *Struma*.<sup>41</sup>

pedo has never been determined, but the Palestinian Jewish community indeed blamed the tragic drowning of more than 750 men, women, and children on the British letter of the law that killeth. On that point, the Anglo-American Report was deadly accurate.

The drowning of the people on board the *Struma* killed the last remnant of hope among Palestinian Jews that the British might yet honor the Balfour Declaration and observe their legal obligations under the Mandate, the Mandate that had gained for England the right to Palestinian rule.

By 1942 London had publicly received (over a BBC broadcast) the word that the Jews of Eastern Europe were being "physically exterminated on Polish soil, using the Ukrainian and the Lithuanian Fascists for this job."<sup>45</sup> Walter Laqueur writes that the report

mentioned a great many facts and figures about the number of Jews killed in various places. . . . It gives a figure of 700,000 victims and says that . . . the German Government has begun to carry out Hitler's prophecy that in the last five minutes of the war, whatever its outcome, all the Jews of Europe would be killed.<sup>46</sup>

That news had been published in America in August 1942. Ironically, the Americans' unaltered, minimal prewar-prescribed annual quota—27,370 "German and Austrian" immigrants allotted for 1942—was only 17.8 percent filled.<sup>47</sup>

In Palestine, Government hoped to avoid the embarrassment of another *Struma*, by sending whatever straggler shiploads of Jewish refugees might still slip somehow through the tightened Nazi bonds on to the island of Mauritius. But, to appease Arab protests, Britain declared that after the war the Jews must return to Europe and not enter Palestine.

The awkward alteration of policy—to allay what some British feared would be a Jewish "insurrection" if no concession was offered—was given full if inadvertent cooperation by the Nazis. In 1942, Jews found it "virtually impossible" to escape. "The total number of immigrants to Palestine (both legal and illegal) in 1942 was 3,038, the lowest figure for any year of the war."<sup>48</sup> The Jewish immigrants who made it to the Jewish-settled area of Western Palestine under the status of "illegal" were in fact "placed in a detention camp on arrival." Only if they passed the "careful security check" and were adjudged not to threaten the "overriding principle of *economic absorptive capacity*"\* would they be "released." And then they would be "set off"—deducted—from the "quota."<sup>49</sup> This meant that they were in fact not "illegal" at all, since they had merely taken some of the inconceivably few Jewish places that the Arabs had agreed to, those allotted in the White Paper.

Also, it must be remembered that in 1942 the Mufti's cohorts were being allowed to reenter Western Palestine. Miraculously evading detection as Nazi sympathizers and allies, the Arabs in general were still very much an influence in the British government's plans. The plight of the Jewish refugees had thrown

\*Emphasis added.



salt on the festering sore of immigration, a condition that Arabs watched with omnipresent hostility. As the Foreign Office official Randall wrote, the British might have to choose "between raising world Jewish opinion against us and trouble with the Arabs."<sup>50</sup>

Disillusioned "world Jewish opinion" decided after the *Struma* debacle to battle the immigration restrictions against Jews into what was after May 1942 formally designated as a "Jewish Commonwealth" in Western Palestine. The Extraordinary Zionist Conference in New York in May 1942, recognizing that the British betrayal of the Balfour Declaration was adamant, voted to further the Balfour-Mandate adoption of a Jewish State, independent and regardless of the Arab-inspired British policy.<sup>51</sup>

The British, however, had made their choice in 1939, although the White Paper restrictions, in the context of Hitler's "war against the Jews,"<sup>52</sup> had become a death warrant. Until the simultaneous events of the May 1948 British leavetaking from Palestine and the 1948 "War of Independence," when Israel was proclaimed internationally as the independent Jewish State, the White Paper would remain the policy of Great Britain. Nonetheless, Palestinian Jews would continue their frantic efforts to smuggle what remained of the prospective community of Jewish refugee immigrants into the Jewish-settled area of Western Palestine throughout the war and afterward.

Meanwhile, England's War Cabinet had declared, in March 1942, that the British would continue to take "all practicable steps . . . to discourage illegal immigration into Palestine,"<sup>53</sup> that "very undesirable trade." The *Struma* was sinking and the Mufti—having declared "holy war against Britain"—was demanding that Hitler, Ribbentrop, and the Bulgarian, Hungarian, and Rumanian governments keep their promise of "the destruction of the so-called Jewish National Home."

That destruction was an "immutable part of the policy of the greater German Reich," the Mufti reminded, and Nazi allies must "do all that is necessary to prohibit the emigration of Jews to Palestine," by sending them to the extermination camps in Poland.

*I asked you, Reichsführer, to take all the measures to prevent the Jews from going,* the Mufti had scolded. Those "measures" must be taken, he insisted, to "give a new practical example" to "the Arab Nation" of the "naturally allied and friendly" Arab-Axis relations.<sup>54</sup>

As further proof of his own fidelity, the Mufti offered the Arab Legion for use against the Allies to "Reichsführer and Reichsminister" Heinrich Himmler. The offer was a reaction against the British "establishment of a Jewish military unit to fight against Germany"—the Jewish Brigade.<sup>55</sup>

## Mufti Asks Hungary to Send Jews to Poland

As a Sequel to This Request  
400,000 Jews Were Subsequently Killed

Rome  
June 28, 1943

His Excellency  
The Minister of Foreign Affairs for Hungary

Your Excellency:

You no doubt know of the struggle between the Arabs and Jews of Palestine, what it has been and what it is, a long and bloody fight, brought about by the desire of the Jews to create a national home, a Jewish State in the Near East, with the help and protection of England and the United States. In fact, behind it lies the hope which the Jews have never relinquished, namely, the domination of the whole world through this important, strategic center, Palestine. In effect, their program has, among other purposes, always aimed at the encouragement of Jewish emigration to Palestine and the other countries of the Near East. However, the war, as well as the understanding which the members of the Three-Power Pact have of the responsibility of the Jews for its outbreak and finally their evil intentions towards these countries which protected them until now — all these are reasons for placing them under such vigilant control as will definitely stop their emigration to Palestine or elsewhere.

Lately I have been informed of the uninterrupted efforts made by the English and the Jews to obtain permission for the Jews living in your country to leave for Palestine via Bulgaria and Turkey.

I have also learned that these negotiations were successful, since some of the Jews of Hungary have had the satisfaction of emigrating to Palestine via Bulgaria and Turkey and that a group of these Jews arrived in Palestine towards the end of last March. The Jewish Agency, which supervises the execution of the Jewish program, has published a bulletin which contains important information on the current negotiations between the English Government and the governments of other interested states to send the Jews of Balkan countries to Palestine. The Jewish Agency quotes, among other things, its receipt of a sufficient number of immigration certificates for 900 Jewish children to be transported from Hungary, accompanied by 100 adults.

To authorize these Jews to leave your country under the above circumstances and in this way, would by no means solve the Jewish problem and would certainly not protect your country against their evil influence — far from it! — for this escape would make it possible for them to communicate and combine freely with their racial brethren in enemy countries in order to strengthen their position and to exert a more dangerous influence on the outcome of the war, especially since, as a consequence of their long stay in your country, they are necessarily in a position to know many of your secrets and also about your war effort. All this comes on top of the terrible damage done to the friendly Arab nation which has taken its place at your side in this war and which cherishes for your country the most sincere feelings and the very best wishes.

This is the reason why I ask your Excellency to permit me to draw your attention to the necessity of preventing the Jews from leaving your country for Palestine; and if there are reasons which make their removal necessary, it would be indispensable and infinitely preferable to send them to other countries where they would find themselves under active control, for example, in Poland, in order thereby to protect oneself from their menace and avoid the consequent damage.

Yours, etc.

Rome Le 28 Juin 1943

A Son Excellence Monsieur le Ministre des  
affaires étrangères de HONGRIE

Excellence !

Vous savez sans doute ce que fût et ce qu'est encore la lutte entre Arabes et Juifs en Palestine , lutte sanglante et longue , dont la raison est le désir de ces derniers de se créer un foyer national , un Etat juif dans le proche orient avec l'aide et l'appui de l'Angleterre et des Etats-Unis d'Amérique . Ceci déveile en vérité l'espoir que les Juifs n'ont cessé d'avoir à savoir : la domination du Monde entier par ce centre stratégique important qu'est la Palestine . En effet leur programme entre autres buts principaux , a toujours visé l'encouragement de l'émigration des Juifs en Palestine et vers les autres pays du Proche-Orient . Mais la guerre , la certitude qu'ont eu les Haïssances du Pacte tripartite du rôle joué par les Juifs dans son déclenchement et enfin leurs mauvaises arrière-pensées envers les pays qui les abritèrent jusqu'ici sont autant de raisons qui justifient leur placement sous surveillance vigilante avec laquelle leur émigration en Palestine ou autre ce trouve fermement arrêtée .

Je fus dernièrement mis au courant des efforts ininterrompus prodigués par les Anglais et les Juifs en vue d'obtenir pour les Juifs résidant dans votre Pays la permission de le quitter pour la Palestine à travers la Bulgarie et la Turquie .

Je suis également que ces démarches aboutissent avec succès , puisque

## Hungary Promises to End Jewish Problem

A. M. KIRKOVET  
DER KÖNIGLICHEN GESANDTZE  
360/B.-1944.

Berlin, den 25. Juli 1944.

Bure Eminens !

Ich habe den Auftrag erhalten Eurer Eminenz mitzuteilen, dass der kgl. ungarische Minister des Aussenern mit Dank Ihr sehr geschätztes Schreiben vom 22. Juni 1944 betreffend die Verhinderung der Auswanderung der Juden nach Palestina dankend empfangen hat; er wird die darin enthaltenen Vorschläge einer Erwägung unterziehen.

Mit dem Ausdruck meiner vorzüglichsten Hochachtung

*H. Kirkovet*  
kgl. ungarischer Gesandter

Seiner Eminenz

Amin El Hussein  
Grossmufti von Palestina

Bubin bei Titten

## Illegal Arab Immigration During World War II

The same Arab Legion organization, it might be noted, was in exclusive control of immigration at the borders into Western Palestine through Transjordan.<sup>56</sup>

The principle of "evenhandedness," whereby Jewish volunteers for the war effort had been accepted only in numbers that matched the disproportionately meager number of Arabs who volunteered, had soon been superseded by the British war needs, as we have seen: hence a "Jewish Brigade." However, that so-called evenhandedness had never been applied at the borders to Western Palestine, where Colonel MacKereth had fought for identity cards several years before to prevent "illicit" Arab immigration and gunrunning. The *Palestine Royal Commission Report* in 1937 had determined that the Arab Legion

Frontier Force could not be used to control and police the Palestine Frontier except at the risk of neglecting the country—Trans-Jordan—from which they are mainly recruited.

The same *Report* had also recognized that Western Palestine's

open frontier some 250 miles long, bordering on countries in which all the inhabitants are allowed to carry arms is almost impossible [to disarm].

While it was "right that the Arabs if still the aggressors, should first be disarmed," the *Report* cautioned that disarming the Arabs "would be an extremely difficult task."

Yet, while the Palestinian Jews were anxious to have the right to supplement the frontier forces, the *Royal Commission Report* had concluded that

it is clear that the Jews cannot claim as of right recruitment in a Force towards which the Palestine Government contributes only one-fourth of the cost, and whose duties are primarily outside Palestine.<sup>57</sup>

Not only was the recruitment of Palestinian Jews—whose enforcement could have effectively prevented Arab "gun-running" and what the Report acknowledged as "illicit Arab immigration" discouraged—but the identity cards were never earnestly implemented.

The identity-card system, that one measure which might have deterred<sup>58</sup> "Arab entrants" who would "satisfy all demands for additional labour" and "leave no room in the labour category for Jewish immigrants from outside Palestine," was given, at best, occasional token and ineffectual brief trial.<sup>59</sup> There were still a "serious number of persons who evade the frontier control and enter Palestine without formality of any kind. . . ." The illicit Arab immigration from "Syria and Transjordan," which had "swollen unemployment lists" and was "used as a political pawn" toward "blocking immigration to which they are radically averse" was just as free-moving during World War II as it had been in the 1930s.

The British "practice" was *still* "sufficient"—adding the Arab immigrants into the "economic absorptive capacity" as though they were "indigenous Arab population for millennia." If, as Hope Simpson admitted,<sup>60</sup> it was "injustice" for "illicit" Arab immigrants to "take the places" that Palestinian Jews created for Jewish immigrant hopefuls "outside the country" in all the earlier years of the Mandatory period, the World War II continuation of that casual British "practice," throughout the dark years of the Jews' extermination in Europe, must be viewed as unfathomably disingenuous and callous.

During all "the years of war," as the joint American-British postwar report, *The Survey of Palestine*, cryptically confirmed, "identity cards" were "several times reviewed" for use as a "system" to prevent Arab mercenaries and rebels from entering "Palestine." However, the "system of illegal immigration" in Western Palestine had been otherwise organized:

*For reasons mainly political* but also related to the practical difficulties involved, it was decided on each occasion that a compulsory system of universal registration should not be introduced. . . .<sup>\*61</sup>

As a grudging token response to the earlier British Reports' evidence of illegal Arab immigration, and the League of Nations' challenges of the British administration on the subject, a helter-skelter "method" was applied by the government in 1938; freely admitted to be no more than symbolic, it

purported solely to establish the holder's identity; and neither the card nor the application form contained any reference to character, antecedents, national status or status under the Immigration Ordinance.<sup>62</sup>

When attempts were made to tighten up the existing farce, effectiveness was soon nullified if indeed any effect had been achieved at all.

For example, in 1941, while the British were justifying the practice of firing on the miserable little rescue ships jammed with hopeful *Jewish* immigrants-to-be, to get them *away* from the "Jewish National Home" in Western Palestine at any cost, Government's District Commissioners actually received instructions *cancelling* its new order to begin to withhold identity cards at the borders to neighboring Arab lands or in Palestine "from persons . . . not . . . legally in Palestine." Because it was seen to "constitute a hardship in numerous instances" and cause "serious inconvenience" to the *Arab* immigrants concerned, even that token "directive" which might cut down Arab immigration was "modified." The *non-Jewish* immigrants "illegally in Palestine" were thus *given cards regardless of their origins*, and allowed to enter or remain in Western Palestine, their

cards being thereafter stamped . . . "*possession of this card in no way constitutes evidence of legal residence in Palestine.*"<sup>\*63</sup>

\*Emphasis added

While no invention was left untested in the British zeal to enforce the prevention of "illegal" Jewish immigrants who were "a very serious embarrassment,"<sup>64</sup> and while the Nazi policy toward Jews was beginning to evolve from the expulsion of the Jews into the more barbarous program of incinerating and gassing those millions of souls who found no place that would accept them—at that very time the hidden immigration of Arabs into Western Palestine was rampant. In the archives the British left behind in Western Palestine there are dozens of cartons stuffed with folders, containing literally reams of forms dated "1940" and "1941," each form stating the name of one (or more) Muslim or other non-Jewish "traveler who is believed to be in Palestine without permission"—all of them dismissed with the stamped or typewritten words: "Could not be traced."<sup>65</sup>

In only a single instance did the files of British correspondence concerning "illegal immigration" refer to "deportation with special reference to Arabs." Saunders, the Inspector General, wrote to the Chief Secretary in April of 1942 that "His Excellency the Officer Administrating the Government raised this question with me recently. . . ." However, Saunders was chided for his mistake. In the handwritten response to his memo about illegal Arab immigration, Saunders was told,

. . . But I was *not* thinking specially of Arabs. Actually the case which gave rise to my inquiry was Jewish. . . .<sup>66</sup>

In fact, the "practice" that Hope Simpson had identified so many years earlier was the Palestine Government's *clearly delineated policy* in its official *Memorandum on Deportation—Arabs*, of April 9, 1942. The circular directed verbatim that

The police have *no* instructions to concentrate on *picking up Arabs* who are in Palestine illegally.

Only if a "person who is in the country illegally" should "come to the notice of the Police" will the illegal Arab immigrant be "put up for deportation. . . ."<sup>67</sup>

Thus, in 1942, when London already had received a "detailed account" that Auschwitz concentration camp alone accounted for "4,000 deaths by shooting, 2,900 by gassing, . . . 2,000 by phenol injection . . . 1,200 beaten to death and 800 . . . committed suicide by walking into the camp's electric fence,"<sup>68</sup> the cynical policy toward Arab immigration into Western Palestine was still operative: the illegal Arab immigrants entered unheeded along with Arab in-migrants, and all were counted as "natives" unless they were "flagrant." The lone immigration memo on "Arabs" states that "140 Arabs" were "summarily deported" and "additionally 406 Arabs" were "deported" between January and March 1942—they included "Lebanese, Syrian, Transjordanian, Egyptian, Adenite and [from] Hedjaz." Those "flagrant" illegal immigrants who had "come to the notice of the Police" were then "conducted to the frontier"—which was, it must be remembered, hundreds of miles long and guarded *only* by members of the *Arab Legion*. At the frontier they were "instructed to make their way home."<sup>69</sup>

Since the police were encouraged not to deport illegal Arab immigrants, and

the only Arab deportees were those whose presence had become "flagrant" because of "arrest" or "loitering" or "information received" by a third party,<sup>70</sup> the fact that 546 Arabs were "deported" in just two months of 1942 indicates that the number who remained, having found employment and/or other support from other immigrants, members of their families who had arrived earlier—or who simply managed to evade the admittedly permissive, blinkered vision of the authorities—can be estimated to be a number many times the 546 who were deported.

As the later, formal second reply to Saunder's naïve inquiry concerning what actions to take against Arab immigrants once again emphasized,

the Officer Administering the Government . . . has read with interest . . . and thanks . . . letter (No. 38/G) of the 15th April, 1942. . . . In fact, however, His Excellency was not thinking of Arabs. . . .<sup>71</sup>

Britain's rationalization of its political appeasement to the Arabs, virtually halting Jewish immigration to the Jewish National Home at the time of greatest peril in Europe, was perhaps the most cynical and craven chapter in the tragic record of the Holocaust. It was wrongful enough that the British had continued including newly arrived Arab immigrants against the "labour schedule" in Palestine—in other words, misrepresenting them as "millennia-settled Palestinian Arabs" who would be "displaced" from jobs in Western Palestine if Jewish immigrants were allowed to fill those rightful places that had been created by Palestinian Jews.

Compounding that wrongful "practice," which barred the gates of sanctuary against Jews into the Jewish-settled area of Western Palestine and thus sealed the fate of hundreds of thousands if not millions of would-be Jewish immigrants in the extermination camps of Europe, there was an *additional* and *never-related* factor.

At the very time that the White Paper was defended and rationalized by the British claim that Palestine had reached the outside population limit of its "absorptive capacity" for Jewish workers, the same British Government enacted special legislation that enabled the Palestine administration to import thousands of "illegal" Arab workers to meet the increased job needs of the government. *There weren't enough laborers, said the British, to fill those needs.*<sup>72</sup> While there were purportedly no places on the Palestine "labour schedule" for Jews who were instead forced to dig trenches for their own and other Jewish bodies in the death camps of Eastern Europe, the war had in fact created additional countless thousands of jobs in Western Palestine.

The official report pertinent to "Arab illegal immigration . . . by Arabs from neighboring territories in search of employment *during the war years*"\* was the Anglo-American Committee's 1945–1946 *Survey of Palestine*. That report began its observations on the subject with "the conclusion . . . that Arab illegal immigra-

\*Emphasis added.

tion for the purpose of permanent settlement is insignificant.”<sup>73</sup> Immediately thereafter, the *Survey* reported that the great majority of Arab “labourers from Syria and the Lebanon” and “Egypt” who were “brought” by “trucks” and “train” to fill the “demand for labour exceeding the local supply” in Western Palestine were presumed to have “remained in Palestine illegally.”\*

In the tradition of earlier British reports seeking to dismiss its pivotal importance as a factor, the *Survey* had disposed of the Arab illegal immigration as “insignificant” and then proceeded from that point to contradict its conclusion. Despite the fact that a maze of confusing figures and clinical terminology obscures the data, and despite the undoubtedly understated figures reported, the information that nonetheless emerges is jolting. The *Survey*’s pages reveal a documented account that indicates duplicity and cynicism, bias and double standards, to a degree not thought to have been practiced by any but the fascist governments in World War II.

Because of the “demand for labour exceeding the local supply,” according to the Anglo-American *Survey*, “official arrangements were made, in October, 1942,” and “under this arrangement” the Report noted that “3,800 labourers” were “admitted” from Syria and Lebanon.<sup>74</sup> Keep in mind that the numbers reported for Arab illegal immigration by the British administration of the Mandate always were understated or minimized, as illustrated earlier in this volume;<sup>75</sup> we find that in another “arrangement,” a “police estimate” of Arab illegal immigrants “working for contractors engaged on military R.A.F. construction or in other civil employment” amounted to “9,687.”<sup>76</sup>

Since policy only “found” those illegal Arab immigrants who were “flagrant,” and because of the design by which Arab immigration was minimized and understated throughout the British Mandatory administration, the true number of thousands of Arabs imported under that legislation can only be speculated about.

Although the author had read and reread the *Survey*’s data describing the Palestine Government’s wholesale importation of Arab illegal immigrants, it was not until the paragraphs were taken apart in order to cite them that it became apparent that many of the paragraphs dealing with “Arab illegal immigration” during “the War years” were describing *different* sets of Arab immigrants and different numbers. One was the “Army” workers, another was the “Navy,” still another the “R.A.F.,” and in addition there were the unquantifiables. In one group of nearly ten thousand reported “foreign workers”—most of whom eventually “deserted” or “remained in Palestine illegally”—the *Survey* states that the Arab

illegal immigrants [were] Egyptians, Syrians, Lebanese . . . also small numbers from Trans-Jordan, Persia, India, Somaliland, Abyssinia and the Hejaz.<sup>77</sup>

Another group of immigrants noted by the Report:

\*Emphasis added.



*In addition to these Syrian and Lebanese Labourers who were brought to Palestine under official arrangement, inhabitants of neighbouring countries, attracted by the high rates of wages offered for employment on military works, entered Palestine illegally during the war in considerable numbers. . . . For example, in 1942, Egyptian labour was brought into southern Palestine by civilian contractors to the military forces without any agreement with the civil administration; these contractors were employed on the construction camps and aerodromes.\**

By stark contrast to the meticulous quota system for Jewish refugees from Hitler, the number in *that* group of "illegal Arab immigrants"—which even in the Report was described as "considerable"—was *omitted* totally from the Report's calculations. As the Report stated unconcernedly,

*No estimates are available of the numbers of foreign labourers who were so brought into the country or who entered individually in search of employment on military works.\**

In regard to still another group, numbering thousands of "illegal immigrants," the *Survey* reported that by the 1945–1946 date of publication of the report

The Services authorities are *not able* at present [1945–46 date of publication of the Report] *to find Palestinians* who could suitably replace all these foreigners.\*

The authorities, therefore, would "desire to retain" 2,000 of a group of more than 4,000 mostly Egyptian immigrants.<sup>78</sup>

What the official Anglo-American *Survey* of 1945–1946 definitively disclosed—however obfuscated the presentation, however buried in the three-volume post-war report it may be—is that those tens of thousands of "Arab illegal immigrants" recorded as having been "brought" into Western Palestine were reported by an administration that was reluctant to record Arab immigration at all. In addition, other *un*estimated "considerable" numbers immigrated "unofficially" or as "individuals" during the war, according to the report. Of the combined masses of Arab illegal immigrants only a small number were "repatriated," and only near the end of the war ("October 1944") was there a token effort to "put the law into force and to deport to their countries of origin the Syrian, Lebanese, Egyptian and other foreign labourers found to be illegally in Palestine.\* Since the Palestine authorities, as was documented earlier, were under orders *not* to deport Arab illegal immigrants unless they were embarrassingly noticeable, the number deported was predictably minimal. And even then, as later pages of the *Survey* noted, those

labourers illegally in the country who are employed directly by the Army, Navy or Air Force are not deported, unless local workers can be found to replace them or until they are discharged from their employment.<sup>79</sup>

\*Emphasis added.

The evidence clearly stated in the report, however, was ignored as a factor in determining what constituted "justice" for Jews in the area, just as the indications of John Hope Simpson's Report and the corroborating evidence of the Royal Commission, Partition, and other Reports had been similarly ignored.

In the decades before Hitler's Arab-abetted war against the Jews began, however brutal and unfair the policy might have been of barring those Jews who were clamoring to get into the Jewish National Home, in those days at least systematic persecution of Jews in Russia, Poland, Rumania, and elsewhere did not forecast physical annihilation. However biased and double-dealing a policy might have been that appeased Arab demands against and at the expense of the legal requirements of the international Mandate for a "Jewish National Home," until now the actuality of condemning would-be Jewish immigrants—refugees from the crematorium—by prohibiting their entry to Western Palestine *has never been seen in context.*

There has been no connection made between the Arab illegal immigrants being imported to fill the labor demands of Western Palestine—the "Jewish National Home"—and the countless Jewish lives taken because those Jews who would have fled to Palestine were forbidden entry.

Those Jews, the Arabs had protested with the support and legislation of the government, would take the jobs available for the "existing" Arab population from "time immemorial." As we now see, that "existing" unemployed Arab population in fact did not exist. It was fabricated.

In the final year of the war, when escape from Europe again became a practicable proposition for a few of the Jewish survivors, the British Government resumed its practice of earlier years in seeking to prevent the departure of Jews from Europe.<sup>80</sup>

The combined efforts of the Nazi-allied Arabs and the British government effectively barred from rescue many hundreds of thousands of Jews whose lives might have been spared.

There was an additional element of duplicity involved in the mass import of Arab laborers, for the "labour demands" in Western Palestine that were so great that the need for workers was considered an "emergency." At that very moment it was the Palestinian Jews who were fighting for the Allies, and the British had knowledge of the extermination of Jews in Eastern Europe. Given those facts, to continue to prohibit Jewish immigration into the Jewish-settled area in Western Palestine on *any* basis must be considered callous and inexplicable. To prohibit the rescue of Jews in the one place where they had a right to go, based on the belief that the so-called "absorptive capacity" for workers had been filled—despite the fact that the elastic "absorptive capacity" had been stretched time and time again, enough to accommodate even the thousands upon thousands of unreported Arab illegal immigrants who flooded in throughout the Mandatory period—would have been by itself a cynical appeasement of extreme Arab demands by the British administration. And it was.

That "absorptive capacity," which was so fraudulently used to prevent Jewish immigration, was in fact the actual means by which the illegal Arab immigration and in-migration was *facilitated*.

While the Jews were working furiously at clearing land that had been ignored or dismissed by Government "authorities" as "uncultivable," and creating places that Government insisted "did not exist," those opened-up places—which in fact disproved Government's theory that the country was "overfull"—were taken by the illegal Arab immigrants. Having cleared those places only to have them expropriated by the Arab in-migrants and immigrant community—Syrians, Egyptians, Hauranis, Algerians, Hejazis, and others camouflaged as "natural indigenous Palestinian population since time immemorial"—the Jews yet continued their efforts, lest the British halt Jewish immigration entirely, which Government on more than one occasion had threatened to do.

Those thousands upon thousands of places continually created by Palestinian Jews discredited Government's unrealistically low "estimated" capacity of the country to absorb new immigrants. Had those places in the country been left open for the Jews instead of being usurped by illegal Arab immigrants falsely represented as part of the "original" and "existing" Palestinian population for "thousands of years"—many factors would have changed. The Jews would have grown in number at least in direct proportion to the number of places they had cleared for Jewish immigrants to come to from persecution. Concurrently, the number of Arabs would have been reduced to a figure that more plausibly represented the "existing" non-Jewish population and its descendants from the beginning of the century. Thus the Jewish population would have grown substantially—by, at the very least, 200,000 more—while the "non-Jewish" population of Western Palestine would have decreased by the very minimum of 200,000—there would have been at least 200,000 *fewer* "Palestinian Arabs." The resulting proportional changes in the population, plus the evidence which would then have been obvious—that the "absorptive capacity" was inaccurate and begun on a fallacious premise—might have caused the British to "open the gates" to the Jews fleeing to their National Home in Western Palestine, instead of sealing their fates in the extermination camps.

If that act appears as the ultimate cynicism, it at least *might have* presupposed an earnestness on behalf of those who somehow, through blinkered vision, accepted the Arab claim that the land could not hold any more immigrants without "taking jobs away from" the so-called "existing," ostensibly phenomenally growing "native" Arab population. That at least was the purported justification for the White Paper's harsh restrictive measures against the Jews.

But, that the British virtually signed the death warrants for countless Jews in mortal danger by engaging the might of the British Empire to enforce strict laws against Jewish immigration; that simultaneously Government declared an excess of jobs amounting to a need of "emergency" proportions, whereby Government not only encouraged or winked at, but *officially enacted* the illegal immigration of thousands of Arab indigents from neighboring and more distant lands, to

take jobs in the Jewish National Home that might have saved the lives of Jewish concentration camp victims—the whole action, seen in context, matches the barbarism that the Allies were battling to defeat.

That deed by Britain's officialdom in Western Palestine is not excusable merely as unwitting complicity in the Mufti-Hitler conspiracy; it may indeed have constituted active participation in the racial genocide of the Jews in Eastern Europe.

In London, meanwhile, the Foreign Office had responded to the news of the genocide with inaction amounting to tacit endorsement. At a moment when Arab "illegals" were being officially and unofficially smuggled over the borders to alleviate the need for workers in the "Jewish National Home," documented evidence shows that whenever the possible rescue of Jews became known, those rescues that were not prevented by the Mufti or other Arab Axis supporters were effectively protested against and eventually foiled by the British Government.

There was at least one notable instance, however, when all the British Empire's might could not prevent one such rescue—a rescue in theory if not in practice. That exception was due to public pressure placed on the British by the United States government, which had chosen to go over the heads of some objecting State Department officials.

In April of 1943, another purportedly sympathetic Anglo-American Conference on refugees had opened and closed in Bermuda; its achievements were as ignominious as the 1938 proceedings at Evian.<sup>81</sup> In the wake of the Bermuda exercise, at the end of 1943 the United States authorized funds necessary to save 70,000 Rumanian Jews—"only a few dollars per head."<sup>82</sup>

The British Foreign Office, however, was

concerned with the difficulties of disposing of any considerable number of Jews should they be rescued from enemy-occupied territory.<sup>83</sup>

The British hoped that the plan would be "abandoned," although they recognized that American elections were drawing near; as the British Ambassador in Washington reported, the United States

Administration would certainly not wish to be identified with a British decision which all Jews here, Zionist or non-Zionist, would agree in regarding as inhumane.<sup>84</sup>

The British balancing act was perilous, as one Foreign Office official noted. The Foreign Office was faced with the need for

helping the State Department and Treasury to meet Jewish electoral pressure, . . . avoiding a crescendo of U.S. criticism about our Palestine policy, and on the other hand, of meeting . . . Arab wishes.<sup>85</sup>

The concern for "Arab wishes" evidently remained the stronger motivation, since Foreign Office opinion "remained hostile to the scheme" although by late 1943 it had long since been known that Rumanian Jews faced certain death.

Another foreign officer's sentiments exemplified, with bloodcurdling candor, the way "Government" reasoned the matter:

Once we open the door to adult male Jews to be taken out of enemy territory, a quite unmanageable flood may result. (Hitler may facilitate it!)<sup>86</sup>

The United States State Department, however, apparently overrode British objections in this case, based on Treasury Secretary Morgenthau's outrage at the fact that

in simple terms, the British were apparently prepared to accept the probable death of thousands of Jews in enemy territory because of "the difficulties of disposing of any considerable number of Jews should they be rescued."<sup>87</sup>

One wonders whether the employment boom for Arab immigrants in Western Palestine during the war was kept secret or was, tragically, simply overlooked by the myriad concerned officials purportedly looking for places for the thousands of Jewish refugees. Is it possible that nobody but the Arab immigrants, the British Government, and the various "private contractors" involved were aware of the war boom and its obvious additional opportunities in the "Jewish National Home"? Or that, although known factors, the two counterpoint claims—of emergency need for Arab "illegal immigrant" workers and of the "difficulties of disposing of Jewish refugees"—were never connected? Was the deadly silence on this crucial point caused by the Palestinian Jews' preoccupation with their frantic effort in Europe to save the Jews in the midst of the war's chaos?

Because of the pat anti-Semitic image of the Jew as "cosmopolitan" and "professional," had the British blocked out from their perception of Jews the fact that it was the Palestinian Jewish physical effort as well as economic support that had reclaimed swamps and transformed massive arid, barren plots of land into the Jewish-settled area of Western Palestine? If the British who witnessed it had forgotten that many Jewish immigrant professional people had taken to the land and to physical labor even before the threat to Jewish existence in Europe was imminent, then perhaps it might be argued that the rest of the free world never properly considered that those jobs being given to the thousands of Arab immigrants during the war could have been filled by the Jews.

That tenuous argument, though, was repudiated by one horrible factor, which by 1942 already had been communicated to governments and people of the free world—that in the Nazi "work" camps the Jews were not only laboring furiously at the basest manual tasks the Nazis could devise, just to keep alive for a few precious days longer, but Jewish prisoners were literally digging their own graves.

By November 1947, when the United Nations recommended partition of Western Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab state, the Arab world summarily rejected the very territory that they currently claim as the "mini-state"—the West Bank area later admittedly sought by many Arab strategists as the "first stage" in the dismantling of a Zionist entity. The Arabs' conduct had long been encouraged and given form by the immutable pattern of British precedents. Not only

had the British tacitly supported Arab rejection of the *Palestine Royal Commission Report's* partition plan a decade before, but obsequious *post-World War II* actions by the weary, decaying Palestine Government made the signals clear. As the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry stated in 1946,

In the face of actual violence and threats of much more serious violence, possibly approaching the status of civil war, the Palestine Government resorted to drastic emergency legislation which permitted it to modify or suspend normal civil liberties. There can be no gainsaying that Palestine today is governed without the consent of Jews or Arabs by an Administration depending almost solely upon force for the maintenance of a precarious authority.<sup>88</sup>

The Report noted that there were "signs . . . of a revival of Arab secret activities, similar to those which preceded the disturbances of 1936-39."<sup>89</sup> Most active Arab Nazi-sympathizers and supporters had left Western Palestine to lead the 1936-1939 Arab "Revolt" from a safe distance. After the war, these Arabs were permitted back into the country, but the Jewish survivors were kept under a strict quota of "1,500 persons a month."<sup>90</sup>

The typical brief 1946 Anglo-American account of postwar violence concentrated on the "Jews, protesting against restrictions upon [Jewish] immigration," and placed the blame for "threats to public order in Palestine" throughout the entire period of the Mandate upon "Jewish immigration."<sup>91</sup>

Near the end of the war, there were many who evidenced concern that gave hope of a policy change. The British Labour Party had resolved in May 1944 that

the Arabs should be induced to move out of [Western] Palestine,

presumably to what was then Transjordanian, or Eastern, Palestine.<sup>92</sup> American support was voiced by

both Democrats and Republicans in the course of the Presidential elections . . . in the autumn of 1944 . . . in particular, a letter by the President . . . in favour of the opening of Palestine to unrestricted Jewish immigration and colonization and such policy as to result in the establishment there of a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth.

These were followed by the June 1945 British Labour Party declarations "in favour of a Jewish State."<sup>93</sup>

But the actual postwar policy of the Palestine government remained unaltered and increasingly hostile to immigration of the Jewish survivors from the death camps. Against the post-mortem of the war, with revelations such as the December 1945 news story headlined, "One Half-Million Jews Offered For Sale," about the Gestapo's offer to "sell" Hungarian Jews "at two dollars each" through the offices of Adolf Eichmann in 1944,<sup>94</sup> the British administration of Palestine remained adamantly opposed to Jewish immigration. On December 27, 1945, the Earl of Halifax, British envoy to Washington, reported anxiously to the Foreign

Office in a “secret telegram” that the United States press was “circulating an allegation”:

in spite of statements that Arab authorities would condescend to an interim in continuation of Jewish immigration into Palestine at the rate of 1,500 a month, all immigration has stopped and no additional immigration certificates are being issued.

Although the qualifications applied to the White Paper’s quota of 75,000 into Palestine from 1939 to the war’s end in May 1945 were so stringent that not even the minuscule quota had been filled despite the millions who would have swum or crawled to get in,<sup>95</sup> Halifax reported that

it is further alleged that the authorities in Palestine when approached on the subject replied that they have no instructions to issue further immigration certificates.

These statements are attracting considerable attention here and will undoubtedly result in much criticism. May I be informed by immediate telegram of the position?<sup>96</sup>

The position, in fact, was apparently left up to the Arabs, as a spate of “secret” dispatches in 1946 illustrates, beginning with a January 1946 Foreign Office minute to the British Prime Minister:

There was a general feeling that immigration into Palestine could not, at this moment, cease altogether and that, while it was right that the concurrence of the Arab States in continued immigration should be sought, His Majesty’s Government would in the last resort have to take their own decision in the matter. . . . to his Majesty’s representatives in the Middle East regarding their approach to the Arab States. These representatives were there authorized to inform the state . . . if the question of adherence to the White Paper was raised, that His Majesty’s Government, while not adhering to that portion of the 1939 undertaking which left the final word on immigration to the Arabs of Palestine only, proposed to implement the spirit of the assurance that more than 75,000 additional Jewish immigrants would not be admitted into Palestine *save with Arab consent*. Certain of the representatives, in reporting the results of their interviews, stated that they had made use of this assurance. . . .

In these circumstances it is thought preferable to make no communication to the [Jewish] Agency pending the receipt of the reply from the Arab States. . . .<sup>97</sup>

There was the “general feeling” that Jewish immigration “could not, at this moment, cease altogether”—by 1946 even the general public in England and abroad knew of the “figure of six million” Jews who had been murdered by the Nazis.<sup>98</sup> The Foreign Office responded the next day: His Majesty’s Representatives in the Middle East would be instructed to “press the Arab Governments to signify their agreement, at the earliest possible date,” to a brief “interim period” for “continued Jewish immigration.” The Foreign Office had

considered asking the United States Government whether they would be prepared to approach Arab Governments urging them to acquiesce without further delay in continued immigration at [the rate of] 1,500 a month pending receipt of Anglo-American Committee's recommendations but I do not think this would be advisable."<sup>99</sup>

Two days later the British Prime Minister answered a "personal and secret" wire addressing the subject from President Truman with one of his own,<sup>100</sup> informing the President that the Arabs had been "approached":

The quota of 75,000 authorized under the White Paper of 1939 [for Jewish immigration] is now virtually exhausted, balance of only a few hundred remaining, and Arabs have been approached urgently in accordance with the statement made by Bevin in Parliament on 13th November [1945] so as to secure maintenance of immigration at present rate of 1,500, repeat 1,500 persons per month pending consideration of report of the Anglo-American Committee.<sup>101</sup>

The same day Jewish Agency representatives also raised the question of Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin's promise in Parliament the preceding November. They had been assured

that immigration would continue at the rate of 1,500 monthly without interruption, but now it seemed as if His Majesty's Government were awaiting the acquiescence of the Arab States. What was the position?<sup>102</sup>

The Colonial Office reported on January 7, 1946, that the "present position is . . . that White Paper quota is to all intents exhausted. . . ." As A. Cunningham reported to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, a careful and exacting count had concluded that although 54,166 "legal" Jewish immigrants and 20,304 "illegal" immigrants totaled only 74,470—"under 75,000 quota" by "first January," 1946—

400 authorities . . . have been virtually exhausted to cover cases of 275 illegal immigrants since brought to account.<sup>103</sup>

According to a "Top-Secret-Special-Care-should-be-taken-to-maintain-the-secrecy-of-the-documents-of-this-file" memo, sent later that month, any "further quota" would necessitate a "reply from the Arab States," pending "a meeting of the Arab League."<sup>104</sup> As the memo stated,

The Foreign Office are doubtful whether the Arabs will easily commit themselves to a definite "yes" and I gather that the Foreign Office might not be averse to our taking a line that we had consulted the Arab states and in the absence of a reply we are continuing the quota and the agreed rate until they should make up their minds.

"From the Palestine point of view it is really most embarrassing to have to wait much longer," the memo concluded, because the "uncertainty" was "raising difficulties . . . apart from the problem of what to do with the illegal immi-



grants. . . .” Enclosed with the memo was a note that clarified the “difficulties apart from” the persistence of Jewish immigration—“It was clear” that “a unilateral pronouncement” by Britain without the concurrence of the Arabs “might damage our relations with the Arab States.”<sup>105</sup>

The Arabs’ response to the Mandatory government’s continuing patronage was forthcoming. Arab troops entered Palestine freely.<sup>106</sup> The Egyptian paper *Al Misri* carried an interview with the Foreign Minister of Iraq, who assessed that

. . . the Arabs ought not to be afraid of the British. I can assure you that the British forces in Palestine would not try to oppose or fight the Arabs, because Britain is a real friend of the Arabs.<sup>107</sup>

In Western Palestine, conditions were steadily worsening. The Arab strategy was to halt communications between Jewish settlements. In Jerusalem, the Arabs had been unhampered by Government discipline. In December 1947, Golda Meir told the Palestine High Commissioner, Sir Alan Cunningham, that

Policemen and soldiers were standing around while shops were set on fire and Jews were being attacked, behaving as if it had nothing to do with them.<sup>108</sup>

Striking at the heart of Jerusalem’s Old City with its Jewish sanctuaries, the Arabs included among their targets cutting off the water supply.<sup>109</sup> The only highway between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem—the supply route vital to the Jews’ survival in Jerusalem—was under siege: villages of non-Jews located at strategic points on the highway were enlisted by the Arabs in Palestine and Iraqi “irregulars.” Deir Yaseen, 2,000 feet above sea level, west of Jerusalem toward Bethlehem and Tel Aviv, was one of those villages. At the time of the Jews’ widely publicized Deir Yaseen attack on April 9, 1948,<sup>110</sup> every isolated Jewish village was under “massive attack.”<sup>111</sup>

Between November 1947 and May 1948, more than 4,000 Jewish soldiers and 2,000 Jewish civilians had been killed, nearly 1 per cent of the total Jewish population.<sup>112</sup>

Meanwhile, Government’s concern for Arab approval—extraordinary, given the Arabs’ unequivocal assurances of support for the Axis during the war just ended—continued to color the altogether contrasting hue of the British attitude toward *Arab* illegal immigrants. For example, the Undersecretary of State for the Colonial Office himself wrote to intercede in the case of “Benamar Hedi and Labidi Yousef,” two Tunisian stowaways “arrested by the master of the ship and turned over to the immigration authorities. . . .” If they were “sent back to Tunisia, there might be considerable political repercussions,” and they would “be shot by the French.”<sup>113</sup>

That same day, February 1, 1946, the High Commissioner sent a “secret” telegram to Lord Killearn, His Majesty’s Ambassador in Cairo, to placate the Egyptian Prime Minister’s concern over the number of Jewish “illegal immigrants who have entered Palestine since exhaustion of White Paper quota.” Although

there was "some difficulty in giving an answer which will not be open to suspicion of evasion," because "it is impossible to fix the exact date on which the White Paper was exhausted," the British Ambassador in Cairo could assure the Egyptians that

So far as this Government is aware, 1,350 Jewish illegal immigrants have entered Palestine since the White Paper was exhausted. These of course will be deducted from new interim quota of 1,500 a month.<sup>114</sup>

The much-awaited Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry Report recommended "the admission of 100,000 immigrants, victims of Nazi persecution, as soon as possible," and that

Palestine should be administered in accordance with the terms of the Mandate . . . which declares with regard to immigration that "The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, shall *facilitate Jewish immigration* under suitable conditions."<sup>115</sup>

By quoting the Mandate, the Anglo-American Report belatedly had revalidated and underscored the intent of the Mandate. The "100,000 immigrants" recommendation had taken two-thirds of all the European Holocaust survivors into account: only about 150,000 remained, "lingering in the camps . . . who cannot find any place to go. . . ."<sup>116</sup> The Report also boldly underlined the distortion under which "Palestine's system of immigration" had operated throughout British administration: facilitating Arab or "other" immigration instead, without regard for the "prejudice" to existing Jewish population.†

His Majesty's Government, however, had no intention of following the Anglo-American Committee's recommendation.

Earlier in April, just before the publication of the Anglo-American *Report*, the High Commissioner of Palestine had reported to the Secretary of State for the Colonies that

. . . as from date of White Paper not more than 75,000 Jews plus the 6,000 provided for in the interim quotas for the four months 15th December, 1945–14th April, 1946 should be admitted to Palestine for permanent residence. Consequences of accepting [Jewish] Agency's contention would be to cause excess of this total of 81,000.<sup>117</sup>

The Secretary of State for the Colonies defended the cutoff. It was not that "he had not great sympathy for the refugees," a Foreign Office extract reported.

\*Emphasis added.

†In the entire "Historical Background" of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry Report, and in the specific section called "Illegal Immigration," not one clue or reference was given to the magnitude of Arab illegal immigration, with and without official Government approval and encouragement, into Western Palestine. It was as though what the veteran archivist at the Public Record Office in Kew Gardens had assumed was true—that "there never was any Arab immigration."

It must be admitted, however, that the admission of 100,000 refugees was not a complete solution to the [public] problem. Moreover to give the Jews the 100,000 certificates would be to give them all they had asked for at the moment, and HMG had the obligation of safeguarding the interests of both Jews and Arabs and it was necessary therefore to have regard to the effect of the introduction of 100,000 additional Jews upon the Arabs in Palestine.<sup>118</sup>

The German Jews were especially singled out by the British Government that year. Survivors from the country of origin of the "final solution" were to be selected for particular scrutiny, as advised in a Foreign Office "confidential note" in July:

We must have . . . a clear definition of the term German JEW and must prevent German JEWS from emigrating to PALESTINE [*sic*].<sup>119</sup>

Britain's attitude toward apprehending war criminals\* for the murders of Jews was by no means equally zealous. More "antisemitism under the skin" existed in Britain in 1946, according to Mr. Bevin, than ever before.<sup>121</sup> Despite the number of leading Nazis untouched by the Nuremberg trials,<sup>122</sup> many British agreed with Con O'Neill, a Foreign Office official who argued against continuing the search. As O'Neill put it, "We don't want war crimes trials to become a universal bore."<sup>123</sup>

But by August 1946, the "measures to stop illegal immigration into Palestine" were a matter of increasing agitation to the British Embassy in Washington. The Foreign Office received report of an angry and bitter United States, with the "first press reports" revealing Britain's halting of Jewish immigration into Palestine:

The British are accused of Nazi practices and of attempting to drive the Jews to desperation in order to complete the transformation of Palestine into an armed fortress to safeguard British Imperialist interests in the Near East.

The British "phrase 'illegal immigrant' " was "attacked" by Zionist organizations in the United States as "invalid," since it was based on the 1939 White Paper and

. . . these measures violate the 1924 Anglo-American Convention which provided that no change should be made in the Mandate without United States consent.<sup>124</sup>

Representative Celler (Democrat-New York) also attacks the measures.

United States Representative Emanuel Celler had "Stigmatized the Labor Government as callous and soulless," and he recommended that "further money and credits under the loans be withheld from Britain unless she keeps her pledges."<sup>125</sup> Celler had also reminded Britain that

the labor platform . . . called for unlimited Jewish immigration into Palestine and the removal of the Arabs if there were not enough room for the Jews. The

\*When the Jewish leadership of Britain requested admission to the Nuremberg hearings, British officials responded that "no Jewish organizations are permanently represented by observers at the trials."<sup>120</sup>

United States Government must insist on the immediate entry of the first 100,000.<sup>126</sup>

And on it went. The violence escalated in Western Palestine—violence from the Muslim Arabs within and without Palestine against the outrage of an equal “*dhimmi*” infidel state, violence after generations of restraint from Palestinian Jews desperate to create homes for the languishing survivors of Nazi genocide and a sanctuary against future onslaughts, by the regaining of their political and cultural independence. There are many documented studies of the bloodletting in Palestine between the war’s end and the United Nations’ declaration of Israel as an independent state. While the number of fatalities may vary slightly in one account or another, all have been in agreement about the causes of the violence and the British aid and support of the Arabs’ attempt to suppress the Jewish state.<sup>127</sup>

The separate forces that had militated against Jews and other *dhimmis* in Arab lands, and in Palestine too with the advent of Muslim, though non-Arab, rule now combined with a ferocity perhaps not even matched by the modern-day mullahs’ uprising in Iran. Using every instrument at its disposal—including the short-sighted support of the frazzled British in Western Palestine—the neighboring Arab world virtually went to war months before the declaration of Israel’s independence. Arab states sent reinforcements, primarily from Syria, Jordan, and Iraq, fully expecting that, as in past Palestine anti-Jewish onslaughts, the government would buckle under the weight of the violence, ending up in support of Arab claims and penalizing Jewish immigration, because the presence of Jews was a “provocation.”

But this time there was not the habitual Jewish restraint, to which both Arab and British had once been accustomed. It had taken the Holocaust to bring effective self-defense to Palestine, where once only the cowering had survived. Now, however, the Jewish “extremist” fringe also attacked. And the British buckling in May 1948 consisted *not* of Government’s customary “report” and subsequent imposition of further immigration restrictions against Jews, but of Britain’s total retreat and abandonment of “Palestine,” one day after Israel—only seventeen percent of the intended “Jewish National Home”—had become the lone, small, mutilated but no less independent Jewish State.

## The Flight from Fact

They [the Arabs] were weak in material resources, and even after success would be, since their world was agricultural and pastoral, without minerals, and could never be strong in modern armaments. Were it otherwise, we should have had to pause before evoking in the strategic centre of the Middle East new national movements of such abounding vigour.

—T. E. Lawrence, 1918

**T**he “Palestinian problem” is often asserted to be the “heart of the matter,” which must be dealt with before any real Middle East peace or any solution can occur. Britain, for example, has never altered its policy. In 1980 the British Foreign Office proposed a “new” Middle East “line”: the “Palestinian Question” must be settled before any peace can begin in the region. The British journalist Terence Prittie<sup>1</sup> wrote:

the media . . . contain many hard-hearted and fair-minded people . . . but [the new policy’s] effects are undeniable. Just as water may eventually wear away stone, so Foreign Office arguments which are tirelessly expounded are wearing away doubts and scruples.

The British are still, wistfully, courting Arab “gratitude.”

The “heart of the matter,” however, is not the Arab refugees or the “Palestinian Arab refugees” or the “rights” of the “Palestinians”—or even Palestine. Were the Jewish-settled independent state on any area within reach of the Arab world—like the Christians in Lebanon, or the Kurds in Iraq—no matter how remote or how barren the location, there might well be another “problem.” And very likely there would also be another group of *effendis* to sell land to the Jews. There would be “landless” peasants anxious to better their lot who would migrate into the area of Jewish development.<sup>2</sup> Perhaps they too would be goaded into claiming that the Jews displaced them from their “land since time immemorial.” But the chances of the *dhimmi* Jews gaining independence among Arabs in an Arab country, where Islam is the state religion,<sup>3</sup> are not even arguable. Even in the Jews’ own Holy Land it took two thousand years and millions of Jewish lives to accomplish the political rebirth of Israel.

The Arabs believe that by creating an Arab Palestinian identity, at the sac-

rifice of the well-being and the very lives of the "Arab refugees," they will accomplish politically and through "guerrilla warfare" what they failed to achieve in military combat: the destruction of Israel—the unacceptable independent *dhimmi* state. That is the "heart of the matter."

All the myths surrounding the Arab "Palestinians" are based on the same premises: 1) the "Palestinian people" have had an identity with the land; 2) that identity has been present for "thousands of years"; 3) the alien Jews "returned after 2000 years" in 1948 to "displace" the "Palestinian Arabs" in the "new" Jewish state; 4) the Arabs were there first—it was Arab land; 5) the Jews "stole" the Arabs' land; 6) the Jewish terrorists forced the peaceable Arabs to flee from "Palestine"; 7) Palestine is Israel, and Israel constitutes all of Palestine—"In 1948 Palestine became Israel"; 8) only Jews immigrated into "Palestine," while Arabs were natives there for millennia; 9) there are no places for the "homeless" Palestinian "refugees" to go; 10) the Jews were living in equality and tranquility with the "Palestinian Arabs" before Israel became a state, just as Jews had lived traditionally in peace and harmony throughout the benevolent Arab world; 11) the Arab "Palestinians," like other Arabs, have "nothing against Jews—only Zionists."

Contrary to those Arab propaganda claims, 1) in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Arabs or Arabic-speaking migrants were wandering in search of subsistence all over the Middle East. The land of "Palestine" proper had been laid waste, causing peasants to flee. 2) Jews and "Zionism" never left the Holy Land, even after the Roman conquest in A.D. 70. 3) The traditional land of "Palestine" included areas both east and west of the Jordan River. 4) The Arabic-speaking "masses" in "Palestine"—what few there were—thought of themselves as "Ottomans or Turks," as Southern Syrians or as "Arab people"—but never as "Palestinians," even after *effendis* and the Mufti tried to incite "nationalism," and even after T. E. Lawrence had made herculean attempts to inject the Arabic-speaking residents of "Palestine" with nationalism. 5) Imbued with religious prejudice, the Muslims of Palestine erupted into anti-Jewish violence often, and at the call of the Muslim leaders, long before Israel. 6) Those anti-Jewish, apolitical acts were later, by the British, ascribed to "Nationalism." 7) The bulk of all "Arab" peasantry in the area—East-Palestinian, Syrian, Iraqi, Egyptian, and others—were rendered "landless" by feudal-like societal structures, natural disasters, extortionate taxation, and corrupt loan sharks. Yet the Jews were cynically charged with creating "landless" Arabs in "Palestine." The British gave state domain lands, allocated for the "Jewish National Home," to those "landless" Arabs who claimed they were being "displaced by Jews" in Western Palestine. 8) All the land outside the limited Jewish-settled area of Western Palestine was treated as "Arab" land: more than eighty percent—including even part of *Western* Palestine—was diverted to the Arabs. 9) The overwhelming bulk of Palestine called "Eastern Palestine," or "Transjordan," became the Arab independent state within Palestine, despite the fact that all "Palestine" had been designated as a "Jewish National Home." 10) The "homelands" to which Arab refugees moved in 1948 included lands that many Arab refugees had only recently left in order

to gain the economic advantages of the small Jewish region within Palestine. Those "homelands" where many Arab refugees of 1948 originated included the greater part of "Palestine"—Jordan today—to which the Jews claimed historic rights: "Jordan" was no less a "Palestinian state" than was the Jewish-settled fraction named "Israel." 11) Those who deprived the Arab "refugees" of homes among families and within their own Arab nation are the Arab-Muslim leaders. 12) The Arab "refugees-émigrés," who by tradition had been migrating into the Jewish-settled areas, were accepted as citizens of Palestine-cum-Jordan, because Jordanians acknowledge that their country is "Palestinian soil." 13) All other adjacent Arab states *refused* to grant the dignity of citizenship to those whom they called their Arab brothers. The migrants had left their nearby Arab homelands to share the new prosperity in the Jewish-settled area of Western Palestine, that fraction of the original Jewish homeland retained by the Jews.

As we have seen, it is only in the Jewish-settled area of Western Palestine that the population distribution is relevant. The charge that "Arab Palestinians were excluded from their homeland" has been levied against the Jewish people, based upon the false assumption that Jews were allowed to settle, unrestricted, throughout their "Jewish National Home" of "Palestine," and thus that Israel was equivalent to all of "Palestine." Since the land of Israel—mainly the Jewish-inhabited land in 1948—accounted for less than a fourth of the land originally designated "Palestine," and if the rest of "Palestine" is inhabited by Jordanian/Palestinians in an *Arab* state carved out of the Palestinian "Jewish National Home"—where Jews are forbidden by law from settling—how, then, can Arabs be said to have been "*excluded*" from a "Palestinian homeland?"

The situation-changing effect of a detailed analysis of the composition and distribution of the population of Western Palestine, and of the nature of immigration and in-migration into that area, is of immense significance; yet these data have heretofore been almost entirely ignored. There was neither map nor measure readily available even to identify accurately the population or territory actually involved in the Jewish-settled areas that constituted the land where ninety-eight percent of all Jews in "Palestine" would live until *after* 1948—a fraction of Western Palestine. There has been no relevant recognition of the British land restrictions against Jews, which limited Jewish settlement to only a portion of *Western* Palestine.

The land in the "Jewish National Home" was treated largely as "Arab Land." The Jews' immigration was brutally restricted, while "illegal" Arab immigration was freely permitted—that was in fact the British "system" of immigration. To appease Arab "discontent," the British violated the international League of Nations Mandate, by "facilitating" *Arab* settlement onto Jewish-settled land, and by treating the Jews only "on sufferance" in their "Jewish National Home." No real measure of Arab in-migrants and immigrants was ever taken, because the prevalent erroneous assumption was and still is that those Arab migrants had "always been there." The omission of such information facilitated the myth of today.

The situation that subsequently evolved brings to mind once more the parable

about Georgia set forth earlier.\* In the parable, the hypothetical white settlers usurped the lands developed by the blacks and then accused the blacks of “displacing whites” in black-settled land; just so, the Arabs swarmed into the Jewish-settled areas of Western Palestine, took the places that Palestinian Jews were clearing for Jewish refugees, and then charged the Jews with “displacing Arab natives” in the Jewish-settled areas of Western Palestine. Just as the whites could not hope to justify such a claim today, similarly the Arabs, who found “benefits they had never known before,” cannot claim to have been victims. The Arab demand for “justice” is seen instead to be “injustice,” as John Hope Simpson acknowledged in 1930.†

This Arab movement of peoples stemmed from a tradition of migration and migrants. It is not equivalent to the situation of the German, Russian, Czech, Hungarian, Vietnamese, Cambodian, Afghan, and Lebanese refugees fleeing to become immigrants elsewhere, escaping from persecution, dictatorship, or certain death. Those in-migrants and immigrants among the Arab “refugee” population had been wrongly regarded immediately upon their arrival in Western Palestine as “existing” settled inhabitants “for millennia” within the Jewish-settled area of Western Palestine; they were actually continuing in 1948 their traditional pattern of shifting to where they thought “their brethren were better treated.” For the instant “natives,” as for those who similarly became instant “refugees,” life was better in the UNWRA camp setting than for landless impoverished laborers anywhere in the Arab world.

Many counted as refugees were, more realistically, itinerant workers from neighboring countries; many who became “refugees” fleeing *from* Israel, ostensibly “Palestinians on their plots of land from time immemorial,” were in actuality those who had recently gone *into* Israel, where they were treated as the instant “natives,” when Israel was still the “Jewish-settled area of Western Palestine.”† The fact that they had earned better wages and found improved living conditions among the Jewish settlements was not a strong enough motivating factor to restrain the Arab leavetaking in 1948.

This pattern of movement had been seen earlier, in 1936, when another “Arab Revolt” had begun. Then, some of the Arab immigrants who had never been reported as “entering” the country suddenly appeared in the British record as “requesting to return to their countries.” The British, knowing full well the broad-scale illegal Arab immigration into the Jewish-settled areas of Western Palestine, had ordered colonial officials not to discourage those who volunteered to go “at their own request,” because “next week they might not want to go”; when the anti-Jewish attacks and the terrorizing riots and strikes died down, the Arabs would want to stay where they might continue to prosper.

Although many of the affluent Arabs and their followers had been leaving

\*See Chapter 12.

†See Chapter 14.



since the United Nations resolution for "Palestine's" partition in November 1947, not until the British abdicated and the Jews gained real equality and independence did the greater part of the "refugee flight" from Jewish-settled areas (Israel) take place. That flight, aided and instigated by Arab leaders, was motivated by several powerful factors. The leaders of the Arab world were involved in an intricate series of intra-Arab power thrusts; "Palestine" could perhaps further their respective personal and dynastic ambitions. The motivations and attitudes by which the Arab leaders could goad, direct, and expedite the Arab masses were built-in: the time-honored subjugation of *dhimmi* Jews and the advantages gained therefrom, as well as the deeply imbued belief in Arab-Muslim superiority, gave potency to the Arab leaders' warnings and exhortations.

For centuries, Muslims had been able to incite the Arabic-speaking masses to anti-Jewish attacks by invoking the racially prejudiced "holy words" and by spreading inflammatory fabrications about the Jews. In 1948, two prime related factors were at play: first, the Arab masses believed that, with independence, the Jews would turn the tables on the Arabs and would take retribution from them for the persecution that the Jewish *dhimmi* had suffered at Arab hands in the past. The few "acts of reprisal" by outraged Jews, in response to the Arab violence designed to prevent the Jews' statehood, were novel and unexpected. For so long the *dhimmi* had exhibited "incredible restraint." Word of the Jews' counterattacks was broadcast far and wide, embellished, and vastly exaggerated. For numerous Arabs, among most of whom migration was an easy and deep-rooted tradition, the inclination was to move. Second, the implication of a *dhimmi*-run country in the Middle East, however small in size, was anathema to an Arab-Muslim group; it was one thing for Arabs to exercise their "right" to take advantage of *dhimmi* property and development, but it was an utterly different matter to be under the rule of such *dhimmis*.

Paradoxically, despite the distaste for the existence of a *dhimmi* development, the Arabs had subordinated their emotions for the advantages of living in an area of greater prosperity under British sovereignty. They had followed the Jews into the Jewish-settled areas of Western Palestine from other areas of the country, and from other lands, to be near the Jews. If the Arab numbers hadn't been swelled by in-migration and illegal immigration, the Jews' majority in their own "National Home" would have been far greater, the number of Arab refugees in 1948 would have been far lower, those who were in fact refugees fleeing to lands outside Jordanian Palestine might have been granted their right to citizenship according to international precedent, and the illusion of a "native Palestinian Arab displacement by Jews" could not have achieved a semblance of credibility.

As President Roosevelt noted in 1939,<sup>4</sup>

Arab immigration into Palestine since 1921 has *vastly* exceeded the total Jewish immigration during this whole period. . . .\*

\*Emphasis added.

It is startling to realize that, if all those Jews and all those Arabs who arrived in Western Palestine between 1893 and 1948 had remained, and if they were forced to leave now, a dual exodus of at least equal proportion would in all probability take place. "Palestine" would be depopulated once again.

Young Israelis and young Arabs don't know the realities of their own and each other's histories. The older Israelis remember; they say they knew, but never thought of proving it—or that any of it was calculable. A prominent Palestinian, born in Jerusalem and specializing in the Arab world, described, as we sat in his office, the "scandal" in the "thirties," when British officials were caught giving "thousands of genuine Palestine citizenship papers" to illegal Arab immigrants. He also recalled that in his "mother's house the servants changed every week—and every week the Arab helpers came from someplace else outside of 'Palestine.'"

By itself, no recollection has weight as an overall indicator. However, with the substantiated evidence supplied by the preceding documentation, the professor's memories and other recollections do serve to flesh out the picture of the conditions that prevailed. It is perhaps for political reasons that no Arab social scientist has elected to trace the multi-ethnic backgrounds of the "Palestinian" Arabs. To do so would give many cruelly manipulated "refugees" back their actual histories, their identities, and would allow them to focus on their real rights to citizenship in the lands where they live today.

Today's twelve- or twenty-year-old "Arab Palestinian people" were not yet born when the Arab exodus from Israel occurred. Most have no notion themselves of the prior history of in-migration and immigration to the Jewish enclaves of settlement within Western Palestine. They do, however, know that to verbalize out loud the thought that it was their Arab "brothers" who kept them in a suspended state of animation called "refugeehood" would bring ostracism and perhaps worse. The Arab Palestine "Liberation" Organization "eliminates traitors," as the PLO's United Nations "observer" Terzi declared in 1978.

The injustices done to the "Arab Palestinian refugees" have been perpetuated by the Arab world, which has also masked and denied the "Palestinian state" that exists. By fanning intolerance toward Jews as "infidels" into violence against Israel as "the enemy," the PLO, or "Palestinian revolutionaries," have taught the twelve-year-old Arab born in a refugee camp that his oppressor is Israel.<sup>5</sup> He knows not about the Arab *effendi* or sheikh who may have stolen his grandfather's or his father's land, through graft or usury; he knows nothing of the thousands of his Arab brothers who had, in the years before 1948, been "landless" peasants, streaming into the newly reclaimed wastelands of the Jewish-settled areas from the very countries where some are still in camps; he has not learned that the Arab world's oil wealth has been used to keep his hatred directed against Israel, by keeping him and his family from the dignity of citizenship in the "brother" country where he is encamped. Moreover, he does not know what many Arabs have admitted: that the Arab world which has rejected its responsibility for his plight must eventually undertake it.

The violent opposition by PLO strongmen and the Arab world in general toward rehabilitation and resettlement of the Arab refugees has brought confusion, frustration, and a state of suspended animation to the lives of some younger Arab “refugees.” While a number of the Arab refugees by now actually possess citizenship in countries such as Kuwait, some families have been absorbed in one or another of the Arab countries *except* for the formal identity of citizenship, which is still withheld; there are also others whose families belong to the hard-core nucleus of militant “revolutionaries.” In that small fanatical group which has become the main source and the conduit for Arab propaganda, to assume any role other than the sacrificial one slotted for them by their leaders would be interpreted as “treachery” by his or her peers. Among the Arab refugees interviewed, many of the youths expressed sentiments similar to those of Muhammad (he asked that his real name be withheld):

Muhammad: I come from Palestine—some say Israel, but the Jews came only 30 years ago . . . Jews came from Europe . . . from Russia—it’s not our fault . . . Dayan came from England . . . Begin from, I don’t know, Switzerland. . . . Why they leave the United States? Why they leave England? The East is for Arabs.

Q: Isn’t Jordan also Palestine?

Muhammad: No, Jordan is Jordan . . . it used to be Palestine but when English finished up, they gave it to Hussein. . . . A million, maybe a million and half Palestinians, all the merchants live in Jordan. Bedouins live way outside on the desert. . . .

Q: If Jordan has a majority of Palestinians, and is “Palestine,” then isn’t Jordan a Palestinian country?

Muhammad: No, because we can’t get rid of Hussein—he’s in CIA. The United States protects him—he’s killed 10,000 Palestinians in ’69, ’70. . . . We refuse citizenship.

Q: In Israel or in Jordan?

Muhammad: Both of them.

Q: Why?

Muhammad: If we took citizenship we wouldn’t get back our land—we’d forget.

Q: But Israel is only a small part of Palestine—what will you do with the Jews in Israel?

Muhammad: It takes time, twenty, thirty, forty years, but we try to get our land—we get rid of them. We have to believe in *something*, you know?

Israelis too are confused and troubled. The older Jewish population can remember the violence, the Arab in-migration, and the influx of Arabs from surrounding borders. But many young Israeli “Palestinian” Jews react with anxiety, empathy, and concern about their alleged culpability, in response to widespread perceptions about the Israeli “occupation” of the West Bank, and the myth of the “three-or-four million Arab Palestinians excluded from their homeland inhabited by them since time immemorial.” For so long the propaganda has reiterated that “Jews displaced Arab natives” in “Palestine,” without even any

factual framework for evaluating such allegations, that many Jews feel they must bear that guilt. It is not a new syndrome. Arthur Miller caught it well in his play *Incident at Vichy*, a treatment of the Nazi-collaborationist Vichy regime in France and its mass arrests of Jews during World War II.<sup>6</sup> In an exchange between two Jewish prisoners, Leduc, a psychiatrist, and Lebeau, a painter:

Leduc: You feel guilty, then?

Lebeau: A little, I guess. Not for anything I've done but . . . I don't know why.

Leduc: For being a Jew, perhaps?

Lebeau: I'm not ashamed of being a Jew.

Leduc: Then why feel guilty?

Lebeau: I don't know. Maybe it's that they keep saying such terrible things about us, and you can't answer. After years and years of it, you . . . I wouldn't say you believe it, but . . . you do, a little.

Goebbels, Nazi exponent of Hitler's "Big Lie," averred that if a lie were repeated often enough and long enough, it would come to be perceived as truth. What he did not add was that the *victim* of the lie may also grow to believe it.

Arab propaganda has attempted to sell several other false ideas. The numbers of Arab refugees have been distorted, just as the numbers of "settled existing Arab natives since time immemorial" were twisted and misrepresented. Even by the Arabs' own refugee count in 1948, higher than the highest United Nations calculations by 150,000, the number of Arab refugees was, by remarkable coincidence, almost identical to the number of Jews—600,000 to 800,000—fleeing or expelled from Arab countries into Israel in 1948.

The Arabs who fled Israel in 1948 came mainly from the coastal areas where the Jews' settlement was heavy—the same areas into which so many Arabs had recently arrived. This might explain why the United Nations was moved to describe, as eligible for refugee status, any Arab who had lived in Israel for the minimal two years.

There were in 1982 about 1,500,000 Jewish citizens in Israel who either themselves fled from or were the offspring of parents who fled from Arab countries.<sup>7</sup> That figure is almost equivalent to even the swollen 1982 total of Arab refugees and descendants—1,900,000—as reported by the largely Arab-staffed UNRWA camps.<sup>8</sup> The Israeli figure did *not* include those Jewish refugees and descendants who fled from the Arab world to countries other than Israel (300,000 in 1982–1983). If those persons were included, the total of Jewish refugees would match even the total UNRWA figure for Arab refugees and their descendants, living both in and away from camps.

In fact, UNRWA reported that, as of June 1982, out of their 1.9 million total figure, 1,249,599 Arab "refugees" registered with UNRWA—and thus presumably receiving refugee benefits—were *not* living in camps! Of the total UNRWA figure of 1,900,000, there were only 676,127 "in camps." That is the *maximum* figure. It should also be noted that most of the Arabs in camps work close by and obtain the rent-free attribute of "camp" residence, which in very many cases is

in an urban setting far superior to the refugee's pre-Israel or other possible habitat. Nevertheless, camp life, however physically endurable, can only be debilitating, given the politicization and enmity existing there. In Israel, where encampments of hundreds of thousand of Jewish refugees were almost all replaced, many problems still plagued former refugees.

There should be sufficient compassion among the Arab states at last to bestow well-earned citizenship upon those living "out of camps" who long ago were absorbed in all other respects into their various countries. Further, the Arabs must be encouraged to discriminate no longer against those still registered as living in camps.<sup>9</sup>

UNRWA's report through June 1982, which is generally acknowledged to be inflated for political exploitation, listed: 65,425 Arab refugees "in camps" in Syria (many of the refugees took over the properties of Syrian Jews who managed to flee the country); in Lebanon 123,442 "in camps"; in Gaza 208,662 "in camps"; and in Jordan (what UNRWA calls "East Jordan") 192,392 "in camps." A total of only roughly 676,000 souls altogether were living—or were *reported* by a politically motivated Arab-run organ to be living—in camps throughout the Arab Middle East. In other words, those camps that were commonly believed to be holding as many as "four million" Palestinian Arabs were inhabited by 676,000 Arabs, including the refugees and their descendants (and probably a large number of "others"), according to the Arabs' own traditionally inflated numbers. Included in that figure are those in the West Bank, that is, the area of *Western* Palestine that was purged of Jews around 1929, and where afterward Jews were restricted by the British from buying land; it was both an integral part of the "Jewish National Home" and later regarded as the "purely-Arab" area, from which Arab in-migrants poured into the Jewish-settled area throughout the Mandatory period. The number of West Bank "refugees" reported by UNRWA to be "in camps" there was 86,206.<sup>10</sup>

Syria has been stating an earnest need for new population; the need presumably still exists. Egypt, with or without the restraints of the peace program, might be given incentive to absorb the 208,662 refugees in Gaza. For the relatively small number who either have not or could not presently be accepted and rehabilitated in their host countries, surely there is room for welcome in the multimillion-mile expanse of the Arab world, particularly for those in Lebanese "camps."

In Lebanon, the number of refugees reported by UNRWA through June 1982 totaled 238,667 altogether, both *in* and *out* of camps. That figure covered the period *before* many Arabs who were registered as refugees had left the area that became embattled in mid-1982. Thus UNRWA's total figure undoubtedly would be the *maximum* number, a number that must have diminished with the height, and the tragic aftermath, of the 1982 fighting. Yet somehow that number shot up from about 230,000 to "300,000" by early 1983.<sup>11</sup> Further, according to UNRWA's figures, reported *before* the height of the hostilities in Lebanon, 123,442, a majority of the refugees, lived *in* camps. Yet, according to *New York Times*' correspondent Thomas Friedman, "the majority of Palestinians in Leba-

non" in March 1983 were "living *outside* the camps in rental apartments.\*"<sup>12</sup>

It's little wonder that, to escape from the tedium of tracing such constant and confusing discrepancies, one would be likely to give up wearily and accept whatever the latest figure quoted might be. As a consequence, however, over 61,000 had been added, against all logic and feasibility, to the UNRWA overall totals: in that one brief moment, in that one place, the figure was swelled more than twenty-five percent—with hundreds of top-notch reporters looking on, and nobody but the Arab UNRWA staff allowed to verify. That was an apt modern example of the continuing escalation, resulting in ever-larger "Palestinian diaspora" figures, and the somewhat helpless attempts to explain the "incredible" or "unprecedented" numbers.

The Arab refugees-plus-descendants who do *live in* refugee camps totaled 676,000 in 1982, throughout the Middle East; that aggregate Arab refugee group was about equal, *including offspring* of Arab parents who were refugees, to just the *original* number of *Jewish refugees* who fled from the Arab world in 1948—*not* including the offspring of Jewish refugees, which by 1980 would bring the total of Jewish refugees to about 1.5 million.

By way of further contrast, the number of refugees throughout the world in 1982 totaled more than 10 million, including well over 2 million African refugee souls, 1 million Asians, and the 2.6 million Afghans who fled to Pakistan.<sup>13</sup> Yet that world figure, while enormous, was significantly reduced from the number reported two years earlier: in 1980, more than 12.6 million, including 6 million Africans and 2 million Asians, had been reported. In 1980 alone, "two million men, women and children fled their home countries, pushed out by war or oppression . . . [and] joined millions" of others in seeking resettlement.<sup>14</sup> As the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees observed, ". . . communities, institutions, cities and nations have generously opened their doors to refugees and—a fact which should be stressed—many refugees have, in their turn, been valuable assets. . . ."<sup>15</sup>

Most of those refugees had fled within the period of a few years before the report. A great number of those who fled two years ago are already removed from the lists, and other unfortunate refugees have taken their places. The United States Committee for Refugees *Survey* noted that more than a million Indochinese refugees were resettled between 1975 and 1981. That report also made special mention of the fact that among those African refugees recorded, "substantial number of the refugees . . . are 'settled in place.'" To be "settled in place" or "resettled in a third country" is considered by the United Nations as a "durable solution" for Indochinese, Africans, and in fact all the world's refugees.<sup>16</sup>

In the case of the Palestinian Arab refugees, perhaps even more than elsewhere, recognition of a "durable solution" in their present lands had been strongly indicated, for those still reported "in camps." Many of them might be in fact returning to the Arab homeland they had abandoned to seek the benefits

\*Emphasis added.

of the Jewish-settled areas in Western Palestine. Unlike the Afghans, or the Ethiopians, or the Vietnamese, or the Cambodians, the Arabs were largely *returning* to areas nearby—in many cases only a few miles from the places they left. Most of the Arab “refugees” who fled still remained within “Palestine.” Yet it is the *Arab* refugees and Israel upon whom the United Nations, the media, and consequently the public focus the most attention.

Politicizing of refugee statistics, no new phenomenon in this situation, has further stimulated that attention. One lopsided presentation exhibits a double-standard reminiscent of British Mandatory reports: in an exceptional treatment of its reported statistics, the United States Committee for Refugees presented the Palestinian Arabs’ total Arab UNRWA figure for refugees and descendants among the roster of current refugees, without qualification. Though considered by that report for many years to be lower on the list of significant refugee situations, the “Palestinians” were in 1982 raised to second on the list after the Afghans, and deemed more “significant” than the destitute Ethiopians, Vietnamese, Cambodians, Laotians, or Salvadorans.

Although the pertinent facts are well known in the refugee-concerned community, no mention is made of the “durable solutions” found by that vast majority of Arabs who have long been living “away from camps,” or of the village-like comfortable surroundings within most of today’s Arab refugee “camps” themselves. Unlike the squalid quarters established for refugees in other parts of the world, many are permanent urban units, far from the wretched image immediately triggered by the term “refugee camp.” Moreover, the United States Committee for Refugees has included in its calculations as “refugees” the Jordanian/Palestinians in Jordan (“733,000”), overlooking the fact that Jordan’s nationality code offered immediate citizenship—a law of return—to “Palestine.”

On the strange other hand, *because* “Israel” offers the “right to citizenship in the Jewish homeland” to Jewish immigrants “under the law of return,” the United States Committee for Refugees suddenly declared in 1982 for the first time the politicized judgment that the hundreds of thousands of Jewish refugees whom the Committee had listed as refugees in the preceding annual report “can no longer be considered refugee(s) by Israel.”<sup>17</sup>

The Arab refugees have been used as a weapon by the Soviets as well as the Arabs; several Arab countries have their own Soviet-trained, Soviet-equipped Palestinian “guerrilla” forces.<sup>18</sup> Some of those forces had originally in fact been living *outside* Israel’s 1949–1967 lines, in territory *excluded* from Israel when they “fled.” What those “refugees” were “escaping” from may have been the Jordanian Army, since they were leaving territory seized by Jordan in 1948. But that group could not have been fleeing from Israel, since the towns they left had already been purged of Jews well before 1948, and the districts of their towns had been excluded from Israel’s territory. Abu Daoud, the PLO mastermind of the Munich massacre, was one such case. Another is Bassam Abu Sharif, a strongman of the Palestine Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), an offshoot of the PLO–al-Fatah combine.<sup>19</sup> Yasser Arafat, who, according to one biography,

may not have been born in "Palestine" at all,<sup>20</sup> has claimed to be from East Jerusalem, an area that was excluded from Israel between 1948 and 1967. His training by the Soviets reportedly was completed during that time.

The "Palestinian Problem," no new phenomenon, is but the pan-Arab enmity by another name. The Arab refugees' manipulation at the cruel whim of leaders in the Arab world is traditional; in earlier days, too, Arabs were periodically whipped into fanatically anti-Jewish onslaughts. What is new is the sophisticated use of Middle-East turnspeak,\* twisted rhetoric artfully aimed at the hearts and minds of the West, originated by the Arabs, and rivaling the Soviets, who are veterans of "semantic infiltration" and the word war. Just as, in their lexicon, totalitarianism translates into "democracy," and degradation becomes "freedom," so has the flawed but democratic Israel been branded "Zionist imperialist" and "racist." So has the carving of Jordan out of the internationally Mandated "Jewish National Home" during the Mandatory period been transformed into the notion that "Israel is all of Palestine"—the "homeland" of all the Arab refugees. It is 1984, where as George Orwell wrote,<sup>21</sup>

War is peace; freedom is slavery; ignorance is strength.

According to *turnspeak*, those Arab migrants and immigrants who, in Sir John Hope Simpson's words, committed the "injustice" of "taking the places" of Jews in the "Jewish National Home" are today's "displaced" Arab Palestinian people, "excluded" from the Jewish-settled area of Western Palestine, their "homeland since time immemorial." The free world is targeted for deception by the twisted speech of Arab propaganda.

From past history it is apparent that the Arab-Muslim world would not, without prodding and pressure, perhaps, from the rest of the world, accept an infidel or non-Muslim minority community as equals; as Arabs say, the land is forever Arab. Arab writers frankly recognize that the world, however cynical, would not take kindly to an abrupt or "quick" destruction of Israel. By promoting "Palestinian nationalism" through the publicized and orchestrated violence of "guerrilla attacks," as the Arab writer al-Ayubi wrote in the early 1970's that they should, the Arabs had *changed the perception of reality from the xenophobic and powerful Arab world pitted against the tiny Jewish state into the image of one tiny nation of Israel against an equally tiny nation of "Palestine."* Israel is portrayed, then, as *all* of "Palestine," the giant "aggressor."

The question is often posed, "What difference does it make whether or not the Palestinians' historical claim is justified?" As one Middle East scholar put it, "Granted, most of the 'Palestinian' claim is specious, but they feel as they do now, and isn't that what is important?" However, the "Palestinians'" claim is avowedly based upon "history" and their goal is the dissolution of another state. Their alleged right of "self-determination" is based upon the erroneous alleged "90% majority of Arabs" in 1917 on the Jewish-settled area that became Israel

\*See definition in Chapter 9.



in 1948. If they invoke “historical rights” and base their claims upon historical justifications, then those historical rights must be examined and verified. Assuming that the real “rights” of the Palestinian peoples to their “homeland” are what the justice-seeking free world is after—whatever those rights may prove to be—then to prevent injustice, the documented truths must be weighed and considered.

In discussing the question of an independent West Bank “mini-state,” the PLO and its sponsor, the United Nations, have relied upon and alleged the existence of “inalienable rights” of self-determination of the Palestinian people.<sup>22</sup> Putting aside the fallacy of the “90%-Arabs, 9%-Jews” premise of the Arab claim, and the dubiousness of the assertion that any rights are “inalienable,” it is helpful to consider the question of the existence of such a principle as an unqualified right of self-determination.

In the historical instances where a national group has been reorganized as a separate sovereign state, the peoples have been distinct from their neighbors in race, language, religion, culture, and tradition, or at least in a majority of such characteristics. With respect to the PLO and the Palestinian Arabs, that is not the case and it is doubtful, therefore, whether the principle of self-determination had even a *prima facie* application at all.

The concept of self-determination was largely a product of the Treaty of Versailles at the conclusion of World War I and of the League of Nations, which grew out of that peace process. President Beneš of Czechoslovakia, who was one of the chief proponents of the principle of self-determination, wrote that “the principle of self-determination itself would need very detailed and precise explanation. It was misused and continues to be misused in an incredible degree. Everybody gives to it the interpretation that serves his political interests and aims. Post-war political experiences will force political science as well as practical politicians to proceed to a real and complete revision on this matter.”<sup>23</sup>

Alfred Cobban, in his book on the subject, states:

We may begin by asking, since self-determination is assumed by this theory to be a right, what kind of right is understood? Is it a right to self-determination where and insofar as circumstances permit, and subject to limitation by the *competing claims of other rights*? Or is it an absolute right, knowing no qualification? In practice, there can be no doubt which is the most appropriate description of the methods of the treaty-makers at Paris. Practically every one, including Wilson himself, recognized that self-determination could only be applied with due regard to circumstances.\*<sup>24</sup>

If there is a right of self-determination, as the Arabs seem to contend, for everyone at all times and under all conditions, can the individual prevail over the group always, can the minority overrule the majority? Can the withdrawing unit be minuscule? Can those who secede disregard the rights and conditions of others who are affected by their secession? To be consistent with “Palestinian Arab”

\*Emphasis added.

claims—were they not distorted—should the United Nations, for example, recognize the right of self-determination of the Ibos in Nigeria, of the Kurds in Iraq and Iran, of the Katangans in Zaire or of the Ulstermen in Ireland? Did the United States recognize the rights of the southern states to secede? Have the oil-rich states of Texas and Oklahoma a similar right to self-determination if they proclaim it? As Cobban says,<sup>25</sup>

If self-determination means this kind of thing, where, and with what unit, can the process possibly stop?

If there is an absolute right to self-determination, should not Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia be permitted to withdraw from the Soviet Union? May the Uzbeks, who were incorporated by conquest around 1875 into tsarist-ruled Central Asia, not insist on an independent country of their own? Could the Volga Germans or the Soviet Jews not demand self-determination in the form of a separate country and government with a part of the land of the Soviet Union? May the Christian Copts in Egypt not claim self-determination, since they find problems living in the midst of a Muslim population?

In short, are there not geographical, historical, economic, and political considerations that rule out national self-determination in the form of the sovereign state for many of the smaller nationalities of the world? Even if the majority of the members of a nation desire political independence, circumstances may prohibit it, and the mere desire of however many people will not alter them. As Cobban wrote, "In the words of Burke, 'If we cry, like children, for the moon, like children, we must cry on.'"

According to Cobban,<sup>26</sup> the "right of self-determination, therefore, if it means anything at all, cannot mean an absolute right to complete national sovereignty . . . and such political independence may be objectively possible, or it may not. *Circumstances, in the end, are the determining factor.*"\*

The principle of self-determination is alleged by representatives of the Soviet Union to be a basic doctrine of Soviet policy and a fundamental principle essential to a valid and justifiable international relationship. One comprehensive and authoritative Moscow-published volume by G. Starushenko, entitled *The Principle of National Self-Determination in Soviet Foreign Policy*, sets forth "the Soviet Union's decisive role in formulating the principle of self-determination and having it recognized as a principle of international law." The author claims that,

Unlike the Imperialist states, the Soviet Union strictly abides by the principle of national self-determination.<sup>27</sup>

The recognition of the principle of self-determination in international law is a revolutionary development.<sup>28</sup>

\*Emphasis added.

In 1961, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko declared that the “unconditional recognition” of self-determination is “one prerequisite for peaceful coexistence”; he then asserted that self-determination was an “inalienable right,” using the same question-begging rhetoric now utilized by Arab clients of the Soviet Union in connection with any and all claims of Arab “Palestinians.”<sup>29</sup>

It is difficult to accept this Soviet doctrine as a matter of principle, as distinct from tactical political maneuver, when one considers the Russian handling of the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia; they each would undoubtedly opt for separate nationhood if Russian guns did not forbid their self-determination; consider also Soviet intervention and repression by force in Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

The Arab advocacy of a “secular democratic state” is profoundly unconvincing. Democracy as an Arab concept has been singularly absent from Arab tradition, as demonstrated by historical and modern references to institutionalized anti-Semitism, as well as systematic discrimination against other non-Muslim minorities, non-Muslim “Arabs,” and even certain fellow-Muslim sects. The concept of “racial purity”—apartheid—evidenced by current Arab rejection of any Jewish settlements among Arabs in the West Bank and the Sinai, is a graphic case in point.

The “moderate” Arab proposal for a “mini-state” on the West Bank and in Gaza, and the strategy behind additional vague Arab demands, have been set forth in Arab writings frequently. The fact that a “mini-state” was not created in the nineteen years when the area was under Arab domination, has been pointed out; the candid comments of “moderates” and the PLO regarding the mini-state—as a “first step” to the destruction of the enemy—must be seen in context, not as bluster but as threat.

When the Arab claim based on fraudulent “historical” devices is exposed and thus discarded, another popular argument surfaces. “After all,” it is said, “it doesn’t matter when the ‘nationalism’ evolved. The important thing is that it exists; it’s a violent nationalism now and the refugees—the ‘Palestinians’—exist.” Yet, a violence born of unworthy incitation, aggravated by unnatural camp conditions and deliberate indoctrination to that violence, ought not necessarily command credence or respect because it calls itself “nationalism.” The movement, whatever its label—terrorism or nationalism—is no more a legitimate excuse for the attempt to destroy one small Jewish state than the “repatriation” of other refugees around the world would be seen as a reason for the destruction of any other state.

The world has treated both Arab and Jewish “refugees” cruelly—the Jewish refugees’ hardships, their cruel history and difficulties in Israel have been shunted aside as an unwelcome “complication,” after having been omitted from consideration for decades. Theodore Draper wrote,<sup>30</sup>

There is something suspicious and ominous about a world which permits one rule for refugees from a Jewish state and another rule for refugees from all other kinds of states.

There is, too, a sad implication in the world's failure to give any consideration at all to the hundreds of thousands of Jewish refugees terrorized and expelled from Arab lands in 1948 and after.

In the name of humanitarianism, the Arab refugees have been bred to believe that the fraudulent history they learn by rote is true: their "dream" of "identity" can only materialize, they believe, at the cost of the destruction of a people. The young "Palestinian refugee" of twelve or thirteen or even twenty has no choice. All persons must dream, and the only dream that has been drilled into the Arab refugee child—in or out of the camps—is "to return to the Palestinian homeland." That they and their families may have little desire to "return" themselves, that a legitimate Palestinian homeland in Jordan already exists, which has been open to them, or that many of them can claim origins and legitimate rights to citizenship in Syria, or Egypt, or Algeria, or wherever their families came from—none of these options for identity has even the slightest chance of gaining credence among them under present conditions of thought control. Merely to verbalize such an idea would bring rejection, if not violence.

In June 1977, during interviews in Damascus, Syrian officials expressed the wish that Syria might get American technological assistance to develop the arable Syrian land, which requires implementation of the Euphrates Dam irrigation potential. The Syrian Minister of Trade and Economy asked that a message be given to the American government. Syria hadn't the population to develop that land, he said, because there was virtually 100 percent employment in Syria, so that they needed people as well as technology. They would give plots of valuable land in Syria to anyone who would come to work it.<sup>31</sup>

Since it was known that in the late 1940s and 1950s the Arab refugees had been in the process of accepting just such an offer until the Arab League and other factors acted against it, I asked various Syrian officials, "Why not give the land to those Palestinian Arabs who would choose to accept your offer?" The answer was always the same. As one of the Syrians responded angrily,

We will give the land to anyone—the Ibos, the Koreans, Americans . . . anyone who comes—anyone but the Palestinians! We must keep their hatred directed against Israel.

The Palestinian Arabs and the Palestinian Jews have become the sacrificial goats in a world power game. After reviewing the results of this making of a myth, it is difficult to find an easy answer: "justice" would be served by a long-overdue recognition, out loud, that there are indeed two states in Palestine today—one Arab and one Jewish. Yet, as Yasser Arafat boasted in 1977,<sup>32</sup> "Our people in the occupied areas are carrying out brilliant operations. Our children have turned stones into bombs. . . . These people cannot be defeated."

There is no glib or ready solution to the present confrontation. Enmity bred over decades cannot be easily defused. The Palestinian Arab "refugees" have found their "myth," as Musa Alami prescribed. They found an identity in that myth. And a dream. But surely a dream of destruction and bloodshed, of "injustice" masquerading as justice, of "rights" based upon falsehoods, cannot continue to capture the sympathy and imagination of the outside world at the expense of the Jews, whose identity the Palestinian Arabs would usurp.

If Egypt and the late President Anwar Sadat could make peace with Israel, however tenuous, after the saber rattling and the religiously inspired anti-Jewish sentiments that created a warm bond between Egypt and Nazism, then so might the other "moderates" and "rejectionists" in the Arab world today. Once, during Solomon's reign (965–928 B.C.), "united Israel" was so "highly honored as the leading state between Egypt and Asia Minor," that Egypt's pharaoh had "given his daughter in marriage" to Solomon, for "good diplomatic and political reasons."<sup>33</sup>

As the Minister of Agriculture of Syria, an avowed supporter and supportee of the Soviet Union, had illustrated, it was "American" technological assistance that Syria wanted. But might it have been the irrigation expertise of Israel that he really needed? The result of the peace-making process depends greatly on the international community's continued adherence to the truth as it is sometimes tacitly acknowledged, and not the totalitarian-sponsored pan-Arab inversion of truth. To achieve their short-sighted ends—a "peaceful" piece of the Arab oil action—some nations among the free world community appear to be buying the turnspeak.

For thirty-five years, while the real nature of the Arab "refugee problem" has often been identified, the affluent Arab world has paid only a relative pittance to the care of the "refugees"; on the other hand, prodigious Arab funds have supported terror. The Arabs have, in addition, rejected every genuine humanitarian attempt to solve the "problem" of their brethren, whose right to the dignity of citizenship is their legitimate human right.

The world community has made the mistake of unwittingly creating a breeding ground of violence. Through perpetuation of the "humanitarian" conditions of the "temporary" camps, it hoped perhaps to avoid having to exact from the Arab world an attitude toward its refugees that conformed to the customary humanitarian requirements expected from other nations; the penalty for such demand was perceived to be the possible loss of substantial Arab oil benefits. The wound was allowed to fester until it began to burst into the terrorism of the PLO and other offspring of the earlier terror tactics in Western Palestine organized by the Mufti, in consultation with his Nazi soulmates. Now, the world community is being faced with the pan-Arab suggestion for another blunder, this one even more difficult to retrieve. The new "moral" claim is presently offered, to take the place of justice. Through the revisionist history of the Arab propaganda, it is asserted that Israel must bear the guilt for the Arab "refugees," since the Jews "in 1948 excluded the Arabs from their homeland since time immemorial."

Unfortunately, and perhaps not surprisingly to those sophisticated in the art of politics, the case as it has been distorted by propaganda does not benefit the "Palestinian" Arab refugees themselves. As the Arab Palestinian writer Fawaz Turki summed it up, although it was "Arab governments" who "continued to oppose . . . integration,"

the price for this intransigence and inflexibility was paid by the Palestinians alone and not by the Arabs. . . . Pawn politics and indifference were the two foci of a problem of tragic and human dimensions.<sup>34</sup>

The Arab-Soviet distortion has prolonged the refugee's frustration, and supports—indeed justifies—Arab terrorist activities, even against Arab Palestinians. The very political process by which the refugee's plight has been highlighted has condemned many Arab "refugees" to encampment psychologically if not physically. However, hundreds of thousands of other Arab "refugees" are already living and working in the critically labor-needy Arab states, in some instances running those countries, and they feel that citizenship is "owed" to them. Indeed, unpublicized and largely unknown, many are in fact already bona fide citizens.

The present propaganda argument is based on the "historical claims" of the "native Arab Palestinian on his land"—now called Israel. According to the propaganda claim, it is from that Jewish-settled area of Western Palestine that the "Arabs were excluded from their homeland since time immemorial." That claim cannot be sustained. If the "historical" claim is *measured* against documented history, which *contradicts* that claim, the Arab propagandists and their supporters often shift to an argument based on pragmatics: the "Palestinian [Arab] people" exist, therefore they must have a "homeland." That argument must run head-on into the realities of justice, of Jordan, and of the Arab-Jewish exchange of refugee populations in 1948.

The Arabs' recognition of how vulnerable was their "return of the Arab refugees" argument inspired the transformation of the "refugee" claim into an "historical" claim. "Palestinian self-determination" was the "new tool"; and its claim is based on the specious and misconceived comparison of the "90%-Arab-native and 9%-Jewish population," in all "Palestine"—what we now know should properly be limited, for comparison, to the *Jewish-settled areas of Western Palestine*. As a few Arab strategists have admitted, the real "refugee" rights could too easily become evident. The "consequences" of the obvious Arab-Jewish refugee exchange of populations were frankly assessed by the Arab writer Sabri Jiryis: "Jews have absorbed the Jews who were expelled or forced from Arab states and the Arab states must, in their turn, settle the Palestinians [Arabs] within their borders and solve their problem."<sup>\*</sup>

Although that Arab-born segment of the Jewish population has finally been recognized, inevitably, as the bulk of the "Sephardic" majority within an "Orientalized" Israel, Western observers are seldom reminded that the Sephardic Israeli

\*See Chapter 2.

majority is in fact mainly composed either of descendants or of those who were themselves the Jewish refugees who fled or were expelled from Muslim-Arab countries. Thus the accompanying social problems, the Arab-born Jews' distrust of the Arab world and their support of a "hardline" government position toward the Arabs—all conditions that are predictable and logical when seen in context—are not evaluated in context. That the social problems are the result of Israel's attempt to absorb a refugee population at least equal to the number of Arabs who purportedly left Israel in 1948—a massive Jewish refugee population that matched the number of Jews already in Israel in 1948—and that all the Arab-born Jewish refugees converged on the Jewish state at the same time that the Arabs left, while Israel was improvising its urgent defense against Arab warfare—the connection is rarely if ever made. What was an obvious, literal exchange of Jewish and Arab refugee populations, remarkably equal in numbers even if one accepts the inflated Arab counts, goes unrecognized or is shrugged aside as an unwelcome complication.

Moreover, to judge the attitudes and viewpoints of Sephardic Jewish refugees from oppression in Arab lands *apart* from the critically significant historical circumstance that made them that way is as faulty and incomplete as it would be for an observer to try to judge the reactions and activities of American blacks toward civil rights without ever having heard of slavery or the history of the blacks in America and the genesis of the Civil Rights movement. Yet the Sephardic Jews' attitudes toward their former masters—attitudes born of harsh experience and the Arabs' continued avowed hostility toward the *dhimmi* Jewish State—are scarcely ever related to the bitter history and the circumstances surrounding that pivotal Jewish exodus from the Arab world.

Meanwhile the Arab émigré-refugees remain exploited by Arab leaders in that Arab world, their own milieu. Most are actually already absorbed: a small percentage are still in their camps. All remain without moderate leadership and many fear for their lives; were they to take a truly moderate stance, they might well be murdered, as others have been.

One must care about the "Palestinian" peoples, whatever their heritage. They are Arabs and Jews and "others" who have been long abused in a world misled by its torturous misconceptions. Instead of permitting those Arab "refugees" who are outside of Jordanian Palestine to suffer the planned discrimination of adamant Arab governments in lands where many "refugees" have lived for a generation or more, the free world might begin a fair and realistic effort to solve the problem.

The possibility of solution is there. An Arab Palestinian state already exists in Jordan. The other Arab states can be encouraged to make room for those among the Arab refugees who have not yet been absorbed, and to give citizenship in their respective states of asylum to those outside Jordan. There is no bromide here for a facile solution, or one that would not be fraught with bitterness and antagonism. Before the India-Pakistan exchange of refugee populations was resolved, years of rancor and violence elapsed.

What must not continue, what cannot be allowed to continue, is the cynical

scapegoating of the Jewish state and the Jewish refugees therein, or the sacrifice of the Arab refugees who are, in the name of "humanitarianism," being employed inhumanely as a war weapon against Israel by the Arab world. In the face of these major problems, too many politicians and persons of influence choose to shut their eyes to the facts. Too many refrain from critical analysis of propaganda in order to preserve their illusions about the price of oil. And far too many, the overwhelming bulk of us, had never been furnished with enough data to understand what the problem really was.

A program calculated to furnish incentives to the Arab states and others—a "Marshall-type" plan to cooperate for peace—has been proposed by many eminent bipartisan political figures. Such a program would<sup>35</sup>

convert that bilateral peace into a truly regional peace, by demonstrating that the fruits of peace exceed the spoils of war. The plan could be financed by all the countries which have a great interest in peace and stability in the Middle East because of their dependency upon the oil in that region. It would be based on the knowledge that there is also an Arab dependency upon the free world to continue its present relationship with Arab states. Such a plan ought to create an incentive to solve the problems that stand in the way of regional space.

To the extent that we render aid, it would necessarily be linked with "the settlement of the refugees" or, if they are already settled, then citizenship for the Arab refugees within these various Arab lands.

The United States has provided most of the over-a-billion dollars in UNRWA funds over the last thirty-plus years, for what was to have been "temporary relief before resettlement." Is it not possible that the fund which has prolonged the refugee status of the "Arab refugees" could be replaced by aid in conjunction with development, and that permanent Arab refugee resettlement in the Arab regions could follow? The Arab world wants the benefits of co-existence with the "West" and therefore a major role can be played by the United States in helping to resolve the Arab refugee-émigré problem.

All the necessary ingredients exist: recent reports of migrant labor in the Arab states have shown that the Arabs are urgently in need of labor, skilled and unskilled. Within the Arab world there is now an abundance of capital to pay the costs of integrating the refugees. Foreign funds, once freed from no-longer-necessary UNRWA camps, could assist the rehabilitation of the Arab refugees. The Jewish refugees from Arab lands have already been absorbed by the Israelis, but those of their properties that were confiscated would match or exceed whatever the Arab refugees left behind. The de facto exchange of Arab and Jewish refugee populations is undeniable, a *fait accompli*. Its recognition by the Arabs should be facilitated with the West's endorsement. Recall the Syrian official's offer to "give land away to workers who come—except the Palestinians," whose "hatred must be directed at Israel." Syria's request for "American technology," along with United States and other Western assistance now in effect or projected in many Arab "rejectionist" states, ought to be reciprocal; cooperation should be



enlisted and required from nations that are aided by the United States and the West.

If the Arab world's political and unjustified discrimination against its refugee-émigré brothers were to cease, and if the camp indoctrination could no longer act as a catalyst to the rejection of peace with Israel, if the Jordanian-Palestinian state, the Arabs' "displacement" of Jews, and the exchange of populations that took place between Jews and Arabs are all finally understood and recognized by the free world, then the Arab "rejectionist" front dedicated to the *jihad* (holy war) against Israel may finally realize that the program of propaganda deception cannot succeed. They may then accede to a policy of genuine moderation, of a kind which in the Western sense means toleration and peace.

At long last the Arab refugees would then be allowed the right to live in a more normal environment, to the refugees' optimal benefit, and to the ultimate advantage of the Arab host nations. This possibly peaceful and ultimately most humane course of action would entail only a relatively minor financial transaction for the Arab nations. It would dignify the refugees and enable the Arab countries of asylum to observe the universal laws of hospitality and decency toward their refugees. It will also, if done, demonstrate that the Arabs are genuinely concerned for the welfare of their brethren, that they have finally observed the humanitarian requirements expected of any government that wishes to benefit from mutual relationships in the free world, and that they are not primarily interested in utilizing the refugees, human beings, flesh and blood, as their weapon in their war.

Thus far, merely mouthing the deceptive words of turnspike has achieved an amazing measure of success for the revisionist history and the propaganda of the "Arab-Israeli conflict."<sup>36</sup> As the late PLO-Saiqa (Syrian PLO) leader Zuheir Muhsein observed in a PLO strategy discussion in 1974, many nations had already accepted the calculated interchange of images: the Arabs had managed "to juxtapose the Israeli existence with a 'Palestinian' one."<sup>37</sup> Muhsein went on to explain the proposed "Independent Palestinian State" on the West Bank:

Our purpose is a democratic State in the whole of Palestine. . . . A State in the occupied areas will not constitute an obstacle. The contrary is true—it will be a point of departure. . . . This State will be the backbone of our struggle against Israel.<sup>38</sup>

The Arabs, through terror and the enticement of oil-power, actually manipulated the prevention of the Jewish majority that should, as mandated, have become in turn the Jewish State of Palestine *before World War II*. Had the Arabs not succeeded, the "final solution to the Jewish problem" might have been haven, not Holocaust.

The cruelest instance of willful blindness to the nature of one's actions is attributable to British immigration policy. It is horrifying to learn that the British—a "civilized people"—were willing to see Jews in Europe put to death by the Nazis; for "fear" of "Arab comment," the British claimed that "Palestine" had "no more places" for Jews, while at the very same moment the British were

importing "illegal" Arab immigrants by tens of thousands into Palestine to do "necessary" work—work and place that they denied to Jews.

In the end, Britain's systematic policy of virtual exclusion of Jews had resulted in utter disaster. It was disaster in the eyes of the British because they left Palestine defeated; for the Arabs, who had won a battle against the entry of perhaps six million prospective Palestinian/Israeli Jews, it was disaster then to be faced, ironically, with the anathema of a *dhimmi* nation that the Jews achieved ultimately *because* of the world's horror at the senseless slaughter of those six million; for the Jews, there was disaster in the tragic timing of Israel's independence: had it been unrepressed it would have culminated in time to preclude the Holocaust. As it turned out, Israel emerged just in time to gather in not only the survivors of Hitler's savagery, but that great swell of Arab-born Zionists who fled seeking refuge. The probable fate of those refugees from Arab lands, had the Jewish state been voted down, became, mercifully, only a matter for abstract speculation.


Today, the explicitly stated Arab goals appear to be gaining credence once again through the medium of propaganda and twisted rhetoric, unquestioned by those of us who haven't known the questions to ask, and unhindered by many who have guessed. Those who understand the reality ought to demand more.

Throughout the Mandate, the British attempted to gain peace by appeasing intimidation and terror. It was a self-imposed intimidation to a perception of oil-power and force that the Western powers by themselves in fact evoked. Yet, others are considering a similar course. But the lesson ought to be clear by now that the West's continuation of the protracted British policy of submission has not brought a peaceful life. As Winston Churchill cautioned in 1939, the acts that we engage in for appeasement today we will have to remedy at far greater cost and remorse tomorrow.

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# APPENDIX I





## APPENDIX II

## Official British Police Report Regarding Jews' Appeal to Arabs

C o p y

10/PS.

District Police Headquarters,  
(C.I.D.)  
P.O.B. 700.  
Haifa.

26th April, 1948.

S E C R E TA/A.I.G., C.I.D.

Subject:- General Situation - Haifa District.

Haifa remains quiet. Yesterday produced a noticeable change in the general atmosphere and businesses and shops in the lower town were open for the first time in many days. Traffic started to move normally around the town and people returning to their places of business filled the streets. In fact, Haifa presented a more normal appearance than it had done for a long while. Some Arabs were seen moving among the Jews in the lower town and German Colony area and these were allowed free and unmolested passage. An appeal has been made to the Arabs by the Jews to re-open their shops and businesses in order to relieve the difficulties of feeding the Arab population. Evacuation was still going on yesterday and several trips were made by "Z" craft to Acre. Roads, too, were crowded with people leaving Haifa with their belongings. At a meeting yesterday afternoon Arab leaders reiterated their determination to evacuate the entire Arab population and they have been given the loan of ten 3-ton military trucks as from this morning to assist the evacuation.

Yesterday morning a Jew attempted to pass the drop barrier of Police H.Q. facing Palmers Gate wheeling a barrow. He was shot and killed by a Police sentry.

At 0640 hrs. yesterday Tيره village was again attacked with mortar fire. Casualties and damage not known.

A report has been received from Military to the effect that at 23.50 hrs. yesterday Jews attacked Acre from the direction of Ein Hamifratz and Tall al Fukhkhah. An advance party succeeded in demolishing three houses in the Manshiya Quarter and then heavy mortar fire was directed at the town. Several mortar bombs landed in Acre Prison and all the inmates have escaped. The British warden staff are safe. Military proceeded to the scene and opened fire with artillery on Ein Hamifratz. The Jews thereupon withdrew and a convoy of 11 vehicles was seen proceeding in the direction of Haifa. Casualties to both sides are not known.

(A.J. Bidmead.)  
for SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE.

Copy:- District Commissioner, Haifa.  
Superintendent of Police, Haifa.  
File.

## APPENDIX III. The Palestinian National Charter

(Palestine Liberation Organization)\*

1. Palestine is the homeland of the Palestinian Arab people; it is an indivisible part of the Arab homeland, and the Palestinian people are an integral part of the Arab nation.

2. Palestine, with the boundaries it had during the British mandate, is an indivisible territorial unit.

3. The Palestinian Arab people possess the legal right to their homeland and have the right to determine their destiny after achieving the liberation of their country in accordance with their wishes and entirely of their own accord and will.

4. The Palestinian identity is a genuine, essential and inherent characteristic; it is transmitted from parents to children. The Zionist occupation and the dispersal of the Palestinian Arab people, through the disasters which befell them, do not make them lose their Palestinian identity and their membership of the Palestinian community, nor do they negate them.

5. The Palestinians are those Arab nationals who, until 1947, normally resided in Palestine regardless of whether they were evicted from it or have stayed there. Anyone born, after that date, of a Palestinian father—whether inside Palestine or outside it—is also a Palestinian.

6. The Jews who had normally resided in Palestine until the beginning of the Zionist invasion will be considered Palestinians.

7. That there is a Palestinian community and that it has material, spiritual and historical connection with Palestine are indisputable facts. It is a national duty to bring up individual Palestinians in an Arab revolutionary manner. All means of information and education must be adopted in order to acquaint the Palestinian with his country in the most profound manner, both spiritual and material, that is possible. He must be prepared for the armed struggle and ready to sacrifice his wealth and his life in order to win back his homeland and bring about its liberation.

8. The phase in their history, through which the Palestinian people are now living, is that of national struggle for the liberation of Palestine. Thus the conflicts among the Palestinian national forces are secondary, and should be ended for the sake of the basic conflict that exists between the forces of Zionism and of imperialism on the one hand, and the Palestinian Arab people on the other. On this basis the Palestinian masses, regardless of whether they are residing in the national homeland or in diaspora, constitute—both their organizations and the individuals—one national front working for the retrieval of Palestine and its liberation through armed struggle.

9. Armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine. Thus it is the overall strategy, not merely a tactical phase. The Palestinian Arab people assert their absolute determination and firm resolution to continue their armed struggle and to work for an armed popular revolution for the liberation of their country and their return to it. They also assert their right to normal life in Palestine and to exercise their right to self-determination and sovereignty over it.

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\*Decisions of the National Congress of the Palestine Liberation Organization held in Cairo July 1st-17th, 1968.

10. Commando action constitutes the nucleus of the Palestinian popular liberation war. This requires its escalation, comprehensiveness and the mobilization of all the Palestinian popular and educational efforts and their organization and involvement in the armed Palestinian revolution. It also requires the achieving of unity for the national struggle among the different groupings of the Palestinian people, and between the Palestinian people and the Arab masses so as to secure the continuation of the revolution, its escalation and victory.

11. The Palestinians will have three mottoes: national unity, national mobilization and liberation.

12. The Palestinian people believe in Arab unity. In order to contribute their share towards the attainment of that objective, however, they must, at the present stage of their struggle, safeguard their Palestinian identity and develop their consciousness of that identity, and oppose any plan that may dissolve or impair it.

13. Arab unity and the liberation of Palestine are two complementary objectives, the attainment of either of which facilitates the attainment of the other. Thus, Arab unity leads to the liberation of Palestine; the liberation of Palestine leads to Arab unity; and work towards the realization of one objective proceeds side by side with work towards the realization of the other.

14. The destiny of the Arab nation, and indeed Arab existence itself, depends upon the destiny of the Palestine cause. From this interdependence springs the Arab nation's pursuit of, and striving for, the liberation of Palestine. The people of Palestine play the role of the vanguard in the realization of this sacred national goal.

15. The liberation of Palestine, from an Arab viewpoint, is a national duty and it attempts to repel the Zionist and imperialist aggression against the Arab homeland, and aims at the elimination of Zionism in Palestine. Absolute responsibility for this falls upon the Arab nation—peoples and governments—with the Arab people of Palestine in the vanguard. Accordingly the Arab nation must mobilize all its military, human, moral and spiritual capabilities to participate actively with the Palestinian people in the liberation of Palestine. It must, particularly in the phase of the armed Palestinian revolution, offer and furnish the Palestinian people with all possible help, and material and human support, and make available to them the means and opportunities that will enable them to continue to carry out their leading role in the armed revolution, until they liberate their homeland.

16. The liberation of Palestine, from a spiritual point of view, will provide the Holy Land with an atmosphere of safety and tranquillity, which in turn will safeguard the country's religious sanctuaries and guarantee freedom of worship and of visit to all, without discrimination of race, color, language, or religion. Accordingly, the people of Palestine look to all spiritual forces in the world for support.

17. The liberation of Palestine, from a human point of view, will restore to the Palestinian individual his dignity, pride and freedom. Accordingly the Palestinian Arab people look forward to the support of all those who believe in the dignity of man and his freedom in the world.

18. The liberation of Palestine, from an international point of view, is a defensive action necessitated by the demands of self-defence. Accordingly, the Palestinian people, desirous as they are of the friendship of all people, look to freedom-loving, justice-loving and peace-loving states for support in order to restore their legitimate rights in Palestine, to re-establish peace and security in the country, and to enable its people to exercise national sovereignty and freedom.



19. The partition of Palestine in 1947 and the establishment of the state of Israel are entirely illegal, regardless of the passage of time, because they were contrary to the will of the Palestinian people and to their natural right in their homeland, and inconsistent with the principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, particularly the right to self-determination.

20. The Balfour Declaration, the mandate for Palestine and everything that has been based upon them, are deemed null and void. Claims of historical or religious ties of Jews with Palestine are incompatible with the facts of history and the true conception of what constitutes statehood. Judaism, being a religion, is not an independent nationality. Nor do Jews constitute a single nation with an identity of its own; they are citizens of the states to which they belong.

21. The Palestinian Arab people, expressing themselves by the armed Palestinian revolution, reject all solutions which are substitutes for the total liberation of Palestine and reject all proposals aiming at the liquidation of the Palestinian problem, or its internationalization.

22. Zionism is a political movement organically associated with international imperialism and antagonistic to all action for liberation and to progressive movements in the world. It is racist and fanatic in its nature, aggressive, expansionist and colonial in its aims, and fascist in its methods. Israel is the instrument of the Zionist movement, and a geographical base for world imperialism placed strategically in the midst of the Arab homeland to combat the hopes of the Arab nation for liberation, unity and progress. Israel is a constant source of threat *vis-à-vis* peace in the Middle East and the whole world. Since the liberation of Palestine will destroy the Zionist and imperialist presence and will contribute to the establishment of peace in the Middle East, the Palestinian people look for the support of all the progressive and peaceful forces and urge them all, irrespective of their affiliations and beliefs, to offer the Palestinian people all aid and support in their just struggle for the liberation of their homeland.

23. The demands of security and peace, as well as the demands of right and justice, require all states to consider Zionism an illegitimate movement, to outlaw its existence, and to ban its operations, in order that friendly relations among peoples may be preserved, and the loyalty of citizens to their respective homelands safeguarded.

24. The Palestinian people believe in the principles of justice, freedom, sovereignty, self-determination, human dignity, and in the right of all peoples to exercise them.

25. For the realization of the goals of this Charter and its principles, the Palestine Liberation Organization will perform its role in the liberation of Palestine in accordance with the Constitution of this Organization.

26. The Palestine Liberation Organization, representative of the Palestinian revolutionary forces, is responsible for the Palestinian Arab people's movement in its struggle—to retrieve its homeland, liberate and return to it and exercise the right to self-determination in it—in all military, political and financial fields and also for whatever may be required by the Palestine case on the inter-Arab and international levels.

27. The Palestine Liberation Organization shall cooperate with all Arab states, each according to its potentialities; and will adopt a neutral policy among them in the light of the requirements of the war of liberation; and on this basis it shall not interfere in the internal affairs of any Arab state.

28. The Palestinian Arab people assert the genuineness and independence of their

national revolution and reject all forms of intervention, trusteeship and subordination.

29. The Palestinian people possess the fundamental and genuine legal right to liberate and retrieve their homeland. The Palestinian people determine their attitude towards all states and forces on the basis of the stands they adopt *vis-à-vis* the Palestinian case and the extent of the support they offer to the Palestinian revolution to fulfill the aims of the Palestinian people.

30. Fighters and carriers of arms in the war of liberation are the nucleus of the popular army which will be the protective force for the gains of the Palestinian Arab people.

31. The Organization shall have a flag, an oath of allegiance and an anthem. All this shall be decided upon in accordance with a special regulation.

32. Regulations, which shall be known as the Constitution of the Palestine Liberation Organization, shall be annexed to this Charter. It shall lay down the manner in which the Organization, and its organs and institutions, shall be constituted; the respective competence of each; and the requirements of its obligations under the Charter.

33. This Charter shall not be amended save by (vote of) a majority of two-thirds of the total membership of the National Congress of the Palestine Liberation Organization (taken) at a special session convened for that purpose.

## APPENDIX IV:

## Feisal-Weizmann Agreement Regarding "The Arab State and Palestine"

and Jewish duly accredited agents shall be established and maintained in the respective territories.

ARTICLE II.

Immediately following the completion of the deliberations of the Peace Conference, the definite boundaries between the Arab State and Palestine shall be determined by a Commission to be agreed upon by the parties hereto.

ARTICLE III.

In the establishment of the Constitution and Administration of Palestine all such measures shall be adopted as will afford the fullest guarantees for carrying into effect the British Government's Declaration of the 2nd of November, 1917.

ARTICLE IV.

All necessary measures shall be taken to encourage and stimulate immigration of Jews into Palestine on a large scale, and as quickly as possible to settle Jewish immigrants upon the land through closer settlement and intensive cultivation

His Royal Highness the Emir FEISAL, representing and acting on behalf of the Arab Kingdom of Hedjaz, and Dr. CHAIM WEIZMANN, representing and acting on behalf of the Zionist Organisation.

mindful of the racial kinship and ancient bonds existing between the Arabs and the Jewish people, and realising that the surest means of working out the consummation of their national aspirations, is through the closest possible collaboration in the development of the Arab State and Palestine, and being desirous further of confirming the good understanding which exists between them,

have agreed upon the following Articles:-

ARTICLE I.

The Arab State and Palestine in all their relations and undertakings shall be controlled by the most cordial goodwill and understanding and to this end Arab



If the Arabs are established as I  
 have acted in my manifesto <sup>of Jan 22</sup> addressed  
 to the British Secretary of State for Foreign  
 Affairs, I will carry out what is  
 written in this agreement. ~~If any~~  
~~changes are changed~~

If changes are made, I can  
 not be considered for failing  
 to carry out this agreement.

Feisal ibn  
 Hussein

---

DEFINITIONS:

I. Main areas of Jewish settlement	{ Incl. in Israel 1949-1967 } { Excl. from Israel 1949-1967 }	{ Contain most of Jewish population }	Safed Tiberias Beisan Nazareth (excl. Nazar. town) Haifa Tulkarem Ramleh Jaffa Jerusalem town
II. Intermediate areas			
III. Intermediate areas	{ Incl. in Israel 1949-1967 } { Excl. from Israel 1949-1967 }	{ Contain very little Jewish population }	Acre Nazareth town Jenin Nablus Ramallah Jerusalem (excl. Jeru. town) Hebron Gaza Beersheba [Names of 1944 Subdistricts—very roughly equivalent to Ottoman Cazas.]
IV. Intermediate areas			
V. Main area of Arab settlement			

Note: The Ottoman Census apparently registered only known Ottoman subjects; since most Jews had failed to obtain Ottoman citizenship (see Chapter 10), a representative figure of the Palestinian Jewish population could not be extrapolated from the 1893 Census.

A. Arab settled population (1893 population and descendants)	{ Jerusalem Haifa Jaffa Tiberias Safed }
B. Arab nomads	
C. Arab "legal immigrants"	1. "Mixed" towns:
D. Arab "illegal immigrants"	2. "Jewish" towns
E. Arab migrants (from main area of Arab settlement and intermediate areas) and descendants (since modern Jewish settlement began)	3. "Non-Jewish" towns
+ incoming	4. Rural areas
- outgoing	
(Statistics prior to 1944 give categories A-E as single figure since no detailed breakdown was available.)	
F. Jewish population	

**APPENDIX V. Population Movement within and into Western Palestine (Officially Recorded) 1893-1948**

*All Demographic Statistics in Thousands*

*Legend for symbols given above chart*

1893		1915			1922			1922—detailed geographical breakdown						1944				
ABCDE	% F	ABCDE	% F	%	ABCDE	% F	%	1	2	3	4	ABCDE	F	%	ABCDE	% F	%	
I 92,3 II 38,9 III 14,3	145,5 31.2	I 195,2 II 195,2 III 14,3	32,3 63,5 98,2	98,2	I 255,5 II 255,5 III 14,3	37,9 82,2 98,1	98,1	1 82,7 2 0,1 3 22,9 4 149,9	52,7 15,1 0,1 14,4			I 429,9 II 103,0 III 37,1	544,3	98,3				
IV 87,4 V 233,5	320,9 68,8	IV 409,1 V 409,1	67,7 1,5 1,8	1,8	IV 417,9 V 417,9	62,1 1,6 1,9	1,9	3 89,9 4 327,7	0,7 0,8	[746]		IV 160,8 V 480,1	6,0 3,4	1,7				
<b>Total</b>	466,4 100,0	<b>Total</b>	604,3 100,0	85,0 100,0	<b>Total</b>	673,4 100,0	83,8 100,0	<b>Total</b>	673,4	100,0	83,8 100,0	<b>Total</b>	1,210,9	100,0	553,7	100,0		
I, II, III IV, V Total	% 100,0 % 100,0 % 100,0	% 134,2 % 127,5 % 129,6			% 175,6 % 130,2 % 144,4							% 391,8 % 199,7 % 259,6						

**Population Movement, 1893-1948 (continued)**

1944—detailed geographical breakdown		1944/1922—expressed as a percentage			1947							
ABCDE	F	ABCDE	F	%	ABCDE	A	B	C	D	E	F	%
1 204,0 2 0,9 3 48,8 4 316,4	199,4 215,9 ..... 129,0	1 247,5 2 213,1 3 213,1 4 211,1	612,5 27,3 895,8	613,7 47,1	1 462,9 II 110,9 III 39,9	249,2 108,7 39,9	8,8 — —	27,3 — —	9,5 — —	+168,1 +2,2 —	596,4	98,1
3 156,8 4 484,2	0,1 9,2	3 174,4 4 147,8	9,4 1,150,0	52,9	IV 173,1 V 517,0	125,1 507,2	48,0 9,8	— —	— —	-71,2 -135,6	5,3 6,5	1,9
<b>Total</b>		<b>Total</b>	1,303,8 100,0	100,0	<b>Total</b>	608,2	100,0				608,2	100,0
			% 421,8 % 215,1 % 279,5									

## Non-Jewish Population by Subdistricts (Cazas) and Relevant Towns: 1893, 1922, 1944

	1922		1944		1944/1922%		1944		
	Rur.	Tot.	Rur.	Tot.	Rur.	Tot.	Subdist.	N-J Pop.	%†
	Ga.	47.1	73.6	79.0	134.3	167.7	182.5	Jaffa	104.7
Beis.	71.1	73.4	48.0	53.6	67.5	73.0	Jer. Ur.	60.1	100.0
He.	37.0	53.1	65.0	89.6	175.7	168.7	Beis.	16.6	100.0
J (R).	45.0	83.4	75.1	147.8	166.9	177.2	Tiber.	26.1	100.0
Ra.	26.9	30.0	42.2	47.3	156.9	157.7	Haifa	115.9	96.5
Nb.	40.7	56.7	68.9	92.1	169.3	162.4	Safed	37.5	79.9
Jn.	30.9	33.5	52.9	56.9	171.2	169.9	Tuck.	31.2	45.7
Ac.	29.0	35.4	53.1	65.4	183.1	184.7	Raml.	24.7	26.2
N (U).		7.4		14.2		191.9	Naz. Ru.	4.3	17.5
N (R).	14.6	22.0	24.3	38.5	166.4	175.0	Normads	8.8	—
Beer.	8.1	10.0	11.4	16.6	140.7	166.0		429.9	
Ti.	12.0	14.5	20.8	26.1	173.3	180.0		1893	
Sa.	13.2	13.9	37.4	46.9	283.3	243.1	Jaffa	51.4	
Ha.	27.0	47.7	53.7	120.1	198.9	251.8	Jer Ur.	27.0	
Tu.	31.6	34.9	65.3	73.3	206.6	210.0	Tiber.	5.4	1912 1,350
Ja.	13.6	41.2	37.6	104.7	276.5	254.1	Haifa	15.9	1922 856
Re.	29.8	45.1	65.9	97.9	221.1	217.1	Safed	14.2	1931 621
J (U)		28.6		60.1		210.1	Benisap	31.3	1944 100
							Naz. Ru.	0.3	1947 —
<b>Total</b>	<b>477.7</b>	<b>673.4</b>	<b>800.5</b>	<b>1,211.0</b>	<b>167.6</b>	<b>179.8</b>		<b>145.5</b>	

† Approximate percentage of non-Jews in focal Jewish areas: according to 1947 Partition Plan plus Jerusalem area.

## Israel 1948

Land ownership as percentage of area in Western Palestine	%	Arabs in areas included in Israel, 1948					
		areas	A	B	CD	E	ABCDE
Jewish-owned land	8.6	present 1947	483.0	56.8	36.8	170.3	746.9
Arab-owned land	3.3	I, II, IV	140.2	19.8	—	—	160.0
Arab-owned abandoned land	16.9	refugees	342.8	37.0	36.8	170.3	586.9
State domains	71.2						



## APPENDIX VI. Methodology

### Description of Methodology, Population Study

The population figures used for the study were extracted, first, from Turkish census data, which were compiled according to Turkish subdistricts, and later, from British censuses and reports of British sub-districts that correspond closely to the earlier Turkish geographical divisions. The figures concerning the "Arab" (non-Jewish) population were then applied to those subdistricts that were 1) largely, 2) partially, 3) negligibly, and 4) not settled by Jews. Five geographic areas were examined, comprising the land that was included within the Armistice agreement. Three of the areas (see map on p. 246 for more specific borders) were included within the established pre-1967 borders of Israel. For the years 1893 and 1915, the Turkish census figures were used; for the years 1922, 1944, and 1947, the British census data corresponding to the same geographic areas were used. The Arab population in these areas was then divided into five categories: A) the Arab settled population (1893 inhabitants and their descendants), B) Arab nomads, C) Arab "legal immigrants," D) Arab "illegal immigrants," and E) Arab migrants. The rate of natural increase of the Arab population in the non-Jewish areas of Western Palestine was applied to the Arabs in the Jewish area. That rate was applied to the original settled Arab population. This figure was then subtracted from the total registered population in order to get a reliable estimate of the in-migration that occurred in each area between 1893 and 1947. Afterward, the number of *legally* registered Arab immigrants (Source: Anglo-American *Survey of Palestine*, 1946–1947) was subtracted from the total in-migrant population figure, as were the token number of *illegal* non-Jewish immigrants that the British government records officially reported. After all these variables were figured in for each area, the remainders are those who in-migrated from the Arab hill country. These absolute figures were also converted to percentages (see Appendix V). In this way, the ratio of Arab to Jew, particularly in the Jewish areas, could be presented for each year (1893, 1915, 1922, 1944, 1947).

The areas that actually came under Israeli rule were the areas that were included in the calculations regarding 1) the amount of out-migration around 1948 and 2) the number of refugees resulting from the establishment of the state. The number of those who stayed behind, subtracted from the total "original settled population" in 1947–1948 leaves a remainder of those who are the possible refugees. The 1947 population figures are used as a base, due to the fact that, by the end of 1947, people had already begun to flee.

### Demographer's Note on Population Study

Two procedures have been used to estimate the volume of net in-migration of Arabs into areas of Jewish settlement between 1893 and 1947.

The first procedure involved using the Turkish census population figures, and applying the rate of Arabs' natural increase in Arab (no-Jewish settlement) areas: applying the percentages of actual births and deaths as obtained from the British Government censuses and reports. Natural increase was calculated from birth and

death data, and then that figure and the Arab immigration total which had been reported were subtracted from the total population increase to give an estimate of net in-migration.

The second procedure involved the following: A) using data for Arab births and deaths available from the *Statistical Abstract of Palestine—1941* for the period of 1922 to 1927; B) calculating the percentage of the total population increase resulting from natural increase and assuming that the remainder of the total population growth provided an estimate of net Arab in-migration, and C) applying these percentages of total growth attributable to natural increase and net in-migration respectively to the total increase in Arab population in Jewish-settled Area I between 1893 and 1947.

The rationale for this second procedure was that fertility and mortality of the Arabs in Palestine between 1922 and 1927—and therefore also natural increase—were reasonably recorded in the *Statistical Abstract of Palestine—1941*, and in general consistent with expectations for a developing area.

It was surprising to discover that these two independent procedures produced the same estimate of minimum Arab net in-migration into Area I between 1893 and 1947. Both procedures resulted in an estimate of minimum net in-migration for that period, of roughly 168,000. Needless to say, the fact that both procedures resulted in the same figure lends credibility.

Philip M. Hauser, *Director Emeritus,*  
*Population Research Center,*  
*The University of Chicago*

*December 30, 1980*

Ref. No. .... 9491

DISTRICT COMMISSIONER'S OFFICES,  
SOUTHERN DISTRICT,  
JAFFA.

I/398/36

14 May, 1936.

Chief Secretary.  
-----Subject:- Relief of distressed  
British Subjects.Reference:- Telephone conversations-  
Mr. Jacobs - Mr. Farley.

I forward, in accordance with your verbal request, particulars concerning 50 British subjects who have applied to me for relief. While many of them owe their present unemployment to the strike which followed upon the recent disturbances, others became unemployed some time before the strike. It is clear that in the majority of cases, their mode of living in Palestine has been precarious; in many cases, moreover, they entered Palestine without permission.

2. My recommendation is, therefore, that these persons should be repatriated with the least possible delay, since, in present circumstances, they are likely to become a not inconsiderable burden on Government.

3. In virtue of the authority given to me by telephone, I have expended the sum of £ 31 from a fund which, at your direction, has been described as "Advances". In view of the indefinite continuance of the strike, and of the period which is likely to elapse before repatriation may be effected, I made payments to each person of £ 1; subsequently at your suggestion, I have restricted the payments to amounts of 250 mils. In the case of persons who have been unable to produce documents in authentication of their right to British protection, I have endeavoured to obtain the testimony of a prominent citizen of Jaffa that the person concerned is, in fact, a native of British Protected Territory.

4. I am transmitting a copy of this letter with its enclosures to the Commissioner for Migration and Statistics whom you may find it necessary to consult.

*G. J. Farley*  
District Commissioner,  
Southern District.

H/AH.

Copy to: Commissioner for Migration and Statistics,  
Jerusalem.

## Example of Enclosures, May 14, 1936

- 3 -

Name.	Entrance to Palestine.	Papers.	Occupation	Average wages per month.	Why unemployed and remarks.
Mohamed Yusef, 13) of Hergesia, Habaravat tribe, Sultan Deris-Jheikh.	On foot from Hejaz, 1925.	No passport. Certificate No. 2685 of 3.12.31 (out of date of registration as British protected person from British Consul, Beirut.	Labourer.	4½	Work ceased owing to strike, but will resume. Money saved sent to parents.
13) Ali Mohamed of Herbers, Dubahanta tribe, Hersi Bah.	On foot from Hejaz, 1926.	No passport. No papers.	Labourer.	4½	Work ceased owing to strike, may resume. No money saved.
14) Mursalni Juma Khan, of Peshawar District Spineang Village, India.	With Army of occupation from Egypt.	No passport. Discharge certificate from Indian Army dated 2.11.1931.	Chaffir..	3½	Work ceased owing to strike, will resume. No money saved.
15) Mohamed Farah, Somali of Aden.	Entered on passport No. 894 of 1.6.35, as pilgrim, January 1936.	Entered as a pilgrim on British Indian Passport No. 894 of 1.6.35 (Visa expired on 10.4.36).	None.	None.	Says money awaits him in Egypt.
16) Yuba Ighabieh Banda, of Khartoum, Sudan.	Entered to Palestine in 1935, by train.	Sudan passport, No. 2079 of 9.3.35.	Mechanic.	6 - 7	Out of work since strike.
17) Mohamed Rashed Bardiri, Kasala, Soudan.	On foot from Egypt, 1933.	No documents.	Garage- hand.	5	Work ceased owing to strike, No money saved.
18) Abro Ibrahim Issa -Warde, Doubaire, near Halia, Soudan.	On foot from EGYPT.	No documents.	Waiter.	3	Resigned from last post owing to small pay. No money saved.
19) Hasean Mahmoud Abu- He-bi.	On foot from Hejaz, 1931.	No documents.	Mason.	4	Work ceased owing to strike. Money saved sent to parents.
20) Asab Habruc Sodani, of Khartoum, Sudan.	With British Army, 1919.	No documents.	Cook.	4½	Discharged from last position.

**Number of Immigrants Annually by Race: Total Number of Persons Registered as Immigrants**

*(Including persons who entered as travellers and subsequently registered as immigrants)*

Year	Total	Jews	Christians	Moslems
1920 (Sept.–Dec.)	5,716	5,514	202	
1921	9,339	9,149	190	
1922	8,128	7,844	284	
1923	7,991	7,421	402	168
1924	13,553	12,856	510	187
1925	34,641	33,801	741	99
1926	13,910	13,081	611	218
1927	3,595	2,713	758	124
1928	3,086	2,178	710	198
1929	6,566	5,249	1,117	200
1930	6,433	4,944	1,296	193
1931	5,533	4,075	1,245	213
1932	11,289	9,553	1,524	212
1933	31,977	30,327	1,307	343
1934*	44,143	42,359	1,494	290
1935	64,147	61,854	903	1,390
1936	31,671	29,727	675	1,269
1937	12,475	10,536	743	1,196
1938	15,263	12,868	473	1,922
1939	18,433	16,405	376	1,652
1940	5,611	4,547	390	674
1941	4,270	3,674	280	343
1942	3,052	2,194	423	435
1943	9,867	8,507	503	857
1944	16,476	14,464	680	1,332
1945 (Jan.–Nov.)	13,984	12,032	714	1,238
<i>Total</i>	<u>401,149</u>	<u>367,845</u>	<u>33,304</u>	

\*In this "comprehensive" British Report, for the year 1934, only 1,784 non-Jews were recorded as immigrants; the "30,000–35,000 Hauranis" who immigrated to Western Palestine were not included in British calculations.

Source: Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, *A Survey of Palestine*, vol. 1, p. 185.

APPENDIX VIII. Evidence of Haj Amin al-Husseini Before the Royal Commission, January 12, 1937 (excerpt)

LORD PEEL: . . . Just one question, then. You want completely to stop Jewish immigration. What do you want to do with the 400,000 Jews here at present?

MUFTI: They will live as they always did live previously in Arab countries, with complete freedom and liberty, as natives of the country. In fact Moslem rule has always been known for its tolerance, and as a matter of fact Jews used to come to Eastern countries under Arab rule to escape persecution in Europe. According to history, Jews had a most quiet and peaceful residence under Arab rule. . . .

MUFTI: But I can say that the Jews, many thousands, are actually living in Iraq and Syria under Arab rule and have the same rights and the same position as the other inhabitants of the countries.

SIR L. HAMMOND: Would you give me the figures again for the land. I want to know how much land was held by the Jews before the Occupation.

MUFTI: First of all I would like to say that one of the members of our Committee will deal later with the land question, but nevertheless I will give you the figures. At the time of the Occupation the Jews held about 100,000 dunams.

SIR L. HAMMOND: What year?

MUFTI: At the date of the British Occupation.

SIR L. HAMMOND: And now they hold how much?

MUFTI: About 1,500,000 dunams: 1,200,000 dunams already registered in the name of the Jewish holders, but there are 300,000 dunams which are the subject of written agreements, and which have not yet been registered in the Land Registry. That does not, of course, include the land which was assigned, about 100,000 dunams.

SIR L. HAMMOND: What 100,000 dunams was assigned. Is that not included in the 1,200,000 dunams? The point is this. He says that in 1920 at the time of the Occupation, the Jews only held 100,000 dunams, is that so? I asked the figures from the Land Registry, how much land the Jews owned at the time of the Occupation. Would he be surprised to hear that the figure is not 100,000 but 650,000 dunams?

MUFTI: It may be that the difference was due to the fact that many lands were bought by contract which were not registered.

SIR L. HAMMOND: There is a lot of difference between 100,000 and 650,000.

MUFTI: In one case they sold about 400,000 dunams in one lot.

SIR L. HAMMOND: Who? An Arab?

MUFTI: Sarsuk. An Arab of Beyrouth.

SIR L. HAMMOND: His Eminence gave us a picture of the Arabs being evicted from their land and villages being wiped out. What I want to know is, did the Government of Palestine, the Administration, acquire the land and then hand it over to the Jews?

MUFTI: In most cases the lands were acquired.

SIR L. HAMMOND: I mean forcibly acquired—compulsory acquisition as land would be acquired for public purposes?

MUFTI: No, it wasn't.

SIR L. HAMMOND: Not taken by compulsory acquisition?

MUFTI: No.

SIR L. HAMMOND: But these lands amounting to some 700,000 dunams were actually sold?

MUFTI: Yes, they were sold, but the country was placed in such conditions as would facilitate such purchases.

SIR L. HAMMOND: I don't quite understand what you mean by that. They were sold. Who sold them?

MUFTI: Land owners.

SIR L. HAMMOND: Arabs?

MUFTI: In most cases they were Arabs.

SIR L. HAMMOND: Was any compulsion put on them to sell? If so, by whom?

MUFTI: As in other countries, there are people who by force of circumstances, economic forces, sell their land.

SIR L. HAMMOND: Is that all he said?

MUFTI: They were not prevented from selling the land, and mostly the country was in such economic condition as facilitated the sale. If the Government had the interest of these poor people at heart they should have prevented sales and these people would not have been evicted from their land. A large part of these lands belong to absentee landlords who sold the land over the heads of their tenants, who were forcibly evicted. The majority of these landlords were absentees who sold their land over the heads of their tenants. Not Palestinians but Lebanese.

SIR L. HAMMOND: Is His Eminence in a position to give the Commission a list of the people, the Arabs who have sold lands, apart from those absentee landlords?

MUFTI: I am sure the Department of Lands can supply such a list.

SIR L. HAMMOND: I didn't ask him to tell me where I could get the information from. I asked was he in a position to give it to me.

MUFTI: It is possible for me to supply such a list.

SIR L. HAMMOND: I ask him now this: does he think that as compared with the standard of life under the Turkish rule the position of the fellahin in the villages has improved or deteriorated?

MUFTI: Generally speaking I think their situation has got worse.

SIR L. HAMMOND: Is taxation heavier or lighter?

MUFTI: Taxation was much heavier then, but now there are additional burdens.

SIR L. HAMMOND: I am asking him if it is now, the present day, as we are sitting together here, is it a fact that the fellahin has a much lighter tax than he had under the Turkish rule? Or is he taxed more heavily?

MUFTI: The present taxation is lighter, but the Arabs nevertheless have now other taxation, for instance, customs. On this very point a member of the Arab Committee will deal.

LORD PEEL: On the burden of taxation?

MUFTI: Yes.

LORD PEEL: And the condition of the fellahin as regards, for example, education. Are there more schools or fewer schools now?

MUFTI: They may have more schools, comparatively, but at the same time there has been an increase in their numbers.

SIR L. HAMMOND: Is there any conscription for the army now?

MUFTI: No.

SIR L. HAMMOND: Would the people like to have that back?

**MUFTI:** Yes. Provided we have our own Government.

**SIR L. HAMMOND:** Then am I to take it from his evidence that he thinks the Arab portion of the population would be more happy if they reverted to a Turkish rule than under the present Mandatory rule?

**MUFTI:** That is a fact.



APPENDIX IX. Muftism and Nazism: World War II Collaboration.  
Documents (examples of original correspondence)

**U.S. Confirms Role of Mufti as Nazi Middle East Leader**

OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL  
FOR PROSECUTION OF AXIS CRIMINALITY

No. 792—PS

17 September 1945

Source of Original OKW Files, Flensburg

[*Excerpt*]

LEADS: CANARIS, IBN SAUD, GRAND MUFTI.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

1. Only through the funds made available by Germany to the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem was it possible to carry out the revolt in Palestine. (Page 1).
2. Germany will keep up the connection with the Grand Mufti. Weapons will be stored for the Mufti with Ibn Saud in Arabia. (Page 2).
3. Ibn Saud himself has close connections with the Grand Mufti and the revolting circles in TransJordan. (Page 2).
4. To be able to carry out our work one of Germany's agents will be placed in Cairo (Page 3).
5. The document is undated but obviously written before the outbreak of the war in 1939. It is not signed.

Analyst Landmann

Doc. No. 792-PS

Source: *The Arab Higher Committee, Its Origins, Personnel and Purposes*. The Documentary Record Submitted to The United Nations, May 1947, by Nations Associates.

**Summons to a Holy War Against Britain**  
*A "Fatwa" Issued by Haj Amin al-Husseini, May, 1941\**

In the name of Merciful and Almighty God.

I invite all my Moslem brothers throughout the whole world to join in the Holy War for God, for the defense of Islam and her lands against her enemy. O Faithful, obey and respond to my call.

O Moslems!

Proud 'Iraq has placed herself in the vanguard of this Holy Struggle, and has thrown herself against the strongest enemy of Islam certain that God will grant her Victory.

The English have tried to seize this Arab-Moslem land, but she has risen, full of

\*Translated from:—"Oriente Moderno," 1941, pp. 552-553; broadcast over the 'Iraqi and Axis radios.

dignity and pride to defend her safety, to fight for her honor and to safeguard her integrity. 'Iraq fights the tyranny which has always had as its aim the destruction of Islam in every land. It is the duty of all Moslems to aid 'Iraq in her struggle and to seek every means to fight the enemy, the traditional traitor in every age and every situation.

Whoever knows the history of the East has everywhere seen the hand of the English working to destroy the Ottoman Empire and to divide the Arab countries. British politics toward the Arab people is masked under a veil of Hypocrisy. The minute she sees her chance, England squeezes the prostrate country in her Imperialist grasp, adding futile justifications. She creates discord and division within a country and while feeding it in secret openly she assumes the role of advisor and trusted friend. The time when England could deceive the peoples of the East is passed. The Arab Nation and the Moslem people have awakened to fight British domination. The English have overthrown the Ottoman Empire, have destroyed Moslem rule in India, inciting one community against another; they stifled the Egyptian awakening, the dream of Mohammed Ali, colonizing Egypt for half a century. They took advantage of the weakening of the Ottoman Empire to stretch out their hands and use every sort of trick to take possession of many Arab countries as happened to Aden, the 9 Districts, the Hadramut, Oman, Masqat and the Emirates of the Persian Gulf and Transjordan. The vivid proof of the imperialistic designs of the British is to be found in Moslem Palestine which, although promised by England to Sheriff Hussein has had to submit to the outrageous infiltration of Jews, shameful politics designed to divide Arab-Moslem countries of Asia from those of Africa. In Palestine the English have committed unheard of barbarisms; among others, they have profaned the el-Aqsa Mosque and have declared the most unyielding war against Islam, both in deed and in word. The Prime Minister at that time told Parliament that the world would never see peace as long as the Koran existed. What hatred against Islam is stronger than that which publicly declares the Sacred Koran an enemy of human kind? Should such sacrilege go unpunished? After the dissolution of the Moslem Empire in India and of the Ottoman Caliphate, England, adhering to the policy of Gladstone, pursued her work of destruction to Islam depriving many Islamic States both in the East and in the West of their freedom and independence. The number of Moslems who today live under the rule of England and invoke liberation from their terrible yoke exceeds 220,000,000.

Therefore I invite you, O Brothers, to join in the War for God to preserve Islam, your independence and your lands from English aggression. I invite you to bring all your weight to bear in helping 'Iraq that she may throw off the shame that torments her.

O Heroic 'Iraq, God is with Thee, the Arab Nation and the Moslem World are solidly with Thee in Thy Holy Struggle!

Source: *The Arab War Effort—A Documentary Account*. The American Christian Palestine Committee (New York, n.d.).

### **The Mufti's Diary on His Meeting with Hitler**

Haj Amin al Husseini, recording in his own handwriting his meeting with Hitler in his diary, says:

The words of the Fuehrer on the 6th of Zul Qaada 1360 of the Hejira (which falls

on the 21st of November 1941) Berlin, Friday, from 4:30 P.M. till a few minutes after 6.

The objectives of my fight are clear. Primarily, I am fighting the Jews without respite, and this fight includes the fight against the so-called Jewish National Home in Palestine because the Jews want to establish there a central government for their own pernicious purposes, and to undertake a devastating and ruinous expansion at the expense of the governments of the world and of other peoples.

It is clear that the Jews have accomplished nothing in Palestine and their claims are lies. All the accomplishments in Palestine are due to the Arabs and not to the Jews. I am resolved to find a solution for the Jewish problem, progressing step by step without cessation. With regard to this I am making the necessary and right appeal, first to all the European countries and then to countries outside of Europe.

It is true that our common enemies are Great Britain and the Soviets whose principles are opposed to ours. But behind them stands hidden Jewry which drives them both. Jewry has but one aim in both these countries. We are now in the midst of a life and death struggle against both these nations. This fight will not only determine the outcome of the struggle between National Socialism and Jewry, but the whole conduct of this successful war will be of great and positive help to the Arabs who are engaged in the same struggle.

This is not only an abstract assurance.\* A mere promise would be of no value whatsoever. But assurance which rests upon a conquering force is the only one which has real value. In the Iraqi campaign, for instance, the sympathy of the whole German people was for Iraq. It was our aim to help Iraq, but circumstances prevented us from furnishing actual help. The German people saw in them (in the Iraqis—Ed.) comrades in suffering because the German people too have suffered as they have. All the help we gave Iraq was not sufficient to save Iraq from the British forces. For this reason it is necessary to underscore one thing: in this struggle which will decide the fate of the Arabs I can now speak as a man dedicated to an ideal and as a military leader and a soldier. Everyone united in this great struggle who helps to bring about its successful outcome, serves the common cause and thus serves the Arab cause. Any other view means weakening the military situation and thus offers no help to the Arab cause. Therefore it is necessary for us to decide the steps which can help us against world Jewry, against Communist Russia and England, and which among them can be most useful. Only if we win the war will the hour of deliverance also be the hour of fulfillment of Arab aspirations.

The situation is as follows: We are conducting the great struggle to open the way to the North of the Caucasus. The difficulties involved are more than transportation because of the demolished railways and roads and because of winter weather. And if I venture in these circumstances to issue a declaration with regard to Syria, then the pro-de Gaulle elements in France will be strengthened and this might cause a revolt in France. These men (the French) will be convinced then that joining Britain is more advantageous and the detachment of Syria is a pattern to be followed in the remainder of the French Empire. This will strengthen de Gaulle's stand in the colonies. If the declaration is issued now, difficulties will arise in Western Europe which will cause the diversion of some (German—Ed.) forces for defensive purposes, thus preventing us from sending all our forces to the East.

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\*This is a reply to the insistent request of the Mufti for an Axis declaration to the Arabs.

Now I am going to tell you something I would like you to keep secret.

First, I will keep up my fight until the complete destruction of the Judeo-Bolshevik rule has been accomplished.

Second, during the struggle (and we don't know when victory will come, but probably not in the far future) we will reach the Southern Caucasus.

Third, then I would like to issue a declaration; for then the hour of the liberation of the Arabs will have arrived. Germany has no ambitions in this area but cares only to annihilate the power which produces the Jews.

Fourth, I am happy that you have escaped and that you are now with the Axis powers. The hour will strike when you will be the lord of the supreme word and not only the conveyer of our declarations. You will be the man to direct the Arab force and at that moment I cannot imagine what would happen to the Western peoples.

Fifth, I think that with this Arab advance begins the dismemberment of the British world. The road from Rostov to Iran and Iraq is shorter than the distance from Berlin to Rostov. We hope next year to smash this barrier. It is better then and not now that a declaration should be issued as (now) we cannot help in anything.

I understand the Arab desire for this (declaration—Ed.), but His Excellency the Mufti must understand that only five years after I became President of the German government and Fuehrer of the German people, was I able to get such a declaration (the Austrian Union—Ed.), and this because military forces prevented me from issuing such a declaration. But when the German Panzer tanks and the German air squadrons reach the Southern Caucasus, then will be the time to issue the declaration.

He said (in reply to a request that a secret declaration or a treaty be made) that a declaration known to a number of persons cannot remain secret but will become public. I (Hitler) have made very few declarations in my life, unlike the British who have made many declarations. If I issue a declaration, I will uphold it. Once I promised the Finnish Marshal that I would help his country if the enemy attacks again. This word of mine made a stronger impression than any written declaration.

Recapitulating, I want to state the following to you: When we shall have arrived in the Southern Caucasus, then the time of the liberation of the Arabs will have arrived. And you can rely on my word.

We were troubled about you. I know your life history. I followed with interest your long and dangerous journey. I was very concerned about you. I am happy that you are with us now and that you are now in a position to add your strength to the common cause.

**Auswärtiges Amt**

Berlin, den 28. April 1942.

Eminenz!

In Beantwortung Ihres mir heute gemeinsam mit Seiner Exzellenz dem Ministerpräsidenten Raschid Ali El Gailani übersandten Briefes und in Bestätigung meiner

Heimstätte in Palästina zuzustimmen.

Es besteht Einverständnis darüber, das der Wortlaut und der Inhalt dieses Briefes unbedingt geheim gehalten werden, bis im gegenseitigen Einvernehmen etwas anderes bestimmt wird.

Gerechtfertigen Euere Eminenz die Versicherung meiner ausgezeichnetesten Hochachtung.



## **Ribbentrop Promises Mufti to Destroy Jewish National Home**

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Berlin, April 28, 1942

Your Eminence:

In response to your letter and to the accompanying communication of His Excellency, Prime Minister Raschid Ali El Gailani, and confirming the terms of our conversation, I have the honour to inform you:

The German Government appreciates fully the confidence of the Arab peoples in the Axis Powers in their aims and in their determination to conduct the fight against the common enemy until victory is achieved. The German Government has the greatest understanding for the national aspirations of the Arab countries as have been expressed by you both and the greatest sympathy for the sufferings of your peoples

under British oppression.

I have therefore the honour to assure you, in complete agreement with the Italian Government, that the independence and freedom of the suffering Arab countries presently subjected to British oppression, is also one of the aims of the German Government.

Germany is consequently ready to give all her support to the oppressed Arab countries in their fight against British domination, for the fulfillment of their national aim to independence and sovereignty and for the destruction of the Jewish National Home in Palestine.

As previously agreed, the content of this letter should be maintained absolutely secret until we decide otherwise.

I beg your Eminence to be assured of my highest esteem and consideration.

(Signed) Ribbentrop

To His Eminence  
the Grossmufti of Palestine  
Amin El Husseini.

Source: *The Arab Higher Committee . . .*, The Documentary Record. Original German, p. 439.

## The Mufti Asks Arab Americans Not to Support FDR

### ADDRESS TO AMERICAN ARABS

*Excerpts from a Radio Speech by Haj Amin al-Husseini  
March 19, 1943, in Rome*

The Arabs and Moslems will not be deceived by Britain once again because not only have they known its true intentions but they have also known those of Britain's allies—America—and I want to draw the attention of the Arab emigrants in America to this fact, reminding them of their glorious past when they supported the National movement. I would also like to remind them that their efforts will be wasted if, God forbid, America and her Allies may be victorious in this War because at such a time the Arabs will never rise again. I therefore know that those Arab emigrants in America will refrain from helping Roosevelt or taking part in a war which he brought on to his country.

If those Allies win this war the Jewish influence will be the arbiter in the world resources and one can thus imagine the future of the Arabs and Moslems, and the dangers which they are exposed to in their fatherlands and beliefs if the Jews and their Allies dominate them and spread the latent hatred on to them.

Then the world will become Hell—God forbid: But Allah is too just and merciful to grant such murderous violators any victory. We are sure that victory will be ours and that of our friends. We have not the slightest doubt about that, we shall not slacken our struggle nor will we be deterred or quietened. Do not be deceived by the allegations of your enemies, because you know full well about their intrigues, and be sure that the nation which fights, sacrifices and awaits will be the victorious one in the end.

Source: *The Arab War Effort, A Documented Account.*

Nach Fliegerangriffen Privatgespräche am Fernsprecher unterlassen!

Liefervermerk:

Deutsche Reichspost  
Telegramm

Versandungsvermerk:

Vergütungen .....  
Benutzige Gebühren .....  
Zusammen .....  
Angen.

Empfänger:  
Tag: .....  
Zahl: .....  
Ort: .....  
Datum: .....

Nr. .... mit W. 194 des ... / um Uhr (Verg.-angabe)

Genau Anschrift (Wohnortvermerk vor Bestimmungsort) Deutsche Schrift

+ AN DEN GROSSMUFTI AMIN EL HUSSEINI,  
-- BERTLIN --  
DIE NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHE BEWEGUNG GROSSDEUTSCHLANDS  
HAT SEIT IHRER ENTSTEHUNG DEN KAMPF GEGEN DAS  
WELTJUDENTUM AUF IHRE FAHNE GESCHRIEBEN. SIE HAT DESHALB  
SCHON IMMER MIT BESONDERER SYMPATHIE DEN KAMPF DER  
FREIHEITSLIEBENDEN ARABER, VOR ALLEN IN PALAESTINA, GEGEN  
DIE JUEDISCHEN EINDRINGLINGE VERFOLGT. DIE ERKENNTNIS  
DIESES FEINDES UND DER GEMEINSAME KAMPF GEGEN IHN  
BILDEN DIE FESTE GRUNDLAGE DES NATUERLICHEN BUENDNISSES  
ZWISCHEN DEM NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN GROSSDEUTSCHLAND

UND DEN FREIHEITSLIEBENDEN MOHAMMEDANERN DER GANZEN WELT. <sup>ion!</sup>  
IN DIESEM SINNE UEBERMITTE ICH JHNEN AM JAHRESTAG DER  
UNSELIGEN BALFOUB - DEKLARATION MEINE HERZLICHSTEN GRUESSE UND  
WUENSCHUE FUEER DIE GLUECKLICHE DURCHFUEHRUNG IHRES KAMPFES  
BIS ZUM SICHEREN ENDSIEG. - <sup>in Baller</sup>  
REICHSFUEHRER-GEZ. HEINRICH HIMMLER. + <sup>anlass.</sup>  
<sup>erschließung</sup> <sup>alle ohne Rücksicht auf ihre</sup> <sup>Verantwort.</sup> <sup>mmabschriften</sup>

November 2, 1943, message from Heinrich Himmler to an anti-Balfour Declaration meeting:

“To the Grand Mufti:

“The National Socialist Movement of Greater Germany has, since its beginning, inscribed upon its flag the fight against world Jewry. It has, therefore, followed with particular sympathy the struggle of the freedom-loving Arabians, especially in Palestine, against the Jewish interlopers. It is in the recognition of this enemy and of the common struggle against him that lies the firm foundation of the natural alliance that exists between National-Socialist-Greater Germany and the freedom-loving Moslems of the whole world. In this spirit I am sending you on the anniversary of the infamous Balfour Declaration my hearty greetings and wishes for the successful pursuit of your struggle until the certain final victory.

Signed: Reichsfuehrer-S.S. Heinrich Himmler

Source: *The Arab Higher Committee . . .*, The Documentary Record.

The Mufti Communicates Anger to Ribbentrop  
upon the Germans' Release of Jews in 1944

Berlin, den 25. Juli 1944

An Seine Exzellenz  
den Herrn Reichsminister des Ausseren.

B e r l i n .

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Exzellenz!

Schon früher hatte ich die Aufmerksamkeit Ihrer Exzellenz auf die dauernden Versuche der Juden aus Europa auszuwandern, um nach Palästina zu gelangen gelenkt, und bat Ihre Exzellenz die notwendigen Schritte zu unternehmen, damit die Juden an der Auswanderung gehindert werden. Auch anlässlich des Austauschplanes zwischen den in Deutschland lebenden Ägypter und Palästina-Deutschen, hatte ich ein Schreiben an Ihre Exzellenz am 5.6.1944 gerichtet und bat, die Juden aus diesem Austauschplan auszuschließen. Ich habe erfahren, dass die Juden am 2.7.1944 abge-

Berlin July 25, 1944

To His Excellency

The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Berlin

Your Excellency:

I have previously called the attention of your Excellency to the constant attempts of the Jews to emigrate from Europe in order to reach Palestine, and asked your Excellency to undertake the necessary steps so as to prevent the Jews from emigrating. I had also sent you a letter, under date of June 5, 1944, in regard to the plan for an exchange of Egyptians living in Germany with Palestinian Germans, in which I asked you to exclude the Jews from this plan of exchange. I have, however, learned that the Jews did depart on July 2, 1944, and I am afraid that further groups of Jews will leave for Palestine from Germany and France to be exchanged for Palestinian Germans.

This exchange on the part of the Germans would encourage the Balkan countries likewise to send their Jews to Palestine. This step would be incomprehensible to the Arabs and Moslems after your Excellency's declaration of November 2, 1943 that "the destruction of the so-called Jewish national home in Palestine is an immutable part of the policy of the greater German Reich" and it would create in them a feeling of keen disappointment.

It is for this reason that I ask your Excellency to do all that is necessary to prohibit the emigration of Jews to Palestine, and in this way your Excellency would give a new practical example of the policy of the naturally allied and friendly Germany towards the Arab Nation.

Yours, etc.



# Notes

## 2. The Invitation

1. November 24, 1975, Beirut.
2. Revolutionary Command, Radio Baghdad, November 25, 1975.
3. *New York Times*, *Le Monde*, *Toronto Star*, December 11, 1975.
4. *New York Times*, December 11, 1975. The Iraqi Minister of Justice in 1941 stated that “Judaism”—not Zionism—was “a threat to mankind.” He did not attempt to disguise the Iraqis’ anti-Jewish sentiments, which exploded that year into an old-fashioned Cossack-style pogrom, long before Israel’s statehood. Further, the killing of the Jewish Dutch citizen, whom the Iraqis hanged as a “Zionist spy” the same year they extended their “welcome,” gave lie to Iraq’s extensive promises of “full rights” to its Jews. See Sylvia Haim, “Arabic Anti-Semitic Literature,” in *Jewish Social Studies*, vol. 17 (1955), pp. 307–12.
5. *Toronto Star*, February 3, 1976.
6. Libya’s Major Abdul-Huni, Council Commanding the Revolution, to ex-Libyan Jewish refugees then in Italy, May 29, 1970. Libyan leader Qadaffy invited former Libyan Jews living in Israel to return, November 24, 1973; see Chapter 7. Also, Sudanese President Numeiry, in a speech at a rally celebrating Independence Day, E-Damar, January 1, 1975. Also Egyptian President Sadat to Jews who fled or were expelled since 1948, filing the caveat that Egyptians “are against the racial policies of the Zionists.” The invitation and its qualification occurred in September 1977, interestingly, just weeks before President Sadat’s Jerusalem peace pilgrimage. See *Chicago Daily News*, September 10–11; also see *The Oregonian* (Portland), July 18, 1977.
7. *Newsweek*, November 17, 1975, interview; also see *Chicago Daily News*, December 30, 1975; see also *Newsweek*, March 14, 1977.
8. Sir Geoffrey Furlonge, *Palestine Is My Country: The Story of Musa Alami* (New York and London: Praeger Press, 1969), p. 152.
9. Muhamed Nimer Al Hawari described the Arab leaders’ ruthless incitement of the Arabs in Jaffa in December 1947: “. . . Jaffa was boiling: every second that passed you heard a new rumour, and after every minute the imaginary tales and lies became bigger, finally, they were accepted as definite truth by the public. When the sun was setting down, many of the Mufti henchmen patrolled the streets in private and lorry cars, calling upon the people: oh! people, oh! men, oh! heros; Help . . . Help . . . , stop the Jewish attack! They have attacked your brothers in the Manshiya; they pillaged their properties; burned their holdings and raped their women and girls. They have committed awful acts of horror and brutality against your brothers!! In

- but a few minutes Jaffa's inhabitants were incited and agitated shouted and fired in the air:—On Them! On Them! On Tel-Aviv, the town of the wicked . . . Groups and individuals, they marched on and among them, behind them or in front of them, went the Mufti henchmen belittling the Jewish strength . . ." *The Secret of the Catastrophe* [Arabic] (Nazareth, 1955), pp. 34–37, cited in translation by Rony E. Gabbay, *A Political Study of the Arab-Jewish Conflict: The Arab Refugee Problem (A Case Study)* (Geneva: Librairie E. Droz; Paris: Librairie Minard, 1959), pp. 82–83.
10. United Nations General Assembly, 2nd session 1947, Resolution 181 (II), November 29, 1947. For earlier partition proposals and Arab reaction, see Chapter 14.
  11. In March 1948, according to a study, these outside forces included 2,500 Syrians, 2,500 Iraqis, "several hundred" Lebanese and Egyptians, and Yugoslav Muslims as well. Harry Sacher, *Israel: The Establishment of a State* (London, 1951), p. 235, cited by Gabbay, *Political Study*, p. 81. General Isma'il Safwat reported to the League Palestine Committee the total number of Arab volunteers as "7,700 persons," March 23, 1948, Iraq Parliamentary Investigating Commission, cited in Gabbay, p. 81.
  12. Nicholas Bethell, *The Palestine Triangle: The Struggle for the Holy Land, 1935–48* (New York: G. Putnam's Sons, 1979), p. 351; Azzam Pasha, Secretary General of the Arab League, described "three characteristics of the future war: the belief in glorious death as a road to paradise, the opportunities of lust and the Bedouin love of slaughter for its own sake." Interview in *Akhbar al-Yom*, October 11, 1947, cited by Gabbay, *Political Study*, p. 83, n. 103.
  13. In September 1947, the Political Committee of the Arab League, at its meeting in Sofer, Lebanon, advised the Arab governments to accept and care for the evacuees from Palestine. *Iraq Parliamentary Investigation Commission on the Causes of the Failure in Palestine*, submitted to Iraq Parliament on September 4, 1949, Appendix 8, pp. 43–50, cited in Gabbay, *Political Study*, p. 92; see also "The Arab Refugee Problem and How It Can Be Solved," proposals submitted to the United Nations General Assembly, December 1951, by Dewey Anderson, Executive Director, Public Affairs Institute; Archibald MacLeish, Harvard University; Henry Atkinson, Church Peace Union; Ivan Lee Holt, Methodist Bishop of Missouri; Kenneth Scott Latourette, President, American Baptist Convention; Daniel Marsh, Chancellor, Boston University; James T. Shotwell, Carnegie Endowment; James G. Patton, President, Farmers International and Cooperative Union; Norman B. Nash, Episcopal Bishop of Massachusetts; and others.
  14. "This will be a war of extermination and a momentous massacre . . . like the Mongolian massacres and the Crusades." Azzam Pasha, Secretary General of the Arab League, at Cairo press conference, May 15, 1948, *New York Times*, May 16, 1948.
  15. Habib Issa, ed., *Al-Hoda*, Arabic daily, June 8, 1951, New York; see *Economist* (London), May 15, 1948, regarding "panic flight"; also see *Economist*, October 2, 1948, for British eyewitness report of Arab Higher Committee radio "announcements" that were "urging all Arabs in Haifa to quit."
  16. Near East Arabic Radio, April 3, 1948: "It must not be forgotten that the Arab Higher Committee encouraged the refugees to flee from their homes in Jaffa, Haifa and Jerusalem, and that certain leaders . . . make political capital out of their miserable situation . . ." Cited by Anderson et al., "The Arab Refugee Problem and How It Can Be Solved," p. 22; for more regarding Arab responsibility, see Sir Alexander Cadogan, Ambassador of Great Britain to the United Nations, speech to

- the Security Council, S.C., O.R., 287th meeting, April 23, 1948; also see Harry Stebbens, British Port Officer stationed in Haifa, letter in *Evening Standard* (London), January 10, 1969.
17. April 28, 1948; according to the *Economist* (London), October 1, 1948, only “4000 to 6000” of the “62,000 Arabs who formerly lived in Haifa” remained there until the time of the war; also see Kenneth Bilby, *New Star in the Near East* (New York: Doubleday, 1950), pp. 30–31; Lt. Col. Moshe Pearlman, *The Army of Israel* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1950), pp. 116–17; and Major E. O’Ballance, *The Arab-Israeli War of 1948* (London, 1956), p. 52.
  18. David Shipler, *New York Times*, October 23, 1979, p. A3. Shipler cites Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre, *O Jerusalem*, and Dan Kurzman, *Genesis 1948*.
  19. *New York Times*, October 23, 1979.
  20. Yitzhak Rabin, *The Rabin Memoirs* (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown, 1979), p. 23, pp. 22–44.
  21. Peter Dodd and Halim Barakat, *River Without Bridges: A Study of the Exodus of the 1967 Arab Palestinian Refugees* (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1969), p. 43; on April 27, 1950, the Arab National Committee of Haifa stated in a memorandum to the Arab States: “The removal of the Arab inhabitants . . . was voluntary and was carried out at our request . . . The Arab delegation proudly asked for the evacuation of the Arabs and their removal to the neighboring Arab countries. . . . We are very glad to state that the Arabs guarded their honour and traditions with pride and greatness.” Cited by J.B. Schechtman, *The Arab Refugee Problem* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1952), pp. 8–9; also see *Al-Zaman*, Baghdad journal, April 27, 1950.
  22. Musa Alami, “The Lesson of Palestine,” *The Middle East Journal*, October 1949.
  23. Lord Caradon, “Cyprus and Palestine,” lecture at the University of Chicago, Center for Middle Eastern Studies, February 17, 1976. Similar statement by Folke Bernadotte, *To Jerusalem*, p. 113.
  24. P.J. Vatikiotis, *Nasser and His Generation* (London: Croom Helm, 1978), pp. 256–57.
  25. *Ibid.* p. 234, quoting a speech by Nasser at Suez, July 26, 1956; in 1952, Sheikh Pierre Gemayel, then leader of the Lebanese National Youth Organization “Al Kataeb,” wrote: “Why should the refugees stay in Lebanon, and not in Egypt, Iraq and Jordan which claim that they are all Arab and beyond that, Moslem? . . . Isn’t it for that alone that these so-called nationalist elements are demanding to resettle the refugees in Lebanon because they are themselves Arab and Moslems?” *Al-Hoda*, Lebanese journal, January 3, 1952, cited in Schechtman, *Arab Refugee Problem*, p. 84; also see Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, “Quest for an Arab Future,” in *Arab Journal*, 1966–67, vol. 4, nos. 2–4, pp. 23–29.
  26. “Mohammed Hassanein Heykal Discusses War and Peace in the Middle East,” *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Autumn 1971. Heykal thus joined the Arab chorus heard after the 1967 war.
  27. Vatikiotis, *Nasser*, p. 257; also see Mohamed Heikal, *The Road to Ramadan* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1975), p. 56.
  28. Interview with Nasser, *Le Monde* (Paris: February 1970), cited in Vatikiotis, *Nasser*, p. 259.
  29. Charles Foltz, interview with Nasser, *U.S. News and World Report*, May 1970, cited in Vatikiotis, *Nasser*, p. 259; see also *Le Monde* interview, February 1970.

30. “. . . contrary to the popular view . . . in the West,” a “great many refugees” were living out of camps “in comfortable housing outside,” in the beginning of the 1960s, according to Fawaz Turki, *The Disinherited: Journal of a Palestinian Exile* (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1972), p. 41.
31. Al-Haytham Al-Ayubi, “Future Arab Strategy in the Light of the Fourth War,” *Shuun Filastiniyya* (Beirut), October 1974. Al-Ayubi, also called Abu-Hammam, has been military head of Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Lieutenant Colonel in the Syrian army, and highly respected strategist on Israel. He perceived the “guerrilla” war against Israel as the ultimately successful one.
32. Rosemary Sayigh, “Sources of Palestinian Nationalism: A Study of a Palestinian Camp in Lebanon,” *Journal of Palestinian Studies*, vol. 6, no. 4, 1977, p. 21; see also Sayigh, “The Palestinian Identity Among Camp Residents,” *Journal of Palestinian Studies*, vol. 6, no. 3, 1977, pp. 3–22.
33. In 1981, the Organization of African Unity’s executive secretary, Ambassador Oumarou Garba Youssoufou from Niger, reflected upon why the millions of displaced souls in Africa were not as visible: “We’re not getting the publicity because of our culture. No refugee is turned away from the host countries, so we’re not dramatic enough for television. We have no drownings, no piratings. . . . We don’t make the news.” “Aiding Africa’s Refugees,” by Gertrude Samuels, *The New Leader*, May 4, 1981.
34. Al-Ayubi, “Future Arab Strategy in the Light of the Fourth War.”
35. Musa Alami, “The Lesson of Palestine,” *The Middle East Journal*, October 1949.
36. Khaled Al-Azm, *Memoirs* [Arabic], 3 vols. (Al-Dar al Muttahida lil-Nashr, 1972), vol. 1, pp. 386–87, cited by Maurice Roumani, *The Case of the Jews from Arab Countries: A Neglected Issue*, preliminary edition (Jerusalem: World Organization of Jews from Arab Countries [WOJAC], 1975), p. 61.
37. Jordanian National Law, Official Gazette, No. 1171, February 16, 1954, p. 105, Article 3(3). Between 1948 and 1967, 200,000 to 300,000 Arabs moved from the West Bank to the “East Bank,” according to Eliyahu Kanovsky, in *Jordan, People and Politics in the Middle East*, Michael Curtis, ed. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1971), p. 111.
38. Walter Pinner, *How Many Arab Refugees?* (London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1959).
39. In 1967, an additional 250,000 Arab refugees from the Israel-occupied territories were reported; added to the number who left in 1948, they brought the total to 789,000 Arab refugees.
40. This estimate was made by officers of the Disaster Relief Organization and confirmed by statistical calculation of the potential number of refugees who might have left after the second truce. Gabbay, *Political Study*, p. 166.
41. Marguerite Cartwright, “Plain Speech on the Arab Refugee Problem,” in *Land Reborn*, American Christian Palestine Committee, November–December 1958; according to a United Nations Interim Report, 1951, A/145/Rev. 1, p. 17: “. . . the figures for Lebanon (128,000) are confused, due to the fact that many Lebanese nationals . . . claimed status as refugees”; UNRWA was “forbidden” by Jordan, Syria, and Gaza from counting newborn children among refugees, according to *Falastin*, Jordanian daily, January 25, 1956; see Joseph Schectman, *The Refugee in the World* (New York: A.S. Barnes & Co., 1963), pp. 201–207.
42. W. de St. Aubin, Director of Field Operations for the UN Disaster Relief Project,

- “Peace and Refugees in the Middle East,” *The Middle East Journal*, vol. iii, no. 3, July 1949.
43. Report of the Director, Special Report of Director and Advisory Commission, UNRWA to Sixth Session, General Assembly, UN Document A/1905; compare, for example, with OAU (Organization of African Unity) definition at 1969 Convention: “Any person . . . compelled to leave his place of *habitual* residence. . . .” Quoted in “Africa and Refugees,” by Neville Rubin, *African Affairs*, July 1974, Journal of Royal African Society, University of London.
  44. UNRWA, Annual Report of the Director, July 1, 1951, to June 30, 1952, General Assembly, Seventh Session, Supp. No. 13 (A/2171). See also October 1950, UNRWA Interim Report of Director, A/1451: “there is reason to believe that births are always registered for ration purposes, but deaths are often, if not usually, concealed so that the family may continue to collect rations for the deceased.” Cited by Schechtman, *Refugee in the World*, p. 206.
  45. *Assistance to Palestine Refugees*, Report on UN Relief to Palestine Refugees (UNPRP) from December 1948 to September 1949; the UNRWA staff was largely “Palestinian” and “nationals of the countries” concerned, “increasingly assuming larger duties” regarding “UNRWA’s responsibility.” UNRWA, Annual Report of the Director, July 1951–June, 1952, G.A. 7th Session, Supp. No. 13 (A/2171), p. 8.
  46. Cartwright, “Plain Speech,” cited by Schechtman, *Refugee in the World*, pp. 200–201.
  47. UN General Assembly, Official Record, 5th session, Ad Hoc Political Committee 31st Meeting, November 11, 1950, p. 194, and Anderson et al, “Arab Refugee Problem and How It Can Be Solved,” p. 26.
  48. Special Report of the Director, UNRWA, 1954–55, UN Document A/2717.
  49. Schechtman, *Refugee in the World*, p. 248, citing *Al-Hayat* (Lebanon), June 25, 1959.
  50. *Ibid.*, p. 249, citing *Al-Hayat*, August 14, 1959.
  51. UNRWA, Annual Report of the Director, July 1951–June 1952, General Assembly, 7th Session, Supp. No. 13 (A/2171), pp. 3, 10.
  52. Cable by McGee and Gore from Amman, Jordan, to President Eisenhower, Secretary of State Christian Herter, and the United Nations, October 1959, while traveling in the Mideast for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Senate Appropriations Committee.
  53. Dr. John H. Davis, October 1959, cited in Schechtman, *Refugee in the World*, pp. 207–208.
  54. *Ibid.*, quoting George B. Vinson, UNRWA eligibility officer stationed in Jerusalem.
  55. Dr. Harry Howard, from the United States *Congressional Record*, April 20, 1960.
  56. UNRWA, Annual Report of the Director. Under the auspices of the Arab Information Center in New York, by 1970 Davis was reporting the figures he himself had proved erroneous and grossly inflated, as the bona fide refugee count. “Why Are There Still Arab Refugees?,” *The Arab World*, Arab Information Center, New York, December 1969–January 1970, p. 3.
  57. See *New York Times*, May 15, 1949; *Life* magazine, September 29, 1958; *Time* magazine, December 2, 1957.
  58. See, for example, Dr. Ali Ghalib, *Malaria in Iraq* (Jerusalem, 1944), pp. 39, 49; Hashim Jawad, *The Social Structure of Iraq* (Jerusalem, 1945), pp. 17–18; Sir George Buchanan, *The Tragedy of Mesopotamia* (Edinburgh, 1938), p. 247.
  59. International Development Advisory Board, *Report*, March 7, 1951.

60. F. T. Witcamp, *The Refugee Problem in the Middle East* (The Hague: Research Group for European Migration Problems, 1959), pp. 39–41.
61. S.G. Thicknesse, *Arab Refugees: A Survey of Resettlement Possibilities* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1949), p. 51.
62. Herbert Hoover, reported in the *New York World Telegram*, November 19, 1945.
63. *El-Balad*, September 13, 19, 1951, cited in Joseph Schechtman, *The Arab Refugee Problem* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1952), p. 91.
64. Dewey Anderson et al., “Arab Refugee Problem and How It Can Be Solved,” p. 39, citing *El-Balad* (Jerusalem), September 18, 1951.
65. Schechtman, *Arab Refugee Problem*, p. 91; p. 94, n. 41.
66. Anderson et al., “Arab Refugee Problem and How It Can Be Solved,” citing a report by Alexander Gibbs Co., “The Economic Development of Syria” (London, 1949).
67. Fawaz Turki, *The Disinherited: Journal of a Palestinian Exile* (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1972), p. 37.
68. Anderson et al., “Arab Refugee Problem,” p. 50, citing a report by a study group composed of members and associates of Chatham House and members of the Royal Asian Society under the chairmanship of Sir Harold MacMichael on Arab refugee settlement possibilities. Arnold Toynbee was also a participant.
69. Editorial in *al-Qubs* (The Torch), Damascus, January 1949. Quoted on March 28, 1949, in *az-Sameer*, an Arabic paper published in New York. Cited in Schechtman, *Arab Refugee Problem*, p. 80.
70. *al-Qubs*, quoted in *az-Sameer*, March 28, 1949, cited in Anderson et al., “Arab Refugee Problem,” p. 52.
71. *Musamaret El Geib* (Cairo), June 3, 1951, cited in Anderson et al., “Arab Refugee Problem,” p. 50. See Chapter 18 for interview with Syrian official who expressed similar needs in 1977.
72. Near East Arabic radio, May 12, 1949, cited in Anderson et al., p. 51.
73. W. de St. Aubin, “Peace and Refugees in the Middle East,” *Middle East Journal*, Washington, July 1949, pp. 359–60. According to Schechtman, *Arab Refugee Problem*, p. 81, “In March 1951, premier Khaled el-Azam stated in connection with the visit to Damascus of UN Secretary General Trygve Lie, Syria would be *willing to accept* refugees provided they were paid compensation for their property in Israel.” (Emphasis added.)
74. From 1949 until 1951 Egyptians were receptive to resettlement proposals. In September 1949, Egypt was planning to hire the refugees to dig wells in Gaza, conditional upon Israel’s cooperation with irrigation methods, *New York Times*, October 1, 1949; in 1951, Egypt and UNRWA negotiated to resettle 50,000 refugees in the Sinai at one point, *New York Times*, August 18, 23, 1950, and March 23, 1951; an additional 20,000 refugees were agreed upon for resettling in the same period, *New York Times*, December 26, 1950, *Times*, London, January 23, 1951.
75. John Davis, “Why Are There Still Arab Refugees?,” *Arab World*, December 1969–January 1970. Also see data on Syria and on Libya, etc., in UNRWA Annual Report of the Director, July 1952 to June 1953, General Assembly, 8th Session, Supp. No. 12 (A/2470), pp. 10–11; in UN Resolution 513 (VI) the General Assembly adopted the Authorization to “transfer” UNRWA funds “allocated for relief” into funds for “reintegration,” dated January 26, 1952, item no. 10. An American representative

- in Lebanon, Ambassador Ira Hirschmann, submitted a comprehensive report to the Assistant Secretary of State re: "Arab Refugee Situation," April 6, 1968, Hirschmann to William B. Macomber, Jr.
76. Dewey Anderson et al., "Arab Refugee Problem and How It Can Be Solved," p. 77, citing *Al-Misri*, October 11, 1949.
  77. *Ibid.*, citing *Al-Ziyyad*, April 6, 1950.
  78. "General Progress Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine," covering the period from December 11, 1949, to October 23, 1950 (pamphlet), General Assembly Official Records, 5th Session, Supp. No. 18 (A/1367/Rev. 1).
  79. See UN Ad Hoc Committee Sessions, November 11, 29, 30, December 1, 1950, for positions of Denmark, Canada, Britain, Australia, Bolivia, Belgium, and Holland. Although giving perfunctory acknowledgment to the Arab position, a substantial bloc among the UN Ad Hoc Committee concluded that "the Arab refugees would have a happier and more stable future if the bulk of them were resettled in Arab countries."
  80. League Resolution No. 389, October 10, 1951.
  81. Mohammad Iqbal Ansari, *The Arab League 1945–1955* (Aligarh: Aligarh Muslim University, 1968), pp. 71–74.
  82. *Revue du Liban* (French), May 12, 1951, cited by Anderson et al., "Arab Refugee Problem," p. 38.
  83. For additional support of resettlement see Thicknesse, *Arab Refugees*, pp. 38–58; Vahe Sevan, "Economic Utilization and Development of the Water Resources of the Euphrates and Tigris," E/Conf. 7/Sec/W.397, August 1, 1949, p. 16; Doreen Wariner, *Land and Poverty in the Middle East* (London and New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1948), pp. 26–33, 75–80, 95.
  84. *Berlut al Massa* (Lebanese daily), July 11–12, 1957, cited by Terence Prittie and Bernard Dineen, *The Double Exodus: A Study of Arab and Jewish Refugees in the Middle East* (pamphlet), (London: Goodhart Press, n.d.), p. 13.
  85. Prittie, "Middle East Refugees," in Michael Curtis et al., eds., *The Palestinians: People, History, Politics* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1975), p. 71.
  86. *Ibid.*, citing Associated Press interview, January 1960.
  87. See Robert MacDonald, *The League of Arab States* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965); also see Mohammad Khalil, *The Arab States and the Arab League: A Documentary Record* (Beirut: Khayat's, 1962), vol. 2, pp. 517–22, 935ff.
  88. "Biggest Little Superpower in the World," *Forbes*, August 1, 1975; author's interview with Jim Cook, January 5, 1979.
  89. Abbas Kelidar, "Iraq: The Search for Stability," *Conflict Studies*, No. 59, The Institute for the Study of Conflict, London, July 1975, p. 21.
  90. Pablo de Azcarate, *Mission in Palestine 1948–1952* (Washington, D.C.: Middle East Institute, 1966), p. 191. Resolution 194 (III) of the United Nations General Assembly, which de Azcarate dates December 14, 1948, is generally recorded as December 11, 1948. The UN "proclamation" referred to by de Azcarate includes the following: "Resolves that the refugees willing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return, and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in

equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible;

“Instructs the Conciliation Committee to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation, and to maintain close relations with the Director of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees and, through him, with the appropriate organs and agencies of the United Nations.”

91. Maurice Roumani, *The Case of the Jews from Arab Countries: A Neglected Issue*, with Deborah Goldman and Helene Korn, vol. I, World Organization of Jews from Arab Countries (WOJAC), Jerusalem, 1975, p. 82.
92. Transmission from Damascus, political agent, Political Department of the Jewish Agency, to Eliahu Sasson, Political Department, Palestine, May 16, 1939 (from the English translation), CZA-525/5630 (Central Zionist Archives).
93. For example, see Permanent Mandates Commission, Minutes of the 32nd Session, pp. 111–118; particularly August 13, 1937: Lord William Ormsby Gore advocated the transfer of the Arab population of Palestine, who “had not hitherto regarded themselves as ‘Palestinians’ but as part of Syria as a whole, as part of the Arab world. . . . They would be going only a comparatively few miles away to a people with the same language, the same civilisation, the same religion . . .,” cited by Martin Gilbert, *Exile and Return: The Struggle for a Jewish Homeland* (Philadelphia and New York: J.B. Lippincott, 1978), p. 185. Also see reactions to Ormsby Gore, PRO FO 371/E71 34/976/31, minute, E.W. Rendel, December 8, 1937: According to British Foreign Office official Rendel, the transfer of “the Arab population from the Jewish state . . . seems clearly to have been regarded as a matter of enforcement by his Majesty’s Government,” judging from Lord Ormsby Gore’s statements in the cabinet and his interview in the *Jewish Chronicle* of August 13, 1937. Rendel feared it would “be very difficult to answer the Saudi Minister’s inquiry.” In 1944, the British Labor Party officially endorsed the proposed transfer of Palestinian Arabs to Arab countries, and a year later the British Commonwealth passed a similar resolution. Schechtman, *European Population Transfers 1939–1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 457.
94. Interview, *New York World Telegram*, November 19, 1945.
95. Carl Hermann Voss, *The Palestine Problem Today: Israel and Its Neighbors* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1953), p. 36.
96. See United States Committee for Refugees, *Biennial Reports*; C.G. Paikert, *The German Exodus* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1962); G. Frumkin, *Population Changes in Europe Since 1939* (New York: A.M. Kelley, 1951).
97. YMCA World Alliance, “World Communiqué,” no. 4, July–August 1957.
98. See speech by Charles S. Rhyne, past president of the American Bar Association, “Fundamental Human Rights of Refugees,” August 1972, *Vital Speeches*, September 15, 1972.
99. United States Committee for Refugees, 1969 *Report*.
100. April 16, 1961.
101. August 28, 1947.
102. *New York Times*, November 12, 1960.
103. Schechtman, *European Population Transfers*, p. 12; Schechtman, *Refugee in the World*, p. 156; for Bulgarian-Turkish Convention of 1913, see Mark Vishniak, *Transfer of Populations as a Means of Solving Problems of Minorities* (New York: Yiddish Scientific Institute, 1942), p. 15.



104. See surveys of the United States Committee for Refugees, particularly 1975–76 Biennial Report.
105. United States Committee for Refugees, 1982 *World Refugee Survey*.
106. United States Committee for Refugees, 1981 *World Refugee Survey*. Contrary to the UN, the United States Committee for Refugees until recently excluded other de facto “resettled” peoples who had “not,” as yet, “acquired a new nationality,” but its *Survey* still included the *total* UN estimate of “1.8 million *Palestinian* refugees in the Near East,” despite the fact that so many, as the *Survey* noted, were living “out of camps” throughout the Middle East and the world, p. 37. Also see Chapter 18.
107. United States Committee for Refugees, 1975–76 *Report*; Iraq, Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria.
108. Matthew Mitchell, then director of the United States Committee for Refugees, to the author, March 1976.
109. Author’s interview with John McCarthy, December 19, 1978, New York.
110. For examples of statements reiterating this policy, see an address by Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs David D. Newsom at the Consultations on Indochinese Refugees convened by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, December 11, 1978, Geneva; remarks by Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Patricia Derian, on ABC, “The Boat People: No Port in the Storm?,” February 5, 1978; “Refugees are Pawns of Natural and Man-Made Disasters . . .” (pamphlet), United States Committee for Refugees, Washington; Richard F. Janssen, “The Uprooted,” *Wall Street Journal*, July 18, 1975; Ronald Yates, “Asian refugees: ‘Mother of Jesus have pity on us,’” *Chicago Tribune*, October 21, 1979.
111. “A solution will be further complicated by the property claims against Arab States of the many Jews from those States who moved to Israel in its early years after achieving statehood.” Deputy Assistant Secretary Harold Saunders, testifying before House of Representatives Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Investigations, November 12, 1975, Department of State Bulletin, December 1, 1975, p. 798.
112. *Al-Muharrir*, January 25, 1966.
113. Interview by Yitzhak Ben Gad, *Philadelphia Inquirer*, December 1, 1974.
114. Interview, *Jeune Afrique*, July 4, 1975.
115. *Al Nahar* (Beirut), May 15, 1975.
116. *Chicago Sun-Times*, January 24, 1977, issued after a “secret conclave;” later the same year, a similar statement was issued by Lebanese Christian leaders’ joint “manifesto,” including Camille Chamoun, a former President of Lebanon, Suleiman Franjieh, President “during the recent civil war,” Pierre Gemayel, then Christian Phalangist leader, and others, *New York Times*, August 27, 1977.
117. Interview with author, November 25, 1978; March 15, 1981. Professor Philip M. Hauser, Director Emeritus, Population Research Center, University of Chicago, was, beginning in 1938: Assistant Chief Statistician for Population, then Deputy Director (until 1947), then Acting Director (1949–50), U.S. Bureau of the Census; U.S. Representative to UN Population Commission, 1947–51.
118. Statement of the organizing conference, World Organization of Jews from Arab Countries (WOJAC), Paris, November 24, 1975. In an Israeli Parliament debate in 1975, Mordechai Ben Porath (later a Cabinet Minister in charge of the rights of Jews from Arab lands) reproached the government: “The State of Israel, regrettably, has

- discriminated in this case, and has played down the rights of the Jews from the Arab States.” Translation from transcript of Knesset Debate, January 1, 1975.
119. United States Committee for Refugees, 1981 *World Refugee Survey*, New York, p. 27.
  120. United States Committee for Refugees, 1982 *World Refugee Survey*, p. 18.
  121. See Article 20 of the PLO Covenant in Appendix III.

### 3. The Arab Jew

1. Bernard Lewis, *The Arabs in History*, 4th rev. ed. (New York, Evanston, San Francisco, London: Harper-Colophon Books, 1966), pp. 31–32; S.D. Goitein, *A Mediterranean Society*, vols. I and II (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: 1971), p. 28; see also H.Z. Hirschberg, *The Jews in Islamic Lands*, 2nd rev. ed. (Leiden, 1974).
2. S.D. Goitein, *Jews and Arabs, Their Contacts Through the Ages*, 3rd ed. (New York: Schocken Books, 1974), p. 49.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 50.
4. Lewis, *Arabs in History*, p. 42; also see Norman A. Stillman, *The Jews of Arab Lands: A History and Source Book* (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1979), pp. 113–114. For further information and fascinating reading, the Stillman work provides new and in-depth insights into the “Jewish social history in the Arab world, spanning 1500 years,” with original translations from Arabic and other languages.
5. Lewis, *Arabs in History*, p. 45, pp. 38–48. See Chapter 8.
6. See examples in Chapter 4; also see Stillman, *The Jews*, “Some Koranic Pronouncements on the Jews,” pp. 150–151.
7. André Chouraqui, *Between East and West, A History of the Jews of North Africa*, trans. from French by Michael M. Bernet (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1968), pp. 45–46; D.G. Littman, *Jews Under Muslim Rule in the Late Nineteenth Century*, reprinted from the *Weiner Library Bulletin*, 1975, vol. XXVIII, New Series Nos. 35/36 (London, 1975), p. 65.
8. *The Meaning of the Glorious Koran*, Surah IX, v. 29, Mohammed Marmaduke Pickthall, ed. (New York: Mentor Books, 1953).
9. Chouraqui, *Between East and West*, p. 46. Also see Hayyim Cohen, *The Jews of the Middle East 1860–1972* (New York, 1973); S.D. Goitein, *Jews and Arabs*.
10. World Jewish Congress, *The Jews of French Morocco and Tunisia* (New York, 1952).
11. Saul Friedman, “The Myth of Arab Toleration,” *Midstream*, January 1970; Goitein, *Jews and Arabs*, p. 67ff.
12. Ibn Battuta, *Ibn Battuta Travels in Asia and Africa 1325–1354*, trans. and selected with introduction and notes by H.A.R. Gibb (London, 1929), p. 125.
13. Edward William Lane, *Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians 1833–1835* (London, New York, Melbourne: 1890), p. 512.
14. The visit to Harat al-Yahud, Cairo’s Jewish Quarter, was recorded in letters from a journalist in Arabic dated June 11 and June 18, 1920, cited by Jacob M. Landau, *Jews in Nineteenth Century Egypt* (New York, 1969), pp. 30–31.
15. Hayyim J. Cohen, *The Jews of the Middle East 1860–1972* (Jerusalem, 1973), pp. 1–3.
16. See interviews in Chapter 6.
17. Goitein, *Jews and Arabs*, pp. 6–7, 87, 88, for examples.
18. Heinrich Graetz, *History of the Jews*, 5 vols. (New York, 1927), vol. 5, pp. 634–639.

19. By Habib Faris, 1890, original title in newspaper, 1890: "The Cry of the Innocent with the Trumpet of Freedom," originally published in Egyptian newspaper *al-Mahrusa*, then as 1890 book, *Human Sacrifices in the Talmud*. Book republished in 1962 as one of a series of information pamphlets, "National Books," no. 184, 1962, 164 pages, listed as one of the publications by UAR Ministry of Education, #3931, edited by Abd al-Ati Jalal, introduction dated June 16, 1962. Cited by Y. Harkabi, *Arab Attitudes to Israel* (Jerusalem, 1971), pp. 270–271.
  20. *Ibid.*, cited in Harkabi, *Arab Attitudes*, p. 271.
  21. Abd al-Karim Gharayiba, *Suriyya fi al-Qarn al-Tasi Ashar 1840–1876* (Cairo, 1961–62), p. 47, cited by Moshe Ma'oz, *The Image of the Jew in Official Arab Literature and Communications Media* (Jerusalem, 1976), p. 21.
  22. 'Abdallah al-Tall, *The Danger of World Jewry to Islam and Christianity* (in Arabic) (Cairo, 1964), p. 104, cited by Harkabi, *Arab Attitudes*, pp. 273–274.
  23. Mustafa Sa'adani, "The Tragedy of Good Father Thomas," *Akhir Sa'ah*, November 28, 1973, cited by Ma'oz, *The Image of the Jew*, p. 22.
  24. *Al-Sayyad*, November 29, 1973, as cited by Ma'oz, *The Image of the Jew*, p. 23.
  25. "Sanctifying War and Hating Peace," by Salem al-Yamani, *Al-Gumhuriya*, June 22, 1982.
  26. "The Arabs and the Jews—Who Will Destroy Whom?" by Dr. Lutfi Abd Al-Azim, *Al-Ahram Iktisadi*, September 27, 1982.
  27. Official Records of the Second Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Summary Record of Meetings 25 September–25 November, 1947, p. 185. During the proposed partition of Palestine, in November, 1947, Egyptian Representative in the United Nations General Assembly, Haykal Pasha, declared that "The Arab governments will do all in their power to defend the Jewish citizens in their countries, but we all know that an excited crowd is sometimes stronger than the police. Unintentionally, you are about to spark an anti-Semitic fire in the Middle East which will be more difficult to extinguish than it was in Germany."
- The Egyptian spokesman's threat made clear that the Arab world has interpreted the term "anti-Semitism" correctly—in the only sense it has been used historically—as a definition of anti-Jewish attitude and action. Arabs do not, as Egypt's President Sadat and others have occasionally claimed, use it themselves as a term connoting both Arabs and Jews.
28. Goitein, *Mediterranean Society*, vol. II, p. 283.
  29. Bernard Lewis, *Islam in History: Ideas, Men and Events in the Middle East* (New York: The Library Press, 1973), p. 136.
  30. Fritz Grobba, *Männer und Mächte im Orient* (Zurich, Berlin, Frankfurt, 1967), p. 194–197, 207–208. Bernard Lewis notes that "this draft was an Arab request to the Germans, not a German offer to the Arabs." Also see: Jon Kimche, *The Second Arab Awakening* (London, 1970); L. Hirszowicz, *The Third Reich and the Arab East* (London, 1966), particularly regarding Mufti's 1937 contact with the Nazis: p. 34.
  31. Sadat's letter, *Al Musawwar*, No. 1510, September 18, 1953, cited in D.F. Green, ed., *Arab Theologians on Jews and Israel* (Geneva, 1976 ed.), p. 87. Quoted also by Gideon Hausner, November 16, 1971, at New York. Also see Harkabi, *Arab Attitudes*, pp. 276–277, for other examples.
  32. *Al-Akhbar*, August 19, 1973.
  33. *Akhar Sa'ah*, Cairo, April 10, 1974, cited by Ma'oz, *The Image of the Jew*, p. 22.
  34. *Akhar Sa'ah*, Cairo, December 3, 1975.

35. Goitein, *Jews and Arabs*, p. 47. "That Jews were present in *Northern Arabia* is proved by the existence of Jewish tombstones on ancient sites halfway between al-Medina and Palestine. These date to an even earlier period, the years before and after the destruction of the Second Temple."
36. *Ibid.*, pp. 77–79.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 76.
38. The Hedjaz (or Hejaz).
39. "When all the states of the region, except Turkey, came under the domination of Islam in the 7th century, the political status of the Jews underwent a change." Cohen, *The Jews of the Middle East*, p. 1.
40. Joseph Schechtman, *On Wings of Eagles, The Plight, Exodus and Homecoming of Oriental Jewry* (New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1961), p. 35. Cohen, *The Jews of the Middle East*, p. 3. Cohen adds that "In the two Shi-ite [Muslim] countries, Yemen and Iran, the status of the non-Muslims was more difficult than in all the other Muslim lands. . . . They were not only deprived of rights, but were also defenseless and considered unclean."
41. In 1172. Cohen, *The Jews of the Middle East*, p. 3. See also Goitein, *Jews and Arabs*, p. 170; Isadore Twersky, ed., *A Maimonides Reader* (New York, 1972), pp. 437–462; Jacob S. Minkin, *The World of Moses Maimonides* (New York, London: Thomas Yoseloff, 1957), pp. 67–78.
42. Schechtman, *On Wings of Eagles*, p. 36.
43. Cohen, *Jews of the Middle East*, p. 4.
44. Garsten Niebuhr, *Reisebeschreibungen*, vol. I, p. 422ff. Translated into English by Robert Herson, *Travels Through Arabia and Other Countries in the East, Performed by M. Niebuhr* (Edinburgh, 1792).
45. Jacob Sappir, *Even Sappir* (Lyck, 1866), p. 52, cited by Schechtman, *Eagles*, p. 37; see also A. Ya'ari, *Sefer Massa Teyman* (A Book of a Journey to Yemen) (Jerusalem, 1951), with intro. and notes by A. Ya'ari.
46. Goitein, *Jews and Arabs*, pp. 76–77.
47. Cohen, *Jews of the Middle East*, p. 5.
48. Yoshua Feldman, *The Yemenite Jews* (London, 1913), p. 17.
49. Reported by Yomtov Zemach, *Bulletin de l'Alliance Israelite Universelle*, 1910, Beirut.
50. Schechtman, *Eagles*, pp. 48–49. The story of the Yemenite Jews' detainment in the desert, and British threats to deport them, is fascinatingly related by Schechtman on pp. 49–52. See Chapters 5 and 10.
51. United States Intelligence Report, May 29, 1946, cited in Schechtman, *Eagles*, p. 41.
52. Schechtman, *Eagles*, p. 31, pp. 49–52.
53. Goitein, *Jews and Arabs*, pp. 46–47.
54. *Ibid.*, p. 47.
55. Cohen, *Jews of the Middle East*, p. 6. Cohen deals very little with the Jews of Aden because, as he explains, "their history is less known."
56. Goitein, *Jews and Arabs*, p. 102.
57. *Ibid.*, p. 115.
58. *Ibid.*, p. 162.
59. Cohen, *Jews of the Middle East*, p. 6.

60. Ibid.
61. "The Disaster of Jews of Aden," December 13, 1947, Aden. Cited by Schechtman, *Eagles*, p. 76.
62. This is in a sense a distillation of the whole Arab propaganda effort, successfully perpetuated by the British authorities while at the same time there was existing evidence, by other more fair-minded British authorities, to contradict that evidence used in the propaganda.
63. Sir Tom Hickinbotham, *Aden* (London, 1958), pp. 82–83.
64. Colonel A.H. Sigrist, Colonial Office, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Disturbances in Aden in December 1947*, Colonial Paper N233 (London, 1948), pp. 6–7.
65. Martin Gilbert, *The Jews of Arab Lands, Their History in Maps* (Oxford, 1975), p. 8.
66. Cohen, *Jews of the Middle East*, p. 67.
67. Gilbert, *The Jews of Arab Lands*, p. 8; *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Disturbances in Aden in December 1947*, pp. 24–25; also Goitein, *Jews and Arabs*, p. 236.
68. Norman Bentwich, "Aden After the Riots," *Commentary*, May 1948.
69. Reported by Rabbi Kopel Rosen, President of the Mizrahi Foundation of Great Britain and Ireland, in the *Jewish Chronicle*, London, January 14, 1949.
70. In 1946, the community of Jews in Aden had been almost 8,000. *British Colonial Office Annual Report on Aden for the Year 1946* (London, 1948), p. 12.
71. There was also a very small community of Jews in Bahrein, traceable "at least from the middle of the 19th century," where anti-Jewish riots exploded in 1947, in the capital city of Manama. Unlike Aden, there are still Jews—"some scores of them"—living in Bahrein, or were in 1973—perhaps the only Jews in Arabia. Cited by Cohen, *Jews of the Middle East*, p. 66.
72. A.J. Mack, "Jewish Life in Aden," *Jewish Chronicle*, February 12, 1959.
73. Hickinbotham, *Aden*, p. 87; Cohen, *Jews of the Middle East*, p. 67. Other sources for information on the Jews of Aden include unpublished studies by B.J. Yaish, entitled *History of the Jews of Aden* and *Modern History of the Jews of Aden*; cited by Schechtman in *Eagles*, p. 401, n. 1.
74. 123,371. Israel Government Statistical Abstracts.
75. See Stillman, *The Jews*, pp. 29–32, for influence of Babylonia (Jewish Bavel), and "authority of Jewish exilarch" when the Arabs "invaded Iraq . . .," p. 29; S.D. Goitein, *Jews and Arabs*, p. 105; also see S. Baron, *Ancient and Medieval Jewish History* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1972); David Sassoon, *History of the Jews in Baghdad* (Letchworth, 1949).
76. Martin Gilbert, *The Jews of Arab Lands, Their History in Maps*, p. 2.
77. Lewis, *Islam in History*, p. 319, n. 9. Lewis gives an illustration of the "traditional relationship" between Muslim and Jew from a report by H.E. Wilkie Young, the British Vice-Consul in Mosul, written January 1909, *Middle Eastern Studies*, vii (1971), p. 232.
78. Cohen, *Jews of the Middle East*, pp. 24–25.
79. Schechtman, *Eagles*, p. 89; also see David Sassoon, *History of the Jews in Baghdad*, pp. 178, 213.

80. *Ibid.*, p. 92.
81. On August 29, 1933.
82. *New York Times*, July 18, 1937; Cohen, *Jews of the Middle East*, pp. 27–28.
83. *Ibid.*
84. Cohen, *Jews of the Middle East*, pp. 29–31.
85. Sylvia Haim, “Arabic Anti-Semitic Literature,” *Jewish Social Studies*, pp. 307–312. Judaism, not Zionism, was a “threat”; moreover, it was not Zionism but friendship with the British that combined with traditional attitudes toward *dhimmi* Jews to accelerate anti-Jewish attacks. Elie Kedourie, *The Sack of Basra and the Farhud of Baghdad*, International Conference on Jewish Communities in Muslim Lands, Institute of Asian and African Studies, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, pp. 33–34.
86. Abd al-Razzaq al-Hasani, *al-Asrar al-Khafiyya fi hawadith al-sana 1941 al-taharuriyya* (Hidden Secrets of the Events of the Liberatory Year 1941) (Sidon, 1958), pp. 226–236. “The point about the police and the army is made on p. 231.” Cited by Kedourie, *The Sack of Basra*, p. 21.
87. Terence Prittie and Bernard Dineen, *The Double Exodus, A Study of Arab and Jewish Refugees in the Middle East* (London, n.d.), p. 25; Schechtman, *Eagles*, p. 98.
88. Abd al-Razzaq al-Hasani, *Tarikh al-wizarat al-iraqiyya* (History of the Ministries of Iraq), vol. 5, new ed. (Sidon, 1967), p. 268, n. 1. Hasani’s informants were Abdullah al-Qassab, a member of the investigation committee, and Ali Khalid al-Hijazi, Baghdad Chief of Police. Cited by Kedourie, *The Sack of Basra*, p. 22.
89. Schechtman, *Eagles*, pp. 87–125. Also see S.H. Longrigg and Frank Stoakes, *Iraq, 1900–1950* (New York, 1958), p. 350.
90. George Lenczowski, *The Middle East in World Affairs*, 2nd ed. (Ithaca, N.Y., 1956), p. 253.
91. Sir Alec Kirkbride, *From the Wings, Amman Memoirs 1947–1951* (London, 1976), p. 115.
92. *Ibid.*
93. “Law for the Control and Administration of Property of Jews who have Forfeited Iraqi Nationality,” no. 5, 1951, *Iraqi Official Gazette No. 2938*, March 10, 1951.
94. As of 1948, fines levied against Jews amounted to \$80,000,000, reported by *Al-Amal*, Beirut, October 31, 1948. Cited by Schechtman, *Eagles*, p. 106.
95. *Al-Zaman*, Cairo, August 10, 1948. Cited by Schechtman, *Eagles*, p. 107.
96. Law No. 1, 1950, “Supplement to Ordinance of Cancelling the Iraqi Nationality No. 62 of 1933,” *Iraqi Official Gazette No. 2816*, March 9, 1950.
97. Shlomo Hillel, *Derekh Ba Midbar* (A Way in the Desert) (Jerusalem, 1965), p. 70ff. Hillel was one interviewee contacted for this book.
98. Arif al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba, Nakbat Beit al-Maqdis Wal-firdaus al-Mafqud, 1947–1955*, vol. IV (Al-Maktaba Asriyya Littiba: Wal-Nashr, 1960), p. 893. An eminent Palestinian historian, Arif al'Arif, reproached Nuri Said for allowing the Iraqi Jews to flee. “This is what the Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Said Pasha told me when we met in Jerusalem on January 13, 1951. I asked him about the limitations imposed on the Iraqi Jews as to their leaving Iraq. He said: ‘Nothing, only their relinquishing their Iraqi nationality.’

“I said: ‘Was it not possible to defer it until the Palestinian and refugee problems are settled?’

“He said: ‘Not at all. The Jews have always been and will forever be a source of evil and mischief for Iraq. They are spies. They sold their properties. They do not

- possess land which they sow. So how will they live? What would they do if they remained in Iraq? No, my friend. We had better get rid of them, as long as the opportunity for getting rid of them is open.’”
99. American Committee for Rescue and Resettlement of Iraqi Jews, Inc., by Dr. Heskell Haddad, President.
  100. Schechtman, *Eagles*, pp. 184–185; Terence Prittie and Bernard Dineen, *The Double Exodus*, p. 23.
  101. R. Nissim, *Ha-Mafteah*, ed. by J. Goldenthal (1847), chapter I, p. 2, intro., p. 75. Cited by H.Z. Hirschberg, *A History of the Jews in North Africa*, vol. I (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974), p. 198.
  102. A.D. 638.
  103. Friedman, “The Myth of Arab Toleration,” p. 58.
  104. Stillman, *Jews*, p. 68.
  105. Cohen, *Jews of the Middle East*, p. 3.
  106. L.A. Mayer, *Mamluk Costume: A Survey* (Geneva, 1952), p. 65.
  107. Stillman, *Jews*, p. 70.
  108. Hirschberg, *History*, p. 402.
  109. From 1517.
  110. Lane, *Manners and Customs*, p. 512.
  111. *Ibid.*, pp. 512–517.
  112. The Alexandria blood libel described was recorded on June 3, 1869; J. Landau, *Jews in Nineteenth-Century Egypt*, pp. 30–32. The Cairo blood libel was recorded October 18, 1844; *ibid.*, p. 30. Landau’s book contains multilingual documented evidence of many libels; Landau refers the reader to a more exhaustive work of his on the subject, “Blood Libels and the Persecution of the Jews in Egypt at the End of the Nineteenth Century,” *Sefunot*, V, 1961 (Jerusalem, Hebrew). Also see article by H.Z. Hirschberg, “Turkey and Religious Slanders, the Attitudes of the Authorities of the Ottoman Empire to Blood Libels,” *Mahanayim*, no. 110, 1966 (Israel Defense Forces, Chief Military Rabbinate, Tel Aviv); Bezalel Landau, “The Blood Libel in Jewish History,” *Mahanayim* no. 80, 1963.
  113. 1888 British report of fellahin hatred of Jews: FO. 78/4145. “This is E.W.P. Foster’s report, dated March 21, 1888, from Alexandria, enclosed in Baring’s Report No. 138 to the Marquis of Salisbury (British Foreign Secretary) dated March 24, 1888. Foster’s account seems trustworthy if one remembers his long connection with the *fallahin* [*sic*] during his employment in the Egyptian Department of Irrigation. Baring (better known, later, as Lord Cromer) notes here that this refers to Riyad Pasha, a well-known official and minister during the earlier years of the British Occupation.” Cited by Landau, *Jews in Nineteenth-Century Egypt*, p. 228, including notes 2 and 3.
  114. Habib Faris, *Surakh al-Bari fi Buq al-Hurriyya* (The Cry of the Innocent with the Trumpet of Freedom), cited by Harkabi, *Arab Attitudes*, p. 271.
  115. Landau cites a report of “a regrettable incident” dated April 30, 1883, from Port Said French Consul to French Foreign Minister in *Jews in Nineteenth-Century Egypt*, p. 225; and a letter reporting persecution dated March 29, 1903, from S. Somekh in Port Said to President of the AIU, *ibid.*, p. 298.
  116. Article 10 (4) of Egyptian Nationality Code cited by Maurice de Wee, *La Nationalité Egyptienne, Commentaire de la Loi du 26 Mai, 1926*, p. 35.
  117. Cohen, *The Jews of the Middle East*, pp. 48–49.

118. 1945. Schechtman, *Eagles*, p. 187.
119. Jewish Agency for Palestine, *Memorandum on the Position of the Jewish Communities in the Oriental Countries*, submitted to the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, Jerusalem, March 1946.
120. Prittie, *Double Exodus*, p. 23. Schechtman, *Eagles*, pp. 187–189. Called the Egyptian Company Law, July 29, 1947, the act introduced prohibitive quotas for non-Egyptian workers and brought into use the 1926 Nationality Code (see note 116 above), which militated against the Jews. See also Cohen, *The Jews of the Middle East*, pp. 49–88.
121. Martin Gilbert, *Exile and Return, the Struggle for a Jewish Homeland* (Philadelphia and New York, 1978), pp. 306–307. “For the Arabs outside Palestine a similar wave of anti-Jewish hatred led to violence against Jews in almost every Arab city: in British-ruled Aden, scene of a savage attack on Jewish life and property, 82 Jews were killed on December 9. In Beirut, Cairo, Alexandria and Aleppo Jewish houses were looted, and synagogues attacked.”
122. *Basler National Zeitung*, August 10, 1948. Cited by Schechtman, *Eagles*, p. 190.
123. Egyptian newspaper *Akhar Saa*, letter reprinted in *Press Review of Bourse Egyptienne*, July 22, 1948. Cited by Yahudiya Masriya, *Les Juifs en Egypte* (The Jews of Egypt) (Geneva, 1971), p. 54.
124. Immigration Department, Jewish Agency, Jerusalem.
125. The trials of twelve Jews were begun on the heels of a purge of the Muslim Brotherhood, to distract from the executions of those anti-government forces by forcing attention to the “Zionists,” according to the *Washington Post* and *Times Herald*, December 22, 1954; 77 were tried in another case, and 7 in yet another in the same period. Schechtman, *Eagles*, pp. 194–195.
126. *New York Times*, Osgood Caruthers, November 24, 1956.
127. Charles Issawi, ed., *The Economic History of the Middle East, 1800–1914* (Chicago, 1966), p. 507. “The Arab-Israeli war led to an exodus of Jews and the loss of much of their property. And the nationalization of the Suez Canal and the war that followed resulted in the taking over of a huge amount of British, French, and Jewish property, the expulsion of thousands of foreigners, and the passing of legislation Egyptianizing all foreign banks and insurance companies.”
128. *Alliance Review*, April 1957, cited by Schechtman, *Eagles*, p. 199.
129. Law No. 391 of 1956. See *Revue Egyptienne de Droit International*, vol. 12, 1956, pp. 80–90, Arabic Section, Article 1 (1) (a) on page 80. Cited by Dr. Ya’akov Meron, *The “Complicating” Element of the Arab-Israeli Conflict* (Jerusalem, 1977), p. 11.
130. April 15, 1978, Official Gazette, cited by Meron, “Complicating” *Element*, p. 11.
131. Interviewed by correspondent of the *Deutsche National Zeitung*, April 1, 1964. Cited by Dafna Alon, *Arab Racism*, p. 14.
132. Cohen, *Jews of the Middle East*, pp. 51–52.
133. Prittie, *Double Exodus*, p. 24.
134. *New York Post*, January 8, 1957.
135. Total of refugees from Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria, 1975, Israel Statistical Abstract.
136. Chouraqui, *Between East and West*, pp. 46–47.
137. Hirschberg, *History*, pp. 19, 197; also see J. Mann, *Texts and Studies in Jewish History and Literature*, vol. I (Cincinnati, 1931), p. 246.
138. Littman, *Jews Under Muslim Rule*, p. 65; Chouraqui, *Between East and West*, p. 48.
139. Hirschberg, *History*, pp. 96–97. According to Hirschberg, “The victories of Hasan



ibn Nu'man and Musa ibn Nusayr in the late 7th and early 8th centuries, through which the whole of North Africa fell into Arab hands, mark the beginning of a new era for Jews. . . . The Jews are mostly described as *dhimmi* (protected persons), an expression which in Maghreb refers only to them, and not the Christians . . ." Arab writers of the period of Arab conquest have affirmed that the Jews were virtually North Africa's only *dhimmi*: "Ibn 'Abd al-Hakam reports that Hasan, the conqueror of North Africa, imposed the *kharaj* on the 'ajam (the strangers, i.e., Byzantines) and the (native) Berbers who adhered to Christianity. He subsequently says that after a time the Rum (Byzantines) reconquered Antablus (the Pentapolis) and staged riots against the *dhimmi*. . . .

"Ibn Hawqal (middle of 10th century) notes the *jawali* (poll-tax) imposed on the Jews in Qabes. Immediately afterwards, he relates that the Bedouin attacked the *dhimmi*, i.e. Jews, who had entered into a protective covenant by paying the *jawali*.

"A poem describing the rough climate of Tahert, where winter was jokingly said to last thirteen months, contains the following verse:

'We rejoice at the sun when it shines  
as the *dhimmi* rejoice on the Sabbath.' "

See also E.F. Gautier, *Le Passe de l'Afrique du Nord* (Paris, 1952), p. 324.

140. Chouraqui, *Between East and West*, p. 48. Khalifa ben Ragasa and his family were "massacred" in 1302.
141. *Ibid.*, p. 49. Chouraqui tells of "the rich Jew of the Dar ben Meshal family [who] was stripped and killed by Mulay Rashid in the seventeenth century." The "lawlessness" of the wanton murder was cloaked in terms of heroics, and celebrated thereafter at Fez, Morocco.
142. *Ibid.*, p. 51. Littman's *Jews Under Muslim Rule* has reprinted documents containing eyewitness reports from North Africa of the "endless complaints . . . about acts which were iniquitous even according to Islamic law . . . a glimpse into the harsh reality of life under Muslim rule," p. 67.
143. Hirschberg, *History*, p. 108.
144. *Ibid.*, pp. 127–128. Hirschberg writes: "A detailed account of developments is given in the letter of Solomon Cohen, a resident of Fustat, who heard of the events from eye-witnesses, Jewish and Muslim refugees in Egypt, and reported them to his father, then in South Arabia (probably in Aden). The father was eager for news of the Maghreb, since he was a native of Sijilmasa and still had relatives in Moroccan cities. The letter, written in Judeo-Arabic, is dated of the month of Shebat in the year 1459 of the Seleucid Era, i.e. January 1148 C.E." The following is the text of the account:
 

"Here is the story of the persecutions, as told by Solomon Cohen: 'Abd al-Mu'min the Susi (i.e. the one of the Sus Valley), leader of the Almohads after the death of Muhammad ibn Tumart the Mahdi, marched against the Emir Tashfin, who was in Oran, besieged and captured the city, killed Tashfin and crucified his body. Thereafter he captured Tlemcen and killed all those who were in it (i.e. including the Jews), except those who embraced Islam. At the news of these events, the Berbers in Sijilmasa rose against the Almoravid governor and expelled him and his garrison force from the city. Some 200 Jews, sensing the impending trouble, fled Sijilmasa at this juncture. They included two brothers of his father Yehuda, as well as Yehuda ben Farhon, whom Solomon mentions specially, probably because he was a local notable and rabbinical scholar or a relative. They escaped to Dar'a, but it was not known what had happened to them afterwards. Following the expulsion of the

Almoravid governor from Sijilmasa, the inhabitants of the latter sent a surrender delegation to 'Abd al Mu'min. On entering the city, the Almohads tried to convert the Jews to Islam by debate and persuasion, but after seven months of religious disputations, a new commander arrived in the city, who solved the problem by a more efficient method. One hundred and fifty persons were killed for clinging to their faith; the remainder converted. The first to adopt Islam was the *dayyan* (religious judge) of Sijilmasa, Joseph ben 'Amaran. All the cities in the Almoravid state were conquered by the Almohads. One hundred thousand persons were killed in Fez on that occasion, and 120,000 in Marrakesh. Only Dar'a and Meknes had not been captured by the time of reporting. The Jews in all the localities from Bajaya (Bougie) westward groaned under the heavy yoke of the Almohads; many had been killed, many others converted, none were able to appear in public as Jews. The news of the capture of Bajaya reached Fustat on the day the letter was written. Large areas between Seville and Tortosa had likewise fallen into Almohad hands."

According to Hirschberg, "This account tallies with the sequence of events as given by Arab historians and in particular by Ibn Baydhaq, the biographer of Ibn Tumart and 'Abd al-Mu'min, who was their contemporary and comrade-in-arms. This permits us to date the events as follows: Oran, 1145 or 1146; Tlemcen, Sijilmasa, 1146; Fez, 1146/7; Marrakesh area, 1147; Bajaya, end of 1147 or beginning of 1148.

"It should be noted that with regard to certain details Solomon's account clarifies some obscure passages in the Arab sources.

"It was published by J.M. Toledano, *HUCA*, 4 (1927), pp. 449–458, and a second time, with an introduction and translation into Hebrew, by the present writer, in *Y.F. Baer Jubilee Volume*, 1960, pp. 134–153. We therefore content ourselves with a summary of the historical parts."

145. *Ibid.*, pp. 138–139.

146. Minkin, *The World of Moses Maimonides* (New York, 1957), pp. 428–429ff.

147. *Ibid.*, p. 29. Also see Hirschberg, *History*, p. 137: ". . . in the opening lines of that *Epistle*, Maimonides most strongly deprecates the condemnation of the forced converts by 'the self-styled sage who had never experienced what so many Jewish communities experienced in the way of persecution,' his conclusion is that a Jew must leave the country where he is forced to transgress the divine law: 'He should not remain in the realm of that king; he should sit in his house until he emigrates, and if he must pursue any occupation he should do so secretly, until he emigrates.' And once more, with greater insistence: 'He should on no account remain in a place of forced conversion; whoever remains in such a place desecrates the divine name and is nearly as bad as a wilful sinner; as for those who beguile themselves, saying that they will remain until the Messiah comes to the Maghreb and leads them to Jerusalem, I do not know how he is to cleanse them of the stigma of conversion.'"

148. *Ibid.*, p. 30.

149. R. Dozy, ed., *The History of the Almohades by . . . al-Marrakoshi* (Leyden, 1881), p. 223. Second ed., Amsterdam, 1978. Cited by Hirschberg, *History*, p. 201.

150. Hirschberg, *History*, p. 371.

151. *Ibid.*, p. 202.

152. Sabbateans and Marranos, for example. See H.H. Ben-Sasson, ed., *A History of the Jewish People* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976), passim; Cecil Roth, *A History of the Marranos* (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1932); H.Z. (J.W.) Hirschberg, *A History of the Jews in North Africa*, vol.

- 1, pp. 191–196; Heinrich Graetz, *History of the Jews*, vol. 4, passim; Gershom Sholem, *Sabbetai Zvi* (Tel Aviv, 1957); Joachim Prinz, *The Secret Jews* (New York: Random House, 1973). Also see Chapter 5.
153. D.F. Green, ed., *Arab Theologians on Jews and Israel: Extracts from the Proceedings of the Fourth Conference of the Academy of Islamic Research* (Geneva: Editions de l'Avenir, 1971), p. 24. "Jews' Attitude Towards Islam and Muslims in the First Islamic Era" by Sheikh Abd Allah Al Meshad. Al Meshad quotes from the Holy Quran: "When they meet those who believe, they say: 'we believe'" (Baqara, 44); "Saying with their lips what was not in their hearts" (Al-Imran 167).
154. Hirschberg, *History*, p. 359.
155. *Shebet Yehuda*, ed. Shohet, 1947, Chapter 27. Cited by Hirschberg, *History*, p. 385.
156. Leo l'Africain, *Description de l'Afrique* (Paris, 1956), cited by Hirschberg, *History*, p. 390; see also Leo Africanus, *The History and Description of Africa and of the Notable Things Therein Contained*, ed. Dr. Robert Brown (London, 1896); *A Geographical Historie of Africa (by) Johannes Leo* (New York: Da Capo Press, 1969). Leo Africanus: al-Hassan ibn-Mohammed al-Wezaz al-Fasi, a Moor, baptized as Giovanni Leone, but better known as Leo Africanus.
157. Hirschberg, *History*, pp. 390, 399.
158. Stillman, *Jews*, pp. 78–79.
159. Arab term for North African region comprising mainly Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia.
160. Chouraqui, *Between East and West*, p. 49.
161. *Ibid.*, pp. 52–53.
162. Text published by J. Benaïm, *Malkhey Rabbanan* (Jerusalem, 1931), 96c-d. Also see Ben-Zvi Institute MS. No. 2651. Cited by Hirschberg, *History*, pp. 400–401.
163. Chouraqui, *Between East and West*, p. 39.
164. The years 1883–1884, Charles de Foucauld, *Reconnaissance au Maroc*, cited in *ibid.*, pp. 118–119.
165. Gilbert, *Exile*, p. 27. "The European and American concern over the Damascus persecutions did not alleviate for long the plight of the Jews . . . under Muslim rule elsewhere."
166. *Ibid.*, pp. 41–42. In May 1885. In addition to the furor in the Jewish press, the British Jewish leader, Sir Moses Montefiore, "mounted a solemn protest."
167. Prittie, *Double Exodus*, p. 20.
168. Schechtman, *Eagles*, p. 272; Prittie, *Double Exodus*, p. 21.
169. May 23, 1948. Chouraqui, *Between East and West*, p. 181.
170. Hirschberg, *History*, p. 369.
171. Africanus, *The History and Description of Africa*, p. 431, cited by Hirschberg, *History*, p. 402.
172. Hirschberg, *History*, p. 444. Hirschberg gives the following account of one of many violent moments of history for Tlemcen's Jews: "At the . . . reign of Charles V, who in 1555 renounced his crowns and retired to a monastery, the Turks took Tripoli and later expelled the troops of the sherif Muhammad al-Mahdi from Tlemcen. The latter city changed hands several times between the Spaniards, the Turks and the sherif's Berber soldiers. The Jews suffered from these changes more than the rest of the population. Joseph ha-Kohen reports: 'It was in the year 5203, i.e. 1543, that Mansur plotted against his master, the king of Tlemcen in Barbary. He called the Spaniards who were in Oran and they came to the city in force and pillaged it, and the Jews,

too, of whom there were many there, were led captive by the enemy, and they were sold as slaves in the month of Adar. Some were redeemed in Oran and some in Fez, and some were led to Spain and estranged from the Lord, the God of Israel.' Armed intervention did not end here. About a year later, Khayr al-Din's son, Hasan Pasha, set out to take revenge upon Mansur and the Spaniards, and then it was the other way again—and each retaliatory action brought trouble for the Jews. The sons of the nagid and some Jews who were with them, who were fleeing for their lives, were seized on the road to Debdou, thrown into prison and forced to redeem themselves with a heavy ransom."

173. Almanac of the Bey's secretary Titteri, *Revue Africaine*, trans. Feraud (1874), p. 316, cited by Chouraqui, *Between East and West*, p. 115.
174. William Shaler, *Sketches of Algiers* (Boston, 1826), cited by Chouraqui, *Between East and West*, pp. 114–115.
175. Chouraqui, *Between East and West*, p. 117.
176. Hirschberg, *History*, p. 6.
177. *Ibid.*, pp. 17–18.
178. *Ibid.*, p. 7. In fact, the Berber language, "despite its cultural backwardness, survives in . . . Algeria with 33 [per cent of the population]." Forty percent of Moroccans and 23 percent of "Tripolitania"—Libyans—still employed the Berber language at the time Hirschberg revised his introduction, 1974. Tunisia was the only North African state in which the Berber tongue was practically extinct—"1 per cent." However, Hirschberg noted that ". . . no doubt . . . Arab consciousness will make further progress in the sovereign states which Libya, Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria have become in the past twenty years" (p. 9).
179. Prittie, *Double Exodus*, p. 21.
180. Chouraqui, *Between East and West*, p. 152.
181. *Ibid.*, p. 153.
182. Prittie, *Double Exodus*, p. 21; Chouraqui, *Between East and West*, p. 153.
183. Chouraqui, *Between East and West*, p. 153.
184. *Ibid.*; Leon Blum was appointed premier of France in June 1936, and again in March 1938.
185. *Ibid.*, p. 154. Chouraqui cited Michel Ansky, *Les Juifs Algériens, du Décret Cremieux à la Liberation* (Paris, 1950), pp. 75–76. See also Maurice Eisenbeth, *Pages Vécues, 1940–1943* (Algiers, 1945).
186. October 2, 1940.
187. Schechtman, *Eagles*, p. 328.
188. Prittie, *Double Exodus*, p. 22.
189. *Ibid.*
190. Chouraqui, *Between East and West*, p. xvi.
191. Algerian Nationality Code, Article 34 (Law No. 63–69, March 27, 1963, published in the *J.O.R.A.*, April 2, 1963, p. 306), as cited in *Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord*, pp. 806–814. On December 15, 1970, an updated ordinance, No. 70–86, Article 32, pertaining to the Algerian Nationality Code repeats the limitation of 1963, published in *J.O.R.A.*, December 18, 1970. All cited in Meron, *The "Complicating" Element*, p. 12.
192. Hirschberg, *History*, pp. 8–11.

193. Anselm Adorne, a Flemish nobleman, visited Tunis in 1470. R. Brunschvig, *Deux Récits de Voyage Inédits en Afrique du Nord* (Paris, 1936), p. 29b/158, p. 192; cited by Hirschberg, *History*, pp. 475–476.
194. Hirschberg, *History*, p. 478.
195. Foreign Jewish traders wore the “round cape, a distinctive mark of Jews from Christian countries”; “wearers of the round cape” is a frequent designation in contemporary literature for Jews of Spanish origin. The term originated with the royal decree that the Jews of thirteenth-century Aragon must wear “distinctive cloaks known as *cape ronde*, whence . . . ‘wearers of the capos or caperon[de].’ ” The *capos* —originally “marks of shame”—evolved over the centuries into “robes of honor” among the Spanish rabbis exiled in Turkey. Cited by Hirschberg, *History*, pp. 462–463. See also A. Neumann, *The Jews in Spain* (Philadelphia, 1942), vol. II, pp. 201–202; 205–206; 327, n. 135; and 345. Also H.Z. Hirschberg, “The Oriental Jewish Communities” in A.J. Arberry, ed., *Religion in the Middle East* (Cambridge, 1969), vol. I, p. 186.
196. *Ibid.*, p. 477.
197. Jews were expelled from Hammamet at the same time, for the same reason. D. Cazes, *Essai sur l’histoire des Israelites de Tunisie depuis les temps les plus recules* (Paris, 1888), pp. 83–84, cited by Hirschberg, *History*, p. 116.
198. Hirschberg, *History*, p. 403.
199. Al-Jannabi’s account of Muhammed al-Qa’im in E. Fagnan, *Extraits inédits relatifs au Maghreb* (Algeria, 1924), p. 340, cited by Hirschberg, *History*, p. 479.
200. Cazes, *Essai sur l’histoire des Israelites de Tunisie*, p. 92ff; Chouraqui, *Between East and West*, p. 53.
201. Chouraqui, *Between East and West*, p. 223.
202. Simon Schwartzfuchs, “Persecution of Jews in the Land of Islam,” *L’Arche*, December 1973.
203. Chouraqui, *Between East and West*, p. 159.
204. *Ibid.*, p. 160.
205. Dated letters from Tunisian Jews to the Alliance Israelite Universelle, in Paris in 1860s, cited by Littman, *Jews Under Muslim Rule*, pp. 67–68.
206. From a letter (28.10.1864) by Salomon Garsin in Tunis to the President of the AIU Paris (AIU Tunis I.C.3). Cited by Littman, *Muslim Rule*, p. 67.
207. From a letter (23.3.1866) by Salomon Garsin, President of the Tunis AIU Committee, to the President of the AIU Paris (AIU Tunis I.C.3.), cited in *ibid.*
208. Letter (14.2.1869) by all the members of the Tunis AIU Committee to Adolphe Cremieux, President of the AIU, Paris (AIU Tunis I.C.3), cited in *ibid.*, p. 68.
209. From a letter (22.9.1880) by A. Daninos, Vice-President of the Tunis Regional AIU Committee, to the President of the AIU, Paris (AIU Tunis I.C.3), cited in *ibid.*
210. Prittie, *Double Exodus*, p. 22.
211. “Tunisia Faces the Future,” *World’s Documents*, 1956, published by *Le Monde Economique*, cited by Schechtman, *Eagles*, p. 316.
212. Albert Hourani, *Syria and Lebanon, A Political Essay* (London, New York, Toronto, 1947), pp. 20, 62–63.
213. Hirschberg, *History*, p. 359.
214. Moshe Ma’oz, “Changes in the Position of the Jewish Communities of Palestine and

- Syria in Mid-Nineteenth Century,” in Moshe Ma’oz, ed., *Studies on Palestine During the Ottoman Period* (Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, The Hebrew University, Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi, 1975), pp. 142–143.
215. ‘Abd al-Rahim al-Jawbari, quoted by C.E. Bosworth, “Jewish Elements in the Banu Sasan,” in Moshe Ma’oz, ed., *Studies in the History of the Jewish Communities in Muslim Lands* (in preparation), cited by Ma’oz in *The Image of the Jew in Official Arab Literature and Communications Media* (Shazar Library, University of Jerusalem, 1976), p. 12; also see Stillman, *The Jews*, pp. 61, 75–77.
  216. Ma’oz, “Changes,” in Ma’oz, *Studies on Palestine*, p. 142.
  217. J.L. Burkhardt, *Travels in Syria and the Holy Land* (London, 1822), p. 180, cited by Ma’oz, “Changes,” in Ma’oz, ed., *Studies on Palestine*, p. 144.
  218. Ibrahim Al-Awra, *Tarikh Wilayat Sulayman Basha-al-‘Adil* (Sidon, 1936), p. 477, cited by Ma’oz, “Changes,” p. 144.
  219. Burkhardt, *Travels in Syria*, p. 180.
  220. As’ad Mansur, *Ta’rikh al-Nasira* (Egypt, 1924), p. 59, cited in Ma’oz, “Changes,” p. 144. See Chapter 9.
  221. See E.B.B. Barker, *Syria and Egypt Under the Last Five Sultans of Turkey* (London, 1876), vol. I, p. 306; H.L. Bodman, *Political Factions in Aleppo, 1760–1826* (North Carolina, 1963), pp. 45, 48, 102; Ma’oz, “Changes in the Position,” *Studies on Palestine*, pp. 145–146.
  222. M.M. Raysher, *Sha’arei Yerushalayim* (Lemberg, 1866), p. 29. On extortion, see Ma’oz, “Changes in the Position,” in *Studies on Palestine*, pp. 145–156.
  223. Ma’oz, “Changes in the Position,” *Studies on Palestine*, p. 147.
  224. Letter from Jews in Tiberias to Sir Moses Montefiore, dated 5599 (1839), in Montefiore’s collection, Ben-Zvi Institute, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem; Abd al-Karim Gharayiba, *Surriyya fi al-Qarn al-Tasi Ashar*, pp. 124–125, cited by Ma’oz, “Changes in the Position,” *Studies on Palestine*, p. 147.
  225. Cohen, *Jews of the Middle East*, p. 12; Ma’oz, “Changes in the Position,” in *Studies on Palestine*, p. 148.
  226. See “A Report on the Treatment of Jewish Prisoners in the Damascus Affair,” in Stillman, *The Jews*, p. 396ff; Cohen, *Jews of the Middle East*, pp. 15, 45.
  227. Graetz, *History of the Jews*, vol. V, pp. 660–661; see also pages 634–661.
  228. “A Translation of the Firman Hatti-Sherif . . . of 12 Ramazan 1256,” in M. Montefiore, *Diaries*, L. Loewe, ed. (London, 1890), pp. 278–279.
  229. Moshe Ma’oz, *Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine 1840–1861* (Oxford, 1968), p. 186ff, pp. 189–194.
  230. Schechtman, *Eagles*, p. 150; Elizabeth P. MacCallum, *The Nationalist Crusade in Syria* (New York, 1928), p. 63.
  231. Cohen, *Jews of the Middle East*, pp. 45–46; Schechtman, *Eagles*, pp. 150–51.
  232. Schechtman, *Eagles*, p. 150.
  233. October 10, 1938, to Dr. Chaim Weizmann, cited by Schechtman, *Eagles*, pp. 150–151.
  234. *Al-Alam al-Isra’ili* (The Jewish World), Beirut weekly in Arabic, January 14, 1944, and May 31, 1945, cited by Cohen, *Jews of the Middle East*, p. 46.
  235. Cohen, *Jews of the Middle East*, p. 69, also p. 46. According to Cohen, “Unfortunately, there is no reliable material on this subject [concerning their number] with

- the exception of Egypt, where a population census was conducted in 1882, in no country of the Middle East was such a census taken prior to the last few decades . . . ,” p. 68. According to the *New York Herald-Tribune*, the remaining number in 1943 was 30,000: April 14, 1947.
236. October 1945, cited by Schechtman, *Eagles*, p. 154.
  237. Jewish Agency for Palestine, *Memorandum on the Position of the Jewish Communities in the Oriental Countries*, submitted to the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, Jerusalem, March 1946.
  238. Schechtman, *Eagles*, p. 157.
  239. Description of Syrian Jews’ testimony before Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, reported by Committee under Bartley C. Crum in *Behind the Silken Curtain, a Personal Account of Anglo-American Diplomacy in Palestine and the Middle East* (New York, 1947), p. 239.
  240. April 14, 1947.
  241. Letter to American Jewish Organizations, dated December 21, 1947.
  242. *New York Herald Tribune*, April 14, 1947.
  243. Cohen, *Jews of the Middle East*, p. 46.
  244. *Jewish Agency Digest of Press and Events*, December 28, 1947.
  245. Cohen, *Jews of the Middle East*, p. 46.
  246. *Al-Salam*, Arabic weekly, Beirut, January 16, 1948, pp. 6, 9, cited in *ibid.*
  247. April 28, 1948, letter to Mogen David Congregation, Brooklyn, New York.
  248. *Al Hayat*, Beirut, December 20, 1947; Schechtman, *Eagles*, p. 162.
  249. January 1948; Schechtman, *Eagles*, p. 163.
  250. See H. Cohen, “Jews in Arab and Moslem Countries,” *American Jewish Yearbook 1971* (New York, 1971), pp. 443–449.
  251. *New York Times*, August 7 and 10, 1949.
  252. Yehezkel Hameiri, *Prisoners of Hate* (Jerusalem, 1969), pp. 61–62.
  253. *New York Times*, December 30, 1949.
  254. In 1954 and 1958. “Since 1947 Jews were not allowed to leave Syria, except for short periods: in 1954 by Hashim al-Atasi, and in 1958 after the proclaiming of the United Arab Republic.” Cohen, *The Jews of the Middle East*, p. 47.
  255. Evidence and counterclaims—concerning the persecution of Syria’s Jews in the past several years—are treated in Chapters 6 and 7.
  256. Gilbert, *Exile*, p. 11.
  257. Abbas Kelidar and Michael Burrell, *Lebanon: The Collapse of a State, Conflict Studies*, no. 74, (London: Institute for the Study of Conflict), p. 1.
  258. Abraham Galante, *Histoire des Juifs d’Istanbul*, 2 vols. (Istanbul, 1941–1942), vol. 2, pp. 3–10, cited by Cohen, *Jews of the Middle East*, p. 8.
  259. In 1826, fifteen Jewish families in Beirut, fifteen in (Lebanese) Tripoli and twenty-five in Sidon, according to A. Massa’ot Ya’Ari, “(Travels of) Rabbi David d’Beth Hillel,” *Sinai*, IV, publ. 1939, pp. 48–50, cited by Cohen, *Jews of the Middle East*, p. 13.
  260. Harkabi, *Arab Attitudes to Israel*, p. 272. Harkabi cited the Egyptian edition of a blood libel published officially in 1962 by the UAR, the reprint of an 1890 Egyptian book; the editor also “surveys other blood libel cases in the Middle East. . . .” Also see pp. 270–276.
  261. Cohen, *Jews of the Middle East*, p. 13.

262. Gilbert, *Exile*, p. 307.
263. Schechtman, *Eagles*, pp. 170–175; Cohen, *Jews of the Middle East*, p. 44; *Alliance Review* (monthly, New York, 1946–1965), June 1951, p. 1; *al-Alam al-Israeli* (The Jewish World), Beirut weekly in Arabic (1929–1934, 1938–1946), July 31, 1939; August 8, 1939, p. 26.
264. Cohen, *Jews of the Middle East*, p. 44.
265. Carl Hermann Voss, *The Palestine Problem Today, Israel and Its Neighbors* (Boston, 1953), p. 49.
266. *Al-Hayat*, Arabic daily, Beirut, November 2, 3, 1957.
267. See Arnold Bruner, “Beirut’s Jews of Silence,” *Jerusalem Post Magazine*, January 12, 1973.
268. Hirschberg, *History*, p. 24.
269. Flavius Josephus, *The Complete Works of Flavius Josephus, the Celebrated Jewish Historian*, trans. W. Whiston (Philadelphia, 1895); *The Famous and Memorable Works by Josephus . . . Faithfully Translated out of the Latin and French by Thos. Lodge* (London, 1602), both containing the essay “Against Apion.” Cited by Hirschberg, *History*, p. 24.
270. Saint Augustine wrote of Hebrew-speaking rabbis in fourth-century Tripoli. Some evidence exists to establish continued Jewish existence despite the rebellion in A.D. 73. H.Z. Hirschberg states that “the few Geniza documents, hints in Arab literature and the literature of the Gaonic period, and some contemporary epitaphs . . . suffice . . . to evoke a continuous chain of Jewish communities in Tripolitania and Tunisia, continuous both in space and time.” Hirschberg, *History*, p. 129. Also see N. Slouschz, *Travels in North Africa* (Philadelphia, 1927); Philo, *In Flaccum 43* (trad. Pelletier, Paris, 1967), p. 75. Philo reported that Egypt and Libya contained about a million Jews before the destruction of the Second Temple, cited in Hirschberg, *History*, p. 25–26.
271. Gilbert, *The Jews of Arab Lands*, p. 1; also see Hirschberg, *History*, Ch. 2.
272. Hirschberg, *History*, pp. 119, 124.
273. *Ibid.*, pp. 130–131; Chouraqui, *Between East and West*, p. 52.
274. Hirschberg, *History*, p. 126; Chouraqui, *Between East and West*, p. 52.
275. Hirschberg, *History*, pp. 133–134; also see Chouraqui, *Between East and West*, p. 51. Cited is a portion of the lament of Abraham Ibn Ezra, whose records provided a “main source” of information about which areas were conquered by the Almohads, and when. The lament, Hirschberg reports, shows “striking faithfulness” to the conditions “as known from Arab sources,” such as D. Cazes, *Revue des Etudes Juives* 20 (Paris, 1890), p. 85.
276. Hirschberg, *History*, p. 125, quoting Abraham ben David, *Sefer Ha-Qabbalah—The Book of Tradition*, edited by Gerson D. Cohen (Philadelphia, 1967), pp. 66–88; see Stillman, *The Jews*, Geniza documents on “calamity,” pp. 186–189ff.
277. Some of the Jewish Spaniards, however, had suffered their own *dhimmi* “protection”; an African-born writer “living in Spain at the end of the Middle Ages” described the “duties” of the judicially empowered official—*muhtasib*—“in charge of markets, morals and protected persons” (*ahl al-dhimma*): the official “must prevent protected persons from looking down upon Muslims in their houses . . . from wielding authority (over Muslims); from . . . riding saddled and decorated horses in Muslim streets, and other acts of ostentation. He must prescribe signs for them . . . to be distinguished from Muslims, such as the *shikla* for men and bells for women. [According to



- Hirschberg, the *shikla* or *shakla* differed from one Maghreb to another—“the exact form is not known.”] He must prevent Muslims being asked to do anything degrading and offensive to them, such as removing refuse, . . . tending pigs, or anything expressive of unbelief or superiority over Islam.” Levi-Provençal, *Documents Arabes inédits sur la vie sociale et économique* (Paris, 1955), p. 122; cited by Hirschberg, *History*, p. 203.
278. *Ibid.*, p. 204.
279. Chouraqui, *Between East and West*, pp. 90–92.
280. In 1588. Gilbert, *The Jews of Arab Lands*, p. 4.
281. In 1785. *Ibid.*
282. Littman, *Jews Under Muslim Rule*, p. 67.
283. *Ibid.*, p. 69. Extracts from a letter (21.7.1867) in Italian by Saul Labi, President of the Tripoli AIU Committee to Adolphe Cremieux, President of the AIU, Paris (AIU Libya [Tripoli] I.C.4).
284. *Ibid.* From a letter (10.7.1879) by Saul Labi, President of the Tripoli Regional Committee, to Adolphe Cremieux, President of the AIU, Paris (AIU Libya [Tripoli] I.C.7).
285. *Ibid.*, pp. 69–70. From a letter (21.2.1897) by the “Comunita Israelitica di Tripoli di Barbaria” (Saul Labi, Mesoud Nahum, Mos. J. Hassan, Abr. Nahum, Aug. Arbib, Clemente Tajar, I. Hassan) to the President, AIU, Paris (AIU Libya I.C.11).
286. *Ibid.*, p. 71. From a letter (16.5.1900) by J. Hoefler, teacher at the Tripoli Boys’ School to the President of the AIU, Paris (AIU Libya I.C.12).
287. Schechtman, *Eagles*, p. 130.
288. Prittie, *Double Exodus*, p. 22–23.
289. Schechtman, *Eagles*, p. 132; Prittie, *Double Exodus*, p. 23.
290. Schechtman, *Eagles*, p. 133. See Chapters 16 and 17.
291. *New York Times*, November 7, 1945.
292. *New York Times*, November 14, 1945.
293. Mustafa Bey Misran, member of Arab Advisory Council to the British Military Administration, *New York Times*, November 16, 1945.
294. Gilbert, *Exile*, p. 307.
295. Maurice Roumani, *The Case of the Jews from Arab Countries: A Neglected Issue* (Jerusalem: Alpha Press, 1975), p. 21.
296. Here, as in Syria and Iraq, the practical advantage of the population exchange was clearly employed.
297. Roumani, *Case of the Jews*, p. 21; according to Prittie, *Double Exodus*, p. 23, “17 Jews were murdered and many arrested.”
298. *London Daily Telegraph*, June 14, 1967, reported sixteen Jews thrown from roofs to their deaths. See also *New York Post*, July 15, 1967.
299. *New York Times*, July 22, 1970.
300. Major Abd ul-Huni, Council Commanding the Revolution, addressed a letter to ex-Libyan Jewish refugees then in Italy that once the Jews from Libya returned, “Then will be abolished the law of sequestration as far as everyone who returns to this country is concerned.” May 29, 1970, cited by Y. Meron, *The “Complicating” Element*, p. 20, n. 51.
301. K. Bilby, *New Star in the Near East* (New York, 1950), p. 30. Bilby “never found the slightest evidence” of “ruthless slaughter” of Arabs by Jews; *Palestine Royal Commission Report*, p. 121; *Palestine Partition Commission Report*, p. 261; *Anglo-*

*American Survey of Palestine*, p. 45; Leopold Amery in House of Commons speech, 1939, quoted in Gilbert, *Exile*, p. 229; M. Begin, *The Revolt*, pp. 162–163. “The success of Arab terrorism,” as the *Anglo-American Committee Report* called it in 1946, had, in the months before Deir Yaseen, been unrestrained. Between late 1947 and March, 1948, 875 Jews were murdered and nearly 2,000 wounded in Arab attacks.” Gabbay, *Political Study*, pp. 61–62.

302. From a statement to the President of Libya in Paris, November 1973, included in Albert Memmi, *Jews and Arabs* (Chicago, 1975), pp. 30–37. According to Memmi, “On Saturday, November 24, 1973, four major European newspapers (*Le Monde*, *The Times*, *La Stampa*, and *Die Welt*) organized a discussion with Libya’s Colonel Kadhafi. I was invited to attend by *Le Monde*, and my questions to the colonel were reported in the press the next day.”

#### 4. Ideology of the East, Rhetoric of the West

1. *New York Times*, March 6, 1976, report on conversation in November 1973, as quoted by *Foreign Policy Magazine*, Spring 1976.
2. King Hussein of Jordan, *Uneasy Lies the Head* (New York: Bernard Geis, 1962), p. 91.
3. Article 3(3) of Law No. 6 of 1954, Jordanian Nationality Law, *Official Gazette* No. 1171 of February 16, 1954, p. 105.
4. *Ha-Aretz*, Tel Aviv, January 29, 1974.
5. CBS Radio, May 28, 1972, cited by Gil Carl Alroy, *Behind the Middle East Conflict* (New York: Capricorn Books, G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1975), p. 178.
6. “The Jihad is the Way to Gain Victory,” by Sheikh Abdallah Goshah, quoted in *Arab Theologians on Jews and Israel, The Fourth Conference of the Academy of Islamic Research* (Al Azhar), D.F. Green, ed. (Geneva, 1971), p. 61.
7. Phillip K. Hitti, *The Arabs, A Short History* (Princeton, 1943), p. 126; also see Bernard Lewis, *The Arabs in History*, p. 36.
8. Professor Yehoshafat Harkabi, *The Arab Position in the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Emadat Ha’aravim besikhsukh Israel-Arav)* (Tel Aviv, 1968), p. 250. Cited in Moshe Ma’oz, *The Image of the Jew in Official Arab Literature and Communications Media* (The Institute of Contemporary Jewry: Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1976), p. 14.

His Eminence Sheikh Nadim Al-Jisr, Member of the Islamic Research Academy, cited several more versions of this *hadith* in his presentation at the Fourth Conference of the Academy, “Good Tidings about the Decisive Battle Between Muslims and Israel, in the Light of the Holy Quran, the Prophetic Traditions, and the Fundamental Laws of Nature and History.”

“In Muslim’s Sahih, is reported on the authority of Ibn’Umar that the Prophet (P.B.U.H.) had said, ‘Verily, you will combat against the Jews, so carry through the fight, until a stone would say: O Muslim This is a Jew; come along and smite him down.’

“In another version of this Hadith, reported also on the authority of Ibn’Umar, the Prophet—P.B.U.H.—had said, ‘The Jews will combat against you. But you will be given power over them, until the stone would say: “O Muslim! This is a Jew lying behind me; come and do away with him.” ’

“In a third version . . . on the authority of Abu Huraira . . . ‘The Hour would

never rise until Muslims fight against the Jews. Muslims would despatch them. The Jews would hide themselves behind stones and trees which would say: “O Muslim Servant of God! There are Jews behind me; come and kill them.”’

“In Bukhari’s Sahih . . . on the authority of Abdullah Ibn’Umar . . . you will take up arms against the Jews, until one of them would lie concealed behind a stone which would say, ‘O Muslim, Servant of God! This is a Jew lying behind me; come and kill him.’”

“It is reported on the authority of Abu Huraira that the Prophet . . . has said, ‘The Hour would not come, until you fight against the Jews; and the stone would say, “O Muslim! There is a Jew behind me; come and kill him.”’”

D.F. Green notes: “‘The Hour’ is the resurrection i.e. the final salvation. Its arrival is made conditional upon the battle against the Jews that has to precede it.” Green, *Arab Theologians*, p. 45.

9. Surah III, v. 112, *The Meaning of the Glorious Koran*, an explanatory translation by Mohammed Marmaduke Pickthall (New York: Mentor Books, 1953). Also see *The Koran*, trans. with notes by N.J. Dawood (England: Penguin Books, rev. ed, 1981), in which the translations are listed chronologically rather than by *surah* number, clearly illustrating that the anti-Jewish and anti-Christian implorations were introduced after Jews and Christians had refused to embrace Islam above their own religion. The themes illustrated in the text also are frequently reiterated with slight variations.
10. Surah II, v. 96, *ibid.*
11. Surah II, v. 90, *ibid.*
12. Surah III, v. 181, *ibid.*, referring to the Jews of Medina. Two examples of the frequent variation on this theme in the Koran:  
 Surah IX, v. 35: “Proclaim a woeful punishment to those that hoard up gold and silver. . . . Their treasures shall be heated in the fires of Hell, and their foreheads, sides and backs branded with them. . . . ‘Taste then the punishment which is your due.’”  
 Surah III, v. 117–120: “They [the Jews] are the heirs of Hell. . . . They will spare no pains to corrupt you. They desire nothing but your ruin. Their hatred is clear from what they say . . . When evil befalls you they rejoice.” *Ibid.*
13. Surah IV, v. 56, *ibid.*
14. Surah IV, v. 160, 161, *ibid.*
15. Surah IV, v. 46, *ibid.*
16. Surah III, v. 117–120, Dawood trans.
17. Surah IV, v. 101, Pickthall trans.
18. Surah V, v. 62, 63, *ibid.*
19. Surah V, v. 51, *ibid.*
20. Surah V, v. 82, *ibid.*
21. Surah IX, v. 29, *ibid.*
22. Surah IX, v. 30, *ibid.*
23. Surah IX, v. 26–34, Dawood trans.
24. Surah V, v. 62–66, *ibid.*
25. Surah II, v. 71–85, *ibid.*
26. The Fourth Conference of the Academy of Islamic Research, Cairo, September 1968.
27. Quoted from Dr. Mahmud Hubballah, Secretary General of the Islamic Research Academy, speech delivered on the inauguration of the Academy’s Fourth Confer-

- ence, in Green, *Arab Theologians*, p. 11. According to Green, “Seventy-seven Muslims, Ulemas and invited guests participated in the Conference. I gather that some of the proceedings were reproduced immediately after the conference in *Majallat al-Azhar*, the University’s monthly. The complete transactions of this conference were then published in 1970 in Arabic (3 volumes) [*Al-Azhar, Majma’ al-Buhuth al-Islamiyya, Kitab al-Mu’tamar al-Rabi’ li-majma al-Buhuth al-Islamiyya*. The original volume has no copyright], and in English (1 volume, 935 pp.) In the latter, it is stated on the front page that the book was printed by the U.A.R. Government Printing Office, which signifies government support. The efforts involved by the authorities to have these transactions translated into English indicate . . . their decision to propagate to the world the views contained in this volume.” Green explains that the order of “extracts” has been “modified in order to group together similar subjects. Repetitions by the authors have been retained in a few cases. The reader will thus be in a better position to decide whether the views are mere eccentricities of one sage, or more common conceptions.” (Introduction, p. 1.)
28. Quoted from Sheikh Abd Allah Al Meshad, “Jews’ Attitude Toward Islam and Muslims in the First Islamic Era,” in Green, *Arab Theologians*, p. 21.
  29. Quoted from Mohammed Taha Yahia, “The Attitude of the Jews Toward Islam and Muslims in the Early Days of Islam” in *ibid.*, p. 19.
  30. Quoted from Kamal Ahmad Own, Vice-Principal, Tanta Institute, “The Jews are the Enemies of Human Life as Evident from their Holy Book,” in *ibid.*, p. 16–17.
  31. Israel-Benjamin (II), *Cinq Années de Voyage en Orient 1846–1851* (Algeria, 1855), p. XXVIII, cited by David Littman, *Protected Peoples Under Islam* (Geneva, 1975), pp. 2–3.
  32. Young, British Consul in Jerusalem, 1839. F.O. 78/368, Young to Palmerston, No. 13, May 25, 1839, cited by A.M. Hyamson, *The British Consulate in Jerusalem (In Relation to the Jews of Palestine, 1838–1914)*, 2 vols. (London, 1939–1942), vol. 1, p. 6.
  33. Léon Godard, *Le Maroc, Notes d’un Voyageur: 1858–59* (Algeria, 1859), cited by Littman, *Jews Under Muslim Rule in the Late Nineteenth Century* (The Weiner Library Bulletin, 1975), vol. XXVIII, p. 66.
  34. Chouraqui, *Between East and West*, p. 51.
  35. *Ibid.*, p. 52.
  36. Robert Brunschvig, *La Berberie orientale sous les Hafsidés*, vol. 1 (Paris, 1940), p. 404, cited by Littman, *Protected Peoples*, p. 2. According to S.D. Goitein, “The yellow badge for Jews was known in Muslim countries many centuries before it was introduced into Christian Europe.” *Jews and Arabs* (New York: Schocken Books, 1974), p. 67.
  37. Bernard Lewis, *Islam in History* (New York, 1973), p. 135.
  38. Arminius Vambery, *The Story of My Struggles* (London, n.d.), p. 395, quoted in Lewis, *Islam in History* (New York, 1973), p. 135. Lewis describes Vambery (1832–1918) as: “. . . one of the leading authorities in Europe on Turkish studies, and one of the founders of the new science of Turkology” (p. 133).
  39. *Middle Eastern Affairs*, March 1950, “Facts and Figures,” vol. 1, no. 3, p. 90.
  40. Excerpted from conversation on January 13, 1951, as reported by Arif al-Arif, from his series “Al-Nakba, Nakbat Beit Al-Maqdis Walfirdaus Al Mafqud,” 1947–1955, vol. IV (Al-Maktaba Al-Asriyya Littiba Wal-Nashr, n.d., intro. dated 12/1/59), p. 893.

41. Amman radio, September 22, 1967, cited by Y. Harkabi, *Arab Attitudes to Israel* (Jerusalem, 1971), pp. 295–296.
42. Except where otherwise indicated, the excerpts are from “*Hatred is Sacred*,” *Extracts from Arab School Texts*, E. Hess, comp. (Jerusalem: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, n.d.).
43. Dafna Alon, *Arab Racialism* (Jerusalem: The Israel Economist, 1969), p. 94.
44. *Indictments Expressed in the Textbooks Used in the Educational System in Egypt and the Gaza Strip* (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education and Culture, Department of Arab Education and Culture, 1967), p. 33; also see pp. 37–38. Also see Alon, *Arab Racialism; Ma'oz, Image of the Jew*.

### 5. Last Year and Next Year in Jerusalem: Zionism in the Arab World and the Holy Land

1. Walter Laqueur, *A History of Zionism* (New York: Schocken Books, 1976), p. 592.
2. Of the diminished post-war Jewish population of 56,000 in Jerusalem, more than 22,000 were non-European “Palestinians.” *Statistical Abstract of Palestine*, 1929, David Gurevich, ed. (Jerusalem, 1930).
3. See *Palestine Royal Commission Report* (London, 1937), pp. 2–5, 7, 9, particularly p. 11, para. 23.
4. James Parkes, *Whose Land?, A History of the Peoples of Palestine* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, Great Britain: Penguin Books, 1970), p. 266.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 31, 26.
6. Samuel Katz, *Battleground: Fact and Fantasy in Palestine* (New York, 1973), p. 88.
7. Avraham Yaari, *Igrot Eretz Yisrael* (Tel Aviv, 1943), p. 46; see F. Nau, “Sur la synagogue de Rabbat Moab (422), et un mouvement sioniste favorisé par l’impératrice Eudocie (438), d’après la vie de Barsauma le Syrien,” *Journal Asiatique*, LIX (1927), pp. 189–192.
8. A. Malamat, H. Tadmor, M. Stern, S. Safrai, *Toledot Am Yisrael Bi’mei Kedem* (Tel Aviv, 1969), p. 348, cited by Katz, *Battleground*, p. 88.
9. Parkes, *Whose Land?*, p. 72.
10. *Ibid.*; also see S.D. Goitein, *A Mediterranean Society*, 3 vols. (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1971), vol. 2, p. 6ff. “. . . the main synagogue [in Ramle] was the Palestinian.”
11. Al-Waqidy, ninth-century Arab historian, recorded a Jewish-settled area in Jericho in the seventh century and “there are other references to Jewish communal life in Jericho as late as the ninth century.” Cited by Itzhak Ben-Zvi, *The Exiled and the Redeemed* (Philadelphia, 1961), p. 146.
12. Ben-Zvi, *The Exiled*, pp. 144–145. The Nadhir and Kainuka Arabian-Jewish tribes’ “battles for their survival . . . is found in Dr. Israel Ben-Zeev’s remarkable book, *Jews in Arabia*,” Ben-Zvi states.
13. Israel Ben Zeev, *Jews in Arabia*, cited by Ben-Zvi, *The Exiled*, p. 145.
14. Ben-Zvi, *The Exiled*, p. 145. Ben-Zvi cites Arabian historian Al-Waqidy, as reported in Ben-Zeev, *Jews in Arabia*.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 146. Ben-Zvi states that some Jews who could “produce letters of protection and treaties signed by or on behalf of the Prophet” were permitted to remain. “. . . there is reason to believe that these surviving Jewish communities were maintained intact until the twelfth century.”

16. Quoted from Sheikh Abd Allah Al Meshad, "Jews' Attitudes Towards Islam and Muslims in the First Islamic Era," in D.F. Green, ed., *Arab Theologians on Jews and Israel* (Geneva, 1971), p. 22.
17. Quoted from Muhammad Azzah Darwaza, "The Attitude of the Jews Towards Islam, Muslims and the Prophet of Islam—P.B.U.H. [Peace Be Unto Him]—at the Time of His Honourable Prophethood," in *ibid.*, pp. 29–30.
18. Ben-Zvi, *The Exiled*, pp. 146–147. ". . . the existence of which we have records."
19. Parkes, *Whose Land?*, pp. 97–99.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 110.
21. Martin Gilbert, *Exile and Return, The Struggle for a Jewish Homeland* (Philadelphia and New York, 1978), p. 17. "In 1322 Jewish geographer from Florence, Ashtory Ha-Parhi, had settled in the Jezreel Valley where he wrote a book on the topography of Palestine. . . ."
22. *Ibid.*, pp. 17–19. Elijah of Ferrara.
23. Parkes, *Whose Land?*, p. 111.
24. Gilbert, *Exile*, p. 17.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
26. *Ibid.* For a more detailed account, see Joachim Prinz, *The Secret Jews* (New York, 1973), p. 147ff.
27. One writer claims all the Messianic movements in Jewish history were led by Sephardic Jews: ". . . not a single one was led by an East European Jew." Prinz, *Secret Jews*, p. 101.
28. Simon Dubnow, *Précis d'Histoire Juivre* (A Concise Jewish History) (Educational Service of the Federation of Jewish Societies in France, Paris, 1963); also see Dubnow's more comprehensive *History of the Jews*, 5 vols. (New York, 1967–73); also see Parkes, *Whose Land?*, pp. 140–141.
29. H.H. Ben-Sasson, ed., *A History of the Jewish People* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976), p. 701.
30. Gershom Scholem, *Sabbatai Sevi, the Mystical Messiah* (Princeton, 1973) p. 95.
31. Ben-Sasson, *History*, p. 706.
32. *Ibid.* "The paradox of a traitorous Messiah is far greater than that of an executed Messiah." Scholem, *Sabbatai Sevi*, pp. 683–684.
33. Ben-Sasson, *History*, pp. 704–706.
34. J. Sasportas, *Zizat Novel Zvi*, J. Tishby, ed. (Jerusalem, 1954), p. 267, cited by Ben Sasson, *History*, p. 704.
35. Heinrich Graetz, *History of the Jews*, 5 vols. (New York, 1927), vol. V, pp. 32–49.
36. H.Z. Hirschberg, *A History of the Jews in North Africa* (Leiden, Netherlands: E.J. Brill, 1974), vol. 1, p. 70.
37. *Ibid.* At that time, according to Hirschberg, "the Cyrenians complained to the Emperor Augustus of attempts to prevent the sending of the half-shekel to the Temple, won their case and obtained the discontinuance of restrictive practices."
38. Acts of the Apostles (2:10), cited by Hirschberg, *History*, p. 70.
39. Acts of the Apostles (6:9), cited in *ibid.*
40. Matthew (27:32); Mark (15:21); Luke (23:26); cited in *ibid.*
41. David de Sola Pool, "Centrality of the Holy Land in Jewish Life," from *The Folk*, vol. II of the Jewish Library, Leo Jung, ed. (London and New York: Soncino Press, 1968).
42. See Nina Salaman, trans., *Selected Poems of Jehudah Halevi* (Philadelphia, 1946);

- also see Goitein, *Jews and Arabs, Their Contacts Through the Ages*, 3rd ed. (New York, 1974).
43. Rudolf Kayser, *The Life and Time of Jehudah Halevi*, Frank Gaynor, trans. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1949), pp. 117–119. According to Kayser, Halevi was inspired to “his greatest poem, the deepest, most heartfelt hymn of the Jewish race, cast out of its homeland, and longing to return to it. Like Moses, he saw the Promised Land, but like Moses, it was not to be his to live in it.” Kayser records a different moment of death than the more popular “kissing of stones” legend: “The details . . . are unknown to us, but the legend has it that Jehudah Halevi was singing his hymn of Zion . . . when he was run through by the sword of an Arab assassin.” (p. 118).
  44. Goitein, *Mediterranean Society*, vol. 2, pp. 156–157.
  45. *Ibid.*, p. 157.
  46. André Chouraqui, *Between East and West, A History of the Jews of North Africa*, trans. Michael M. Bernet (Philadelphia, 1968), p. 126.
  47. According to Jewish tradition.
  48. Daily Prayer Book *Ha-Siddur Ha-Shalem*, intro. by Philip Birnbaum (New York, 1949).
  49. Chouraqui, *East and West*, pp. 16, 59.
  50. See, for example, Bernard Lewis, *The Arabs in History*, rev. ed. (New York, Evanston, San Francisco, London: Harper-Colophon Books, 1966); Goitein, *Jews and Arabs*; Philip K. Hitti, *The Arabs* (Princeton, 1943).
  51. Goitein, *Mediterranean Society*, vol. 2, p. 21.
  52. *Ibid.*, p. 20.
  53. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
  54. *Ibid.*, p. 51.
  55. Rabbi Isaac ben Jacob Alfassi (1013–1103), Chouraqui, *East and West*, p. 83.
  56. Goitein, *Mediterranean Society*, vol. 1, p. 67.
  57. Laqueur, *History of Zionism*, p. 55.
  58. Laqueur was discussing the German-born rabbi Hirsch Kalisher, author of *Drishat Zion* (Seeking Zion), published 1862.
  59. W.T. Young to Viscount Palmerston, Jerusalem, June 26, 1839, F.O. 78/368 (No. 15), cited in A.H. Hyamson, ed., *The British Consulate in Jerusalem in Relation to the Jews in Palestine, 1838–1914*, 2 vols. (London: Edward Goldston Ltd., 1939–1941), vol. 1, p. 11.
  60. Gilbert, *Exile*, p. 27.
  61. Hyamson, *Consulate*, vol. 1, p. lvii.
  62. W.T. Young to Colonel P. Campbell, Jerusalem, July 19, 1839. (Enclosure 2 to No. 9) (No. 27), cited in *ibid.*, p. 16; see also Young to Palmerston, May 1839, *ibid.*, pp. 4–7.
  63. *Ibid.*, p. lviii.
  64. James Finn to Sir Stratford Canning, Jerusalem, April 6, 1850, F.O. 195/292 (No. 3), *ibid.*, p. 163.
  65. *Ibid.*, p. lviii.
  66. James Finn, *Stirring Times or Record from Jerusalem Consular Chronicles from 1835–56*, 2 vols. (London: C. Kegan, Paul & Co., 1878), vol. 1, pp. 127–128. For other references to the subject see vol. 1, p. 117 n., vol. 2, pp. 67, 103, 104, 360.
  67. Elizabeth Finn, *Reminiscences of Elizabeth Anne Finn* (Edinburgh and London,

- 1929), p. 56; also see p. 160, cited by Hyamson, *Consulate*, p. lviii.
68. Charles Churchill to Sir Moses Montefiore, June 11, 1842, quoted in Gilbert, *Exile*, p. 28.
69. Katz, *Battleground*, p. 101.
70. *Ibid.*
71. George Gawler, *Tranquillisation of Syria and the East* (London, 1845), pp. 6–8.
72. A.W.C. Crawford, Lord Lindsay, *Letters of Egypt, Edom and the Holy Land* (London, 1847), vol. 2, p. 71, cited in Katz, *Battleground*, p. 101.
73. Gilbert, in *Exile*, p. 34, says that in 1874 “a British explorer, Charles Warren, published a book entitled, boldly, *The Land of Promise*. In his book he envisaged a Palestine with as many as fifteen million inhabitants. In order to reach this goal Warren advocated widespread Jewish rural settlement. In a second book, *Underground Jerusalem*, published a year later, in 1875, Warren wrote that for the time being Palestine would have to be governed on behalf of the Jews by someone else, ‘allowing the Jew gradually to find his way into its army, its law, and its diplomatic services, and gradually to superintend the farming operations, and work himself on the farms.’ But after only twenty years of such activity, Warren believed, the Jewish principality ‘might stand by itself, as a separate kingdom guaranteed by the Great Powers.’ ”
74. *Spectator*, May 10, 1879.
75. Moshe Aumann, *Land Ownership in Palestine 1880–1948* (Jerusalem, 1976), pp. 11–12. The first European settlement, Rishon l'Tsion, was established by Russian Jewish pioneers.
76. Judah ben Solomon Hai Alkalay, *Destiny of the Lord* (Vienna, 1857).
77. Howard Sachar, *A History of Israel, From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1976), pp. 6–7. Alex Bein, *Theodore Herzl*, trans. Maurice Samuel (Philadelphia, 1940), p. 5, 15.
78. *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, vol. 2, pp. 638–639; Alkalay's 1840 work concerning the Damascus blood libel, and “hints” of Zionism, *Shelom Yerushalayim*, led to his first Hebrew publication, *Minhat Yehudah*, in 1843.
79. *Ibid.* Before Alkalay died in 1878, he had “managed to organize a small group of followers.” Sachar, *History*, p. 6.
80. Among other works citing Yehudah Alkalay: Arthur Hertzberg, *The Zionist Idea* (New York: Doubleday, 1959).
81. Mordecai Soussan, *L'éveil politique Sepharade* (Political Awakening of the Sephardim, doctoral thesis) (Faculté de droit et de Science Politique d'Aix-Marseilles, 1975), p. 62.
82. Isadore Twersky, ed., *A Maimonides Reader* (New York, 1972), pp. 456–57.
83. Goitein, *Jews and Arabs*, p. 75.
84. *Ibid.*, p. 75ff.
85. Paula Stern, “Obituary for a People: The Jews of Tunisia,” Alicia Patterson Fund Award Winner, May 1971. Unpublished study.
86. Hayyim Cohen, *The Jews of the Middle East: 1860–1972* (New York, 1973), p. 160.
87. Cohen, *Jews*, p. 160.
88. Raphael Patai, *Israel Between East and West* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Publishing Corp., 1970), pp. 207–208.
89. According to the Jewish Agency, *Report of the Executive Submitted to the 24th Zionist Congress, 1951–1955* (Jerusalem: Zionist Organization, 1955), p. 147, cited



in Maurice Roumani, Deborah Goldman, Helene Korn, *The Case of the Jews from Arab Countries: A Neglected Issue* (Jerusalem, 1975), p. 27.

90. Excerpted from UN General Assembly (32nd G.A.), December 1977, by Mordechai Ben Porath, member, Israel UN delegation, speech on General Assembly Resolution 194 (III) of 1948.
91. Hayyim J. Cohen, *Absorption Problems of Jews from Asia and Africa in Israel* (Jerusalem, 1974), p. 1.
92. Carl Hermann Voss, *The Palestine Problem Today, Israel and Its Neighbors* (Boston, 1953), p. 31.
93. *Ibid.*, pp. XIV–XV, preface.
94. Goitein, *Jews and Arabs*, pp. 13–14.

## 6. Invitation Declined

1. The interviews, recorded on tape, were conducted between 1976 and 1982, in New York, Chicago, Washington, D.C., Paris, London, Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem; the Jewish refugees' professional backgrounds varied, and their ages ranged from 18 to 68, but they shared one goal, to a remarkable extent: they all sought freedom to live proudly within their traditions, as Jews, as Zionists, and as first-class citizens.

## 7. Remnant of a Tradition: The Arab-Jewish Diaspora

1. Current population estimates compiled from the *American Jewish Yearbook*, 1983 edition, George Gruen, editor, published in New York by the American Jewish Committee; Government of Israel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jerusalem, 1983 figures. Figures for 1948 compiled from the World Organization of Jews from Arab Countries (WOJAC); Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, "The Position of the Jewish Communities in Oriental Countries," a memorandum submitted by the Jewish Agency; Hayyim Cohen, *The Jews of the Middle East*, 1973, Halsted Press, New York.
2. Medina, Khaibar, Qaraiza; see Chapter 8.
3. March 6, 1975, Rashad Nowilaty, Saudi Arabian Ambassador to The Hague.
4. America established its own precedent in 1885. President Grover Cleveland's choice for United States representative in Vienna, Anthony Keiley of Virginia, was turned down because, "the position of a foreign envoy wedded to a Jewess by civil marriage would be untenable and even impossible in Vienna," May 1885, *Foreign Relations*, p. 48. When the Secretary of State objected to "infraction" of an "essential principle" —never to "inquire into" or "even hear testimony . . . upon the religious belief of any official," the Austrian government found a different reason for its objection: an ostensible "want of political tact" exhibited by appointee Keiley on an earlier visit to Vienna. *Ibid.*, p. 55.

President Cleveland resolved the matter in his address to the United States Congress on December 8, 1885: ". . . The Government of Austria-Hungary invited this Government to take cognizance of certain exceptions, based upon allegations against the personal acceptability of Mr. Keiley, the appointed envoy, asking that in view thereof, the appointment should be withdrawn. The reasons advanced were such as could not be acquiesced in, without violation of my oath of office and the precepts of the Constitution since they necessarily involved a limitation in favor of a foreign

government upon the right of selection by the Executive, and required such an application of a religious test as a qualification for office under the United States as would have resulted in the practical disfranchisement of a large class of our citizens and the abandonment of a vital principle in our Government. . . . I have made no new nomination, and the interests of this Government in Vienna are now in the care of the secretary of legation, acting as chargé d'affaires ad interim."

5. Statement by Max Van Der Stoel, Dutch Foreign Minister to the Dutch Parliament, The Hague, March 12, 1975, regarding cancellation of official visit to Saudi Arabia.
6. Reported by Anthony Sampson, *Observer Review*, "Desert Diary," March 9, 1975, London.
7. Jordanian Nationality Law, Article 3(3) of Law No. 6 of 1954, *Official Gazette* No. 1171, February 16, 1954.
8. George E. Gruen, "Morocco: Plotting for Peace," in *Reform Judaism*, June 1981, New York, pp. 10–11.
9. The first group of four rabbis visited in May 1976; George Gruen, *ibid.*
10. *Ibid.*
11. Jonathan Tumin, "Letter to the Editor," *Commentary*, December 1976.
12. *New York Times*, April 18, 1979.
13. Gruen, "Morocco," pp. 10–11. This also applies to Tunisia's Jewry.
14. Estimates vary from 4,500 in 1980, according to the *American Jewish Yearbook*, 1983, p. 278, to 5,500, as reported by the American Syrian Jewish Community's Steven Shalom, February 7, 1979, New York, to 5,000 estimated in 1980 by the American Jewish Committee, and 4,300 as estimated by the Israeli government, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jerusalem, 1983.
15. For example, in the Italian journal *Epoca*, April 28, 1974, "Drama in the Ghetto of Damascus," by Livio Caputo; Copenhagen, *Politiken*, December 21, 1974, "Jews in Syria Holed up in Nameless Street," by Ole Roessell; Stockholm, *Espressen*, June 17, 1972, "Concern When Being Faced with the Reports from Syria," by Per Ahlmark.
16. See Chapter 6.
17. George E. Gruen, "Assad's Syria," in *Worldview*, June 1981, pp. 11–12.
18. Stanley F. Reed III, quoted in George E. Gruen, *ibid.*, p. 11.
19. *London Observer*, April 21, 1974.
20. *Le Figaro*, May 1974.
21. Then UN Secretary General U Thant, June 15, 1970.
22. Letter to Secretary General Dr. Kurt Waldheim, Paris, July 10, 1974.
23. On "60 Minutes" they were benignly referred to initially as "Information" officers.
24. As a member of the Anglo-American Committee had noted in 1945 while investigating conditions for Jews in Arab states. Bartley C. Crum, *Behind the Silken Curtain. A Personal Account of Anglo-American Diplomacy in Palestine and the Middle East* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1947), p. 239. Tactics of intimidation had changed little in thirty years.
25. Robert Azzi, "Damascus, Syria's Uneasy Eden," *National Geographic*, April 1974.
26. *National Geographic*, editorial, November 1974, p. 587.
27. "Syria: Israel's Toughest Enemy," CBS, February 16, 1975, rebroadcast June 1975, with addendum re: criticism of report.
28. During a hearing Wallace agreed with those who attacked the accuracy of the program; he admitted that escapees "leave for the reasons that you [the complainant] suggest." He went on to say that many left purely for "economic reasons" and that,

although he had not yet returned to Syria to do the update, “there is not the slightest doubt in my mind that the report [the first] was 100% on target.” Mike Wallace to H. William Shore, at televised CBS “Town Meeting,” October 21, 1975, in Hartford, Conn.

29. Sequel “60 Minutes” segment televised March 21, 1976.
30. Memorandum, March 21, 1976, “CBS Syrian Jewry” by George E. Gruen, Director, Israel and Middle East Affairs, American Jewish Committee.
31. *Ibid.*
32. “The International Convention on Civil and Political Rights of 1966 to which Syria adhered on 21st April, 1969, . . . particularly . . . Article 12(2) of the Convention which stipulates that: ‘Every person has the right to leave any State, including his own.’ ”

Letter to Senator Claiborne Pell from Council for Jews in Arab Lands, November 24, 1978.

33. March 17, 1976.
34. *Evening News*, October 25, 1978, London, “The Forgotten Jews Who Live in Prison City.” According to Murphy, in addition to 3,000 Jews in Damascus, 1,500 lived in Aleppo to the north and 300 in Kamishli near the Turkish border.
35. Gruen, “Assad’s Syria,” p. 12.
36. Henry Tanner, *New York Times*, August 30, 1982.
37. Elenore Lester, *The Jewish Week*, September 24, 1982.
38. Stephen Shalom, interview, February 7, 1979.
39. *Chicago Sun-Times*, April 2–3, 1979; *New York Times*, April 3, 1979.
40. *New York Times*, December 30, 1974.
41. Henry Tanner, *New York Times*, February 28, 1974.
42. Jesse Zel Lurie, *New Leader*, October 28, 1974, p. 11.
43. *Commentary*, “In Search of Moderate Egyptians,” May 1975.
44. June 1977, interview in Alexandria.
45. *Chicago Sun-Times*, report by Jay Bushinsky, April 3, 1979.
46. *New York Times*, report by Jonathan Kandell, April 3, 1979.
47. *Chicago Sun-Times*, April 2, 1979.
48. Leo Szilard, *The Voice of the Dolphins* (New York, 1961), p. 78.
49. Joachim Prinz, *The Secret Jews* (New York, 1973), pp. 52–53. The *New York Times*, on August 18, 1934, reported, on page 2, a story headed “Berlin Jewish Group for a Unified Reich.” The news item under the boldface heading related that The League of National German Jews, a “small Jewish organization in Berlin, issued a summons to all German Jews to vote for Chancellor Hitler in the plebiscite Sunday. . . . The statement reads:

“We members of the League of National German Jews, founded in 1921, have always in war or peace placed the good of the German people and the German Fatherland above our own good. Accordingly, we greeted the national uprising of January, 1933 [when Hitler came to power], although it brought rigors for us. . . .

“We agree fully with the political testament of Reich President and Field Marshall von Hindenburg, who called the accomplishment of Reich Chancellor Hitler and his movement a decisive step of major historical importance. . . .

“To the German fatherland belongs body and soul that portion of the Jews who, like ourselves, know no other fatherland than Germany. In the spirit of the dead

Reich President's testament, we support the unification of the offices of Reich leader and Reich Chancellor.

“We urge all Jews who feel themselves German to vote “Yes” on August 19.”

Hitler's *Mein Kampf* had been published a decade earlier.

### 8. “Palestina”: A Precedent of Prey

1. P.J. Vatikiotis, *Nasser and His Generation* (London, 1978), p. 254.
2. Thames Television Series, London, “Palestine,” aired in the United States January–February, 1979.
3. Minutes of the Supreme Council, in D.H. Miller, *My Diary at the Conference of Paris*, 22 vols. (New York, 1924), vol. 14, p. 405.
4. *Palestine Royal Commission Report*, Command Paper #5479, 1937, p. 120, para. 14.
5. James Parkes, *Whose Land?* (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1970), p. 31.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 17.
7. Bernard Lewis, “The Palestinians and the PLO, a Historical Approach,” *Commentary*, January 1975, p. 32–48.
8. Yehoshua Porath, “Social Aspects of the Emergence of the Palestinian National Movement,” in *Society and Political Structure in the Arab World*, M. Milson, ed. (New York, 1973), pp. 101, 107, 119.
9. Marie Syrkin, “Palestinian Nationalism: Its Development and Goal,” in Michael Curtis et al., eds., *The Palestinians: People, History, Politics* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1975), p. 200. Syrkin found that Haj Amin al-Husseini—the notorious Mufti of Jerusalem himself—“originally opposed the Palestine Mandate because it separated Palestine from Syria.” *Ibid.*
10. *Ibid.* According to Neville Mandel, *Arabs and Zionism Before World War I* (Berkeley, 1976), p. 152, n. 49:
 

“After World War I, when the nature of an independent Arab state and its component parts were being discussed, the term ‘Greater Syria’ was advanced to embrace the Fertile Crescent and its desert hinterland. Palestine, as an integral part of that area, was dubbed ‘Southern Syria.’ But these terms were not in use in 1913 and 1914, when very few nationalists contemplated complete Arab independence.”
11. George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement* (Philadelphia, New York, Toronto: J.B. Lippincott, 1939), p. 15, n.1; also see Mandel, *Arabs and Zionism*, pp. 151–153.
12. The Ba’ath Party “describes itself as a ‘national, popular revolutionary movement fighting for Arab unity, Freedom and Socialism,’” in 1951. Syrkin, “Nationalism,” in Curtis et al., *Palestinians*, p. 200; also see Menahem Milson, “Medieval and Modern Intellectual Traditions in the Arab World,” in *Daedalus*, Summer 1972, particularly pp. 24–26; Michel Aflaq, prominent Ba’athist and Christian, on Arab Nationalism, cited in Milson, above; also see Aflaq, *Fi Sabil al Ba’ath* (Arabic) Beirut, 1962 (3rd printing), cited in Milson, p. 26; also see Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798–1939* (London: Oxford, 1962), particularly p. 301.
13. Ahmed Shukeiry, as head of the PLO, to Security Council on May 31, 1956, cited by Syrkin in “Nationalism,” in Curtis et al., *Palestinians*, p. 201.
14. President Hafez Assad of Syria, Radio Damascus, March 8, 1974.
15. *Palestine Royal Commission Report*, Chapter 1, p. 6, para. 11.

16. Psalm 137:5, quoted by British M.P. Alfred Duff Cooper, July 30, 1939. Members of British Parliament Cooper, Josiah Wedgewood and Leopold Amery “spoke bitterly against . . . the policy of not accepting . . . Jews” in Palestine, in Martin Gilbert, *Exile and Return: The Struggle for a Jewish Homeland* (Philadelphia and New York: J.B. Lippincott, 1978), pp. 239–40.
17. Parkes, *Whose Land?*, p. 26.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 10.
19. J.B. Pritchard, *Ancient Near Eastern Texts Relating to the Old Testament* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1955), p. 378.
20. M. Stern, “The Political and Social History of Judea Under Roman Rule,” in *A History of the Jewish People*, H.H. Ben-Sasson, ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976), p. 266.
21. *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 11th ed. (1911), vol. XX, p. 622.
22. *Ibid.*, pp. 621–622.
23. Yigael Yadin, *Masada* (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 11.
24. *Ibid.*
25. *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, vol. XX, p. 622.
26. Alfred Guillaume, *Islam* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1954), pp. 10–11.
27. Bernard Lewis, *The Arabs in History*, rev. ed. (New York, Evanston, San Francisco, London: Harper-Colophon Books, 1966), pp. 31–32.
28. Salo W. Baron, *A Social and Religious History of the Jews*, 3 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1937), I, pp. 308ff.
29. Lewis, *Arabs in History*, p. 40.
30. S. Safrai, “The Lands of the Diaspora,” in *A History of the Jewish People*, Ben-Sasson, ed., p. 380.
31. S. Safrai, “From the Abolition of the Patriarchate to the Arab Conquest (425–640),” in *History of the Jewish People*, Ben-Sasson, ed., pp. 358–359. Of this little-known history Safrai writes: “Twice the Jews of Himyar succeeded in throwing off Ethiopian domination; even in the eyes of Byzantium it was a Jewish kingdom, small but occupying a strategic position. The king of Himyar prevented Byzantine traders from passing through to India on the grounds that Jews were being persecuted in Roman lands. Byzantium was reluctant to risk a war so far away in South Arabia, but was able to persuade Ethiopia to take up its quarrel. The king of Himyar hoped for Persian aid, but there was a lull in the fighting between Rome and Persia at the time, and the Persians did not appreciate the importance of this outlet from the Red Sea being controlled by an ally of Byzantium. Du Noas fell in a battle against an invading Ethiopian army, and the Jewish Kingdom came to an end.”
32. Guillaume, *Islam*, pp. 11–12.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 12.
34. *Ibid.* See examples in Chapter 4.
35. For details of the Prophet Muhammad—Abū al-Qasim Muhammad ibn ‘Abd Allāh ibn ‘Abd al-Muttalib ibn Hashim—see Guillaume, *Islam*, pp. 20–54; the “traditional” biography of Muhammad (Arabic) is Ibn Hisham’s recension of Ibn Ishaq’s *al-Sira al-Nabawiyya*, 2 vols. (Cairo, 1955); *The Life of Muhammad*, abridged English trans. by A. Guillaume (Karachi, 1955). Cited by Norman A. Stillman, *Jews of Arab Lands, A History and Source Book* (Philadelphia, 1979), p. 6, n. 9. See also Lewis, *Arabs in History*.
36. Guillaume, *Islam*, p. 43.

37. *Ibid.*, pp. 43–44.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 44.
39. The Nadir tribe. *Ibid.*, p. 46. Also see Stillman, *Jews of Arab Lands*, pp. 8–10, for a study of “exclusively Muslim” sources, tracing Muhammad’s “face-to-face contact with a large, organized Jewish Community,” an “encounter” that “did not prove to be an auspicious one.” The Nadir tribe in Medina went to Khaibar in “exile,” Stillman, *Jews*, p. 14.
40. Salo W. Baron, *Social and Religious History*, vol. 1, p. 311. He cites Muwatta, in Al-Zurkani’s commentary IV, p. 71.
41. Lewis, *The Arabs in History*, p. 45.
42. Al-Bukhari, *al-Jami al-Sahih*, bk. 56 (Kitab al-Jihad, Bab 157), ed. M. Ludolf Krehl (Leiden, 1864), vol. 2, p. 254, cited by Stillman, *Jews*, p. 17. According to Stillman, “This *hadith* appears in several other canonical collections.”
43. Stillman, *Jews*, p. 17, citing Ibn Sa’d, *Kitab al-Tabaqat al-Kabir*, ed. by Edvard Sachau et al. (Leiden, 1909), vol. 2, pt. 1, pp. 66–67; al-Waqidi, *Kitab al-Maghazi*, vol. 2, pp. 566–68; Ibn Hisham, *al-Sira al-Nabawiyya*, vol. 2, pp. 618–619.
44. Itzhak Ben-Zvi, *The Exiled and the Redeemed* (Philadelphia, 1961), p. 144. Also see Stillman, *Jews*, p. 14ff.
45. The Koran, Surah 33, v. 26–32, Dawood translation.
46. Guillaume, *Islam*, p. 49.
47. Lewis, *Arabs*, p. 45.
48. Guillaume, *Islam*, p. 49.
49. *Ibid.*, pp. 49–50. The appellation Bedouin derives from the word *badia* (steppe), which connotes the Arabian desert territories native to the wanderers. Also see C.M. Doughty, *Travels in Arabia Deserta* (London, 1888), since then in many editions; H. St. Philby, *Arabia* (1930); *Heart of Arabia* (1922); *Arabia of the Wahhabis* (1928); T.E. Lawrence, *Revolt in the Desert* (1927) and *The Seven Pillars of Wisdom* (1935); In Arabic, A’rif al-A’rif, *Al Kada’ Bein Al Badou* (1937), *Ta’arikh Beir Al Sab’* (1932). In German see G.H. Dalman, *Arbeit und Sitte in Palestina* (1928), 5 vols.
50. Quoted in Philip K. Hitti, *The Arabs, A Short History* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1943), p. 57.
51. Jacob de Haas, *History of Palestine* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1934), p. 145. According to de Haas, “It was more than usually futile, and evidently had no great popular support, for Syrene was captured and, when brought before the Caliph, was shrewdly ridiculed by the monarch for his pretensions, and handed over to the Jews to be punished for claiming to be the Messiah.”
52. M.A. Beek, *A Short History of Israel from Abraham to Bar Cochba* (London, 1963), p. 212.
53. “Josephus,” quoted in Samuel Katz, *Battleground: Fact and Fantasy in Palestine* (New York: Bantam Books, 1973), p. 106.
54. Dio Cassius, *History of the Romans*, lxi, 12–14, cited by de Haas, *History*, p. 55; see also pp. 52–56; also Theodor Mommsen, *Provinces of the Roman Empire*, I, p. 243.
55. Parkes, *Whose Land?*, pp. 44–45; *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 11th ed., vol. XX, pp. 622–623.
56. S. Safrai, “The Characteristics of the Era,” in *A History of the Jewish People*, Ben-Sasson, ed., p. 310.
57. *Palestine Royal Commission Report*, p. 11, para. 23.

58. "The discovery of ossuary and synagogue inscriptions in all parts of Palestine throw welcome light on the position of the Jews from the century prior to the fall of Jerusalem, to about the end of the third century. The notable inscription on a synagogue in Jerusalem and the massive remains of buildings in Galilee are all most probably of dates prior to 70 C.E., for Robinson well says (*Researches*, 1858, p. 71) 'the splendor of these edifices . . . suggest a condition of prosperity, and wealth, and influence' of which there is not evidence in the centuries following the Roman conquest. On the other hand, a number of the finds indicate by their longing for peace that the humbler structures were erected in the second and third centuries. Dr. Samuel Klein, 'Corpus Inscriptionum,' the first attempt to catalogue the Jewish material discovered to 1920, lists building or synagogue inscriptions of Emmaus ('Amwas) Ashdod, Chorazin, Umm Al-'Amad, Edditike, Ummel Kanatir, Chirbet Semmaka (Carmel), 'Ain ed Dok (north of Jericho), Gaza, Kefar Kenna, 'Alma (north of Safed), Gischala (ed-Dschis), Kasjun (Kesun), Meron, Capernaum, Kefar Birim, Irbid, Tel Hum, Kedes, and, in Trans-Jordan, at Chirbet Kanef, in the Jaulan, Nawe (Naua), Jakuk (north of Irbid), and at Beisan (p. 63 et seq.). The information has been increased since this compilation. All the facts indicate close settlement of the land, and justify Josephus' descriptions of contemporary conditions." A footnote by J. de Haas, *History of Palestine*, p. 29.
59. *Ibid.*, p. 67.
60. Lewis, *Arabs*, p. 49.
61. Parkes, *Whose Land?*, pp. 60–61.
62. *Ibid.*, p. 61.
63. David George Hogarth, "Arabs and Turks," *The Arab Bulletin*, April 21, 1917, no. 48.
64. Antonius, *Arab Awakening*, p. 267. Antonius was a prominent Arabist authority and a negotiator for the Arabs in the 1920–1930 period, and his book was influential in propagating Arab "nationalism."
65. Parkes, *Whose Land?*, p. 74.
66. Hitti, *The Arabs*, p. 81.
67. *Ibid.*, p. 83.
68. *Ibid.*, p. 89.
69. *Ibid.*
70. Hogarth, "Arabs and Turks," *The Arab Bulletin*, #48.
71. *Ibid.*
72. *Ibid.* According to Hogarth, "They themselves, even when Baghdad was filled with Semites, were patently anti-Arab and obscurely Shiah, though later they would parade conformity to the Sunna, which Baghdad itself had laid down and if Abbasid rule in Iraq will not satisfy our formula, neither will it nor will that of the Omayyads satisfy it in Egypt, North Africa, Spain or Iran. For there the subjects were non-Arab, and soon many governors would not be Arabs either, but Turks like the Tulunids of Egypt, or Berbers like the dynasties which were to detach the Mediterranean shores of Africa from the distant inland Caliphate, which knew nothing about the sea."
73. Hitti, *The Arabs*, pp. 59–60.
74. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
75. Hogarth, "Arabs and Turks," *The Arab Bulletin*, #48.
76. Lewis, *Arabs*, p. 12.

77. Ibid., p. 13.
78. Ibid., p. 14.
79. Parkes, *Whose Land?*, p. 63.
80. Hitti, *The Arabs*, pp. 48–49. See Hitti's conclusion that the tribute or collection, allotted to followers by the Koran's edict, was most important: See Sarah 9, verse 29ff, in Chapter 4 herein.
81. Parkes, *Whose Land?*, p. 65; also see Hitti, *The Arabs*, pp. 59–60; Daniel Pipes, *In the Path of God: Islam and Political Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1983).
82. Parkes, *Whose Land?*, p. 65.
83. Ibid., p. 66.
84. Ibid.
85. Hitti, *The Arabs*, p. 50.
86. Lewis, *Arabs*, pp. 14–15.
87. Steven Runciman, *A History of the Crusades*, 3 vols. (Middlesex, England: A Peregrine Book published by Penguin Books, 1965, first pub. Cambridge, 1951), vol. 2, p. 295. Runciman added, "Benjamin of Tudela was distressed to see how small their colonies were when he visited the country in about 1170." See Benjamin of Tudela, *Voyages*, ed. Adler (London, 1907), Hebrew text, pp. 26–47.
88. Runciman, *Crusades*, 2, pp. 294–295, has found that "In the kingdom of Jerusalem these (Christians) were of mixed origin, most Arabic-speaking . . . almost all members of the Orthodox Church. In the County of Tripoli some of the inhabitants were members of the Monothelete sect called the Maronites. Farther north the indigenous inhabitants were mostly Monophysites of the Jacobite Church, but there were very large colonies of Armenians, almost all of the Separated Armenian Church, and in Antioch, Lattakieh and Cilicia, considerable groups of Greek-speaking Orthodox. In addition there were in the Holy Land religious colonies of every Christian denomination. The monasteries were mainly Orthodox and Greek-speaking; but there were also Orthodox Georgian establishments, and, especially in Jerusalem itself, colonies of Monophysites, both Egyptian and Ethiopian Copts and Syrian Jacobites, and a few Latin groups who had settled there before the Crusades. Many Moslem communities had emigrated when the Christian kingdom was set up." Also see Runciman, pp. 319–323; E. G. Rey, *Les Colonies Franques de Syrie* (Paris, 1883), pp. 75–94; E. Geruli, *Etiopi in Palestina* (Rome, 1943), pp. 8ff, about Abyssinians and Copts.
89. As documented by Hogarth and other authoritative historians, Saladin, often considered an Arab, was really a Kurd. Hogarth, "Arabs and Turks," *The Arab Bulletin*.
90. De Haas, *History*, p. 300, citing Gaudefroy-Demombynes, *La Syrie au debut du Quinzieme Siecle d'après Qal Qachandi* (Paris, 1923), p. xxxii. Also see Ernest Frankenstein, *Justice for My People* (New York, 1944), p. 121.
91. Philip Graves, *Palestine, The Land of Three Faiths* (London, 1923), p. 55, n.1.
92. De Haas, *History*, p. 300. Also see Frankenstein, *Justice*, pp. 121–122.
93. Ibid., p. 259.
94. Makrizi, *Histoire des Sultans Mamlouks de L'Egypte*, trans. M. Quartremere (Paris, 1937–1945), vol. II, part II, pp. 29–30. Cited by Frankenstein, *Justice*, p. 122.
95. Compiled from data of Hogarth, Hitti, Leish, Frankenstein, Katz, Guillaume, Parkes, Ben-Sasson, *Anglo-American Survey* (1946), pp. 1–86, particularly pp. 1, 4, 5, 13, 14. For a more comprehensive chronology of entire Arab world, see Lewis, *Arabs*, pp. 179–183.
96. Lewis, *Arabs*, p. 15; also see Marshall G.S. Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam* (Chicago:



- University of Chicago Press, 1974), 3 vols., particularly 1, p. 57ff.
97. *Ibid.*, p. 17.
  98. According to de Haas, "The Turkish officials in Palestine, at all times, had declined to speak Arabic officially. In fact most of them did not know it. This resistance went back to Mamluk days, for the Arab historians noted with pride, or pleasure, when a Mamluk sovereign knew Arabic passably well." *History*, p. 446.
  99. Hogarth, "Arabs and Turks," *The Arab Bulletin*.
  100. Mark Twain, *The Innocents Abroad* (London, 1881; cited here, New York, 1966), pp. 367–369. "It was in this distressing and poverty-stricken period that Palestine was visited by writers who saw the glow of the orient, who were enamoured by its romantic coloring, and who revelled in its bizarre presentation of life. Disraeli, who visited Palestine in 1831, standing before the Tombs of the Kings, visualized the historic pageant of the people from whom he was descended. He saw Jerusalem in a blaze of emotion that left its mark on all his subsequent writings, and even on his policy as British statesman. The Frenchman Lamartine was moved to an ecstasy of another kind. To him all the bizarre characters, their pompousness, the barbaric splendor, made a great appeal." De Haas, *History*, p. 387.
  101. Had only the information of Muslim-Arab writers been available, "we would not know much about the Jews . . . during the first centuries of the Arab conquest," according to H.Z. Hirschberg, *A History of the Jews in North Africa* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974), vol. 1, p. 87. Hirschberg writes: "We are accustomed to the historical accounts of Arab writers, who almost completely ignore the existence of Jews and Christians, mentioning them and their affairs only incidentally" (p. 369). And then, often with distortion: according to Hirschberg, the woman who at one point led the Berber fight against Muslim Arabs was purported to be Jewish, and "a brutal sorceress" whose sons were "saved . . . from destruction by guiding . . . into the haven of Islam." In fact, a historian of Tunisian Jewry discovered "proof that the woman was not a Jew," and the story is judged to have been "intended as a propaganda among the Berbers for wholehearted conversion to Islam." Yet after thirteen or fourteen hundred years, it was left to scholars to devote years of painstaking research to piece together a puzzle of fragmented historical Jewish materials buried under the reams of "concentrated data from Arab authors of the 8th to 14th centuries." The notion of the "Jewish" military leader was still preserved as such in Algerian and Tunisian Jewish folklore until the nineteenth century, when the "propaganda" was finally disputed. See Hirschberg, *History*, especially pp. 87–96.
  102. Richard Hartmann, *Palestina unter den Arabern, 632–1516* (Leipzig, 1915), cited by de Haas, *History*, p. 147.
  103. De Haas, *History*, p. 258. John of Wurzburg list from Reinhold Rohricht edition, pp. 41, 69.
  104. F. Eugene Roger, *La Terre Sainte* (Paris, 1637), p. 331, cited by de Haas, *History*, p. 342.
  105. Frederich Hasselquist, *Reise nach Palastina, etc., 1749–52* (Rostock, 1762), p. 598, cited by de Haas, *History*, p. 355.
  106. Parkes, *Whose Land?*, p. 212. See Chapters 13 and 14.
  107. *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 11th ed., vol. XX, p. 604.
  108. *Ibid.*
  109. In a handbook, prepared under the direction of the historical section of the Foreign Office, no. 60, entitled "Syria and Palestine" (London, 1920), p. 56.

110. Dio Cassius, *History of the Romans*, lxix, 12–14, cited by de Haas, *History*, pp. 55–56. De Haas adds: “In the third of the Schweich Lectures of 1922 the late Israel Abrahams (‘Campaigns in Palestine from Alexander the Great,’ London, 1927) belittles Dio Cassius’ record of this war, and repeats the suggestion that the Jews were influenced by Hadrian’s ‘consent to the rebuilding of the Temple.’ This rebuilding myth, depending upon the alleged visit of Hadrian to Palestine on the death of Trajan, has been fully dealt with by Henderson in his biography of Hadrian. All the dimensions of the war, its gravity, and its duration, are fully attested by the inscriptions relating to the legions and by the honors distributed at the end of the campaign. The archeological records, carefully analyzed, support Dio Cassius and not his would-be corrector.”
111. Carl Hermann Voss, *The Palestine Problem Today, Israel and Its Neighbors* (Boston, 1953), p. 13.
112. Gunner Edward Webbe, *Palestine Exploration Fund, Quarterly Statement*, p. 86, cited in de Haas, *History*, p. 338.
113. De Haas, *History*, p. 337, citing *Palestine Exploration Fund, Quarterly Statement*, 1925, p. 197, translation of Latin manuscript by a Franciscan pilgrim.
114. Henry Maundrell, *The Journal of Henry Maundrell from Aleppo to Jerusalem, 1697*, Bohn’s edition (London, 1848), respectively pp. 477, 428, 450.
115. Thomas Shaw, *Travels and Observations Relating to Several Parts of Barbary and the Levant* (London, 1767), p. 331ff. De Haas notes: “Hasselquist, the Swedish botanist, munching some roasted ears of green wheat which a shepherd generously shared with him, in the plain of Acre, reflected that the white bread of his northern homeland and the roasted wheat ears symbolized the difference between the two civilizations. Had he known that Mukaddasi boasted in the tenth century of the excellence of Palestine’s white bread he might have been still more impressed by the low estate to which the country had fallen in seven hundred years. . . . Hasselquist joined a party of four thousand pilgrims who went to Jericho under an escort of three hundred soldiers. He estimated that four thousand Christians, mostly of the eastern rites, entered Jaffa each year, and as many Jews. The Armenian Convent in Jerusalem alone could accommodate a thousand persons. The botanist viewed *the pilgrim tolls as the best resource of an uncultivated and uninhabited country*. . . . Ramleh was a ruin.” (Emphasis added.) De Haas, *History*, pp. 349, 358, 360, citing Frederich Hasselquist, *Reise nach Palastina*, etc., 1749–1752, pp. 139, 145–146, 190.
116. Norman Lewis, “The Frontier of Settlement in Syria, 1800–1950,” in Charles Issawi, ed., *The Economic History of the Middle East* (Chicago, 1966), p. 260.
117. Count Constantine F. Volney, *Travels Through Syria and Egypt in the Years 1783, 1784, 1785* (London, 1788), vol. 2, p. 147. According to Volney, “. . . we with difficulty recognize Jerusalem. . . . remote from every road, it seems neither to have been calculated for a considerable mart of commerce, nor the centre of a great consumption. . . . [the population] is supposed to amount to twelve to fourteen thousand. . . . The second place deserving notice, is Bait-el-labm, or Bethlehem, . . . The soil is the best in all these districts . . . but as is the case everywhere else, cultivation is wanting. They reckon about six hundred men in this village capable of bearing arms. . . . The third and last place of note is Habroun, or Hebron, the most powerful village in all this quarter, and . . . able to arm eight or nine hundred men . . .” (pp. 303–325).
118. Volney, *Travels*, vol. 2, p. 431.

119. A. Keith, *The Land of Israel* (Edinburgh, 1843), p. 465. "The population (viz., of the whole of Syria), rated by Volney at two million and a half, is now estimated at half that amount."
120. J.S. Buckingham, *Travels in Palestine* (London, 1821), p. 146.
121. *Ibid.*, p. 162.
122. James Mangles and the Honorable C.L. Irby, *Travels in Egypt and Nubia* (London, 1823), p. 295.
123. Brockhaus, *Allg. deutsch Real-Encyklopaedie*, 7th ed. (Leipzig, 1827), vol. VIII, p. 206.
124. S. Olin, *Travels in Egypt, Arabia Petraea and the Holy Land* (New York, 1843), vol. 2, pp. 438–439.
125. *Ibid.*, pp. 77–78.
126. No. 238, "Report of the Commerce of Jerusalem During the Year 1863," F.O. 195/808, May 1864. ". . . The population of the City of Jerusalem is computed at 15,000, of whom about 4,500 Moslem, 8,000 Jews, and the rest Christians of various denominations . . ." From A.H. Hyamson, ed., *The British Consulate in Jerusalem*, 2 vols. (London, 1939–1941), vol. 2, p. 331.
127. James Finn to the Earl of Clarendon, Jerusalem, September 15, 1857, F.O. 78/1294 (Pol. No. 36). Finn wrote further that "The result of my observations is, that we have here Jews, who have been to the United States, but have returned to their Holy Land—Jews of Jerusalem do go to Australia and instead of remaining there, do return hither, even without the allurements of agriculture and its concomitants." *Ibid.*, 1, pp. 249–52.
128. J.B. Forsyth, *A Few Months in the East* (Quebec, 1861), p. 188.
129. H.B. Tristram, *The Land of Israel: A Journal of Travels in Palestine* (London, 1865), p. 490.
130. Mark Twain, *The Innocents Abroad*, pp. 349, 366, 367.
131. *Ibid.*, p. 349.
132. *Ibid.*, p. 429.
133. *Ibid.*, p. 366, 375.
134. *Ibid.*, pp. 441–442.
135. *Ibid.*
136. Jules Hoche, *Les Pays des croisades* (Paris, n.d.), p. 10, cited by David Landes, "Palestine Before the Zionists," *Commentary*, Feb., 1976, p. 49.
137. Brother Lievin de Hamme, *Guide indicateur*, vol. III, pp. 163, 190.
138. The Reverend Samuel Manning, *Those Holy Fields* (London, 1874), pp. 14–17. W.M. Thomson reiterated the Reverend Manning's observations: "How melancholy is this utter desolation! Not a house, not a trace of inhabitants, not even shepherds, seen everywhere else, appear to relieve the dull monotony. . . . Isaiah says that Sharon shall be wilderness, and the prediction has become a sad and impressive reality." Thomson, *The Land and the Book* (London: T. Nelsons & Sons, 1866), p. 506ff.
139. W.C. Prime, *Tent Life in the Holy Land* (New York, 1857), p. 240, cited by Fred Gottheil, "The Population of Palestine, Circa 1875," *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 15, no. 3, October 1979.
140. S.C. Bartlett, *From Egypt to Palestine* (New York, 1879), p. 409, cited in *ibid.*
141. *Ibid.*, p. 410.
142. W. Allen, *The Dead Sea: A New Route to India* (London, 1855), p. 113, cited in *ibid.*

143. W.M. Thomson, *The Land and the Book* (New York: Harper Bros., 1862), p. 466, cited in *ibid.*
144. E.L. Wilson, *In Scripture Lands* (New York, n.d.), p. 316, cited in *ibid.*
145. Colonel C.R. Conder, *Heth and Moab* (London, 1883), pp. 380, 376.
146. *Ibid.*, p. 366.
147. Pierre Loti, *La Galilee* (Paris, 1895), pp. 37–41, 69, 85–86, 69, cited by David Landes, "Palestine Before the Zionists," *Commentary*, February 1976, pp. 48–49.
148. Landes, "Palestine," p. 49.
149. *Palestine Royal Commission Report*, p. 6, para. 12.
150. *The Koran*, Surah 8, "The Spoils," v. 41.
151. "In the book, *Kitab al-Kharaj* (Book of Offerings) by Abu-Yussuf, a disciple of Abu-Hanifa, in the chapter on 'The Division of the Spoils,' it is deduced from that chapter of the Koran, that *ganima*, the spoils, after a fifth has been set aside from it to God, belong to the victorious Moslems, not individually, but to all together, the collective body." See the translation of this chapter in the periodical *Der Islam*, vol. I, pp. 347–353, appendix to the article by F.F. Schmidt, 'Die Occupato im islamischen Recht,' *ibid.*; p. 300ff., cited by A. Granott, *The Land System in Palestine* (London, 1952), p. 327, n. 8.
152. Belin, 'Du Régime des fiefs militaires dans l'Islamisme, et principalement en Turquie,' *Journal Asiatique*, 1870, Sixième série, tome XV, pp. 196–197. Cited in A. Granott, *The Land System in Palestine* (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1952), p. 18.
153. "During the seventeenth century some of the more permanently established leaseholders began to coalesce with the landowners into a new landed aristocracy—the *ayan-i memleket* or country notables, whose appearance and usurpation of some of the functions and authority of government were already noted at the time." Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London, 1961), p. 33. Lewis notes the following: cf. the remarks of Huseyin Hezarfen, writing in 1669 (R. Anhegger, "Hezarfen Huseyin Efendi'nin Osmanli devlet teskilatina dair mulahazalari," *TM*, x(1951–3), 372, 387. The *ayan-i vilayet* already appear occasionally in *Kanuns* of the sixteenth century (Barkan, *XV ve XVI inci asirlarda . . . Kaunular*, i (1943, index).
154. A. Granott, *The Land System in Palestine*, pp. 31–32. According to de Haas: "The sultans regarded Palestine as their personal domain, acquired by the law of arms and war. The inhabitants, except a few tribes like the Druzes who were never conquered, could not pretend to real or personal property. Even private inheritance reverted to the sultan. Though the peasants were not serfs as under the feudal system, and under no obligation of service, all the country was crown land. When this system of crown land was compromised by grants to nobles, the peasants did not go with the land. The census when it was introduced, was employed for imperial military purposes. The individual could not be imprisoned for debt though the village, as a unit, could be made to suffer for its collective obligation. The struggle, therefore, was between the land and the tax collector. If the assessor arrived at the right moment he seized what he claimed, and satisfied his demand. The peasant had no interest in thorough cultivation, or in the fertilization of the soil. His primitive tools were evidence of his poverty and indifference. The like picture was presented in Greece to the middle of the nineteenth century." From de Haas, *History*, pp. 361–362; also see Volney, *Travels*, vol. 2, pp. 370, 406, 408. (Emphasis added.)
155. Granott, *System*, p. 31.
- "They were abolished by the well-known edict of Tanzimat ('the new regime') . . . of

- Gulhane in 1839. This proclamation declared that, in spite of its deplorable consequences, there was still to be found in the Ottoman Empire the ‘destructive principle’ of *iltizam*—a principle which produced the unlimited rule of the governors in the provinces and a crushing exploitation of the inhabitants. The object of the reforms was to enable the State to recover for itself all its rights of ownership of the landed properties” (p. 32).
156. Volney, *Travels*, vol. 2, pp. 406–431.
  157. Volney, *Travels*, vol. 2, p. 411. He also said, “When the peasants are in want of money to purchase grain, cattle, etc. they can find none but by mortgaging the whole, or part of their future crop, greatly under its value. The danger of letting money appear closes the hands of all by whom it is possessed; and if it is parted with it must be from the hope of a rapid and exorbitant gain; the most moderate interest is twelve per cent, the usual rate is twenty, and it frequently rises as high even as thirty.”
  158. Issawi, *Economic History*, p. 72. “*Their extortion was usually proportionate to the shortness of their tenure*; this led the government to introduce in the 18th century a system of life farming of taxes, *malikane*, in the hope of checking abuses but its application was not universal.” (Emphasis added.)
  159. *Ibid.*
  160. Granott, *System*, p. 57.
  161. I.M. Smilianskaya, “The Disintegration of Feudal Relations in Syria and Lebanon in the Middle of the Nineteenth Century,” from Issawi, *Economic History*, p. 234.
  162. Olin, *Travels in Egypt*, p. 138.
  163. Hope Simpson, *Report*, p. 146.
  164. W.G.A. Ormsby-Gore, Secretary of State for the Colonies, testimony at 32nd session of Permanent Mandates Commission, August 1937.
  165. See C.F. Volney, *Travels*, vol. 2, pp. 406–431; Bernard Lewis, *Emergence of Modern Turkey*, p. 33, text and n. 21.
  166. John Lewis Burckhardt, *Travels in Syria and the Holy Land* (London, 1882), p. 299; according to Smilianskaya, “Reports from Volney, Petkovich and Uspenskii of peasants migrating in search of a living were substantiated by Urquehart.” “Disintegration,” in Issawi, *Economic History*, p. 235.
  167. Burckhardt, *Travels*, p. 299.
  168. *Ibid.*, cited by Norman Lewis, “The Frontier of Settlement in Syria, 1800–1950,” *International Affairs*, XXXI (January 1955), pp. 48–60; reprinted in Issawi, *Economic History*, p. 261.
  169. N. Lewis, “Frontiers,” p. 261.
  170. Writer P. Uspenskii, Russian Foreign Policy Archives (Embassy in Constantinople Fund), case 915, 1. 174, cited by Smilianskaya in “Disintegration,” in Issawi, *Economic History*, p. 235.
  171. *Ibid.*, pp. 234–235, n. 46.
  172. N. Lewis, “Frontier,” Issawi, *Economic History*, p. 265. He cites C. Doughty, *Travels in Arabia Deserta* (New York, n.d.).
  173. “When the mandatory powers took over the territories of these four countries [Palestine, Trans-Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq] [*sic*] after the last war, the system of land tenure was based on the Ottoman Land Code. This was a body of civil law . . . on the statute books during the nineteenth century. Its *weakness was that it was never generally enforced* . . . [emphasis added] . . . the main legal categories into which land was divided by the Ottoman Land Code (promulgated in 1858) . . . are:

"1. *Mulk land*: This is the land held in absolute freehold ownership. It is governed by the provisions of sacred law and not by those of the Civil Statute Law. Landownership comprises two rights: the *raqaba*, or right of absolute ownership, and the *tasarruf*, or right of the *usufruct* of land. In *mulk* tenure both rights belong to the individual.

"2. *Miri land*: . . . the *raqaba* or absolute ownership belongs to the state but the *usufruct* to the individual. It is a form of heritable leasehold ownership in which the state leases land to the individual.

"3. *Waqf land*: . . . dedicated to some pious purpose and is not very important in this region.

"4. *Matruka*: Land reserved for some public purpose as for example village threshing floors.

"5. *Mawat land*: Dead or unreclaimed land.

". . . these different divisions do not cover the leasehold tenancies between landlord and cultivator. . . . The Ottoman Land Code apparently does none of the things that a land-tenure code ought to do."

- [The purpose of these categories of land, then, was really] "the collection of revenue. The real purpose of the code was to tax every piece of land, and therefore to establish clearly the title to it by registering its legal owner as a *miri* owner. The state's claim to ownership really meant only that the state did not recognize ownership unless the titles were registered and the land therefore taxable." Doreen War-riner, "Land Tenure in the Fertile Crescent," in Issawi, *Economic History*, pp. 72–73.
174. Elie Kedourie, "Islam Today," in Bernard Lewis, ed., *Islam and the Arab World* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1976), p. 331. According to Kedourie, the new state law "resulted in the transformation of customary tenures and of land in common or tribal ownership or use into state-registered, individually owned free-holds. This reform rode rough-shod over customary rights which, though not set down in official documents, yet had immemorially regulated agrarian relationships in large parts of the empire."
175. Thomson, *Land and Book*, 1868 edition (New York: Harper & Bros.), vol. I, pp. 497–498.
176. Roderique H. Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire* (Princeton, 1963), p. 63. Davison refers to "forceful" evidence of such conditions in Mustafa Fazil Pasa's *Lettre adresse a S.M. le Sultan* (n.p., n.d., "but Paris, either late 1866 or early 1867").
177. *Ibid.*, p. 65.
178. Fatima Aliye, *Ahmed Cevdet Pasa and His Time* (Istanbul, 1332), pp. 33–34, cited by Davison, *Reform*, p. 67.
179. Davison, *Reform*, p. 69, citing Ziya Bey from *Hurriyet* #5, as quoted in *Tanzimat*, I, p. 841 (The *Tanzimat*, on the Occasion of its Hundredth Anniversary) (Istanbul, 1940).
180. Ahmed Midhat, who wrote, "in exile, for Turkey and against Russia," quoted by Davison, *Reform*, p. 69.
181. Suleyman Pasa zade Sami, ed., *Suleyman Pasa muhakemesi* (Suleyman Pasha's Trial) (Istanbul, 1328). "A biography and defense of his constitutionalist father by the son, with large portions on his interrogation and trial arising from his generalship in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877," cited by Davison, *Reform*, p. 69.
182. Granott, *Land*, p. 58.
183. Thomson, *Land and Book*, pp. 497–498; C.T. Wilson, *Peasant Life in the Holyland*

- (London, 1906), pp. 288–297; also see Issawi, *Economic History*; Davison, *Reform: Granott, Land*.
184. C.T. Wilson, *Peasant Life in the Holy Land* (London: John Murray, 1906), pp. 288, 290, cited by Granott, *Land System*, p. 64.
  185. Issawi, *Economic History*, p. 258. He adds: "This process had been described and analyzed, with unrivalled depth and vividness, by the fourteenth century historian and sociologist, Ibn Khaldun."
  186. Issawi, *Economic History*, p. 258.
  187. Volney, *Travels*, vol. 2 (1787 ed.), pp. 196–197.
  188. Issawi, *Economic History*, p. 258. A "vivid account" by the British consul in Aleppo: Skene to Bulwer, May 12, 1860, FO 78 No. 1538.
  189. N. Lewis, "Frontier," in Issawi, *Economic History*, pp. 258–260.
  190. J.L. Burckhardt, *Travels*, pp. 301–302. At one spot, ". . . the whole neighborhood of Aleppo is infested by obscure tribes of Arab and Kurdine robbers, who through the negligence of the Janissaries, acquire every day more insolence and more confidence in the success of their enterprises. Caravans of forty or fifty camels have in the course of last winter been several times attacked and plundered at five hundred yards from the city gate; not a week passes without somebody being ill-treated and stripped in the gardens near the town; and the robbers have been sometimes taken their night's rest in one of the suburbs of the city, and there sold their cheaply acquired booty" (pp. 654–655).
  191. H.B. Tristram, *The Land of Israel: A Journal of Travels in Palestine* (London, 1865), p. 490. According to de Haas, "To 1900 Beersheba had no permanent inhabitants, but about that year the government obtained control of the Negeb, and in order to exercise police power over the Bedouins established a station at the site of the Biblical wells." *History*, p. 445. Thus Beersheba in 1909 became "a straggling little town with government buildings, a few stores . . . and dwelling houses for eight hundred people." Ellsworth Huntington, *Palestine and its Transformation* (Boston, 1911), p. 115. Across the fifteen miles between Debir and Beersheba, Huntington found "no sign of any village, merely three ruins, and the tents of some Bedouins." The land was so impoverished that the government rented 7,500 acres in the Negev for an annual rental of \$2,000. Huntington, *Palestine*, p. 117.
  192. Lortet, *La Syrie d'aujourd'hui: Voyages dans la Phénicie, le Liban et la Judée, 1875–80* (Paris, 1881), p. 137.
  193. Smilianskaya, "Disintegration," in Issawi, *Economic History*, p. 234. Also see account in 1841 by K.M. Bazilli, Russian Consul General in Beirut, Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossii, fond "Posolstvo v Konstantinopole" (Russian Foreign Policy Archives, "Embassy in Constantinople" Fund), case 718, 1.112, cited by Smilianskaya, "Disintegration."
  194. *Ibid.* ". . . representatives of the feudal class used the capital they accumulated by the exploitation of peasants. This capital was not invested in agriculture as a rule, but in trade and usurious operations. . . . One branch of the ancient feudal family of Dahdah, owners of a *muqata'a* in northern Lebanon, had commercial offices in Marseilles, Paris and London" (p. 239).
  195. "The Jews in Jerusalem are in general very poor. . . . the whole Jewish people are suffering the greatest distress—and if some relief be not afforded . . . whole families must, during this next winter, perish from want. . . . In the midst of their wretched condition they look upon 500 as acknowledged paupers. . . ." Young to Palmerston,

- Jerusalem, May 25, 1839, FO 78/368 (No. 13), cited in Hyamson, *British Consulate*, vol. I, p. 5.
196. Exact population statistics for the mid-nineteenth century are unlikely, and estimates of the period varied broadly. One source, *Murray's Handbook for Travellers in Syria and Palestine* (1858), was reprinted in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 8th ed., vol. XVII, pp. 180–198 (1860). According to that set of statistics, covering a wider area than historic Palestine—the whole Turkish Pashalic of Sedon—coupled with the 1895 figures of Vital Cuinet, *Syrie, Liban*, the number of Jews in Palestine in 1858 is roughly estimated at about 15,000.
197. In 1839 the British Consul wrote from Jerusalem: “I commenced with the intention of numbering the whole Jewish population. . . . I found the religious prejudice so strong against their being numbered at all—for by their law it is not allowed—that at present I am only able to give your Lordship the aggregate number, which I think may be considered as pretty accurate—but certainly, *rather under, than overstated, as the Jews will ever be considered less in number than they really are.*” (Emphasis added.) Young to Palmerston, Jerusalem, May 25, 1839, FO 78/368 (No. 13), from Hyamson, *British Consulate*, pp. 4–7.
198. James Finn, *Stirring Times or Record from Jerusalem Consular Chronicles* from 1853–1856 (London, 1878), vol. I, pp. 180–181.
199. Mandel, *Arabs and Zionism*, p. xxii. The office of Mufti of Jerusalem belonged to the Husseini family from the “mid-19th century on,” Porath, “Social Aspects,” in *Society*, Milson, ed., p. 98.
200. D. Warriner, “Land Tenure,” in Issawi, *Economic History*, p. 77. One factor that “influences the land system is the existence of a parasitic landlord class, a result of the Turkish system in which grants of land were made to political supporters of the sultan or in which powerful chiefs seized in the rights to farm taxes. But the more general cause for the rise of the city-notable type of landlord is the perpetual indebtedness of the peasants, which results from the uncertainty of grain yields. One or two years of bad harvests impoverish cultivators, force them to borrow even to buy seed, and after borrowing at high rates of interest, they are eventually forced to sell their holdings to wealthy merchants in the town and to continue to exist as tenants of the big landowners. . . .
- “The landlords who have acquired land in this way are rarely farmers and may not even visit the villages they own. . . . Landownership is a credit operation and nothing more. . . . In this case the large landowner . . . appears simply in the role of a money lender without responsibility to the land. This type of ownership is injurious, since it prevents constructive investment in the land.”
201. G. Schumacher, “Der arabische Pflug,” *Zeitschrift des deutschen Palaestina-Vereins*, 1889, Bd. XII, p. 165. According to Granott, *Land System*, pp. 335–336, n. 13: “There was no need to flee to a distance in order to escape the pursuers, since there were places of refuge within the country itself. Among the swamps of Nahr ez Zerqa in Samaria, between Caesarea and Tantura, there are several lonely stretches without a footpath and without any connection with the outer world, so that it is almost impossible to find anyone hiding there. These marshes were used as places of refuge by the Arabs who ran away to escape confiscation of their property, and other oppressive requirements of the Turkish Government. See G.A. Smith, *The Historical Geography of the Holy Land* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1931, 25th ed.), p. 145.”



202. Hermann Guthe, *Palaestina* (Bielefeld und Leipzig: Verlag von Velhagen und Klasing, 1908), p. 47; cited by Granott, *Land System*, p. 61.
203. Granott, *Land System*, p. 61.
204. Charles M. Doughty, *Travels in Arabia Deserta* (New York: Random House, n.d.), p. 56.
205. N. Lewis, "Frontier," in Issawi, *Economic History*, p. 261.
206. *Ibid.*, p. 263.
207. Makrizi, *Histoire des Sultans Mamlouks*, II, pp. 29–30, cited in Frankenstein, *Justice*, p. 122.
208. Parkes, *Whose Land?*, pp. 210, 212. See Parkes' map of various ethnic settlements in Palestine, and their locations, p. 211.
209. N. Lewis, "Frontier," in Issawi, *Economic History*, p. 266, 263.
210. De Haas, *History*, p. 419.
211. *Ibid.*, p. 425; 3,000 Albanians were brought into Acre, according to Sir Sidney Smith's dispatch of May 9, 1799, in de Haas, *History*, p. 355.
212. N. Lewis, "Frontier," p. 266. According to Davis Trietsch, "In the last decades, several Turkish provinces have been lost to Christian neighbors because the Christian population was recognized as independent by the State (Ottomans). *Many Muslims had to leave.*" (Emphasis added.) *Jüdische Emigration und Kolonisation* (Berlin, 1923), p. 31.
213. Abdel Razak Kader, *The Jerusalem Post*, January 8, 1969.
214. Sherif Hussein, *Al-Qibla*, Mecca, March 23, 1918.
215. Ameen Rihani, *Around the Coasts of Arabia* (London, 1930), pp. 101, 109, 96–109.

### 9. *Dhimmi* in the Holy Land

1. "Still, the Jew in Jerusalem is not estimated in value much above a dog. . . . What the Jew has to endure, at all hands, is not to be told. Like the miserable dog without an owner he is kicked by one because he crosses his path, and cuffed by another because he cries out." British Consul Wm. T. Young to Viscount Palmerston, Jerusalem, 25 May 1839, F.O.78/363 (No. 13), in Albert M. Hyamson, ed., *The British Consulate in Jerusalem*, 2 vols. (London, 1939), 1, p.6. Christians, too, were the occasional scapegoat as infidels, though they were usually less vulnerable, because of their protection by a powerful European base: In 1860, for example, a consul in Damascus reported of "an awful day of slaughter . . ." when "the cry was got up that the Christians had murdered some Mahometans; and . . . not a Christian found was spared." British Consul Jas. Brant, July 12, 1860, Enclosure 4 in No. 23, in *Despatches from Her Majesty's Consuls in the Levant, Respecting Past or Apprehended Disturbances in Syria, 1858–1860* (London: Harrison and Sons, 1860), p. 53.
2. James Finn to the Earl of Malmesbury, Jerusalem, July 8, 1858, F.O. 78/1383 (Pol. No. 12), in Hyamson, *Consulate*, 1, p. 260.
3. *Palestine Royal Commission Report* (Peel Report) (London, 1937), p. 7, para. 14. For example, immediately upon the end of the Crusaders' reign, some 300 rabbis made a pilgrimage from Provence and Flanders to rebuild the Jewish communities that the Crusaders had unsuccessfully attempted to eradicate. Martin Gilbert, *Exile and Return* (Philadelphia, 1978), p. 12. At the time of the Crusaders, "a full thousand years after the fall of the Jewish state, there were Jewish communities all over the country. Fifty of them are known to us; they include Jerusalem, Tiberias, Ramleh,

- Ashkalon, Caesarea, and Gaza." Samuel Katz, *Battleground, Fact and Fantasy in Palestine* (New York, 1973), p. 89. In the eleventh–twelfth centuries, the time of the Crusaders' conquest, although the vast majority of the Holy Land's inhabitants were "native Christians"—most of them were "of mixed origin, most Arabic-speaking, and carelessly known as Christian Arabs." Steven Runciman, *A History of the Crusades*, 3 vols. (London, 1965), vol. 2, pp. 294–295; Jewish communities were plentiful enough to fight as a group and "were among the most vigorous defenders of Jerusalem against the Crusaders." Katz, *Battleground*, p. 89. In Haifa "The Jews almost single-handedly defended . . . against the Crusaders, holding out in the besieged town for a whole month (June–July, 1099)." Katz, *Battleground*, p. 89. The fact is that it was at the time the Jews were prohibited by law from becoming citizens of the Holy Land that Jehudah Halevi, the famous Jewish writer and poet (whose travails were discussed in earlier pages) immigrated to Judah-cum-Palestine and commanded his fellow Jews to follow. See Chapter 5.
4. Yasser Arafat, *New York Times*, December 3, 1968, p. 6.
  5. In fact, the 1946 *Anglo-American Committee Report* remarked that, "An immediate result of the *success of Arab terrorism* was the *beginning of Jewish terrorism* and, even more significant, a closing of the ranks, a tightening of the discipline, and a general militarization of Jewish life in Palestine. . . . a citizen army which felt that at any moment it might have to fight for its very existence." *Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry Report*, April 20, 1946, Lausanne, Switzerland, p. 32. (Emphasis added.) This seems to contradict the mournful complaints that the "old" Israel of the '50s and '60s has been "abandoned" to "militarism."
  6. For example, during the speeches before an audience of 90 to 100, at the organizing meeting of the Chicago Chapter of the Palestine Human Rights Committee, activist David Dellinger and Professor Ibrahim Abu-Lughod discussed, from the dais, the "parallel between Israel and Nazi Germany." November 1980.
  7. See Chapter 7.
  8. Gérard Chaliand, *The Palestine Resistance* (London, 1972), p. 10, cited by Lewis, *Islam in History*, p. 320, n. 11.
  9. Abd Al-Monem Al-Sawi, *Al-Gumhuriya*, August 8, 1982.
  10. Anis Mansour, "What if the PLO Leaves Lebanon?" *October* magazine, August 8, 1982.
  11. In *Palaestina Handbuch*, in addition to the large Jewish populations in Jaffa (10,000), Safed (8,000–10,000) and Haifa (1,600–2,000), Davis Trietsch found a Jewish population in the following towns as of 1910: Gaza (160), Ramle (100), Beersheba (20), Acre (50—twenty years earlier there were nearly 1,000, but most went to Haifa), Sh'fa Amr (20), and Hebron (1,000—according to Nawratski, 1,500—5.5 to 8 percent of the total population). Davis Trietsch, *Palaestina Handbuch*, 2nd ed. (Berlin-Schmargedorf: Orient-Verlag, 1910), pp. 34–40, 41–44. Compare another scholar's figures for 1913, which are higher: Curt Nawratski, *Die jüdische Kolonisation Palastinas* (Munich: Verlag Ernst Reinhardt, 1914), p. 394ff. In 1922, the Jewish populations were: Gaza (54), Khan Yunis (1), Beersheba (98), Ramle (35), Lydda (11), Hebron (430), Bethlehem (2), Ramallah (7), Tulkarem (23), Nablus (16), Jenin (7), Nazareth (53), Beisan [Beit Shean] (41), Acre (78). Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, *A Survey of Palestine* (1946), vol. 1, p. 148.
  12. By 1944, in all of the towns listed above—except Acre (50) and Lydda (20)—the Anglo-American Committee's *Survey*, p. 151, reports the number of Jews to be zero.

13. As one of many examples of Arabs victimized by Arab terrorism, in March of 1970 the *New York Times* reported that grenade attacks had killed 27 in the Gaza Strip, wounding 132. According to the report, “Although Arab guerrillas are acknowledged to be responsible for the terrorism, most of the victims are Arabs. Only four of last month’s fatalities and 16 of the wounded were Israelis.”

According to prominent Palestinian Arabs in the United States, the “secular democratic state” would be the only free state in the Middle East. Professor Ibrahim Abu Lughod, Northwestern University, stated in 1980 that “The PLO has the consensus of its population. There is no coercive policy.” November 1980 address to Palestine Human Rights Committee, Chicago.

Yet after the murder of a Palestinian Arab from Ramallah, the PLO United Nations observer Zehdi Labib Terzi told an incredulous NBC interviewer that “Those who collaborate with the enemy should be executed.” December 26, 1977. For earlier examples, see Chapter 14.

14. James Parkes, *Whose Land?* (Great Britain, 1970), pp. 70–71.
15. *Ibid.*
16. Martin Kabtanik, *Journey to Jerusalem* (1491), from Gilbert, *Exile and Return*, p. 19.
17. Arnold van Harff, *The Pilgrimage of Arnold van Harff* (London, 1946), p. 217.
18. Felix Fabri, *The Wanderings of Felix Fabri* (London, 1897), p. 130, cited by Katz, *Battleground*, p. 92.
19. David Landes, “Palestine Before the Zionists,” *Commentary*, February 1976, p. 52.
20. Jacob de Haas, *History of Palestine* (New York, 1934), p. 334.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 338; also see Katz, *Battleground*, p. 93. For additional information on Murad III see C. Brockelmann, *History of the Islamic Peoples* (New York, 1960), pp. 302, 328; Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London, 1961), p. 27.
22. *Ibid.* According to de Haas, “Solomon Ashkenazi, [Murad’s] confidential agent, prevented the execution of this decree. . . . Sandys, however, [George Sandys, *A Relation of a Journey Begun in 1610* (London, 1627)] infers that the Jews were saved by Esther Kiera, who was the confidant of the Sultan’s chief wife, and a great power in Constantinople till 1600, when she was butchered by the Janizaries.”
23. *Ibid.* De Haas cites an illustrative description of Jerusalem in 1590 by Gunner Edward Webbe, a British traveler, in the *Palestine Exploration Fund, Quarterly Statement*, p. 86.
24. Katz, *Battleground*, pp. 96–98. “Among the *immigrants* who began arriving when the Crusaders’ grip on Palestine had been broken by Saladin was an organized group of three hundred rabbis who came from France [Provence] and England [Flanders] in the year 1210 to strengthen especially the Jewish communities of Jerusalem, Acre and Ramleh. Their work proved in vain. A generation later came the destruction by the Mongol invaders. Yet no sooner had they passed than a new immigrant, Moses Nachmanides, came to Jerusalem, finding only two Jews, a dyer and his son; but he and the disciples who answered his call reestablished the community.

“Though Yehuda Halevi and Nachmanides were the most famous medieval preachers of *aliyah*, they were not the only ones. From the twelfth century onward, the surviving writings of a long series of Jewish travelers described their experiences in Palestine. Some of them remained to settle; all propagated the national duty. . . .

“There were periods, moreover, when the Popes ordered their adherents to prevent Jewish travel to Palestine. For most of the fifteenth century the Italian

maritime states denied Jews the use of ships for getting to Palestine, thus forcing them to abandon their project or to make the whole journey by a roundabout land route, adding . . . the dangers of movement through Germany, Poland, and Southern Russia or through the inhospitable Balkans and a Black Sea crossing before reaching the comparative safety of Turkey. In 1433, shortly after the ban was imposed, there came a vigorous call by Yitzhak Tsarefati, urging the Jews to come by way of then tolerant Turkey. Immigration of the bolder spirits continued.”

25. *Ibid.*, pp. 96–97.
26. Siebald Rieter and Johann Tucker, cited by Katz, *Battleground*, pp. 97–98.
27. Katz, *Battleground*, p. 93.
28. *Palestine Royal Commission Report*, pp. 11–12.
29. John Hayman and Joseph von Egmont, *Travels* (London, 1759), cited by Katz, *Battleground*, p. 93.
30. H.H. Ben-Sasson, *Toledot Hayehudim Bi-Mei Habeinayim* (Tel Aviv, 1969), pp. 239–240.
31. Y. Ben-Zvi, *The Land of Israel and Its Settlements During the Turkish Regime*, pp. 205–206, cited by David Ben-Gurion, *Israel, A Personal History* (Tel Aviv, 1971), p. 15.
32. Ben-Gurion, *Israel*, p. 15.
33. See Katz, *Battleground*, p. 94.
34. *Ibid.*
35. Ibn Barouk bought the rule under the reign of Murad IV (1623–1640). De Haas, *History*, p. 342.
36. *Ibid.* De Haas notes that “In 1630, owing to the renewal of the Red and White feuds, Bethlehem was almost destroyed. In 1644–45 Nazareth, which contained some sixty ruined houses, was captured by the Pasha of Safed, and the population fled.” Until 1658 in the holy Christian town of Nazareth, “*none but Muslims were permitted to settle* there. Later a few Greek Christians were admitted to the town, which became a center for the Turkish cavalry and by the end of the century numbered eighty-one houses.” (Emphasis added.)
37. A.Y. Brawer, *Haaretz* (Tel Aviv, 1929), p. 169, from *Palestine, A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies*, published for the Esco Foundation for Palestine, Inc. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947), pp. 519–520.
38. De Haas, *History*, p. 345, citing M. Franco, *Essai sur l’Histoire des Israelites de l’Empire Ottoman* (Paris, 1897), p. 88.
39. R.P. Michael, *Voyage Nouveau de la Terre-Sainte* (Paris, 1702), pp. 58, 563.
40. Ben-Gurion, *Israel*, p. 15. Sheikh Daher invited Rabbi Chaim Aboulafia, who commenced “renewing the tradition of Don Joseph Nasi in settling Jews in the villages and establishing an agricultural community in nearby Shfaram.”
41. *Ibid.*
42. Katz, *Battleground*, p. 94.
43. John Lewis Burckhardt, *Travels in Syria and the Holy Land* (London, 1822), p. 317.
44. De Haas, *History*, p. 360.
45. E.D. Clarke, *Travels* (1812), pp. 364–365. According to Clarke the “Butcher’s” real name of Ahmed was obscured by his acts. Ahmed had sold himself into slavery as a boy in Constantinople and was eventually taken by Ali Bey into Egypt, where Ahmed bragged of his achievement of the rank of governor; see also Moshe Ma’oz, “Changes in the Position of the Jewish Communities of Palestine and Syria in

- Mid-Nineteenth Century,” in *Studies on Palestine During the Ottoman Period*, Ma'oz, ed. (Jerusalem, 1975), p. 145.
46. Baron Geramb, monk of the Order of La Trappe, *Pilgrimage to Jerusalem and Mount Sinai* (Philadelphia, 1840), vol. 1, p. 288.
  47. De Haas, *History*, p. 368. Also see an interesting account in R.A. Stewart Macalister and E.W.G. Masterman, “A History of the Doings of the Fellahin during the First Half of the Nineteenth Century from Native Sources,” *Palestine Exploration Fund, Quarterly Statement*, 1906 (London), pp. 221–225.
  48. Salomon Munk, *La Palestine, description géographique, etc.* (Paris, 1845), p. 648, as cited by de Haas, *History*, p. 367.
  49. William Jowett, “Christian Researches,” 1823–1824, quoted by James Aikken Wylie, *Modern Judea* (London, 1850), pp. 293–294.
  50. De Haas, *History*, p. 368; also see Ma'oz, “Changes,” in *Studies*, pp. 143–145; in Arabic, Abd al'Qadir al Maghribi, “Yahud al-Sham mundhu Mi'at Am,” *Majallat al-Majama' al-'Ilmi al'Arabi*, vol. IX (1929), p. 642, cited by Ma'oz, “Changes,” p. 143; in Hebrew, see S. Lulqo, *Aliyatah Shel Mishpahat Farhi ri-Yridatah*, M.A. seminar paper, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1966, cited by Ma'oz, “Changes,” p. 144.
  51. *Ibid.*
  52. *Ibid.*
  53. According to de Haas: “Scores of . . . fiendish acts are reported of him. His spirit of cruelty spread. The Nablusians, in 1785, began a persecution of the Samaritans which lasted twenty-five years. Djazzar for his part fiercely persecuted the Metawalis, and their small representation in the present population is probably due to his having beheaded most of those he took prisoner.” *History*, p. 369.
  54. Burckhardt, *Travels*, p. 340. For more detailed observations of El Djazzar, see Count C.F. Volney, *Travels Through Syria and Egypt in the Years 1783, 1784, 1785* (London, 1787), II. Sir Sidney Smith assisted Djazzar in 1799 against Napoleon: Conder, *Tent Work*, vol. 1, p. 195.
  55. Volney, *Travels*, II, p. 449; Brown's *Travels*, pp. 366–370, as cited by de Haas, *History*, pp. 369–370.
  56. Heinrich Graetz, *History of the Jews*, 5 vols. (New York, 1927), vol. V, pp. 459–460.
  57. *Ibid.*
  58. See Chapter 3; also see André Chouraqui, *Between East and West, A History of the Jews of North Africa*, trans. Michael M. Bernet (Philadelphia, 1968), pp. 45–46; David Littman, *Jews Under Muslim Rule in the Late Nineteenth Century*, reprinted from the Wiener Library Bulletin, 1975, vol. XXVIII, New Series Nos. 35/36 (London, 1975) p. 65; Ismar Elbogen, *A Century of Jewish Life* (Philadelphia, 1944), p. 76. According to the Esco Foundation for Palestine, *Palestine*, p. 520: “To the Arabs, the Jews as a group were *kuffar* (infidels) and often *frangi* (Europeans). Some hostility to them was always latent, as it was to all foreigners.”
  59. Moshe Ma'oz, *Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine* (Oxford, 1968), p. 10.
  60. Dr. John Martin Augustus Scholz, *Travels* (London, 1821), p. 103, cited by de Haas, *History*, pp. 380–381.
  61. Landes, “Palestine Before the Zionists,” p. 50.
  62. *Ibid.*, p. 52.
  63. James Finn, *Stirring Times or Record from Jerusalem Consular Chronicles from 1853–56* (London, 1878), pp. 118–119.
  64. Landes, “Palestine,” p. 52.

65. Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby, F.O. 195/165 (No. 251), Foreign Office, 25 November 1840 (Enclosure 1), extract from a letter from Mr. Calman to Lord Ashley, dated 3 August 1840. Cited in Hyamson, *Consulate*, 2, pp. lxxvii–lxx.
66. Burckhardt, *Travels*, pp. 317, 327.
67. *Ibid.*, p. 328.
68. From disciples of the Vilna Gaon, from Abraham Yaari, *Irgot Eretz Yisrael* (Tel Aviv, 1943), p. 330, cited by Katz, *Battleground*, p. 99.  
According to Katz, “Surviving letters tell about the adventures of groups who came from Italy, Morocco, and Turkey. Other letters report on the steady stream of Hasidim, disciples of the Baal Shem-Tov, from Galicia and Lithuania, proceeding during the whole of the second half of the eighteenth century.  
“It is clear that by now the state of the country was exacting a higher toll in lives than could be replaced by immigrants.”
69. Finn, *Stirring Times*, vol. 1, p. 127; see also *Despatches from Her Majesty’s Consuls in the Levant*, p. 53.
70. Graetz, *History*, vol. V, pp. 633–634.
71. *Ibid.*, p. 633.
72. De Haas, *History*, p. 393, citing Baron Geramb, *Pilgrimage to Jerusalem*, vol. 1, pp. 181–182, quoting a letter dated Jerusalem, July 16, 1834.
73. Ma’oz, “Changes,” in *Studies*, pp. 147–148; also see K. Schulman, *Sefer Ariel* (Vilna, 1856), p. 76; S.N. Spyridon, ed., *Annals of Palestine* (1821–1841), p. 100.
74. Y. Ben-Zvi, “Me’ora’ot Tzfat,” *Sefunot*, Jerusalem, 5723, vol. VII, pp. 277ff; see also Yusuf al-Dibs, *Ta’rikh Suriyya* (Beirut, 1893–1905), vol. VIII, p. 649. Cited by Ma’oz, *ibid.*, pp. 147–148.
75. Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby, F.O. 195/165 (No. 251), Foreign Office, 25 November 1840 (Enclosure 1 to No. 23b.), extract of a letter from Mr. Calman to Lord Ashley, dated August 3, 1840. In Hyamson, *Consulate*, 2, pp. lxxix–lxxx.
76. Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798–1939* (London, 1962), p. 40; also see Ma’oz, “Changes,” in *Studies*, p. 147, and *Ottoman Reform*.
77. Ma’oz, *Ottoman Reform*, pp. 189–190.
78. See Ma’oz, “Changes,” in *Studies*, pp. 148–150.
79. Katz, *Battleground*, p. 94.
80. Joseph Amzalek to W.T. Young, Jerusalem, 25 March 1839, F.O. 78/368, in Hyamson, *Consulate*, 1, p. 20.
81. Colonel Campbell to W.T. Young, Alexandria, 22 June 1839, F.O. 78/368, (Enclosure 7 to No. 10), in *ibid.*, p. 22.
82. Wm. T. Young to Colonel Patrick Campbell, Jerusalem, 25 May 1839, F.O. 78/368, in *ibid.*, p. 8.
83. A.W. Kinglake, *Eothen* (London: T. Nelson & Sons, Ltd., 1844), pp. 261–265.
84. For more detailed information about the blood libel see Chapters 3 and 4.
85. Wm. T. Young to Viscount Palmerston, Jerusalem, 25 May 1839, F.O. 78/368 (No. 13), abstract, in Hyamson, *Consulate*, 1, pp. 6–7.
86. Michaud and Poujoulat, *Correspondence d’Orient, 1830–1831* (Brussels, 1841), vol. VI, pp. 73–74.
87. Ma’oz, “Changes,” in *Studies*, pp. 147–148.
88. Neville Mandel, *Arabs and Zionism Before World War I* (Berkeley, 1976), p. 33. Mandel reports that the Christians as *dhimmi*, along with Jews, were competing in Palestine as in other Muslim countries (see Chapter 3 above, especially in Syria) for

the “goodwill and favours of the dominant Muslim majority.” In addition, the Arab Christians were united in their “deep religious prejudice against Jews.”

Also see information about the slanders in 1849 and 1870 in Jerusalem: H.Z. Hirschberg, “Blood Libels . . . at the end of the Nineteenth Century,” in *Mahanayim* No. 110, IDF, Tel Aviv (Hebrew).

89. Ismar Elbogen, *A Century of Jewish Life*, p. 76.
90. W.T. Young to Viscount Canning, Highbury Grange, Nr. London, 13 January 1842, F.O. 78/501, (Enclosure 2 to No. 29), cited in Hyamson, *Consulate*, 1, p. 44.
91. Report submitted to British Consul, Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby Foreign Office, 25 November 1840, F.O. 195/165 (No. 251), (Enclosure 1 to No. 23b), extract of a letter from Mr. Calman to Lord Ashley, dated August 3, 1940, *ibid.*, 2, p. lxvii.
92. Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby, APPd. Victoria R. F.O. 78/427 (No. 33), Foreign Office, 17 February 1841, in *ibid.*, 1, p. 38.
93. W.T. Young to Col. Hugh Rose, Beirut, dated Jerusalem, 24 May 1841, F.O. 78/444 (abstract), *ibid.*, 1, pp. 40–41.
94. Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Posenby, Foreign Office, 17 February 1841, F.O. 78/427 (No. 33), *ibid.*, 1, pp. 37–38.
95. Palmerston to Chekib Pasha, of 9 August 1841, F.O. 78/463, F.S. Rodkey, “Lord Palmerston’s Policy for the Regeneration of Turkey, 1839–41,” *Royal Historical Society Transactions*, Fourth Series, vol. XII, p. 179.
96. Palmerston to Ponsonby, 17 February 1841, F.O. 78/427 (No. 33), Hyamson, *Consulate*, vol. 1, p. 38.
97. Hyamson, *Consulate*, 1, p. 134, n.1.
98. James Finn to Lord Palmerston, Jerusalem, 13 March 1847, F.O. 78/705 (No. 12), *ibid.*, 1, p. 96. Responding to Consul Finn’s memo: “Viscount Palmerston has had under his consideration your Despatch No. 12 of the 13th of March last detailing the circumstances of an attempt recently made at Jerusalem, to revive the calumnious accusation against the Jewish people, that they use Christian blood in their Paschal Rites; —And I am directed by His Lordship to express to you his entire approval of your conduct as reported in that Despatch.  
“I am further directed by His Lordship to instruct you to take an opportunity to convey to Mehemed Pacha the thanks of Her Majesty’s Government for the decisive and liberal manner in which His Excellency executed the commands of the Sultan in putting down this fanatical attempt to revive such unjust accusations against the Jewish People.” John Bidwell to James Finn, Foreign Office, 19 May 1847, F.O. 78/705 (No. 2), *ibid.*, 1, p. 103.
99. Israel Ben Yosef Binyamin, *Sefer Masa’ei Israel* (Lyck, 1859), pp. 8–9. Cited by Ma’oz, *Studies*, p. 154.
100. W.T. Young to Viscount Palmerston, Jerusalem, 25 May 1839, F.O. 78/368 (No. 13), in *Consulate*, 1, pp. 6–7.
101. Ma’oz, *Ottoman Reform*, p. 120, quoting Consul James Finn; F.O. 78/705, Finn to Palmerston, No. 7, Jerusalem, 5 February 1847; F.O. 78/755, Finn to Palmerston, No. 22, Jerusalem, 17 July 1848.
102. James Finn to Viscount Palmerston, Jerusalem, 2 May 1848, F.O. 78/755 (No. 19), *Consulate*, 1, p. 106.
103. James Finn to Sir Stratford Canning, Jerusalem, 1 March 1849, F.O. 78/803 (No. 8), abstract, *ibid.*, 1, p. 110.

104. James Finn to Viscount Palmerston, Jerusalem, 27 September 1850, F.O. 78/839 (No. 20), abstract, *ibid.*, 1, 168–169. Hyamson adds: “Abderrahman el Amer, a chief of the neighbouring village of Dura, for many years terrorized the inhabitants of Hebron, Jews as well as others, of which town he was for periods *de facto* ruler at times, despite the Government. He first appeared there on the expulsion of the Egyptians in 1840 when, murdering the local Egyptian governor in the street, he proclaimed the Sultan of Turkey, and appointed himself governor of the town.” Also see James Finn, *Stirring Times*, 1, pp. 236 et seq., 250 et seq., and 392 et seq.; and vol. 2, pp. 33 et seq.
105. James Finn to Sir Stratford Canning, Jerusalem, 15 July 1851, F.O. 78/874 (No. 10), *ibid.*, 1, pp. 171–172.
106. James Finn to Viscount Palmerston, Jerusalem, 29 December 1851, F.O. 78/874 (Consular No. 21), *ibid.*, 1, pp. 183–184.
107. James Finn to Viscount Palmerston, Jerusalem, 29 December 1851, F.O. 78/874 (Political No. 10), *ibid.*, 1, p. 185.
108. James Finn to the Earl of Malmesbury, Jerusalem, 29 May 1852, F.O. 195/369 (Political No. 2), *ibid.*, 1, p. 198–202.
109. James Finn to the Earl of Malmesbury, Jerusalem, 18 November 1852, F.O. 78/913 (Political No. 13), abstract, *ibid.*, 1, p. 211.
110. James Finn to the Earl of Clarendon, Jerusalem, 19 July 1853, F.O. 78/962 (No. 9), *ibid.*, 1, p. 215.
111. James Finn to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, Jerusalem, 13 October 1853, F.O. 195/369 (No. 32), *ibid.*, 1, p. 216.
112. James Finn to the Earl of Clarendon, 28 December 1853, F.O. 78/963 (Political No. 33), *ibid.*, 1, pp. 218–219.
113. James Finn to the Earl of Malmesbury, Jerusalem, 8 July 1858, F.O. 78/1383 (Political No. 12), *ibid.*, 1, p. 260.
114. James Finn to the Earl of Malmesbury, Jerusalem, 11 November 1858, F.O. 78/1383 (Political No. 34), *ibid.*, 1, p. 261.
115. Thomas B. Sandwith, Vice Consul, Caiffa, to Noel Temple Moore, Caiffa, 20 May 1863, F.O. 78/1775 (No. 18), *ibid.*, 2, pp. 311–312.
116. Noel Temple Moore to the Honorable E.M. Erskine, Jerusalem, 3 March 1864, F.O. 195/808 (No. 6), *ibid.*, 2, pp. 330–331.
117. Earl Russell to Noel Temple Moore, Foreign Office, 11 June 1864, F.O. 78/1816 (No. 1), *ibid.*, 2, p. 332.
118. Ibrahim Abu Lughod, address at Palestine Human Rights Committee Meeting, November 1980, Chicago.
119. *Palestine Royal Commission Report*, p. 144.
120. *Ibid.*, p. 131.

## 10. The Population Under the Turks: Mid-Nineteenth Century to 1918

1. “The process of disintegration of the feudal mode of production in Syria evolved under the conditions of a growing influx of foreign capital and of the subjection of the country’s economic development to the interests of foreign capital. The legacy of this process was the ruin of industry and the impoverishment of the peasant economy.

“The growing feudal oppression, along with exploitation by foreign capital,



- delayed the development of new relations of production. Feudal forms of exploitation were preserved under these conditions and this led to an even greater aggravation of economic and political contradictions and to an intensification of the class struggle." I.M. Smilianskaya, "The Disintegration of Feudal Relations in Syria and Lebanon in the Middle of the Nineteenth Century" *Peredneaziatskii Etnograficheskii Sbornik* (Moscow), I (1958), 156–179, from Charles Issawi, ed., *The Economic History of the Middle East 1800–1914* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 247; also see Hope Simpson, *Report on Immigration, Land Settlement and Development*, Command Paper #3686, London, 1930, p. 90; also see Chapter 8.
2. "Palestine in the early 19th century . . . did not appear as a well-defined geographical or administrative unit. Only the area around Jerusalem, including some of the adjacent biblical places, was defined as Palestine or Filistin . . ." Kemal Karpaz, *Research Prospectus on the Demographic History of Palestine*, submitted to the Institute for Mediterranean Affairs (New York, 1972), p. 2; in the United States recommendation at the 1919 Peace Conference, it was stated "(1) That there be established a separate State of Palestine." Outline of Tentative Report and Recommendations prepared by the Intelligence Section for President Wilson and the Plenipotentiaries, January 21, 1919.
  3. Ernst Frankenstein, *Justice for My People* (London: Nicholson and Watson, 1943), p. 127.
  4. Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby, Foreign Office, 25 November 1840, FO 195/165 (No. 251), (Enclosure 2), extract of a letter from Lord Ashley to Palmerston, dated 25 September 1840, cited in Albert Hyamson, ed., *The British Consulate in Jerusalem 1838–1914*, 2 vols. (London, 1939–1941), 2, p. lxxii, Introduction.
  5. Jacob de Haas, *History of Palestine, The Last Two Thousand Years* (New York, The MacMillan Co., 1934), p. 419.
  6. Frankenstein, *Justice*, p. 127.
  7. W.F. Lynch, *Narrative of the United States Expedition to the River Jordan and the Dead Sea* (London, 1849), p. 446.
  8. James Finn to the Earl of Clarendon, 16 September 1857, FO 78/1294 (Political No. 37), (Enclosure 1), from Elizabeth A. Finn, wife of the British Consul, Jerusalem, July 1857, cited in Hyamson, *Consulate*, 1, p. 254.
  9. James Finn to the Earl of Clarendon, Jerusalem, 1 January 1858, FO 78/1383 (Political No. 1), cited in Hyamson, *Consulate*, 1, p. 257.
  10. The Algerians had been settled in Damascus by the Moor leader Abd-el-Kader in 1852 after his efforts at Arab independence in Morocco against the Moroccans and then the French were defeated. De Haas, *History*, p. 425.
  11. From James Finn to Sir Bulwer, Jerusalem, 19 June 1860, in *Papers Relating to the Disturbances in Syria*, no. 2, June 1860, p. 35.
  12. From Consul James Finn to the Earl of Malmesbury, Jerusalem, 1 January 1859, in *Despatches from Her Majesty's Consuls in the Levant, Respecting Past or Apprehended Disturbances in Syria: 1858–1860*, p. 64.
  13. From letter sent by Peter Meshulam to Consul James Finn, Haifa, 29 June 1860, *Further Papers Relating to Disturbances in Syria, June 1860*, presented to the House of Commons . . . July 30, 1860, p. 52.
  14. See Chapter 8 chronology.
  15. From Consul James Finn to Lord J. Russell, Jerusalem, 2 July 1860, *Further Papers*, p. 18.

16. Norman N. Lewis, "The Frontier of Settlement, 1800–1950," in Issawi, ed., *Economic History*, p. 266.
17. See complete study of observations by C.G. Smith, "The Geography and Natural Resources of Palestine as Seen by British Writers in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries," in Moshe Ma'oz, ed., *Studies on Palestine During the Ottoman Period* (Jerusalem, 1975), pp. 87–100.
18. George Adam Smith, *The Historical Geography of the Holy Land* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1894), pp. 84–85.
19. C. Conder, *Palestine* (London, 1889), pp. 212–213. See also Conder, *Tent Work in Palestine*, 2 vols. (London, 1878), vol. 2, especially Chapter XII, "The Fertility of Palestine."
20. De Haas, *History*, p. 407.
21. "As late as 1877 Colonel C.R. Conder declared the population insufficient, and suggested the land could support ten times the total of its then population." *Ibid.*, citing Conder, *Tent Work in Palestine*, p. 368.
22. Outside the gates of Jerusalem "we saw, indeed, no living object, heard no living sound, we found the same void, the same silence . . . as we should have expected before the entombed gates of Pompeii or Herculaneum." Alphonse de Lamartine, *A Pilgrimage to the Holy Land*, trans. from French (New York, 1948), I, p. 268; "a complete eternal silence reigns in the town, on the highways, in the country . . . the tomb of a whole people," Lamartine, I, pp. 308–309, as cited by de Haas, *History*, p. 407.
23. According to Dean Stanley, "Palestine . . . is an island in a desert waste . . . also an island in the midst of pirates. The Bedouins are the corsairs of the wilderness." And Jerusalem: "A city of ruins. Here and there a regular street, or a well-built European house emerges from the general chaos, but the general appearance is that of a city which has been burnt down in some great conflagration." Dean Stanley, "Sinai and Palestine," as cited by de Haas, *History*, p. 407.
24. De Haas, *History*, p. 407, citing C. Conder, *Tent Work*, p. 327.
25. "There was . . . no interest in the contemporary inhabitants. Not a kind word was written about them." De Haas, *History*, p. 407.  
 "Conder was one of the few, if not the solitary exception. He called attention to the fact that the native Muslim population was generally considered 'fit for the fate of the Red Indian and the Australian, as savages who must disappear before the advance of a superior race.'" De Haas, *History*, p. 407.
26. Consul James Finn to the Earl of Malmesbury, Jerusalem, 1 January 1859, *Past or Apprehended Disturbances*, p. 61.
27. British Consul James Finn to Earl of Clarendon, Jerusalem, 1 January 1858, FO 78/1383 (Political No. 1), in Hyamson, *Consulate*, 1, p. 257.
28. British Consul James Finn to Lord John Russell, Jerusalem, 4 January 1860, F.O. 78/1521 (Political No. 1), in *Past or Apprehended Disturbances*, p. 89; also extract in Hyamson, *Consulate*, 1, p. 268.
29. British Consul James Finn to Earl of Clarendon, Jerusalem, 15 September 1857, F.O. 78/1294 (Political No. 36), in Hyamson, 1, *Consulate*, p. 249.
30. From letter of March 19, 1933, by the Department of Development, Public Record Office, PRO FO 371/17204/33.
31. British Consul James Finn to Viscount Palmerston, Jerusalem, 7 November 1851, FO 78/874 (No. 20), in Hyamson, *Consulate*, 1, p. 179.

“. . . in Safed and Tiberias, if not in Jerusalem, they form the majority of the inhabitants . . . in them lies a germ of development for future time, and a character different from that of the ordinary population of Palestine.

“The Jews are almost the only artisans—and it is remarkable that the glaziers, blacksmiths, watchmakers, tailors, shoemakers, bookbinders, &c are almost exclusively Jews.”

32. British Consul James Finn to Earl of Clarendon, Jerusalem, 1 January 1858, FO 78/1383 (Political No. 1), in Hyamson, *Consulate*, 1, p. 257. “Their number amounts to 8,000, almost half of the city, and the majority of them are of the Spanish-speaking class, called Sephardem, and are generally Turkish subjects.”  
Also see Moshe Ma’oz, *Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine* (Oxford, 1968), p. 208; see comparative figures compiled by Itzhak Ben-Zvi, *Israel Under Ottoman Rule—Four Centuries of History* (Jerusalem: Yad Itzhak Ben-Zvi, 1955), p. 365ff.
33. British Consul James Finn to the Earl of Clarendon, Jerusalem, 17 January 1856, FO 78/1217 (Political No. 1), in Hyamson, *Consulate*, 1, p. 239.
34. Letter to Jas. Graham, Esq., Jerusalem, July 1857, FO 78/1294, in Hyamson, *Consulate*, 1, p. 255. “I would particularly draw attention to the fact that the Sultan of Turkey by the Laws of the Empire gives every encouragement to the cultivation of land and the planting of trees.”
35. Martin Gilbert, *Exile and Return: The Struggle for a Jewish Homeland* (Philadelphia and New York: J.B. Lippincott, 1978), pp. 28–30. “Montefiore [bought] agricultural land both at Jaffa and Jerusalem, and later extend[ed] his land-purchases to the Galilee, at Tiberias and Safed.” Also see Ma’oz, *Ottoman Reform*, pp. 207–208.
36. Ma’oz, *Reform*, p. 207; also see Finn to Clarendon, Jerusalem, December 28, 1853, FO 78/963 (No. 33); Finn to Malmesbury, Jerusalem, January 1, 1859, FO 78/1454 (No. 1); Finn to Russell, Jerusalem, January 4, 1869, FO 78/1521 (No. 1); also see Braver in *Zion*, v (1939–1940), p. 169; Vinreb in *Zion*, iii (1938), p. 76. Cited in Ma’oz, *Reform*, p. 207.
37. Hyamson, *Consulate*, 1, p. xlvii, Introduction.  
“Young, in his report on the condition of the Jews in his district which was called for on his appointment, estimated the Jewish population, Sephardim and Ashkenazim, in 1839 at 9690 souls, of whom 5500 were to be found in Jerusalem and 1500 in Safed. There were already then about 400 Jews living in the villages of Palestine.”  
By 1864, “The population of the City of Jerusalem is computed at 18,000 of whom about 5000 are Moslems, 8000 to 9000 Jews, and the rest Christians of various denominations.” From “Report on the Trade and Commerce of Jerusalem in the Year 1864,” March, 1865, FO 195/808, in Hyamson, *Consulate*, 2, p. 336.
38. Sir George Gawler, *Jewish Chronicle*, August 16, 1860, cited in Gilbert, *Exile*, p. 28; see Chapter 9.
39. Ma’oz, *Reform*, p. 207.
40. Finn to Canning, FO 78/874 (No. 10), Enclosure in Finn to Palmerston, Jerusalem, 24 July 1851 (No. 6); *Jewish Intelligence*, xxii, No. 260, cited in FO 78/1217 (No. 1), Finn to Clarendon, Jerusalem, January 7, 1856; see also FO 78/2068, Moore to Palmerston, Beirut, 1 December 1849, FO 78/2068 (No. 45), in Hyamson, *Consulate*, 1, p. 156; H.H. Jessup, *Fifty-Three Years in Syria*, 2 vols. (New York, 1910), 1, p. 269; M. Raysher, *Sefer sh’arey Yerushalayim* (Lemberg, 1866), p. 18, 28; G. Williams, *The Holy City* (London, 1845), p. 432. All cited in Ma’oz, *Reform*, p. 207, n. 3.
41. Itzhak Ben-Zvi, *Eretz-Israel* (Poalei Tzion Palestine, 1918), p. 195.

42. A.J. Sussnitzki, "Zur Gliederung wirtschaftslicher Arbeit nach Nationalitäten in der Türkei," *Archiv für Wirtschaftsforschung im Orient*, II, 1917, pp. 382–407, in Issawi, *Economic History*, p. 116. According to Sussnitzki, "The Jews formerly played a very different part in agriculture. On the ancient significance of the Jews as the most important factors in Mesopotamia, see Krauss, 'Die Juden Mesopotamiens in Handel und Wandel,' *Oe. M.O.*, 1916, nos. 1–6, pp. 71, 84; on the decline of Jewish agriculture, *ibid.*, p. 87." From Issawi, ed., *Economic History*, p. 117.
43. "You are aware that I have for some years had at heart the distressed and degraded condition of the Jewish people in this country who are generally speaking without employment and in the bondage of pauperism," British Consul James Finn to the Earl of Clarendon, Jerusalem, July 1857, FO 78/1294, in Hyamson, *Consulate*, 1, p. 253.
44. See Ben Zion Gat, *Jewish Community in Palestine Between 1840–1881* (Jerusalem: Ben Zvi Institute, 1964); Mordechai Eliav, *Love of Zion and the Men of Hod; German Jewry and the Settlement of Eretz-Israel in the 19th Century* (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1970).
45. Consul Finn to the Earl of Malmesbury, Jerusalem, 1 January 1859, in *Past or Apprehended Disturbances*, p. 63.
46. Simon Schama, *Two Rothschilds and the Land of Israel* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), pp. 161, 162–165.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 167.
48. *Ibid.*, p. 61ff.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 133.
50. C.G. Smith, "Geography and Natural Resources in Palestine," in Ma'oz, ed., *Studies*, p. 93.
51. Schama, *Two Rothschilds*, p. 158.
52. *Ibid.*, pp. 133–134, citing PICA 11/59.
53. *Ketavim*, vol. III, December 18, 1889, p. 66. From letter written by Y. Grazavsky to Y. Eisenstadt.
54. Simon Schama, *Two Rothschilds*, p. 117.
55. *Ibid.*, p. 156, quoting Emile Meyerson report, *La Colonisation Juivre en Palestine*, December 13, 1914, p. 4.
56. Sir John Hope Simpson, *Palestine: Report on Immigration, Land Settlement and Development*, Command Paper 3686 of 1930, London, pp. 146–147.
57. *Palestine Royal Commission Report*, Command #5479, London, 1937, p. 125.
58. Mordechai Abir, "Local Leadership and Early Reform in Palestine, 1800–1834," published in Ma'oz, ed., *Studies*, pp. 304–305.
59. Roderique H. Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856–1876* (Princeton, 1963), pp. 99, 141; see Elie Kedourie, "Islam Today," in Bernard Lewis, ed., *Islam and the Arab World*, pp. 321–336, particularly pp. 330–331; also see Albert Hourani, *Syria and Lebanon: A Political Essay* (London: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 29–32; A. Granott, *The Land System in Palestine, History and Structure* (London, 1952), p. 81; Neville Mandel, *Arabs and Zionism Before World War I* (Berkeley, 1976), pp. xxi, xxii, introduction; Abir, "Local Leadership and Early Reforms in Palestine, 1800–1834," in Ma'oz, ed., *Studies*, pp. 284–310.
60. Abd-el-Hadi family of Nablus and Jenin, 60,000 dunams; El-Husseini family of Jerusalem and Jericho, 50,000 dunams; Taji (al Farouki) family of Ramle, 50,000 dunams (4 dunams = 1 acre). Granott, *Land System*, p. 81.

61. Ibid., p. 83; see also Mandel, *Arabs and Zionism*, p. xxii; *Palestine, A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies*, Esco Foundation for Palestine, 2 vols. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947), 1, p. 466.
62. Granott, *Land System*, p. 83.
63. Moshe Aumann, "Land Ownership in Palestine 1880–1948," from Michael Curtis et al., eds., *The Palestinians, People, History, Politics* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1975), p. 24.
64. Granott, *Land System*, p. 40.
65. Mandel, *Arabs and Zionism*, p. xxiii.
66. Ma'oz, *Reform*, pp. 79–80, 145, 160–161; also see Mandel, *Arabs and Zionism*, p. 2.
67. According to Neville Mandel, *Arabs and Zionism*, p. 18, and reports of the period, Mehmed Sherif Rauf Pasa, who governed in 1877–1889, "tried earnestly to enforce the entry restrictions against Jews, and he made difficulties for foreign Jews already residing in his Mutasarriflik [district of Jerusalem, where most Jewish development was taking place] who wished to become Ottoman subjects"; see also David Farhi, "Documents on the Attitude of the Ottoman Government Towards the Jewish Settlement in Palestine After the Revolution of the Young Turks, 1908–1909" in Ma'oz, ed., *Studies*, pp. 190–210.
68. De Haas, *History*, pp. 439–443.
69. *U.S. Consular Reports 1880*, II, pp. 67–68, cited by de Haas, *History*, p. 437.
70. "Exports fell off 50% and the imports 15% at Jaffa . . . influenza so serious that business was suspended for a time." De Haas, *History*, p. 437.
71. *U.S. Consular Reports*, October 1890, IV, p. 683, cited in *ibid.*
72. *U.S. Consular Reports*, October 1881, IV, p. 513, cited in *ibid.*
73. Moza, near Jerusalem, marked the beginning of Jewish agricultural endeavor in Palestine in 1873. In 1878, Petach Tikvah was founded northwest of Jaffa, and Rishon l'Tsion was established in 1882 in the same general area. Because the other two earlier ventures proved to be premature, they foundered; hence, "Jewish agricultural colonization" is considered to have begun with Rishon l'Tsion in 1882, although Petach Tikvah also began anew in the same year. De Haas, *History*, p. 439.
74. For detailed data on Ottoman restrictions against Jewish immigration and related factors, see David Farhi, "Documents," in Ma'oz, *Studies*, pp. 190–210; Mandel, *Arabs and Zionism*; Schama, *Two Rothschilds*; de Haas, *History*; Alter Druyanow, *Ketavim*, vol. III, 1889; Esco, *Palestine*.
75. De Haas, *History*, p. 440. See also Farhi, "Documents," in *Studies*, pp. 190–191.
76. Mandel, *Arabs and Zionism*, pp. 2–3.
77. *Ibid.* When foreign governments attempted to investigate the restrictions, the Turkish ruling powers gave as one reason that "Jewish immigrants were a threat to public order and hygiene in the city." Mandel, *Arabs and Zionism*, p. 3; PRO FO 195/1581 (No. 9), March 5, 1887, N.T. Moore (Jerusalem) to Sir W.A. White (Constantinople); cf. State Department, *Papers*, 1888, ii, 1559–60, no. 57 (28.1.1888), O.S. Straus (Constantinople) to Secretary of State Bayard; and ISA (T) no. 47 (15.12.1887), Ministry of Internal Affairs (SP) to Mutasarrif (Jerusalem).
78. Mandel, *Arabs and Zionism*, pp. 3–4ff. Mandel attributes more "nationalism" to the Arabs than does T.E. Lawrence; compare with Lawrence, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* (London: Jonathan Cape, Ltd., 1934); David Lloyd George, *The Truth About the Peace Treaties* (London: Victor Gallanz, Ltd., 1938).

79. De Haas, *History*, p. 441.
80. David Vital, *Origins of Zionism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), p. 182; also see Mandel, "Turks, Arabs, and Jewish Immigration into Palestine, 1882–1914," in A. Hourani, ed., *St. Antony's Papers*, no. XXVII, Middle Eastern Affairs, Number IV (Oxford, 1965), p. 49.
81. From *Palestine Exploration Fund, Quarterly*, January 1888, C. Schick, October 26, 1887, entry, "Jerusalem"; see FO 195/1581 (No. 9), Moore to White, Jerusalem, March 5, 1887; also see *Ketavim*, vol. III, 1889, Druyanow, ed.; Schama, *Two Rothschilds*.
82. *U.S. Consular Reports*, November 1892, XXXI, p. 307.
83. Farhi, "Documents," in Ma'oz, *Studies*, p. 191. Farhi cites Mandel, "Turks, Arabs and Jewish Immigration into Palestine, 1882–1914," in A. Hourani (ed.), *Middle Eastern Affairs*, no. IV, *St. Antony's Papers*, no. XXVII, Oxford, 1965, pp. 77–108; Y. Ro'i, "Ha-'Emda ha-Tziyonit Klapei ha-'Aravim, 1898–1914" [The Zionist Attitude towards the Arabs], *Keshet*, XLII (Winter 1969), pp. 153–159; Porath, "The Political Awakening of the Palestinian Arabs and Their Leadership Towards the End of the Ottoman Period," in Ma'oz, *Studies*; Y. Yehoshua, "Tel-Aviv as Seen by the Arabic Press During the First Years of its Existence (1909–1914)," *Hamizrah Hehadash*, vol. XIX, no. 3 (1969), pp. 218–222 (in Hebrew). Farhi dates the first decree "prohibiting Jews from Russia, Rumania and Bulgaria from settling in Palestine" at 1882. Neville Mandel traces the Ottoman government's "ostensible response to the Anglo German group"—a group of "solid gentlemen . . . who in 1881" proposed to the Porte that Jews be settled "along a railroad which they wanted to build from Smyrna to Baghdad." According to Mandel, the Turkish restrictions were announced in 1881. *Arabs and Zionism*, p. 2.
84. *Havazzelet* (The Rose), XII, 41 (September 1, 1882); cf. *Levant Herald*, iii, 444 (November 24, 1881), cited in Mandel, *Arabs and Zionism*, p. 2.
85. Schama, *Two Rothschilds*, p. 160.
86. E.C. Blech to Sir Nicholas O'Conor, Jerusalem, 16 November 1907, FO 371/356 No. 40321 (No. 62), cited by Farhi, "Documents," in Ma'oz, *Studies*, p. 190. According to Farhi, "This quotation appears in a detailed report on the Zionist movement, in which Blech tries to prove that only the 'fanatics' believe in the feasibility of building a Jewish state. It is interesting to note that a copy of the report was forwarded to Lord Rothschild, but the above quoted words were omitted." See entire correspondence in Hyamson, *Consulate*, 2, pp. 569–571.
87. Vital, *The Origins of Zionism*, p. 196.
88. The other four "Biluim" stayed in Constantinople, where "they constituted themselves as the Central Bilu Constantinople Bureau and continued the efforts towards obtaining free land from the Government." Shulamit Laskov, *Biluim* (Hebrew with English abstract, p. viff) (Jerusalem: Publishing House of the World Zionist Organizations, 1979) p. vi. See Laskov's study for detailed history of the pioneer movement, an example which may mirror in microcosm the struggles of the Jewish developments in Jewish-settled Palestine.
89. See S. Laskov, *Biluim*, p. vi; Gilbert, *Exile*, p. 39.
90. Laskov, *Biluim*, pp. vi, vii.
91. Mandel, *Arabs and Zionism*, p. 5.
92. *Ibid.*
93. Laskov, *Biluim*, p. vii.

94. Ibid.
95. Ibid., pp. vii, viii.
96. Ibid., p. vii.
97. “. . . as many as one in two of them departed again in view of the difficult local conditions (besides the efforts of the authorities).” Mandel, *Arabs and Zionism*, p. 29.
98. Ibid., p. 7; see *Havazzelet*, xiv, 23 (2.5.1884).
99. Vital, *Origins*, p. 182; Lilienblum to Ussiskin, June 1882, *Mi-yamim rishonim*, ii, pp. 136–137; also see Greenberg to Mohilever, October 16, 1891 (O.S.), CZA, A9/63/1.
100. *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, Cecil Roth, Geoffrey Wigoder, eds. (Jerusalem: Macmillan and Co., 1972), vol. 8, col. 1248.
101. Vital, *Origins*, p. 183. According to Vital, Jewish development was, however, “moderately reinforced: two major, and several minor settlements had been established. In 1890 30,000 dunams (7,500 acres) of land were bought half-way between Haifa and Jaffa, the biggest single acquisition yet. A further 10,000 dunams were brought the same year just south of Rishon le-Zion. Hadera was built on the first tract, Rehovot on the second. Smaller points of settlement followed: Mishmar ha-Yarden (1890), Ein Zeitim (1891), Benei Yehuda (1891), Meir Shefeya (1891), Moza (1894), Hartuv (1895), Be’er Tuvia (1896), Metula (1896), Mahanayim (1899), and the Sejera training farm (1899). Most of these were offshoots of existing settlements, two were backed by Hibbat Zion, two by Baron Edmond de Rothschild, one was established independently by Jews from Bulgaria” (pp. 182–183).
102. In southern Transjordan, for example, the populations had diminished. Kerak, which had 8,000 inhabitants in 1872, had only 2,000 in 1895. Christian Ginsburg, *Report on Exploration of Moab* (Brighton, England, 1872); Vital Cuiet, *Syrie, Liban et Palestine, Géographie administrative, statistique, descriptive et raisonnée* (Paris, 1896); de Haas, *History*, p. 431; also the 15,000 inhabitant Circassian (Persian) settlement that had arrived after the Russo-Turkish War had shrunk, to 5,000.
103. John Dickson to Edmund Fane, Jerusalem, 16 July 1891, FO 195/1727 (No. 25), in Hyamson, *Consulate*, 2, p. 461.
104. Ibrahim Hakki, The Governor of Jerusalem to Mr. Consul Dickson, June 24/July 6, 1891, FO 195/1727, in Hyamson, *Consulate*, p. 462.
105. “That much of the land was held by the Crown merely added to the confusion and difficulty. In 1892 Jaffa landowners [Jewish], on whose property orange plantations had been established, were notified by Constantinople they would have to surrender all their freehold deeds, and in exchange receive documents showing that they were tenants of crown lands. Someone had discovered that this area was made part of the imperial domain in 1517. The case was not fought in any court, but wholesale bribery was employed to prevent the imperial order being carried out.” De Haas, *History*, pp. 441–442; also see United States Consular Reports, November 1892, XLI, p. 309.
106. Vital, *Origins*, p. 88; according to Vital, “Yemenite Jews” worked their way to “Erez-Israel” from the end of the fifteenth century, “at least.”
107. De Haas, *History*, p. 448.
108. See Chapters 3 and 5.
109. Extract of letter from the Reverend A. Ben Oliel of the “Presbyterian Alliance Mission,” Jerusalem, February 11, 1892, FO 195/1765, in Hyamson, *Consulate*, 2, pp. 478–480.
110. Esco, *Palestine*, p. 520ff; see also David Landes, “Palestine Before the Zionists,”

- Commentary*, February 1976; Great Britain Foreign Office, *Syria and Palestine*, Peace Handbook, No. 60 (London, 1920).
111. According to British Consul Dickson, the Turkish authorities were given instructions “to apply the restrictions to all Jews without distinction of nationality.” Dickson to Clare-Ford, Jerusalem, April 29, 1893, FO 195/1806 (No. 19), in Hyamson, *Consulate*, 2, p. 485.
  112. Enclosure to FO 195/1806, Jerusalem, March 22, 1893. Petition to “Her Britannic Majesty’s Consul, Jerusalem” from Simeon S.E. Judah, in *ibid*.
  113. Pierre Loti, *Jerusalem* (Paris, 1895), pp. 128, 183–184, cited by Landes, “Palestine.”
  114. Despatch No. 56 from Consular Agent Amzalak, Jaffa, August 27. Enclosure to Dickson to Currie, Jerusalem, September 16, 1895, FO 195/1895, Hyamson, *Consulate*, 2, p. 501.
  115. John Dickson to Sir Philip Currie, Jerusalem, September 16, 1895, FO 195/1895; for additional Consular Reports, see Hyamson, *Consulate*.
  116. Esco, *Palestine*, pp. 521–522.
  117. Mandel, *Arabs and Zionism*, p. 22.
  118. Theodor Herzl, *Der Judenstaat* (Vienna, 1896).
  119. See Chapter 5.
  120. See Albert Hyamson, *Consulate*, 1, p. liii, introduction; de Haas, *History*, p. 442; Farhi, “Documents,” in Ma’oz, ed., *Studies*, pp. 190–210.
  121. Vital Cuinet, *Syrie, Liban et Palestine, Géographie administrative, statistique, descriptive et raisonnée* (Paris, 1896), pp. 583–584. Cuinet estimated the area as roughly 22,000 square kilometers.
  122. Hyamson, *Consulate*, 1, p. liii.
  123. *U.S. Consular Reports*, 1898, LVIII, p. 476.
  124. Hyamson, *Consulate*, for more detailed reports.
  125. Mandel, *Arabs and Zionism*, p. 8; also see Granott, *Land System*, Ch. V.
  126. See John Dickson to Sir Francis Clare-Ford, Jerusalem, December 30, 1892, FO 195/1765 (No. 35) and Enclosure to same dated December 22, 1892, in Hyamson, *Consulate*, 2, p. 481; also see Mandel, *Arabs and Zionism*, p. 8.
  127. Mandel, *Arabs and Zionism*, p. 25; see Central Zionist Archives, W/125/1 (May, 1905), Levontin to Wolffsohn. Mandel traces Ottoman restrictions and their inconsistencies in execution; see Chapter 1, “Ottoman Policy and Practice: 1881–1908,” pp. 1–31.
  128. De Haas, *History*, p. 442.
  129. Israel State Archives (T), No. 34, September 8, 1904, Minister of the Interior to Mutasarrif of Jerusalem Resid Bey, cited by Mandel, *Arabs and Zionism*, p. 26.
  130. The late historian David Farhi recalled: “In an interview which I had in Istanbul (21.1.1965) with Dr. Sami Gunzberg, the Sultan’s dentist, who seems to have played a certain role in introducing Herzl to the Sultan, he maintained that, ‘The Sultan was inclined to help Herzl, but Herzl associated with “undesirable people.” The Sultan passed on a message through me, to the effect that he had to reject Herzl’s request, since he feared that the masses would be aroused.’ Gunzberg would not explain who the ‘undesirable people’ were.” David Farhi, “Documents,” in Ma’oz, ed., *Studies*, p. 193; also see Vital, *Origins*, pp. 280–308.
  131. Abraham Galanté, “Abdul Hamid II et le Sionisme,” *Haménora* (Jan.–March 1933, Stambul), p. 9, “quoting a private file kept by the grandson of the Chief Rabbi,” cited by Farhi, “Documents,” in Ma’oz, ed., *Studies*, p. 194. According to Mandel, Herzl



- tried until his death in 1904 to convince Abdulhamid, “to no avail.” Mandel, *Arabs and Zionism*, p. 16.
132. Galanté, “Abdul Hamid”, p. 13, cited by Farhi, “Documents,” p. 194.
133. E.Z. Karal, *Birinci Mesrutiyet ve Istibdad Devirleri (1896–1907)* (Ankara, 1962), p. 486, “quoting a manuscript by Dr. Atif Huseyin, kept in the library of the T.T.K.”; cited by Farhi, “Documents,” in Ma’oz, *Studies*, pp. 194–195; for another interpretation, see Mandel, *Arabs and Zionism*, pp. 9ff.
134. Ma’oz, *Reform*, p. 194; Esco, *Palestine*, p. 521.
135. Esco, *Palestine*, p. 521.
136. *Anglo-American Committee Survey*, vol. 2, p. 582; *Palestine Royal Commission Report*, p. 368; “It may be that there was a growth in apprehension, particularly in light of the fact that there was much propaganda among the *fellahin*, but in the first decade expressions of opposition to the Jews because of *fear of displacement* were not in evidence.” Esco, *Palestine*, p. 528.
137. Ernest Main, *Palestine at the Crossroads* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1937), p. 267.
138. Elija Sapir, “ha-Sin’a le-yisra’el ba-sifrut ha-’aravit,” *ha-Shilo’ah*, vol. vi (1899), pp. 228–231, cited in Mandel, *Arabs and Zionism*, p. 53. A Palestinian Jew, Antebi, reported to Paris that in 1900 “Jerusalem already possesses its German anti-Semitic club,” JCA 263/No. 37, January 8, 1900, Antebi to President, JCA, in Mandel, p. 54.
- The Russian Imperial Society’s clinics “were open to all sections of the local population—save the Jews.” *Ibid.*; see *Otchet*, vol. 1 (1896), p. 39.
139. Central Zionist Archives (Austro-Hungarian material) Z3/114 May 17, 1913, Hochberg, Constantinople, “Le mouvement arabe,” cited in Mandel, *Arabs and Zionism*, p. 155.
140. F. Kassab, *Le nouvel Empire Arabe: La Curie Romaine et le Pretendu Peril Juif Universel—Response a M.M. Azoury bey* (Paris, 1906), pp. 28–38ff. Kassab was a Greek Orthodox Arab from Beirut, of whom “little is known,” according to Neville Mandel; another pamphlet, “Palestine Hellenisme et Clericalisme” (Constantinople, 1909), which Mandel reports has “a staunchly Ottomanist point of view . . .” Mandel, *Arabs and Zionism*, pp. 50–51.
141. The price paid for land skyrocketed when that transaction was deemed “illegal,” and forced underground, it must be noted.
142. Mandel, *Arabs and Zionism*, p. 77, citing *Ha-Zevi* (Jerusalem), xxvi, no. 28, 1 November 1909.
143. *Ibid.*, citing *Ha-Zevi*, xxvi, no. 29, 2 November 1909.
144. *Ibid.*, p. 121, citing *Ha-Or* (Jerusalem), ii xxvii, 204/379, 9 July 1911.
145. Central Zionist Archives Z2/7, December 5, 1908, Jacobson to Wolffsohn; Mandel, *Arabs and Zionism*, p. 66.
146. Alliance Israelite Universelle Archive IX E27 (October 18, 1909), Antebi to Frank; according to Mandel, the “function” of the group is “doubtful” and if it operated, it “confined itself to direct approaches” to Jerusalem officials. Mandel, *Arabs and Zionism*, p. 78.
147. Alliance Israelite Universelle Archive X E29 (January 4, 1910), Antebi to S. Loupo, cited in Mandel, *Arabs and Zionism*, p. 78.
148. Mandel, *Arabs and Zionism*, p. 55; *Ha-Zevi*, xxv, 129 (March 15, 1909), from *al-Asma’i*, Jaffa.

149. Ibid.
150. Ibid. For many examples: The governor of the Jerusalem district between 1906 and 1908 reported that “There are here influential people and notables who have attained wealth and fame through injuring the rights of the people . . . on account of the ascendancy of the Arab inhabitants. . . .” Letter from Ali Akram to Ministry of the Interior, Doc. no. 11, ISA, Ali Akram Bey Archive, cited in Porath, “Social Aspects,” in Milson, ed., *Society*, p. 99. Also see Hope Simpson *Report*; Granott, *Land System*.
151. De Haas, *History*, p. 442.
152. Vital, *Origins*, p. 179. “The simple, stated prohibition on Jews taking up *new* residence in rural areas came to serve as the grounds for their being barred from returning home after a journey to town for the High Holidays in one province, from renewing leases on their homes in a second province, from moving from one village to another in a third. In all cases, the consequence was accelerated pauperization and general social misery in the overcrowded towns in which residence was free.”
153. Farhi, “Documents,” in Ma’oz, ed., *Studies*, p. 193. According to the British Consul in Jerusalem, the Jews numbered 100,000 in a total Palestine population of 400,000–450,000. FO 371/356, Blech to O’Conor, November 16, 1901, cited in *ibid.*, pp. 195–196.
154. Vital, *Origins*, p. 196; among “numerous” examples of “officials taking bribes,” see Chaim Chissim, *Miyyoman ahad habiluyim*, trans. S. Herberg (Tel Aviv, 1925), p. 77, December 9, 1885; Druyanow, *Ketavim*, i, 847, September 21, 1886; and Alliance Israelite Universelle Archive I C 3., October 4, 1887, Hirsch to Pres. AIU; cited in Mandel, *Arabs and Zionism*, p. 19, n. 84.
155. Gilbert, *Exile*, p. 74.
156. E. Yellin, *Le-ze-eza-ai* (Jerusalem, 1938), pp. 31–33, 171–172; Zalman David Levontin, *L-erez Avontenu* (Tel Aviv, 1924), p. 56, as cited in Mandel, *Arabs and Zionism*, p. 19.
157. Chaim Chissim, *Miyyoman*, p. 75, cited in Mandel, *Arabs*, p. 19.
158. PRO FO 78/3506, enc. to no. 48 (January 22, 1883), Wyndham to Granville, “Notification officielle” (n.d.); cf. FO 195/1447 no. 3, January 16, 1883, Elderidge to Dufferin; *Times* (London), no. 30,730, January 30, 1883, letter from Oliphant (Haifa), enclosing order (26.12.1882) Vali (Sam) to Kay. (Haifa); and *Havazzelet*, xiii, 9, (16.2.1883), as cited by Mandel, *Arabs*, p. 6.
159. *Havazzelet*, xxxi, 9, February 16, 1883; cf. 15, April 6, 1883, and 16, April 15, 1883, cited by Mandel, *Arabs*, p. 6.
160. PRO FO 195/2097, enclosure to No. 33 (April 26, 1901), Drummond-Hay to O’Conor, cited by Mandel, *Arabs*, p. 22.
161. PRO FO 195/2097, No. 19 (March 7, 1901), Monahan to Drummond-Hay; Jewish Colonization Association 258/no. 57, March 7, 1901, S.I. Pariente (Beirut) to President, JCA; and Jewish Colonization Association 259/no. 85 (August 30, 1901), C. Dreyfuss (Beirut) to same; cited by Mandel, *Arabs*, p. 22.
162. Mandel, *Arabs*, p. 121.
163. Alliance Israelite Universelle, Archive X E 29 (June 21, 1911), Antebi to Haham Basi (Constantinople), cited in Mandel, *Arabs*, p. 121.
164. Ruhi Bey al-Khalidi, reported in *Ha-Zevi*, xxvi, 29 (November 2, 1909), as cited by Mandel, *Arabs*, p. 77. Professor Farhi agreed that Arab active reaction to Jews “both on village and city level” in the 1907 period was not political. As Farhi noted, Mandel

- and Porath have “somewhat different interpretations.” Farhi, “Documents,” in Ma’oz, ed., *Studies*, pp. 195–196.
165. Mandel, *Arabs*, p. 106; Central Zionist Archives, L18/275, January 22, 1911.
166. *Ibid.*, p. 88; Shukri al-’Asali, open letter to Sami Pasa, *al Karmil*, December 8, 1910; *Ha-Herut*, iii, 26, December 21, 1910. Original published in *al-Muqtabas*, Damascus, vi, 2, 1911, pp. 121–122.
167. *Ha-Or*, ii [xxvii], 91/266 (5.2.1911), cited by Mandel, *Arabs*, p. 107.
168. Central Zionist Archives (CZA), Z2/11 (May 16, 1911), Jacobson to Wolffsohn, cited by Mandel, *Arabs*, p. 112.
169. “When Ruhi Bey pointed out that the Arabs were opposed only to foreign Jews, Vartkis Efendi retorted that the masses were incapable of making the distinction.” Mandel, *Arabs*, p. 113.
170. Najib Nassar; Nassar was an “Ottomanist,” who believed in “forming societies for Ottomans which will strive for Ottomanism . . . .” Among Ottomans were surely many Herzls who must display “their own worth and moral courage.” When the so-called “Ottomanism” was rendered null and void by the British defeat of the Turks in 1918, some among the British imbued anti-Jewish hostility among the Arabs in Palestine with the purpose of “nationalism”; Mandel, *Arabs*, pp. 107–112. Mandel calls Nassar’s book, *Zionism: Its History, Object and Importance* (Haifa, 1911), “the first book in Arabic about Zionism.”
171. Alliance Israelite Universelle, Archive IX E 28 (June 3, 1910), Antebi to President, AIU, *ibid.*, p. 78.
172. *Falastin*, iii, 84, November 8, 1913, cited by Mandel, *Arabs*, p. 175.
173. Gilbert, *Exile*, p. 74; also see Gilbert’s map, p. 75, illustrating the Jewish villages attacked by Arab gangs.
174. For example, William B. Quandt, Fuad Jabber, Ann Mosley Lesch, *The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1973); Y. Porath, “Palestinian Arab National Movement,” in *Society and Political Structure in the Arab World*, Menahem Milson, ed. (New York: Humanities Press, 1973), pp. 93–144. For contradictory observations see Lloyd George, *Truth about the Peace Treaties*, vol. 1, pp. 118–119; Furlonge, *Palestine Is My Country, The Story of Musa Alami*, p. 151; also see report by T.E. Lawrence, *Arab Bulletin*, March 1917: “There is no national feeling.” Elie Kedourie, *England and the Middle East*, p. 102ff.
175. Malcolm MacDonald’s report of talks with Sir Harold MacMichael, High Commissioner and Commander-in-Chief General Haining. Memorandum, “Talks in Jerusalem,” Cabinet Papers, 24/278, August 6 and 7, 1938, cited in Gilbert, *Exile*, p. 205.
176. CZA Z3/48 (January 23, 1914), Lichtheim to ZAC; Order no. 1845/2217 (January 31, 1914), Minister of the Interior (SP) to Governors (Beirut and Jerusalem) enclosed in CZA Z3/48, February 11, 1914, Lichtheim to ZAC, cited in Mandel, p. 171.
177. *Ibid.*
178. P.J.C. McGregor to Sir I. Mallet, Jerusalem, 15 March 1914, No. 16140 (No. 16 Conf.), Hyamson, *Consulate*, 2, p. 583.
179. Alex Bein, ed., *Arthur Ruppin: Memoirs, Diaries, Letters* (New York: Herzl Press, 1971), p. 149.
180. Schama, *Two Rothschilds*, pp. 211–212; also see Aaron Cohen, *Israel and the Arab World* (London, 1970), p. 113ff; Alex Bein, *The Return to the Soil* (Jerusalem: Department of Publishing, Jewish Agency, 1952), p. 155ff.
181. *Ibid.*, p. 212; also see Ruppin, *Memoirs*, p. 153.

182. *Ha Lebanon*, the first Hebrew weekly, was founded in Jerusalem in 1864, and in 1877 *Habazeleth* (“The Rose”) became the “only publication approximating a weekly newspaper printed in Palestine” for many years. De Haas, *History*, p. 438; also see Reports of British Consuls in Jerusalem in the nineteenth century, Hyamson, *Consulate*, pp. lvii, lviii; James Finn, *Stirring Times*; Samuel Katz, *Battleground: Fact and Fantasy in Palestine* (New York: Bantam Books, 1973); also see Chapter 9.
183. Schama, *Two Rothschilds*, p. 212.
184. *Ibid.*
185. *Ibid.*, p. 213, citing Bein, *The Return*, p. 155ff.
186. *Ibid.*
187. *Ibid.* At the end of 1915, “11,277 were recorded as having emigrated (i.e. excluding conscript)”: also see Bein, *The Return*, p. 155ff; Aaron Cohen, *Israel and the Arab World* (London, 1970), pp. 113ff.
188. PICA (Palestine Jewish Colonization Association) 13/439, Jaffe-Kohn, March 22, 1915, cited in Schama, *Rothschilds*, pp. 213–214.
189. Schama, *Rothschilds*, pp. 214–215.
190. Nili, the initial letters of the Hebrew biblical verse, from the book of Samuel, “The Strength of Israel will not lie,” Gilbert, *Exile*, p. 89, also pp. 95–96, 102–103, 111; Katz, *Battleground*, pp. 190–191; Schama, *Two Rothschilds*, p. 217.
191. May 11, sent through Sir Reginald Wingate in Cairo, received by Ronald Graham, British Foreign Office. Gilbert, *Exile*, p. 97.
192. *London Times*, March 30, 1917.
193. *London Daily Chronicle*, March 30, 1917; see also *Sunday Chronicle*, April 15, 1917.
194. *New Europe*, April 19, 1917. While the war was still on, the Russian government had already been contacted by Britain’s Ambassador, who asked what the Russian reaction would be to the “Zionist homeland.” March 13, 1916, aide-memoire from Sir George Buchanan, Great Britain’s Ambassador at Petrograd to Sazanov, Esco, *Palestine*, p. 83; see also Gilbert, *Exile*, p. 95.
195. Lloyd George–Sir Mark Sykes discussion, April 3, 1917. Cabinet Papers 24/9, cited by Gilbert, *Exile*, p. 95.
196. For relatively favorable Arab reaction to the Balfour Declaration, see D.H. Miller, *My Diary at the Conference of Paris*, vol. 14; at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, Syrian delegation stated that the “doors of Palestine” should “open wide” to the Jews. “Will not a Palestine enjoying wide internal autonomy be for them a sufficient guarantee? If they form the majority there, they will be the rulers . . .” February 13, 1919 entry, p. 399ff, p. 414ff. For the Arab perspective, see George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, pp. 390–392, regarding “promises” made to the Arabs prior to the Balfour Declaration. On the “McMahon Pledge” the purported promise to the Arabs, see letter from Sir Henry McMahon in *The Times*, London, July 23, 1937, in which he wrote: “I feel it my duty to state, and I do so definitely and emphatically, that it was not intended by me . . . to include Palestine in the area in which Arab independence was promised. I also had every reason to believe at the time [Oct. 24, 1915] that the fact that Palestine was not included in my pledge was well understood by King Hussein.” Cited in Esco, *Palestine*, pp. 186–187.

For adverse reactions see Gilbert, *Exile*, Chapters 9 and 10; Nicholas Bethell, *The Palestine Triangle* (New York, 1979), pp. 21–22; according to the Esco study “no objection to the Balfour Declaration was registered by the Arabs at the time of its announcement.” *Palestine*, p. 110ff. For favorable reactions of T.E. Lawrence, see

- interview with *Jewish Guardian*, November 28, 1918; also see Lloyd George, *The Truth About the Peace Treaties*, pp. 1141–1151; *London Times*, May 28, 1917, article by Lord Rothschild; *Palestine Royal Commission Report*, 1937; Antonius, *Arab Awakening*, pp. 390–392.
197. *Palestine Royal Commission Report*, pp. 23–24.
  198. *Ibid.*
  199. PICA 137/439. According to Schama, *Two Rothschilds*, p. 369, n. 67, the locust plague began in 1915, a year before “usually thought.”
  200. Schama, *Two Rothschilds*, p. 216, citing PICA, Doc. 7/433, December 22, 1916.
  201. The Syrian delegation to the Paris Peace Conference stated that 400,000–500,000 “Syrians” “died of famine and want.” D. H. Miller, *My Diary*, vol. 14, p. 404; according to Ernst Frankenstein, *Justice for my People*, p. 129, if the figures given by the Syrian delegation included Palestine, “they mean 13%–16% of the population” was lost, “otherwise 17%–21%.” The non-Jewish population of Palestine in 1914 was 595,000, according to Roberto Bachi, *The Population of Israel*, Committee for International Coordination of National Research in Demography (Jerusalem, 1974), p. 36; in 1919, 582,550, according to the *Palestine Royal Commission Report*, p. 156; and in 1922, 668,258 according to the 1922 census as reported in *Report . . . for the Year 1937*, Colonial No. 146, p. 221.
  202. September 1917, Schama, *Two Rothschilds*, p. 217.
  203. Gilbert, *Exile*, p. 111; Katz, *Battleground*, pp. 120–121.
  204. Sarah Aaronson, sister of Aaron, Katz, *Battleground*, pp. 120–121. Also see Anita Engle, *The Nili Spies* (London, 1959); Hebrew works cited in Katz, *Battleground*, n. 3, p. 121; Chaim Weizmann, *Trial and Error*; Vladimir Jabotinsky, *Story of the Jewish Legion* (New York, 1945).
  205. Twenty of those condemned to hanging “were kept alive, though under lock and key, until the liberation at the end of the year.” Schama, *Two Rothschilds*, p. 217, also n. 73, p. 370.
  206. “End of October, 1917,” *Palestine Royal Commission Report*, pp. 22–23.
  207. *Ibid.* According to the report, “On the 14th February and the 9th May, 1918, the French and Italian Governments publicly endorsed it.” For an inclusive description of the political events preceding and resulting from the Balfour Declaration, see Gilbert, *Exile*.
  208. The policy statement “took the form of a letter from Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,” Lord Arthur James Balfour, “to Lord Rothschild.” *Palestine Royal Commission Report*, pp. 22–23. It began, “I have much pleasure in conveying to you on behalf of His Majesty’s Government the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations, which had been submitted to and approved by the Cabinet”: The body of the statement was followed by: “I should be grateful if you would bring the Declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.”

The Balfour Declaration would form the base for the international adoption by the League of Nations for a Jewish National Home in Palestine. The Jews’ acceptance of a home “in Palestine,” rather than Palestine as the “Jewish nation” or Jewish state, was a “compromise.” The Jews, the British, and the Americans all stated the recognition that a Jewish independent state would indeed exist when Jews were the majority of the country and had set up their governing apparatus. The British took over the administration of the Palestine Mandate of the League of Nations in 1922, and England pledged to “facilitate” the “immigration” and “close settlement” by Jews

in their Jewish National Home—without prejudicing the civil and religious rights of the existing population. Esco, *Palestine*, pp. 68–70; see Chapters 13–15.

The general expectations at the time were that “. . . the effort to establish a Jewish state in Palestine, has certainly entered ‘the realm of practical politics,’ and events of the year 1918 have proved that the British cabinet has an understanding with the Zionist leaders which most assuredly goes far beyond the declaration of November 2, 1917.” Herbert Adams Gibbons, “Zionism and the World Peace,” *Century* (New York), January 1919, vol. 97, no. 3.

### 11. Popular Misconceptions About the Population of “Palestine”

1. *New York Times*, from Associated Press, October 6, 1980, p. 3; *Chicago Tribune*, from United Press International, October 7, 1980, p. 6.
2. A.J. Sussnitzki, “Zur Gliederung wirtschaftlicher Arbeit nach Nationalitäten in der Türkei,” *Archiv für Wirtschaftsforschung im Orient*, II, 1917, 382–407, in Charles Issawi, ed., *Economic History of the Middle East 1800–1914* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 116. According to Sussnitzki, “The Jews formerly played a very different part in agriculture. On the ancient significance of the Jews as the most important factors in Mesopotamia, see Krauss, ‘Die Juden Mesopotamiens in Handel und Wandel,’ *Oe. M. O.*, 1916, no. 1–6, pp. 71, 84; on the decline of Jewish agriculture, *ibid.*, p. 87.” Issawi, p. 117.
3. Lewis French, *Reports on Agricultural Development and Land Settlement in Palestine*, Jerusalem, 1931–1932.
4. Sir John Hope Simpson, *Palestine: Report on Immigration, Land Settlement and Development*, 1930, Command Paper #3686, London; Sir John Hope Simpson’s findings were preceded and inspired by the Shaw Commission Report of 1930, *Commission on the Palestine Disturbances of August 1929*, Command Paper 3530, 1930, London, the first official British Administration document in support of Arab contentions that Jewish settlement was “displacing” Arabs in Palestine. The Hope Simpson report formed the basis for the 1930 White Paper of Lord Passfield, Command Paper #3692, which restricted Jewish immigration to guard against what was termed “landless Arabs.”
5. Hope Simpson, *Report*, p. 26.
6. A.M. Carr-Saunders, *World Population* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936), p. 313. Carr-Saunders’ findings were incorporated into the important *Palestine Partition Commission Report*, Command #5854, London, 1938, pp. 23, 25–26, which played a large role in determining the continuance of immigration restrictions against Jews in Palestine during and after World War II.
7. According to the census, “In the settled population of 969, 268 persons, 132, 692 are immigrants having been born abroad. Thus, 14 per cent of the population are foreign-born. The proportions in the communities are, of course, very different. Not quite 2 per cent of the Moslem population are immigrants, while 58 per cent of the Jewish population are foreign-born. Of the Christians, nearly 20 per cent are from abroad. Thus the actual population of Moslems is very nearly equal to that part of the natural population of Moslems which is to be found in Palestine, while Jewish population is predominantly immigrant in character.” *Census of Palestine*, vol. I, part I, report by E. Mills, B.A., O.B.E., Assistant Chief Secretary Superintendent of Census, 1933, Alexandria, p. 59.

8. Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, *Report to the United States Government and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom*, Lausanne, Switzerland, April 20, 1946, p. 23; also see *Palestine Royal Commission Report*, Command Paper #5479 of 1937, p. 125.
9. Anglo-American Committee, *Survey*, vol. 3 (unpublished), p. 1151.
10. *Palestine Royal Commission Report*, pp. 128–129.
11. *Statistical Abstract of Palestine*, 1936, cited by Moshe Braver, "Immigration as a Factor in the Growth of the Arab Village in Eretz-Israel," *Economic Review* (Jerusalem), vol. 28, nos. 7–9, July–September, 1975, pp. 12–13.
12. Philip Hauser, Gladys Epting, demographers: author's interviews, November 1980.
13. *Palestine Partition Commission Report*, p. 22; see n. 18, Ch. 14 herein.
14. "While it is undoubted that the difference reflects a greater expectation of life, particularly in infancy, among Jews than Moslems, it must be noted that the Jewish population is made up largely of young adult immigrants who are in those years of life when the risk of dying is at its lowest and the smaller proportion of infants and old people which this immigration has produced is itself a cause of a low crude death-rate." *Report . . . for the Year 1937*, Colonial No. 146, p. 224.
15. *Palestine Royal Commission Report*, p. 282.
16. As the figures in Chapter 12 determine, there was not a consistent "600,000," as prevalent authorities stated.
17. Malcolm MacDonald, British Secretary for the Colonies, statement before the House of Commons, November 24, 1938; Carr-Saunders, *World Population*, pp. 310–311; Anglo-American Committee, *Survey*, vol. 3, p. 1150.
18. "The very high birth-rate of Palestine is established by the preponderance of the Moslems, who show the highest birth-rate of all the religions. The Moslem settled population rose by natural increase at an average rate of 18,000 per annum, or about 2½ per cent per annum in the five years 1931–5. The Jewish birth-rate is considerably lower than the Moslem." *Report . . . for the Year 1937*, Colonial No. 146, pp. 223–224; also see *United Nations Special Committee on Palestine Report to the General Assembly*, vol. I, pp. 11–12, New York, 1947.
19. "The increase in the Moslem and Christian populations is to be attributed mostly to their higher rate of natural increase, due not only to the very high birth rate, but also to the fall in the death rate of infants, as well as a considerable increase in the life span of life while the increase in the Jewish population (more than seven fold) is to be credited mostly to immigration." Rony Gabbay, *A Political Study of the Arab-Jewish Conflict* (Paris: Librairie Minard, 1959), p. 7; A. Granovsky, *The Land Issue in Palestine* (Jerusalem: Keren Kayemeth Le Israel, 1936), pp. 66–67, stated that "The rate of natural increase of the Arab population of Palestine is . . . among the highest in the world, in fact" (pp. 66–67).
20. Anglo-American Committee, *Survey*, 1945–1956, vol. I, p. 144.
21. Carr-Saunders, *World Population*, p. 310.
22. *Palestine Partition Commission Report*, p. 27.
23. "Comparable with the mass immigration movements into Australia and New Zealand in the latter half of the nineteenth century." *Partition Commission Report*, p. 22.
24. *Ibid.*
25. The Report went on: "Official statistics show that in the four years 1933–36 there was an increase of 164,267 persons in the Jewish section of the population. This

- shows that the Jewish population as it stood in 1932 has very nearly doubled in the last four years. The average Jewish immigration for the period 1933–36 has been at the rate of rather over 40,000 persons a year.” *Palestine Royal Commission Report*, p. 280.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 125.
  27. Carr-Saunders, *World Population*, p. 307.
  28. *Department of Migration Annual Report*, 1936, p. 20.
  29. *Report . . . for the Year 1934*, Colonial No. 104, p. 35.
  30. *Palestine Royal Commission Report*, p. 125.
  31. See the table “Number of Immigrants Annually by Race. Total Number of Persons Registered as Immigrants,” in Appendix VII. “The table indicates that *all three main religious communities have gained by migration, the smallest proportional gain being that of the Moslems*. It is of interest that the Jewish increase by migration in the fourteen year period is very nearly the same as the Moslem natural increase in the same period, about 237,000.” Memoranda by the Government of Palestine, Memo No. 1, “Growth of Population,” p. 2. (Emphasis added.)  
 “. . . Meanwhile, the Arabs, though their proportion of the total population was falling, had increased by an even greater number—the Moslems alone from 589,000 to 1,061,000. Of this Moslem growth by 472,000 *only 19,000 was accounted for by immigration*. This expansion of the Arab community by natural increase has been in fact one of the most striking features of Palestine’s social history under the Mandate.” Anglo-American Committee, *Report to the United States Government and His Majesty’s Government . . .*, p. 23. (Emphasis added.)  
 “Although different considerations from those relevant to Jewish immigration apply to Arab immigration, special consideration need not be given to the latter as, out of a total number of 360,822 immigrants who entered Palestine between 1920 and 1942 only 27,981 or 7.8% were Arabs.” Anglo-American Committee, *Survey*, vol. 2, p. 795.
  32. “. . . In a less important degree the records may be held to be defective in respect of the inhabitants of the limitrophic districts of Palestine on the one side and Syria and the Lebanons on the other along the northern frontier, for these people have the right of freedom of unrestricted passage across the frontier so long as they remain within the limitrophic districts. But these defects are of no great consequence in the *consideration* of the records of migration as revelatory of the execution of the mandatory policy of conducting Jewish immigration into Palestine according to the capacity of the country to absorb immigrants and it is in that aspect of the matter that the statistics may be held to have a high degree of accuracy.” *Department of Migration Annual Report*, 1936, p. 20. Emphasis added.
  33. *Census of Palestine—1931*, vol. I, part I, Report by E. Mills, pp. 148–151.
  34. *Ibid.*, p. 170–171.
  35. Anglo-American Committee, *Survey*, vol. 1, p. 216.
  36. Hope Simpson, *Report*, p. 126.
  37. For example, Anglo-American Committee, *Survey; Report . . . for the Year 1934*, Colonial No. 104; *Report . . . for the Year 1937*, Colonial No. 146; Memoranda by the Government of Palestine, Memo No. 1, “Growth of Population,” 1937.
  38. *Report . . . for the Year 1934*, Colonial No. 104, p. 34.
  39. *Palestine Royal Commission Report*, pp. 280–282, 291–292; Hope Simpson, *Report*, p. 138.



40. For example: "There has been unrecorded illegal immigration both of Jews and of Arabs in the period since the census of 1931, but no estimate of its volume will be possible until the next census is taken." *Report . . . for the Year 1937*, Colonial No. 146, p. 221.

"There has been unrecorded illegal immigration both of Jews and of Arabs in the period since the census of 1931, but it is clear that, since it cannot be recorded, no estimate of its volume is possible." Memoranda by the Government of Palestine, Memo No. 1, "Growth of Population," 1937, p. 2.

". . . It was pointed out in the Blue Book of the Palestine Government for 1928 that there was an under-estimation of the population of Palestine for that year by about 20,000–25,000, owing to unrecorded immigration. This immigration consists in part of Arabs who enter from adjoining countries, in part of Jews who come into the country in various ways without the ordinary formalities of regular immigrations." Hope Simpson, *Report*, p. 157.

"In addition to this increase by recorded immigration, a number of persons are known to enter Palestine illegally from both adjacent and European countries and to remain there permanently." *Report . . . for the Year 1934*, Colonial No. 104, p. 34.

". . . the smuggling of immigrants into Palestine by land and sea. This has been checked in large part by the recruitment of additional police for patrol along the coastal and inland frontiers, by assistance from the Trans-Jordan Frontier Force, by the establishment of a small preventive force for service in the port areas of Jaffa and Haifa, and by the prosecution of all persons arrested, in addition to their deportation. The preventive force consists of a British Police Inspector and twenty-five N.C.O.'s and other ranks who board all ships, check crews, search for stowaways, and prevent persons refused admission from landing." *Report . . . for the Year 1934*, Colonial No. 104, p. 44.

"Not all the migratory movements are recorded. It is well known that a considerable movement of illegal immigration occurs across the borders of Palestine. Since 1939 records are kept of illegal immigrants enumerated in ships, arrested or interred from reliable evidence and are included in the population estimates." Anglo-American Committee, *Survey*, vol. 1, p. 162.

". . . Within the country . . . the discovery of a source of wealth and prosperity in the south would be followed by a permanent migration from the central and northern parts of Palestine. In this type is, of course, included immigration of settlers into Palestine from other countries.

"The problem of illegal immigration into Palestine is that concerned with permanent settlement in the country whether by Jew or Arab, contrary to the provisions of the immigration legislation in force from time to time." Anglo-American Committee, *Survey*, vol. 1, p. 209.

41. For example: "At the Twenty-Seventh Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission a question was asked as to the number of Trans-Jordanians who enter Palestine and leave after the seasonal work is done. No reliable statistics are available, but it is believed that few remain in Palestine permanently. Most seek to make a little capital in Palestine with which to return to Trans-Jordan and to assist their livelihood there." *Report . . . for the Year 1935*, Colonial No. 112, p. 50.

". . . there has been some immigration from the surrounding territories, which, since it avoids the frontier controls, is not recorded." *Palestine Royal Commission Report*, p. 291.

“The dimensions of the volume of illegal immigration from neighboring territories are not known. . . . It is probable that seasonal immigration leaves a residue in Palestine of people who have decided to settle permanently in the country.” *Palestine Royal Commission Report*, p. 292.

“The conclusion is that Arab illegal immigration for the purposes of permanent settlement is insignificant.” Anglo-American Committee, *Survey*, vol. 1, p. 212.

“These records are not complete and similar data for previous years are not known. No allowance has therefore been made for illegal immigration in the years previous to 1939.” Anglo-American Committee, *Survey*, vol. 1, p. 162.

42. “Arab illegal immigration is mainly casual, temporary and seasonal. It is effected chiefly by illegal entry across the land frontiers of Palestine. Owing to the fact that the bulk of illegal immigration is unrecorded on entry and departure, since the Arabs do not pass through the frontier controls, evidence as to the character of the immigration of Arabs is not easily found in Palestine.” *Palestine Royal Commission Report*, p. 291.

“Arab illegal immigration is mainly of the types described . . . as casual, temporary and seasonal. It is illegal in the sense that the entry and the mode of entry do not conform with the provisions of the Immigration Ordinance and it is therefore not susceptible of statistical record. On the other hand it is not illegal in the sense that the immigrants settle permanently in Palestine.” Anglo-American Committee, *Survey*, vol. 1, p. 210.

“The length of the land-frontiers of Palestine . . . makes effective frontier-control difficult. . . .” *Ibid.*, p. 216.

“In the case of Moslems, uncertainty in the definition of ‘settled’ population, incompleteness of records of natural increase and a certain amount of illegal immigration (mainly from neighboring countries) are the factors most capable of introducing a margin of error in the compilation of population estimates.” *Ibid.*, p. 162.

43. Martin Gilbert, *Winston S. Churchill*, 5 vols., *The Prophet of Truth: 1922–1939*, vol. 5 (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1977), particularly pp. 847–849, 867, 1069–1072.
44. “The increase in Jewish immigration was accompanied by . . . large-scale dispossession of Arabs. Thousands of Arab farm families, driven from the land on which they and their ancestors had lived, were forced to go to the towns.” Mahmoud Rousan, *Palestine and the Internationalization of Jerusalem* (Baghdad: Ministry of Culture and Guidance, 1965), p. 31, cited by Fred Gottheil, “Arab Immigration into Pre-State Israel: 1922–1931,” in Curtis et al., *The Palestinians*, p. 30.
45. Martin Gilbert, *Churchill*, vol. 5, p. 1072.
46. 27th Session, June 3 to June 18, 1935, Geneva, p. 47, League of Nations Publication VI.A. Mandates 1935.
47. From Mandatory records left by the British in May 1948: Israel State Archives (hereafter ISA), Group 11, File 1180/37, Imm. 35, January 3, 1926. To Palestine Gendarmerie, Samakh, from Controller (of Permits) Memo, “Entry of refugees into Palestine.” Those who “appear to be Syrian, Lebanese or Palestinian by nationality may be admitted into Palestine without passport or visa.”
48. See, for example, “urgent” memo, “Refugees from Syria,” giving orders to “furnish blank passes as speedily as possible.” ISA Group 11, File 1180/37 to District Commissioner from Controller of Permits, November 18, 1925; Arabs from “Damascus without a proper permit . . . scattered all over Palestine.”; ISA Group 11, File 1180/37 No. 180/7. To Controller of Permits, Jerusalem from District Office, Na-

blus, October 25, 1926; also see ISA Group 11, File 1180/37 memo March 9, 1926, “Refugees from Syria,” J. Broadhurst to Controller of Permits; ISA Group 11, File 1180/37 IMM/35, November 26, 1931, “Syrian Affairs”; ISA Group 11, File 11578/36, May 2, 1936, “Hauranis”; minutes to preceding document, May 2, 1936, signed (High Commissioner) A. Wauchope and P.T.O.

49. *Palestine Royal Commission Report*, pp. 291–292: “. . . it is certain that many of the inhabitants of Syria and the Lebanon enter Palestine without formality although they are not inhabitants of the adjoining districts of Syria. Such entry is illegal.

“A large proportion of Arab immigrants into Palestine come from the Hauran. These people go in considerable numbers to Haifa, where they work in the port. . . . Most persons in this category probably remain permanently in Palestine, wages there being considerably higher than in Syria.

“The Deputy Inspector-General of the Criminal Investigation Department has recently estimated that the number of Hauranis illegally in the country at the present time is roughly 2,500.”

Under the heading “Arab Illegal Immigration,” a 1945–1946 report noted that “. . . the ‘boom’ conditions in Palestine in the years 1934–1936 led to an inward movement into Palestine particularly from Syria.” Anglo-American Committee, *Survey*, vol. 1, p. 211.

50. *Palestine Royal Commission, Minutes of Evidence Heard at Public Session*, Colonial Nos. 134, 135, 137: Wednesday, December 2, 1936, pp. 80–92, and Tuesday, December 8, 1936, pp. 93–101.
51. *Palestine Royal Commission Report*, p. 292.
52. In fact, the total number of Jews approved for immigration for the entire year of 1934 was 42,359, according to the *Report . . . for the Year 1934*, Colonial No. 104, p. 35.
53. *Report . . . for the Year 1935*, Colonial No. 112, p. 49, 214.
54. According to the *Report . . . for the Year 1934*, Colonial No. 104, p. 44, 772 Jews and 1,635 non-Jews were deported.
55. *Report . . . for the Year 1934*, Colonial No. 104, p. 11.
56. According to the *Report for the Year 1937*, Colonial No. 146, p. 68: The numbers of persons deported in 1935 for immigration offenses is as follows: Total 2,445; Jews 293; Non-Jews 2,152. It is interesting to note that for the year 1933, almost three times as many non-Jews as Jews were reported as “travellers entering” Palestine, while almost three times as many Jews as non-Jews were reported as “travellers remaining illegally.” No reasons were given for such a surprising disparity in the reporting; figures for 1934 and 1935 are similarly skewed.
57. C.S. Jarvis, *United Empire*, vol. 28, p. 633, cited by Gottheil, “Immigration,” in Curtis et al., *The Palestinians*, p. 31; see also *Palestine Royal Commission Report*, p. 291.
58. Hope Simpson, *Report*, p. 138: “. . . Egyptian labour is being employed in certain individual cases, and its ingress has been the subject of adverse comment in the Press. . . . It may be a difficult matter to ensure against this illicit immigration, but steps to this end must be taken if the suggested policy is adopted, as also to prevent unemployment lists being swollen by immigrants from Trans-Jordania.”
59. *Ibid.*
60. *Ibid.*, p. 126.
61. *Palestine Royal Commission, Minutes of Evidence*, November 24, 1936.
62. September 26, 1937.

63. *Report . . . for the Year 1937*, Colonial No. 146, p. 221.
64. For example, Hope Simpson, *Report; Palestine Royal Commission Report*.

## 12. A Hidden Factor in Western Palestine: Arab In-Migration

1. The Old Testament indicates that historic Palestine included land on both sides of the Jordan River, east bank as well as west bank, including the territory now known as Jordan. The portion of historic Palestine east of the Jordan River equaled or exceeded in area the portion west of Palestine. In biblical times the tribe of Manasseh occupied more territory to the east of the Jordan River than to the west, the entire tribe of Reuben dwelled east of the Jordan, and the land called Gad was east of the Jordan. Mount Gilead and Ramouh Gilead all were east of the Jordan, as were other biblical places and people. (See map, page 12, *Literary and Historical Atlas of Asia*, prepared by J. G. Bartholomew for the Everyman Library.) Even in the time of the New Testament (as shown by the map in Appendix I), the land included territory on the east side of the Jordan River as well as the west. The New Testament city of Philadelphia was well east of the Jordan River, as was the city of Golan, which was part of Palestine, according to the Old Testament as well as the New. For an additional example, see *Rand McNally Atlas of World History*, ed. R.R. Palmer, Chicago, 1957, p. 25.
2. For map of Palestine, east, see O. R. Conder, *The Survey of Eastern Palestine*, Committee of the Palestine Exploration Fund, London, 1889; also see J. Stoyanovsky, *The Mandate for Palestine* (London, New York, Toronto, 1928), pp. 66, 204–210. Arthur Balfour's memorandum of August 11, 1919, stated: "Palestine should extend into the lands lying east of the Jordan." Balfour, who led the British delegation to the Paris Peace conference (in 1919) "determined the frontiers" of Palestine in a memorandum to Prime Minister Lloyd George, June 26, 1919: "In determining the Palestinian frontiers, the main thing to keep in mind is to make a Zionist policy possible by giving the fullest scope to economic development in Palestine. Thus, the Northern frontier should give to Palestine a full command of the water power which geographically belongs to Palestine and not to Syria; while the Eastern frontier should be so drawn as to give the widest scope to agricultural development on the left bank of the Jordan, consistent with leaving the Hedjaz Railway completely in Arab possession."
3. December 2, 1918—Toynbee minute: Foreign Office Papers; 371/3398—Arnold Toynbee agreed with the Mandate: "It might be equitable [to include in Palestine] that part . . . which lies east of the Jordan stream . . . at present desolate, but capable of supporting a large population if irrigated and cultivated scientifically . . . The Zionists have as much right to this no-man's land as the Arabs, or more," cited in Martin Gilbert, *Exile and Return*, p. 115. See also David Lloyd George, *The Truth About the Peace Treaties* (vol. I), pp. 1144–1145.
4. United States recommendation at the Paris Peace Conference, January 21, 1919. See also U.S. Congressional Resolution, June 30, 1922, in *Survey of Palestine*, p. 21.
5. In Arabia itself, largely equivalent to present Saudi Arabia, Jews had been present and had developed towns such as Medina and Khaibar, where they thrived from Roman days and before, until the conquest by Muhammad and subsequent directions from Omar. Then the Jews were slaughtered or their land expropriated and Jews were forced to flee for their lives if they did not convert to Islam. Many of those Jews

in the seventh century fled as refugees back to “Palestine,” where Jewish inhabitants could even then be found in most towns referred to today as purely Arab areas.

Into the twentieth century, between 3,000 and 5,000 Jews lived in “purely Arab towns,” such as Jenin, Tyre, Sidon, and Nablus during the Turkish domination; roughly 1,500 held on under the British Mandate; and in 1944–1947, zero. Those towns had been rendered *judenrein* by Arab pogroms; see Chapter 9.

6. Lord Balfour speech, July 12, 1920, cited in *Palestine Royal Commission Report*, para. 27, p. 27, 1937; see maps in this chapter and Appendix I. See n. 15 here.
7. High Commissioner Harold MacMichael to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, regarding Transjordan, cipher telegram, private, personal and most secret, 1941, PRO CO733/27137.
8. David Lloyd George, *The Truth About the Peace Treaties*, pp. 1119, 1140. Also see Esco, *Palestine*, vol. 1, pp. 64ff.
9. Gilbert, *Exile*, p. 132; see T.E. Lawrence, *Revolt in the Desert*, about Abdullah, particularly pp. 1–7. Feisal’s role is woven throughout Lawrence’s account. Also see King Abdullah of Jordan, *My Memoirs Completed* (Washington, D.C., 1954).
10. August 1, 1921, Secret dispatch #2301/pol., CO733/41683, Enclosure “A,” Report No. 6.
11. PRO FO 371/6342, March 23, 1921.
12. July 4, 1921, telegram to Secretary of State for the Colonies, CO733/35186; response to “Very Confidential” memo “from the Civil Secretary after his recent tour in Trans-Jordania,” Churchill to Samuel, July 2, 1921, CO733/36252.
13. Churchill Papers 17/14, January 17, 1921; cited in Gilbert, *Exile and Return*, p. 132; the British chose Feisal to be King in March 1921, at the Cairo Conference. See Esco, *Palestine*, pp. 121–126.
14. MacMichael hoped in 1941 to offer Abdullah a “consolation prize” of “Trans Jordan” when the country gained independence of the Mandate, and *after* Abdullah “has realized that his hopes . . . for Syria . . . are vain. We simply cannot have recrimination of these pledges to the Arabs until we are absolutely clear how and when they are to be converted into practice. The smaller the time gap between any promise and its implementation, the better. . . .” MacMichael to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, PRO CO733/27137.
15. According to the 1937 *Palestine Royal Commission Report*, “Trans-Jordan was cut away from that field [in which the Jewish National Home was understood to be established at the time of the Balfour Declaration, . . . the whole of historic Palestine].” The reason given was the later claim of the Arabs that a letter, called the McMahon pledge, from Sir Henry McMahon on October 24, 1915, had included Palestine in the territory that Britain promised to the Arabs. A formal Arab protest, called “The Holyland. The Muslim-Christian Case Against Zionist Aggression,” was not declared until November 1921, six years after the date of the McMahon letter and four years after the Balfour Declaration. The fact that McMahon had *excluded* Palestine from his promise—as had the Emir Feisal excluded it from his request at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, ignoring the McMahon letter—was conspicuously absent. The British government’s failure to publish the complete correspondence gave credence to what otherwise would have been a quickly squelched, rather obvious ploy, until 1939, when a committee of British and Arab delegates scrutinized the correspondence; the British then determined that, in the words of one delegate, the Lord High Chancellor, Lord Maugham, “The correspondence as a whole, and

particularly . . . Sir Henry McMahon's letter of the 24th October, 1915, not only did exclude Palestine but should have been understood to do so. . . ." Similar testimony came from many eminent British government officials. Most notably, from Sir Henry McMahon himself: in *The Times* of London, July 23, 1937, McMahon wrote, "I feel it my duty to state, and I do so definitely and emphatically, that it was not intended by me in giving this pledge to King Hussein to include Palestine in the area in which Arab independence was promised. I also had every reason to believe at the time that the fact that Palestine was not included in my pledge was well understood by King Hussein." The British case supporting McMahon was strengthened even further by the fact that Feisal waited until January 29, 1921—nearly six years later—to bring up the subject, and then he was quoted by Winston Churchill as being "prepared to accept" the exclusion of Palestine.

The logical deduction to be made from the plethora of evidence seems clear: Palestine was indeed excluded—and in any case, the Balfour Declaration was incorporated by the Council of the League of Nations and was thus binding upon its trustee, England as Mandatory power, while no British letter of pledge could have been binding even if one had been given. Nevertheless, Arabs and their supporters have continued to attempt to cast doubt, as though the written documents didn't exist. Significantly, however, the 1937 *Palestine Royal Commission Report*, which was issued the same year that McMahon published his *Times* rejoinder, made the recommendation that "Transjordan should be opened to Jewish immigration." It never was. *Palestine Royal Commission Report*, pp. 22–38; for texts of several British witnesses and full McMahon text: Esco, *Palestine*, vol. 1, p. 181ff. Great Britain, *Correspondence*, Cmd. #5957; Churchill White Paper, June 3, 1922, Statement of British policy in Palestine, Cmd. #1700, p. 20; Lloyd George, *The Truth About the Peace Treaties*, vol. II, pp. 1042, 1140–1155; D.H. Miller, *Diary*, vol. XIV, pp. 227–234 and 414, vol. II, pp. 188–189, vol. XVII, p. 456; H.F. Frischwasser-Ra'an, *The Frontiers of a Nation* (London: Batchworth Press, 1955), pp. 104–107. Frischwasser-Ra'an writes of the statement by British Foreign Office expert on the Near East, Lord Robert Cecil: " 'Our wish is that the Arab country shall be for the Arabs, Armenia for the Armenians and Judea for the Jews,' " pp. 104–105; Antonius, *Arab Awakening*, pp. 390–392; *The Letters of T.E. Lawrence*, David Garnett, ed. (Doubleday, Doran, 1939), pp. 281–282; for international legal interpretation, see J. Stoyanovsky, *The Mandate for Palestine* (London, New York, Toronto: Longmans, Green & Co., 1928), pp. 66, 205–223; Parliamentary Debates, Commons, vol. 113, col. 115–116, May 23, 1939, for the views of the Archbishop of Canterbury; for examples of discussion of the McMahon-Hussein matter that omit available evidence described or referred to above, and suggest support of the Arab protestations, see William B. Quandt, Fuad Jabber, Ann Mosely Lesch, *The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1973), pp. 8–11; John S. Badeau, *East and West of Suez* (New York: The Foreign Policy Association, 1943), p. 45.

16. In the Anglo-American Committee's "Historical Summary of Principal Political Events in Palestine Since the British Occupation in 1917," a chronological summary beginning in 1917, no mention at all is made of the gift of Transjordan to the Arabs by the British—neither in the 1922 summary nor in 1928, when an "organic Law" was enforced, nor in 1929 when the ratification of the "Agreement" took place. See Summary in *Survey of Palestine*, vol. 1, pp. 15–25.

Yet that act, which severed roughly seventy-five percent of the Mandate of Palestine, is ignored as a “principal political event”—the de facto creation of an Arab state on seventy-five percent of what had been deemed the “Jewish National Home,” and which had been specifically set aside by the British and Arabs alike as an area “not purely Arab,” as compared to Iraq and Syria. In the chapter preceding the “Summary,” the Arabs’ acquisition of an Arab-Palestinian state—a Palestinian state surely no less than Israel became—is presented as a *fait accompli*: “Prior to the 12th August, 1927, the High Commissioners for Palestine included within their jurisdiction the entire Mandatory area *without separate mention of Transjordan*. Since that date, however, the High Commissioners have received separate commissions for Palestine and Trans-Jordan respectively.” See *Survey of Palestine*, p. 14. (Emphasis added.)

In the Summary, however, exhaustive attention is drawn to the Balfour Declaration and its ramifications upon the Arab community in Palestine; on the rioting:—“The hostility shown towards the Jews [which was] . . . shared by Arabs of all classes; Moslem and Christian Arabs, whose relations had hitherto been uneasy, were for once united. Intense excitement was aroused by the wild anti-Jewish rumors which were spread during the course of the riots.” See Haycraft Inquiry, October 1921, in *Survey of Palestine*, pp. 18, 19.

17. The only proposal Britain as Mandatory power submitted to the League of Nations “during the lifetime of the League . . .” was a 1922 memorandum citing Article 25 of the Mandate; Article 25 allowed the Mandatory power “with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations, to postpone or withhold application of such provisions of the mandate as he may consider suitable to those conditions, provided that no action . . . is inconsistent with . . . Article 15, 16 and 18.” The article referred to “the territories *lying between the Jordan and the Eastern boundary of Palestine . . .*,” the eastern boundary being the Hejaz (Saudi Arabia). In Dr. Paul S. Riebenfeld, “Israel, Jordan and Palestine,” (unpublished manuscript), pp. 10–18ff, exhaustive study of documentation concerning Transjordan and the Mandate.

In fact it appears that, to humor Emir Abdullah, the British gave the appearance of a severance, with the real consequences of a severance from Palestine upon the Jewish National Home, and the de facto creation of the Palestinian Arab state, while the British never *attempted* to legalize their actions, only to record them; “the only legal action ever taken by the British Government” was taken under Article 25: the Resolution of September 16, 1922. *League of Nations Official Journal*, November 1922, pp. 1390–1391; Riebenfeld, *ibid.*, p. 18.

For an absorbing account of “what exactly happened on September 16, 1922” see Dr. Riebenfeld’s “Integrity of Palestine,” *Midstream*, August/September, 1975, p. 12ff; also see Ernest Frankenstein, *Justice for My People*.

18. Alec Kirkbride, *A Crackle of Thorns* (1956), pp. 19–20. Kirkbride goes on to say, however, that “There was no intention” in 1920 “of forming the territory east of the river Jordan into an independent Arab state.” Also see *Palestine Royal Commission Report*, suggesting that Transjordan—Eastern Palestine—“if fully developed could hold a much larger population than it does at present,” p. 308.
19. When Britain entered into an agreement to transfer the exercise of administration on February 20, 1928, the League of Nations Permanent Mandates Commission challenged the agreement as a “conflict with the Mandate for Palestine.” Quincy Wright, *Mandates Under the League of Nations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930), p. 458. The statement of the Commission (in part) was: “Since the

Commission is charged with the duty of seeing that the mandate is fully and literally carried out, it considers it necessary to point out . . . , in particular, Article 2 of the Agreement, which reads as follows:

“The powers of legislation and administration entrusted to His Britannic Majesty as mandatory for Palestine shall be exercised in that part of the area under Mandate known as Transjordan by His Highness the Amir . . . ’ does not seem compatible with the stipulation of the Mandate of which Article 1 provides that: ‘The mandatory shall have full powers of legislation and of administration, save as they may be limited by the terms of this mandate.’ ”

League of Nations, *Official Journal*, Oct. 1928, p. 1574; also see pp. 1451–1453; also in Riebenfeld, *Israel, Jordan and Palestine*, pp. 24–25; . . . At that point Britain’s Council member “explained that Great Britain still regarded itself as responsible for the . . . mandate in Transjordan and the Council was satisfied.” Quincy Wright, *Mandates Under the League of Nations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930), p. 458; as another example, in 1937 the Permanent Mandates Commission, at the 32nd Session, insisted that no obstacle should “prevent that Jewish National Home being established.” Minutes of the 32nd Session, p. 90.

20. May 1946. See Chapter 17.

21. April 12, 1948, Arab League Resolution: No partition would be acceptable, and all Palestine must be liberated from the Zionists; on April 16, 1948, Abdullah abolished the Jordan Senate and appointed 20 new Senators: 7 Senators were Palestinian Arabs; on April 24, 1948, Jordan’s House of Delegates and House of Notables, in joint session of Parliament, adopted a resolution: “. . . basing itself on the right of self-determination and on the existing de facto position between Jordan and Palestine and their national, natural and geographic unity and their common interests and living space. . . .” The parliament supported the “unity between the two sides of the Jordan. . . .” Cited in “Jordan Annexes Arab Palestine,” by Benjamin Schwadran, *Middle Eastern Affairs*, vol. 1, no. 4, April 1950.

22. April 12, 1948, cited in Paul Riebenfeld, “The Integrity of Palestine,” in *Midstream*, August–September 1975, p. 22.

23. *Ibid.*

24. Jordanian Nationality Law, *Official Gazette*, No. 1171, Article 3 (3) of Law No. 6, 1954, February 16, 1954, p. 105.

25. Ahmed Shukeiry to the Council of the Arab League, November 1966, cited in Riebenfeld, “The Integrity,” *Midstream*, p. 23.

26. Mohamed Heikal, *Road to Ramadan* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1975), p. 96. See Heikal’s account of a meeting between Arab heads of state, including King Faisal, Ghadafi, and President Nasser; according to Heikal, King Hussein’s war ended September 27, 1970, with the signed agreement between Hussein and Yasser Arafat, and the “withdrawal of all . . . forces from every city in the country” (p. 99). According to another source, the ceasefire took place September 25, but fighting continued well into 1971. *Political Terrorism*, edited by Lester Sobel (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1975), cited in *Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the West Bank*, edited by Anne Sinai and Allen Pollack (New York: American Academic Association for Peace in the Middle East, 1977), p. 60.

27. June 2, 1971: Hussein’s orders to Jordanian Premier Wasfi Tel, cited in *Hashemite Kingdom*, p. 61.

28. Description in documentary film of Golda Meir’s life, originally broadcast on PBS,



- New York, December 1978, after her death on December 8, 1978.
29. The area of Israel within Armistice Demarcation lines contained roughly this area plus the previously barren southern half of Western Palestine called Negev. The Negev was fifty percent of the seventy percent of land in Western Palestine that was included in Israel in 1948.
  30. Jews had remained in the “holy cities” of the “Land” throughout their “exile.” The actual agricultural redevelopment was begun by Jewish pioneers much earlier, but the “first wave” of Jewish settlers from abroad is said by some to have begun in 1872; by others, to have begun in 1878–1882. See Chapters 5 and 10.
  31. United States Recommendation, by Delegation to the Peace Conference on January 21, 1919.
  32. Erich W. Bethman, ed., *Decisive Years in Palestine 1918–1948* (New York: American Friends of the Middle East, Inc., 1957), p. 19.
  33. Martin Gilbert, *Sir Horace Rumbold—Portrait of a Diplomat* (London: Heinemann, 1973), p. 398.
  34. Carl Hermann Voss, *Answers on the Palestine Question* (Boston: 1949), p. 17.
  35. Stephen H. Longrigg, *Syria and Lebanon Under French Mandate* (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 60. Longrigg laments the loss of the Arab character, attributing it to the Balfour Declaration.
  36. See Chapter 8.
  37. Colonel Conder, *Heth and Moab* (London, 1883), p. 366. In Colonel Conder’s repeat visit in 1881–1882 after the Turk’s war with Russia, he found Palestine a “ruined land.” In the ten years between his visits the population had “diminished most sadly in numbers and wealth.”
  38. According to Arthur Ruppin, the 1882 population for “Palestine”—Western Palestine—was 300,000. Arthur Ruppin, *The Jews in the Modern World* (London, 1934), pp. 367–368. Professor Fred M. Gottheil estimates, through painstaking examination of Palestine Exploration Quarterly reports of 1875 and 1887, and the other most reliable partial data published before the 1893 Ottoman census, that the settled population of (Western) Palestine was about 475,000 (474,085) in 1875: See “The Population of Palestine” in *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 15, no. 3, October 1979, Table 7; since Colonel Conder noted that the population of 1872 had “diminished sadly” by 1882, the above figures are not incompatible; also see Luke and Keith-Roach, *Handbook of Palestine and Transjordan* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1934).
  39. Ruppin, *The Jews*, p. 368; Luke and Keith-Roach, *Handbook*, p. 59, estimates 35,000 Jews.
  40. According to projection of the statistics of Vital Cuinet for 1895, and the earlier source, *Murray’s Handbook for Travellers in Syria and Palestine*, 1858, which was reprinted in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 8th edition, 1860, vol. XX, p. 905, the “settled” Muslims—not wandering Bedouin tribes—numbered approximately 141,000; Bedouin Muslims, 65,000; Christians, 55,000; Jews, 34,000; Druses and foreigners, 5,000.
  41. Vital Cuinet in his *Syrie, Liban et Palestine, Géographie administrative, statistique, descriptive et raisonnée* (Paris, 1896), assesses the total Palestine population in 1895 at 457,592: 341,638 in Sandjak of Jerusalem and 115,954 in Sandjaks of Nablus and Acre (the area approximating “Western” Palestine).
  42. As Ernst Frankenstein, in his demographic breakdown based on statistics of Cuinet and others, *Justice For My People* (London, 1943), pp. 127ff.

43. Carl H. Voss, *The Palestine Problem Today, Israel and Its Neighbors* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1953), p. 13.
44. *Ibid.*; see also James Parkes, *A History of Palestine from 135 A.D. to Modern Times* (New York, 1949), pp. 320–321; also see Franklin Delano Roosevelt, memorandum to United States Secretary of State, May 17, 1939.
45. Kemal H. Karpat, *Research Prospectus in the Demographic History of Palestine*, submitted to the Institute of Mediterranean Affairs, New York, 1972 (unpublished).
46. See Winston Churchill, debate on 1935 White Paper, May 22, 1939, in Gilbert, *Churchill*, vol. 5, p. 1072 (quoted in Chapter 11).
47. *Palestine Royal Commission Report*, July 1937, p. 71, noting the earlier Hope Simpson Report, *Report on Immigration, Land Settlement and Development*, 1930.
48. For the Turkish period, the “Ottoman Population Records and the Census of 1881/82–1893” in English, complete, compiled and analyzed by Professor Kemal Karpat, History Department, University of Wisconsin, in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 9, no. 2, 1978, Great Britain, pp. 237–72. According to Professor Karpat, “The validity of the census results obtained in 1893 can be tested against some other reliable estimates.” On the other hand, Karpat noted that in the service of vested interest, “. . . the Armenian Catholic Patriarch Hassoun IX in a letter to the British showed the Armenian Catholics of [the vilayet—a Turkish geographical division—of] Sivas as numbering 10,000. The Ottoman census of 1893 showed the number of Catholic Armenians in Sivas province as 3,052 people . . . Other vilayets show more or less the same pattern,” pp. 256–257; For “Patriarch Hassoun’s inflated estimates” see Great Britain, House of Commons, *Accounts and Papers*, vol. 100 (1881), no. 6, p. 99, cited in Karpat, p. 257. Professor Karpat also cites Vital Cuiet, *Syrie, Liban*, which was used by this study as a comparative source for the period (noted above).

According to Karpat, “. . . despite all these shortcomings, the official Ottoman censuses still supply useful data because their margin of error was far less than the figures given by observers, travellers, and biased informants, as shown by various comparative tables. There are several arguments that sustain the value of these censuses. As indicated later, they had to be accurate and complete since they provided the only factual basis available to the government for levying taxes and conscripting men into the army. The government itself constantly tried to improve its census results by introducing new methods, seeking the advice of outside experts, and using European models.” Karpat, *Ottoman*, p. 240.

Professor Karpat’s citations include Engin Akarli, “The Ottoman Population in the Nineteenth Century,” M.A. thesis, University of Wisconsin (Madison, 1970). See also Marc Pinson, “Demographic Warfare: An Aspect of Ottoman and Russian Policy, 1854–1866,” Ph.D. diss. (Harvard, 1970). Nineteenth-century population data are included in the Ottoman Government Yearbooks, *Devleti Aliye Salnameleri* (Salname), 68 vols., 1847–1918. Also see Karpat, *The Gecekondu, Rural Migration and Urbanization* (New York, 1976), and “Ottoman Immigration Policies and Settlement in Palestine,” *Settler Regimes in Africa and the Arab World*, I. Abu-Lughod and B. Abu-Laban, eds. (Wilmette, 1974), pp. 57–72; George Sabagh, “The Demography of the Middle East,” *Middle East Studies Association Bulletin*, 4, 2 (15 May, 1970), 1–19.

A comment on the reliability of the Ottoman census, from demographer Stanford Shaw: “There is no evidence to substantiate accusations that the records were falsified

for political purposes. Indeed, Ottoman reluctance to publish their figures as well as procedures, if anything, seems to indicate the reverse. There was a conscious effort to make the count as complete and up to date as possible throughout the period under discussion, and the figures seem to reflect this ideal. Not perfect, then, by any means, but *probably as good as contemporary efforts in the other nations of Europe, and far more accurate than the rough estimates left by foreign visitors, the Ottoman census reports stand as a vital indication of the state of Ottoman society at the time and an important source for all those who seek to understand its history*," Shaw, "The Ottoman Census System and Population, 1831–1914" in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 9, no. 3, August 1978, p. 337. (Emphasis added.)

Additional sources on the Turkish period for the study: Davis Trietsch, *Palaestina Handbuch* (Berlin-Schmargendorf, 1907 [1st ed.], 1910 [2nd ed.]); Arthur Ruppin, *Syria: An Economic Survey* (New York, 1918); Curt Nawratzki, *Die Jüdische Kolonisation Palästinas* (Munich, 1914).

A map of the Jewish settled areas of Western Palestine fitted over a comparable map used for Turkish census purposes readily enables a translation of Turkish census figures to be made; also see *Woodhead Commission Map*, for proposal no. 2.

49. For the British Mandatory period, 1922 and 1944 census figures, in Anglo-American Committee, *A Survey of Palestine*, vol. 1, pp. 144–146, 214; for the 1947 population figures, in UN Series, *Official Records of the Second Session, General Assembly*, Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestine Question, Summary Record of Meetings September 25–November 25, 1947, Lake Success, N.Y. (Annex 25 Report of Subcommittee II to Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestine Question, Afghanistan, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Colombia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen, pp. 291–308, Appendix IV, V, VI (the study chart's Arab population in 1947—747,000—total was not clarified in 1947 because of the 1947–1948 Arab-Israeli War). The UN annex data do not contain certain figures for areas within Israel which were in addition to the 1947 partition plan. *Israel's Struggle for Peace* (New York: Israel Information Office, 1960) provided January 1, 1948, population in Israel under armistice agreement of 1949, p. 89; for land percentages, p. 20; the UN annex data (Arab–UN figures) were the 1947 basis of the study's calculations; for reported Arab immigration, Anglo-American Committee, *Survey*, p. 795.

50. "The difference between births and deaths gives one the natural increase, which, when compared with the total increase, yields the presumed net movement into or out of the area." William Peterson, *Population* (London, 1969), p. 43.

Natural increase equals births minus deaths. Net immigration or in-migration equals total population minus natural increase.

Until now, natural increase according to Jewish and non-Jewish areas has not been calculated. Thus the actual difference between natural and increase by immigration in those breakdowns has not been properly considered.

51. See E. Mills, *Census of Palestine, 1931* (Alexandria, 1933), list of non-Arab peoples by nationality and native language, Table X, Language, Table XI, Birthplaces (see lists in Chapter 11); see *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 11th ed., 1911, vol. XX, p. 604; see Bernard Lewis, *The Arabs in History* (London, 1966), p. 9.
52. Also, the use of the categories is inconsistent. Whereas the 1937 *Report . . . for the Year 1937*, Colonial No. 146, primarily used the categories, "Jews, Arabs and Others," or "Jews, Non-Jews," the Department of Migration was able to delineate their figures into the categories "Jews, Moslems, Christians." The 1936 Department

of *Migration Annual Report 1936*, Jerusalem, 1935–[1939], acknowledges this inconsistency with its statement, “The statistics for the year are not strictly comparable with those given in the annual report . . . unless adjustments are made for tables concerned with immigrants arriving, travellers subsequently registered as immigrants and all persons registered as immigrants whether they arrived as immigrants or travellers,” p. 20.

Does this mean that some of those listed as Jewish immigrants were actually travelers? Does it mean that those listed as Muslim travelers were actually immigrants? It is difficult to know for sure. This is all of interest, because different categories used in reporting appear to have depended upon what exactly was being reported, whether it was immigration or travel, and what was being described of the immigrants or travelers. For example, within each year, the *Official Mandatory Reports* used the following categories:

1920–21	“Jews, Non-Jews” for immigrants
1922	“Jews, Non-Jews” for immigrants but “Jews, Christians, Moslems” for returning immigrants
1923	“Jews, Christians, Moslems” for “Provenance of Immigrants,” yet “Jews, Non-Jews” for immigration summary
1925	“Jews, Christians, Moslems” for “Provenance of Immigrants”; however, “Jews, Non-Jews” for labor and immigration statistics
1926	“Jews, Christians, Moslems” for “Provenance of Immigration” and general immigration data, but “Jews, Non-Jews” for labor categories of immigrants
1928	“Jews, Non-Jews” for Labor Schedules but “Jews, Christians, Moslems” for “Provenance of Immigrants”
1930	“Jews, Christians, Moslems” for “Provenance of Immigrants” but other classifications according to “Jews, Non-Jews”
1931	“Jews, Christians, Moslems” for “Provenance of Immigrants” but the classification of labor and occupation of immigrants according to “Jews, Non-Jews”
1933	“Jews, Christians, Moslems” for occupation of immigrants, “Provenance of Immigrants,” and other classifications
1934	“Jews, Christians, Moslems” for “Provenance of Immigrants” and labor/occupation, but “Non-Jews, Jews” for general immigration data
1935	“Jews, Non-Jews, Other” for arrivals/departures in Palestine and travelers, yet “Jews, Non-Jews” for recording immigration and emigration
1936	“Jews, Non-Jews” for travelers, immigration and emigration, but “Jews, Arabs, Others” for labor/occupation, and “Provenance of Immigrants”
1937	“Jews, Arabs, Others” for arrivals/departures and “Provenance of Immigrants” while “Jews, Non-Jews” for travelers, immigration, and emigration data

During this year, the categories “Jews, Moslems, Christians” were used in the Department of Migration Report to describe arrivals/departures.

53. In the *Palestine Royal Commission Report*, July, 1937, the figures for population are broken down into (a) “Jews, Moslems, Christians and Others,” as well as (b) “Jews, and Non-Jews,” p. 279.
- The *Palestine Partition Commission Report*, London, 1938, changes categories arbitrarily: the category “Jews and Moslems including Non-Arab Christians” appears on the same page with another listing that notes the qualification: “‘Arab’ in this section is used in its strict sense and not an equivalent [*sic*] to ‘non-Jews,’” p. 23. At still another point, the same official report vacillates between a “Jews-and-non-Jews” listing and a “Jews-and-non-Jews-and-Arabs” listing—the last two contradictory listings used in the same chart! *Ibid*.
54. Bethman, ed., *The Decisive Years*, pp. 19–20.
55. Department of Migration, *Annual Report*, 1936, p. 20; similar observations in *Annual Reports*, 1935, 1937, 1938.
56. Anglo-American Committee, *Survey*, p. 795.
57. For example, the *Report* by the Government of the United Kingdom to the Council of League of Nations on Administration of Palestine and Transjordan—1937 stated that: “It was recognized at the census of 1931 that classification by ‘race’ or ‘nationality’ into the broad groups, Arabs, Jews and Others, is a political necessity. Statistics of migration were put on a ‘racial’ basis in 1935, and in 1938 the classification of vital occurrences will be two-fold, namely, by religious confession and by ‘race’ or ‘nationality.’ The re-introduction of a classification of migration by religious confession will enable population records to be kept *in future* [emphasis added] both by religion and by ‘race,’” p. 219; also, from the *Palestine Partition Commission Report*, London, 1938: “For the purpose of our report, except where it is expressly otherwise stated, we have treated the population as falling into two categories, Arabs and Jews. The Arab section includes persons who are not Arabs, but as nearly 98 percent of the non-Jewish population are Arabs, the use of the term Arab, which we prefer to that of non-Jew, generally causes no distortion of the picture,” p. 33.
58. The source, Vital Cuinet, *Syrie*, corroborates our 1893 calculations almost exactly, although Cuinet did not have the benefit of the Turkish census figures. Re: Population of Western Palestine, pp. 93, 100, 178, 183–184, 520, 627, 628.
59. Jews, 1895—59,000–60,000; Muslims—58,000; Christians—37,800 according to Cuinet, *ibid*.
60. See chart in Appendix V.
61. Vital Cuinet’s estimate of the total non-Jewish population in Western Palestine is remarkably close to the Ottoman census—in 1895, Palestine (*Sandjaks* of Jerusalem, Nablus, and Acre) contained 252,784 settled Muslims, 64,820 Bedouin Muslims (nomads), 70,802 Christians, 60,800 Jews, 1,175 Druses, and 7,211 foreigners, totaling 457,592.
62. J.L. Burckhardt, *Travels*, p. 299; also see note 165, Chapter 8 footnotes.
63. Others had informally begun even earlier. See Chapter 10.
64. A. Druyanow, *Ketavim letoldot hibbat ziyyon ve-yishshuv erez yisra’el* (Odessa, Tel Aviv, 1919, 1925, 1932) vol. 3, pp. 66–67 (December 18, 1889), from Y. Grazowski (Rishon l’Tzion) to Y. Eisenstadt (Barzelei). See Chapters 10, 11. Also see N. Mandel, *Arabs and Zionism*, p. 38, for his citation in another context.
65. According to another source, twenty-one Jewish settlements had been established by

- 1893: see *Palestine News*, November 1, 1918; also see David Vital, *Origins of Zionism* (Oxford, 1975), p. 100; Gurevich and Gertz, *Jewish Agricultural Settlement in Israel* (Jerusalem, 1938), p. 34.
66. Gideon Kressel, "Agnatic Endogamy as a Cultural Mode of Social Stratification: FBD and FBS Marriage in Jawarish," *Asian and African Studies*, vol. 14, no. 3 (1980), p. 255ff.
67. If we assumed each family equaled 5 souls, then 40 Jewish families = 200 Jews, followed by 400 Arab families = 2,000 Arabs; we would find the hypothetical ratio which applied was 10 Arabs following 1 Jew. There were 15 other Jewish settlements with roughly an overall total of over 900 Jews in 1889 (which estimated total was computed by factoring the 1914 total for Rishon l'Tsion back to its 1889 total, which equals a 7.5-times increase; dividing by 7.5 the 1914 total for the other 15 Jewish settlements' population—6,860—we arrive at 914.6—roughly 915 Jews in the 15 settlements in 1889 (1893) according to Arthur Ruppin, *Syria*, pp. 29–31.
68. Areas I and II on map in this chapter.
69. Areas III, IV, and V, *ibid.*
70. John Hope Simpson, *Palestine: Report on Immigration, Land Settlement and Development*, Command Paper #3686, 1930, pp. 145–147.
71. For example, according to an early British census report, after 1914 Arab "tribes from the Hedjaz and Southern Transjordan" were coming into Western Palestine, not only into the Jewish-settled areas, but to other places in the country as well, for reasons of "adequate rainfalls" and "pressure exerted by other tribes east of the River Jordan." J. B. Barren, comp., *Palestine Report and General Abstracts of the Census of 1922* (Jerusalem: Greek Convent Press, 1922), p. 4.
72. "Egypt's modern rate, in time of both 'population explosion' and modern medicine, is only 25 per thousand per year. Surely the Egypt of the 1890s could not have equalled it. Such a rate would be considerably higher than present-day India's (19/1000/year), almost equal to Turkey's (28/1000/year)—both countries at their highest growth rates in history." Justin A. McCarthy, "Nineteenth Century Egyptian Population," *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 12, no. 3, October, 1976, p. 25. McCarthy's observation of Egyptian demographics undoubtedly applies similarly to the nearby population in Western Palestine.
73. *The Statistical Abstract of Palestine 1944–45* reported that 570,800 Arabs were living in the Jewish-settled area of (Western) Palestine; by October 1948, the United Nations had announced two figures, the higher estimating that the number would "shortly increase to 500,000" according to Disaster Relief Organization figures, confirmed by statistical calculation of the potential number of refugees who might have left after the second truce. The Arab League total, unverifiable, was 150,000 greater than the higher of the UN totals. The total number of possible "settled" refugees, according to the results of this book's calculations, after subtracting Arab immigrant figures, is: 343,000 "Arab settled population and descendants" from the Jewish-settled area and included in Israel in 1949; 37,000 Arab nomads; 36,800 Arab "legal" immigrants; and 170,000 in-migrants—a total of 586,900 "refugees" including in-migrants, immigrants, and nomads. The U.S. State Department reported 472,000 Arab refugees, distributed as follows: 61,000, Lebanon; 86,000, Transjordan; 9,000, Egypt; 4,000, Iraq; 73,000, Syria; and 237,000 in "Palestine." *New York Times*, February 2, 1949.
74. See demographic expert's comment on the population study, in Appendix VI following description of methodology.

75. In fact, some of those places were needed for the Jews who were expelled from the so-called “purely Arab towns” in non-Jewish areas of Western Palestine, particularly during the British Mandate. See Chapter 9.
76. A.M. Carr-Saunders, *World Population* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936), p. 310, as cited in *Palestine Partition Commission Report*, London, 1938, p. 23.
77. Interviews with author, November 25, 1978; March 15, 1981. Professor Philip Hauser, Director Emeritus, Population Research Center, University of Chicago. Beginning in 1938: Assistant Chief Statistician for Population, then Deputy Director (until 1947), then Acting Director (1949–1950), U.S. Bureau of the Census; U.S. Representative to UN Population Commission, 1947–1951.
78. Even after averaging the Arab population increase of Jewish-settled areas and non-Jewish areas in Western Palestine, the resulting artificially lowered rate was inordinately high. According to the *Palestine Post* in December 1945: “Palestine’s net rate of increase is high compared even with other near-eastern countries: 1944:

	Birth rate (per 1000)	Death rate	Natural increase
Cyprus	295	124	171
Lebanon	170	65	105
Syria	220	90	130
Egypt	381	286	95
Transjordan	425	188	237
Palestine			
Moslems	524	190	334

“The fertility even of Egypt, which is among the highest in the whole world, is surpassed by that of the Palestinian Moslems—according to the statistics. As in most other countries, a downward trend is observed in Egypt: while in 1927 it had in the age group up to five years 100,000 persons more than the five to nine group, only ten years later, it had 171,000 fewer in the former than in the latter group. There is no such trend to be seen among the Palestinian Moslems, however. Their birth-rate, according to the statistics, has varied between 45 and 53 since the year 1922, actually reaching a peak in 1943 and 1944.” M. Lefebvre, “Palestine’s High Birthrate—A Doubtful Miracle,” *The Palestine Post*, December 14, 1945, p. 6.

79. Justin A. McCarthy, “Nineteenth Century Egypt Population,” *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 12, no. 1, October 1976, pp. 31–33. “The rate of natural increase between 1966 and 1970 had risen to 27.6, one of the highest in the world, but this is a purely modern phenomenon. In the period studied in this work [19th Century], 18 per thousand per year is the highest to be expected.

“These figures must be kept in mind for comparisons. Birth rates may not have changed drastically for the nineteenth century, but death rates have. With the differences between the health standards of the two, the nineteenth-century rate of increase must necessarily have been lower than the modern figure. Any population estimate that demands a growth rate of perhaps 20 per thousand for the nineteenth century cannot be correct. Yet estimates that demand rates well above this have repeatedly been made. Comparisons to the above make it possible to judge their accuracy.

“Russell, in *Late Ancient and Medieval Population*, has demonstrated that the

natural rate of increase (i.e. without migration) can never be more than 6.2 percent.” [McCarthy notes here that: “Russell calculates that approximately one-third of women in a given population are of marriageable age and that 10% of all marriages are sterile. He quotes studies which show a woman can (statistically) have one child every 29 months, if no restraints exist. That is, there is a 41% chance of a woman being able to bear a child in any one year. Taking the one-third who are married, dividing out the men, he arrives at 16.7% rate of child-bearing women. 41% of these can have a child in a year, or 6.9%, considering the 10% sterility rate, 6.2%.”] Since, however, this figure assumes that in one year no one will die and everyone who can will have children, it is never even closely reached. With medicine allowing developing countries tremendously high birth and low death rates, the *modern* area of greatest increase, Latin America, *has not even reached 30 per thousand*. (Emphasis added.) McCarthy, p. 31; see also Riad Tabbarah, Chief Population Division, UN Economic Commission for Western Asia, *Population and Human Resources in Arab Development*, Beijing (Peking) International Roundtable Conference on Demography, Beijing, October 20–27, 1980, conference organized jointly by the United Nations and the Government of the People’s Republic of China, pp. 3–4.

80. Moshe Aumann, *Land Ownership in Palestine, 1880–1948* (Jerusalem: Israel Academic Committee on the Middle East, 1976); also see L. Shimony, *The Arabs of Palestine* (Tel Aviv, 1947), pp. 422–423.
81. *New York Times*, December 17, 1980, letter dated December 8, 1980, from Bruce J. Chasan, Bala Cynwyd, Pa.
82. In the area where ninety-eight percent of all Jews would live between 1893 and 1948, the Jewish population was over 596,000 in 1947.
83. The data available for this study accounted for all the population in Western Palestine; we could trace that population’s whereabouts in the prescribed area, but we cannot tell where the population came from because the British did not quantify Arab immigration.
84. Kemal Karpat, *Research Prospectus*, pp. 2–7.
85. Fred M. Gottheil, “Arab Immigration into Pre-State Israel: 1922–1931,” from Curtis et al., eds., *The Palestinians*, p. 38; also see *ibid.*, p. 3; Carl Hermann Voss, *The Palestine Problem Today*, p. 13; James Parkes, *A History of Palestine from 135 A.D. to Modern Times* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1949), pp. 320–331.
86. Riad Tabbarah, *Population*, p. 5.
87. *Ibid.*, p. 5ff.
88. Prof. Moshe Braver, “Immigration as a Factor in the Growth of the Arab Village in Eretz-Israel” from *Economic Review—Problems of Aliyah and Absorption*, vol. 28, nos. 7–9, July–September 1975, p. 20. According to Professor Braver, “Obviously full credibility cannot be attached to the ‘investigation’ of elders and savants in the villages. We used several methods of verification, comparing various testimonies obtained in each village about itself and information about it obtained in others. We ignored any information which seemed to be unreliable. We took into account the fact that, in the atmosphere of political distrust toward the Israeli researchers in Judea and Samaria, questions about population movements in the past would necessarily draw answers of faulty veracity. Nevertheless, we believe that we have in our possession sufficient factual material on which to base our conclusion *that the proportion of internal migration in the settlement of Arab migrants in the coastal plain, during the period under review is small—smaller in the southern section of the coastal*



- plain and somewhat larger in the central and northern part of the area. *This means that the major increase in the population of the Arab villages in the coastal plain, during the British period, had come largely from immigrants from the neighboring countries,*" p. 20; on this subject, also see Ruth Kark, "Land Purchase in Emek Hefer" in A. Schmueli and D. Grossman, eds., *The Sharon*, Tel Aviv.
89. See the population study chart in Appendix V.
  90. Interview with Professor M. Braver, July 1979, Tel Aviv University.
  91. Moshe Braver, "Immigration as a Factor in the Growth of the Arab Village in Eretz-Israel," *Economic Review*, vol. 28, nos. 7–9, Jerusalem, 1975, p. 16.
  92. Braver, "Immigration," p. 16.
  93. Richard T. Antoun, *Arab Village—A Social Study of a TransJordanian Peasant Community*, Indiana University Press, (Bloomington, 1972), p. 33.
  94. *Ibid.*, p. 30.
  95. According to Antoun, most of the Kufr al-Ma households were, by Sir John Hope Simpson's rule of measure, "landless" Arabs—yet no blame was placed in that area of Eastern Palestine as it was in Western Palestine, where all "landless Arabs" were judged to be the victims of Jewish development and thus counted against the Jewish immigration and labor quota.
  96. Gideon Kressel, "Agnatic Endogamy," pp. 255–56ff.
  97. According to Kressel's study the Jawarish ("the collective name of the descendants of one A'merel Abani Jarushi, of the children—*awlad*—of Musalam of the Tarhunah Bedouin Tribe of Tripolitania, Libya") had "fled to Hebron" during the 1948 war, but were "persecuted by the Egyptians for their previous ties with Jews," and so in 1949 had "smuggled themselves back" into Israel, finally settling in homes near Ramle provided and erected by the Israeli government in 1952; p. 5, "Realization of Agnatic Endogamy: Diachronic Perspectives." *Mediterranean Marriage Strategies and Marriage Prestations*, John Peristiany, ed. (Paris, 1984).
  98. Kressel, "Realization," n.2.
  99. One of U'kashah's brothers, an agricultural worker, "in his own words." Kressel, *Realization*, pp. 13–14. The U'Kashahs are "now living in Ramla, Lod and Jaffa," as well as Jawarish, p. 15. According to Kressel, the commonality of Egyptian origin is not unifying as "the name of Libya united the M'arabat." The "concealment" of Egyptian origins thus resulted, 1) because "most of the settlers and like them the Arab inhabitants of Ramla of today could claim this pedigree" so that the "Egyptian pedigree loses its strength as an exclusive social distinction"; there is no "occupational unity" to the claim of Egyptian origin "like the Maghrabite descent"; 3) to admit Egyptian identity in Israel would refute the "Palestinian-since-time-immemorial claim" and "cause difficulties" for the Egyptian-descended Arabs in Israel "as a result of the extreme enmity toward Israel from Egypt and in the resultant atmosphere of hostility since 1948." Kressel, *Individuality Versus Tribality* (Tel Aviv: 1975), p. 43.
  100. Kressel, "Agnatic Endogamy," p. 267. Kressel concludes that "allegiances to former cultural-ethnic groups in most cases survived radical changes of environmental milieu . . ." and that "one of the most salient expressions of this fact pertained to the pattern of marriage." *Ibid.*, pp. 266–68.
  101. Also see Richard Oestermann, "Who are the Palestinians?" *Jerusalem Post*, January 12, 1975.
  102. Another study, conducted in the years 1943 to 1947, and 1949 to 1963, surveyed

more than 800 villages in Western Palestine and found that the Arab residents were predominantly of foreign origin. Dr. Shlomo A. Ben-Elkanah, historian and Orientalist, cited as an example the village of Um el-Fahan, which he investigated in 1943: of a total population of 2,800, approximately 900 came from Egypt, 1,400 from the Hejaz, and 500 from Transjordan–Eastern Palestine. Exhaustive data, now in preparation for publication, were seen by this writer during interview, May 1983.

### 13. A Hidden Movement: Illegal Arab Immigration

1. The records reproduced in this book that have been taken from the files of various archives containing British government and other Mandatory period documents are by no means all-inclusive; as previously stated, the data relevant to *Arab* immigration were difficult to locate. Among the massive volume of material on immigration and stacks of files on visas, passport control, etc., there was virtually no such category or reference to the data. The author has included recorded evidence of illegal Arab immigration sufficient to indicate decisively that the phenomenon indeed existed. However, an exhaustive and extended investigation of the remaining unpublished documentation on the subject could well become the subject for a dissertation or another book.
2. ISA Record Group 11, File 1180/37. November 18, 1925, Urgent—District Commissioner, Northern District from Controller, “Copy to Chief Secretary (Interview with Acting Chief Secretary of November 18, 1925)”; see also ISA 11 1180/37, March 16, 1926, “Subject: Refugees from Syria.”
3. ISA Record Group 11, File 1180/37, Imm/35, January 3, 1926, O.C. Palestine Gendarmerie, Samakh. Subject: Entry of Refugees into Palestine. From: Controller.
4. ISA Record Group 11, File 1180/37, No. 180/7. From District Offices, Nablus, 25 October 1926. To Controller of Permits, Jerusalem. Subject: Damascene Refugees; see also Nov. 8, 1926, “Damascene Refugees.”
5. ISA Imm/35-126, November 8, 1931.
6. ISA Imm/35-13 or HA/274 December 22, 1931. From Immigration Officer to A.D.S.P. i/c Acre Sub-District; see also ISA Record Group 11, File Imm/35, November 26, 1931. From N.I. Mindel to Deputy Commandant of Police, C.I.D., Subject: Syrian Affairs; ISA Record Group 11, File 1180/57, Imm/35, December 30, 1931, From Chief Immigration Officer to Deputy Commandant of Police, C.I.D., Jerusalem, Subject: Syrian Affairs; ISA Record Group 11, File 1180/37, AP/174 Acre, 25th January, 1932, From Asst. Supt. of Police, Acre Division to District Superintendent of Police, Northern District, Subject: Syrian Affairs; ISA Record Group 11, File 1180/37, Imm/35, June, 1932. From Inspector of Immigration, Subject: Mukhtar’s certificate; ISA Record Group 11, File 1180/37, Imm/35, January 15, 1932. From Immigration Officer to A.S.D.P., Acre, Subject: Druzes who are in Palestine without permission.
7. ISA I/398/36 Ref. 9491 to Chief Secretary from G. Farley, District Commissioner, Southern District, copy to Commissioner for Migration and Statistics, Jerusalem. May 14, 1936.
8. ISA Record Group 2, File I/588/33, No. 1a. Memorandum from Albert M. Hyamson, 6-28-33.
9. *Ibid.* Still another case cited: A beggar of Syrian origin would bring “great difficulty” because of the “delay.”

10. ISA Record Group 2, File I/578/36, Doc. #1, May 2, 1936.
11. *Ibid.*, Doc. #1–5, May 2, 1936.
12. Handwritten Minute, A. Wauchope, May 2, 1936, Doc. #2, *ibid.*, followed by ISA Record Group 2, File I/578/36, CR/246/365, May 2, 1936, to Southern District Commissioner from Chief Secretary Hall, implementing High Commissioner Wauchope's instructions.
13. ISA Record Group 2, File I/578/36, May 2, 1936, R 4, Minutes signed PTO and AGW. See also "Prevalence of Countrymen in the Southern District" memo from Palestine Police Deputy Inspector-General, *ibid.*, May 4, 1936, Doc. #6.
14. See Chapter 17.
15. ISA I/578/35, May 11, 1936.
16. ISA Record Group 2, File I/578/36, Minute 19, May 30, 1936.
17. ISA Record Group 2, File I/478/36, Minute 15, May 23, 1936.
18. ISA Record Group 2, I/578/36, No. 9A, May 6, 1936, to POLSEC from AMN-KHAS; also see ISA 2, I/578/36, No. 7, CF/246/36, May 7, 1936, Subject: "Prevalence of Countrymen in Southern District"; ISA 2, I/578/36 Telegram No. 337, May 26, 1936 from Wauchope, High Commissioner for Palestine, Transjordan to Commissioner, Berbera Somaliland; ISA 2, I/578/36, No. 11, minutes, May 19, 20, 1936 regarding Egyptian, Somali and Sudanese wishing to repatriate.
19. ISA 2, I/578/36, No. 436, June 5, 1936, #23. Another example: High Commissioner Wauchope to Governor General of Sudan, ISA 2, I/578/36. "Confidential" No. 38, Ref. #CF/246/36, July 18, 1936.
20. ISA I/578/36, No. 19, Enclosure to letter, May 14, 1936 (Ref. # 9491). See letter and enclosure in Appendix VII.
21. Ernest Main, *Palestine at the Crossroads* (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1937), p. 56; also see Esco, *Palestine*, pp. 493–494.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 37.
23. Nation Associates, *The Arab Higher Committee*, The Documentary Record Submitted to United Nations, May 1947, New York, pp. 4–7.
24. Anglo-American Committee, *Survey*, vol. I, according to the later official historical chronology, p. 17. Winston Churchill at that time estimated that "about 250 casualties occurred, of which nine-tenths were Jewish." Gilbert, *Exile*, p. 129.
25. Esco Foundation for Palestine, *Palestine*, vol. I, pp. 132–133; "The Government was finally forced to disarm the Arab police, proclaim martial law and hand over the control to the military. Order was not restored until two days after the outbreak.

"The Jews accused the Military Administration, headed by Sir Louis J. Bols, of complicity. The Zionist authorities blamed the Government particularly for allowing the Moslem-Christian Associations to agitate against the Balfour Declaration. The actions of the military authorities after the riots confirmed the feeling that they were motivated by an anti-Jewish attitude. Severe penalties were inflicted on Jewish defense organizations which had armed the Jews for self-protection. Vladimir Jabotinsky who had been an officer in the British army—one of the initiators of the Zion Mule Corps and the Jewish Legion, and the godfather of the Haganah (Jewish secret defense force)—and other members of the Jewish defense were sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment for the possession of firearms and ammunition. The Jews were incensed at this, particularly because at the same time an exactly similar penalty was meted out to an Arab rioter convicted of rape. The Administration on its part made accusations against the Zionist Commission. Sir Louis Bols in a long memorandum

- charged the Commission with attempting to create a political fait accompli in the country before the Mandate had been determined. He implied that the Christians and Moslems were justified in feeling that the status quo was not being maintained, in view of the fact that Hebrew had been recognized as an official language, Jewish courts had been established, a quasi-governmental structure of the Zionist Commission had been introduced, etc. A local Committee of Inquiry was appointed to investigate the causes of the disturbances but the results of its inquiry were not revealed on the grounds that 'their publication could serve no useful purpose' " (pp. 133–134).
26. See Chapters 9 and 10.
  27. Colonel R. Meinertzhagen, *Middle East Diary, 1917–1956* (London, 1959), pp. 81–82.
  28. *The Times*, London, February 7, 1938.
  29. Esco Foundation for Palestine, *Palestine*, vol. 1, p. 134; "A little over a month after the decision on the Mandate at San Remo (April 24, 1920), the Military Administration under Sir Louis Bols came to an end and the Civil Administration was initiated on July 1, 1920, under Sir Herbert Samuel as High Commissioner."
  30. *Arab Higher Committee*, p. 9.
  31. League of Nations, Mandate for Palestine, Command #1785, Article 6, 1922.
  32. *Ibid.*
  33. August 26, 1920. "The first Immigration Ordinance was enacted and a quota of 16,500 immigrant Jews fixed for the first year." Chronology, Anglo-American Committee, *Survey*, vol. I, p. 18.
  34. As the *Survey of Palestine* stated, "Different considerations from those relevant to Jewish immigration apply to Arab immigration . . ." (p. 795).
  35. Statistics from the *Report . . . for the Year 1935*, Colonial No. 112, p. 13, cited by Count de Penha Garcia, League of Nations Permanent Mandates Commission, Minutes of the 29th Session, Annex 13.
  36. League of Nations Permanent Mandates Commission, Minutes of the 29th Session, pp. 139–141.
  37. *Report . . . for the Year 1935*, p. 14.
  38. League of Nations Permanent Mandates Commission, Minutes of the 29th Session, p. 140.
  39. *Report . . . for the Year 1935*, Colonial No. 112, p. 50, para. 21.
  40. Permanent Mandates Commission, Minutes of the 29th Session, p. 141.
  41. Report by M. Palacios, September 3, 1935, Minutes of the 29th Session, Permanent Mandates Commission, Annex 6, p. 187.
  42. Report by Count de Penha Garcia, Minutes of the 29th Session, Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations, Annex 13, p. 194.
  43. See Chapters 14 and 15.
  44. PRO CO 733/287 1936, signed O.G.R. Williams, November 2, 1936.
  45. PRO FO 371/E1203, January 23, 1937, to Lord Ormsby-Gore, Secretary of State for the Colonies, *Secret*.
  46. PRO FO 371/E1203/976/31, Minute written by L. Baggallay, Feb. 27, 1937.
  47. PRO FO 371/E1330, Telegram from Sir R. Bullard, Jeddah.
  48. PRO FO 371/20819; see MacKereth letter, October 23, 1937, particularly pp. 19–20.

49. PRO FO 371/20819.
50. PRO FO 371/20819; see also interview between the officer administering the Government (OAG) and Shertok, October 16, 1937.
51. “Confidential letter,” PRO FO 371/20819.
52. PRO FO 371/20818.
53. PRO FO 371/20817.
54. PRO FO 371/20818.
55. PRO FO 371/20817, “Immediate Secret” “*Expulsion of Palestinian Terrorists from Syria.*”
56. PRO FO 371/20818.
57. PRO FO 371/20817.
58. PRO FO 371/20818.
59. PRO FO 371/20818.
60. PRO FO 371/20818, cited in Gilbert, *Exile*, pp. 189–190.
61. PRO FO 371/20818.
62. PRO FO 371/20819.
63. PRO FO 371/20819.
64. PRO FO 371/20819, RE: MacKereth Transfer to Jerusalem.
65. PRO FO 371/20819.
66. PRO FO 371/20819, “Palestine: Further Proposals for Strong Action.”
67. PRO FO 371/20818, cited in Gilbert, *Exile*, p. 191.
68. PRO FO 371/20819.
69. PRO FO 371/20821.
70. PRO FO 371/20818. Cited in Gilbert, *Exile*, p. 190.
71. PRO FO 271/20819.
72. PRO FO 371/20819.
73. PRO FO 371/20821.
74. PRO FO 371/20821.
75. Foreign Office Memorandum, November 19, 1937; Cabinet Papers 24/273. Cited in Gilbert, *Exile*, p. 193.
76. MacKereth, 1893–1962; additional correspondence, Middle East Centre, St. Antony’s College, Oxford, re: Arab terrorist activities, etc., from *Britain and Palestine 1914–1948*, compiled by Philip Jones (Oxford: Oxford University, 1979), p.83.

#### 14. Official Disregard of Arab Immigration

1. See, for example, C. F. Strickland, *Report on the Possibility of Introducing a System of Agricultural Cooperation in Palestine* (Jerusalem, 1930), pp. 1–3, cited by Esco Foundation for Palestine, *Palestine: A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies*, 2 vols. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947), vol. 2, pp. 708–712, 810; also see Government of Palestine, *Census of Palestine 1931*, 2 vols. (Alexandria, 1933), vol. 1, pt. 1, E. Mills, *Report*; also see Permanent Mandates Commission, *Report of 17th Session*, 1930, particularly p. 142; also see Permanent Mandates Commission, *Minutes, June 1930*, for rejection of Hope Simpson findings; also see *Palestine Royal Commission Report*, p. 74, paras. 61, 62; also see statement in House of Commons, November 17, 1930, in *Report of the Experts of the Joint Palestine Survey Commission* (Boston, 1928), p. 404; also see Government of Palestine, *Report of a Committee on*

- the Economic Conditions of Agriculturists in Palestine and the Fiscal Measures of Government in Relation thereto*, 1930, pp. 17–18, 22, para. 42, especially Tables XIX, XX (Points 32, 35–36), XXII; also see testimony of Lewis Andrews, November 24, 1936, in *Palestine Royal Commission: Minutes of Evidence Heard at Public Sessions*, Colonial 134; also see League of Nations Mandate for Palestine, Article 9; also see William M. Thompson, *The Land and the Book* (New York: Harper Brothers, 1873), vol. 1, pp. 497–498; also see Lewis French, *Reports on Agricultural Development and Land Settlement in Palestine*, 1931, particularly p. 79, para. 77; p. 37, para. 9; pp. 23–26, paras. 93, 96; also see *Report . . . for the Year 1934*, Colonial No. 104, p. 78, para. 20; p. 58, para. 36; also see A. Granowsky, *Land and the Jewish Reconstruction of Palestine* (Jerusalem, 1931), pp. 17–128.
2. John Hope Simpson, *Report on Immigration, Land Settlement and Development*, 1930, Command Paper #3686, p. 126.
  3. “Importation of other than Jewish labour. —Further, it is clear that if unemployment is a valid reason for preventing Jewish immigration, it is also a reason for preventing importation of labour of other nationalities. At the time of writing, even with marked unemployment among Arabs, Egyptian labour is being employed in certain individual cases, and its ingress has been the subject of adverse comment in the Press.” Hope Simpson, *ibid.*, p. 138.
  4. *Ibid.*
  5. *Ibid.*
  6. *Ibid.*, p. 126.
  7. Memorandum on Deportation—Arabs, April 9, 1942, ISA Record Group 2, File I/588/33.
  8. “Seasonal and occasional labour.—There are two obvious dangers against which provision must be made in the execution of any measures dealing with the registration of unemployment. The first lies in the large amount of casual and temporary unemployment of the agricultural labourer and indeed of the small Arab cultivator. Of this class many individuals flock to the towns in order to earn something in addition to what is yielded by the land. The agricultural labourer is paid entirely in kind, while, in the case of the small cultivator, unless he can eke out his income during the agricultural off-season, he is frequently unable to obtain the cash necessary to pay his taxes or his moneylender, and for the year’s purchases which are essential for his household. There can be no valid reason for refusal to register as unemployed temporary labourers of this kind, if they are in fact in the labour market, and in fact unemployed. The regulations of the employment exchanges should, however, be so framed as to ensure that the names of persons of this class seeking employment should be removed when seasonal activity causes them to return from the towns to the villages.” Hope Simpson, *Report*, pp. 137–138.
  9. *Ibid.*, pp. 138–139.
  10. *A Survey of Palestine*, prepared for the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, 1945–1946, vol. I, p. 28.
  11. Statement of Policy, 1930, Command #3692.
  12. *A Survey of Palestine*, vol. I, p. 28.
  13. *Ibid.*, p. 27.
  14. Hope Simpson, *Report*, p. 142.

15. *A Survey of Palestine*, vol. I, p. 23.
16. Rhodes House, File 7, Box 15, March 15, 1937, extract of letter from Hope Simpson to J. R. Chancellor.
17. "Great Britain and Palestine, 1915–1945," published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs (London and New York, 1946), Paper #20, p. 56.
18. October 29, 1930, *A Survey of Palestine*, vol. 1, pp. 27–28. Weizmann's indignation was apparently at times tempered by obsequious support of the British "system of immigration": see one 1934 report from Sir Eric Drummond, British envoy in Rome, regarding Weizmann's concern at "the large influx of German Jews into Palestine." Daniel Carpi, *Zionism: Studies in the History of the Zionist Movement and the Jewish Community of Palestine* (Tel Aviv: Masada, 1975), p. 242; earlier, Sir Herbert Samuel provoked outrage in the Palestinian Jewish community with his "redefinition" of the Balfour Declaration, in 1921. Neil Caplan, *Palestine Jewry and the Arab Question 1917–1925* (London: Frank Cass, 1978), pp. 88ff; also see Moshe Mossek, *Palestine Immigration Policy Under Sir Herbert Samuel: British Zionist and Arab Attitudes* (London: Cass, 1978).
19. February 14, 1931, *ibid.*, pp. 28–29. According to Martin Gilbert, MacDonald "read out" the letter in the House of Commons on February 13. *Exile*, p. 156.
20. *Report . . . for the Year 1935*, Colonial #112, pp. 62ff.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 315.
22. Hope Simpson, *Report*, p. 26.
23. See, for example, Ernest Main, *Iraq* (London, 1935), p. 182; "Notes on Syria," in *Great Britain of the East*, August 6, 1936.
24. *Report . . . for the Year 1935*, Colonial #112, p. 315; also see Minutes of League of Nations Permanent Mandates Comm.: "Lord Lugard: there was apparently a growing recognition that Transjordan contrasted unfavourably with Palestine . . ."; XXIII (23rd Session), p. 98.
25. Main, *Palestine at the Crossroads*, p. 116. See n. 1 above.
26. PRO FO 371/17204/33, *Comments of Department of Development on the Memorandum of the Jewish Agency on the 1st and supplementary Reports on Agricultural Developments and Land Settlement in Palestine*, c.i.e., c.b.e., p. 2.
27. A. Granovsky, *The Land Issue in Palestine* (Jerusalem: Keren Kayemeth LeIsrael Ltd., 1936), p. 39.
28. *Report . . . for the Year 1934*, Colonial #104, p. 58.
29. *Report . . . for the Year 1935*, Colonial #112, p. 63. According to Granovsky, "All but a few of the tenants of tracts acquired by Jews have remained on the land, either as independent farmers or tenants. Of the 688 (the figure given by the Jews) tenants who formerly lived in the Plain of Jezreel, 526, or 76%, remained in agricultural occupations, and their position was made anything but worse by the transfer of the land to Jewish owners." Granovsky, *The Land Issue in Palestine*, pp. 40–41.
30. Protection of Cultivators Ordinance, 1929, see Laws of 1929, vol. I, p. 299; cited in Anglo-American Committee, *Survey*, vol. I, p. 290.
31. Cultivator's Protection Ordinance of 1933, see *Survey of Palestine*, vol. I, pp. 290–291, citing Drayton, vol. I, p. 506. By this ordinance, any Arab who claimed (vis-à-vis claimants to be "Arab refugees" in '48 in camps, who were in part itinerants from elsewhere) to be grazing or a "statutory tenant" . . . not "grossly neglected" his

- “holding”—in other words, if he proved he’d wandered over the area, it was declared he must be given subsistence area, remuneration based on landlord’s earnings.
32. A total of 3,271 applications for resettlement had been received; “2,607 being disallowed.” *Palestine Royal Commission Report*, p. 240.
  33. From the letter to Chancellor from John Hope Simpson, August 4, 1936, File 7 in Box 15 MSS British Empire s. 284 at Rhodes House (extract).
  34. PRO FO 371/4882, letter to Duff Cooper (Right Honorable) from Sir Ormsby-Gore, May 6, 1937.
  35. Evidence of Arab illegal immigration taken from Palestine Royal Commission Notes of Evidence, Wednesday, December 2, 1936, 14th Meeting (Public), testimony of M. Shertok and Dr. David Werner Senator, pp. 90–92, Tuesday, December 8, 1936, 17th Meeting (Public), testimony of M. Shertok and Eliahu Epstein, representing Jewish Agency for Palestine; pp. 93–101.
  36. *Ibid.*

*Question:* “Are you giving any suggestions in regard to a remedy?”

*Answer:* “The first remedy is an effective control of the frontiers, with some system of check in the country itself.”

*Question:* “It means a very big system. No doubt you have thought that out. It means practically that every man in Palestine would have to have a card of identity. Then the police can go and say to him: ‘Let me see your card,’ and if he has not got one you can get at him?”

*Answer:* “If the control of the frontiers, after an experimental period, did not prove effective, such a measure as you indicate might have to be resorted to, but in our submission the control of the frontiers has never been effective, and if it was it might deter these people from coming into Palestine. . . . I submit that if these people knew there were the Police after them who would not let them across, a large number of them would be deferred from even attempting to cross.”
  37. Hammond to Weizmann, Palestine Royal Commission, “*Secret*” Notes of Evidence taken on Friday, December 18, 1936, twenty-sixth meeting (private), testimony of Dr. Chaim Weizmann, pp. 33–35; see also Ninth Meeting testimony of Thursday, November 26, 1936, particularly pp. 9, 14, 23, 36; see also testimony of Thirty First meeting (Private), Wednesday, December 23, 1936, particularly pp. 7, 31, 39–40, 53, 63, 68.
  38. Chaim Weizmann, born in Motol, near Pinsk, Russia; Zionist leader who explained Zionism to Arthur Balfour and was critically involved in the events of Palestine throughout the Mandatory period.
  39. George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening—the Story of the Arab National Movement* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1939).
  40. Palestine Royal Commission, Notes of Evidence (Public), testimony of George Antonius, January 18, 1937.
  41. Palestine Royal Commission, Notes of Evidence, taken on January 12, 1937, testimony of Haj Amin al-Husseini. See excerpt of Mufti testimony in Appendix VIII.
  42. Abdul Hadi, former Arab Secretary of the Strike Committee, in testimony before Palestine Royal Commission, January 13, 1937. See *Palestine*, January 20, 1937.
  43. *Palestine Royal Commission Report*, June 1937, London, Command #5479. (Also known as Peel Commission Report.)
  44. Foreign Office Official Ronald Campbell, Egyptian Department, cautioned against



implementing a policy “which would be hateful to the Arabs.” October 15, 1937, Minute, FO 371/20816. In Gilbert, *Exile*, p. 188.

45. *The Palestine Royal Commission Report*, pp. 291–292.

“A large proportion of Arab immigrants into Palestine come from the Hauran. These people go in considerable numbers to Haifa, where they work in the port. It is, however, important to realize that the extent of the yearly exodus from the Hauran depends mainly on the state of the crops there. In a good year the amount of illegal immigration into Palestine is negligible and confined to the younger members of large families whose presence is not required in the fields. Most persons in this category probably remain permanently in Palestine, wages there being considerably higher than in Syria. According to an authoritative estimate as many as ten or eleven thousand Hauranis may go to Palestine temporarily in search of work in a really bad year. The Deputy Inspector-General of the Criminal Investigation Department has recently estimated that the number of Hauranis illegally in the country at the present time is roughly 2,500.”

46. *Ibid.*

47. *Ibid.*, pp. 292–293.

48. *Ibid.*, p. 39.

49. Palestine Royal Commission, Notes of Evidence, November 24, 1936, pp. 22–29.

50. From *The Palestine Royal Commission Report*, p. 300:

“76. The heavy immigration in the years 1933–6 would seem to show that the Jews have been able to *enlarge the economic absorptive capacity of the country for Jews*. The process can be continued for some time to come and it would appear that its expansion need only be limited by the amount of the funds which Jewish philanthropy and enterprise are prepared to pour into the country. But such an expansion of the economic absorptive capacity is calculated to lead to a development of the Jewish National Home which is not organic but is unnatural, *since it ignores one of the conditions of the Home, namely the hostile attitude of the Arab inhabitants of Palestine.*” (Emphasis added.)

51. *Ibid.*, p. 394.

52. July 16, 1937: cited in Martin Gilbert, *Exile and Return*, p. 182.

53. Esco Foundation for Palestine, *Palestine, A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies*. Published for the Esco Foundation for Palestine, Inc., vol. II (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947), pp. 852–853; Chaim Weizmann was the partition plan’s “leading spokesman.”

54. *Palestine Partition Commission Report*, printed and published by His Majesty’s Stationery Office, London, 1938, Command #5854, p. 18.

55. Esco, *Palestine*, vol. II, p. 854. For text of 20th Zionist Congress’ resolution, see pp. 18–19, *Palestine Partition Commission Report*.

56. *Palestine*, published for British Palestine Committee at Letchworth, England, January 27 issue, article dated January 20, 1937.

57. *Palestine Partition Commission Report*, p. 17.

58. *Palestine Royal Commission Report*, p. 366.

59. *Ibid.*, p. 135.

60. “Japheth in the Tents of Shem,” *Asia and the Americans*, December 1942, pp. 692–694.

61. *Arab vs. Arab*, pamphlet (Wadsworth and Co., Rydal Press, Keighley, England, 1939), p. 3. Rhodes House Doc. 905 17.75 (22).
62. James Parkes, *A History of Palestine from 135 A.D. to Modern Times* (N.Y: Oxford University Press, 1949), pp. 321–322.
63. *Ibid.*, p. 321.
64. Ernest Main, *Palestine at the Crossroads* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1937), p. 107.
65. Stuart Emeny, *News Chronicle*, London, December 10, 1938.
66. Martin Gilbert, *Exile and Return, The Struggle for a Jewish Homeland* (Philadelphia, 1978), p. 204.
67. Lieutenant Colonel H.J. Simson, *British Rule and Rebellion* (London: Blackwood, 1937), p. 315.

Simson pointed out that “The label on the money box had been altered from ‘strike fund’ to ‘distressed Palestine,’ but otherwise there was no change,” p. 290.

68. On October 15, 1937, Esco Foundation for Palestine, *Palestine, A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies*, vol. II, p. 879; the Mufti’s “figurehead,” Jamal Husseini, President of the Arab Party, had escaped earlier.
69. November 21, 1938; also see Esco, *ibid.*, p. 878 ff.
70. “The murdered were as follows—

Feb. 1937	Mukhtar of Arab Birket Caesarea
Sept. 1937	" Balad Esh Sheikh
Dec. 1937	" Shahmata
April 1938	" Migdal. He was a Christian Arab. His wife was also murdered.
April 1938	" Mafaleen
Aug. 1938	" Ejn Razal
Aug. 1938	" Beth Mahsir
Sept. 1938	Wife and three sons of the Mukhtar of Deir Es Sheikh. Mukhtar was absent at the time.
Oct. 1938	Mukhtar of Ard-el-Yehud, near Haifa. He was a Christian Arab.
Oct. 1938	" Beth Hema
Nov. 1938	" Akaba Quarter, Nablus

“During the same period, attempts were made on the life of the Mukhtar of Lifta village (July 1937), and the Mukhtar of Seir (October, 1938)”; cited in *Arab v. Arab*, pamphlet, Wadsworth and Co., Rydal Press, Keighley, England, 1939, p. 13; also see *Palestine*, October 6, 1937, vol. XII, no. 40, for list of Arab “notables” “murdered between April and September, 1937.”

71. *Ibid.*
72. Letter to James Malcolm, February 22, 1937, transmitted to Former High Commissioner of Palestine, John Chancellor, RH File 7/Box 15. From “an English correspondent in Palestine whose name for obvious reasons it is undesirable to disclose but for whose impartiality and veracity I can thoroughly vouch.” J. Malcolm.
73. RH File No. 7 of Box 15, letter to John Chancellor from Peake, June 20, 1937, extract, p. 3.
74. PRO FO 371/20817, Havard to Foreign Office, No. 15, “important, repeated to Jerusalem, Paris, Baghdad, and Damascus saving.”

75. Ormsby-Gore Cabinet Papers 24/272, November 9, 1937; cited in Gilbert, *Exile*, p. 191.
76. August 21, 1938, Cabinet Papers, 24/278, cited in Gilbert, *ibid.*, p. 206.
77. August 12, conversation with Dr. Izzet Tannous, Arab Christian head of the Arab Centre, London; cited in Gilbert, *ibid.*, p. 206.
78. *Palestine Partition Commission Report*, 1938, Command #5458, p. 246; Esco Foundation for Palestine, *Palestine, A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies*, pp. 874–875, 1146, 1156ff.
79. Esco Foundation for Palestine, *ibid.*, p. 1156.
80. October 24, 1938, Cabinet Committee Minutes: Cabinet Papers 27/651, cited in Gilbert, *Exile and Return*, p. 210.
81. League of Nations Permanent Mandates Commission, 1937, Minutes of the 32nd Session, pp. 73–74.
82. *Ibid.*
83. Colonel Wedgewood, June 1938, *Survey of International Affairs*, 1938, vol. I, p. 417, n. 1.
84. *Palestine Partition (Woodhead) Commission Report*, 1938, from Martin Gilbert, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict, Its History in Maps* (London: Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1974), p. 28
85. *Palestine Partition Commission Report*, pp. 144–45.
86. *Report . . . for the Year 1937, Colonial #146*, p. 80.
87. *A Survey of Palestine*, vol. I, p. 297.
88. PRO FO371/17204/33, High Commission Despatch #247 (REF. ADM. 305), July 23, 1921, in Dept. of Development Response to Jewish Agency, (See n. 26 above), p. 5.
89. Granovsky, *The Land Issue in Palestine*, p. 40.
90. *Palestine Royal Commission Report*, p. 240.
91. *Palestine Partition Commission Report*, Note of Reservations by Sir Alison Russell, p. 257.
92. Sir Geoffrey Furlonge, *Palestine is My Country. The Story of Musa Alami* (New York: Praeger Press, 1969), p. 136.
93. Main, *Palestine at the Crossroads*, pp. 193–194. Main reported that “It is shown in Chapter 6 how greatly the Shaw Commission and the Hope-Simpson Inquiry went astray in their estimates of the displacement of Arab tenants and agricultural workers, although it must be noted that both made it clear that in any event no blame attached to the actual Jewish purchasers. The Shaw Report (Command #3530, 1930, p. 62) says of the land sales between 1921 and 1929 ‘no criticism can be levied against the Jewish land companies in respect to these transactions.’ The Hope Simpson Report (Command #3686, 1930, p. 51) says of the Jewish purchases in Jezreel, the scene of most of the alleged displacements, ‘the Jewish authorities have nothing with which to reproach themselves.’ ”
94. *Report . . . for the Year 1936, Colonial #112*, p. 62ff.
95. Main, *Palestine at the Crossroads*, pp. 193–194.
96. Granovsky, *Land and the Jewish Reconstruction in Palestine*, Palestine’s Near East Publications, Jerusalem, 1931, pp. 155–156.
97. Parkes, *A History of Palestine from 135 A.D. to Modern Times*, p. 321; also see Doreen Warriner, “Land Tenure in the Fertile Crescent” from Issawi (ed.), *The Economic History of the Middle East* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 5.

98. Government of Palestine, *Report by C. F. Strickland of the Indian Civil Service on the Possibility of Introducing a System of Agricultural Co-operation in Palestine* (Jerusalem, 1930), pp. 1–2: In 1930 C. F. Strickland concluded that in (Western) Palestine “His [the fellah’s] trouble is his debt; so long as a small cultivator sees the burden of his debt to be so great and the rate of accruing interest so high . . . he will make no sincere attempt to alter his plan of cultivation. If his present crops allow him to pay only one half of the interest upon his debt, there is little inducement to make such improvements as will enable him to pay three-quarters of the amount. The benefit will fall entirely into the hands of his creditors, while he will only labour the harder without hope of reaching freedom.”
- Also see Furlonge, *Palestine is My Country, The Story of Musa Alami*, p. 135ff.
99. Main, *Palestine at the Crossroads*, p. 40.
100. Enclosure: re: Arab Executive Committee rejection of French’s Arab aid and development proposal and regarding: landless Arabs; signed O.G.R. Williams of Colonial Office on Downing Street (handwritten note) January 1, 1934, PRO CO 733/17249.
101. *Palestine Royal Commission Report*, p. 263, quoting Lewis French Report. According to the French Report, “In one Sub-District in the hilly tracts it is reported that in a decade no less than 30 percent of the land has passed from Arab peasants to Arab capitalists.”
102. Parkes, *A History of Palestine from 135 A.D. to Modern Times*, p. 321.
103. “. . . for the employed the rate of wages has steadily gone up. The daily wage paid to an Arab for skilled labour is now from 250 to 600 mils, and for unskilled labour from 100 to 180 mils. In Syria the wage ranges from 67 mils in older industries to 124 mils in newer ones. Factory labour in Iraq is paid from 40 to 60 mils.” *Palestine Royal Commission Report*, 1938, Command #5479, p. 127. (100 mils equals 2 shillings.)
104. Main, *Palestine at the Crossroads*, p. 124. According to the *Palestine Royal Commission Report*, in the three-year period of 1933–1935, Arab estate holders received over \$20 million for land sales, with Jewish purchases paying several times more than the land value. *Palestine Royal Commission Report*, p. 126.
105. November 24, 1936, Palestine Royal Commission, Minutes of Evidence, pp. 22–23.
106. *Ibid.*, p. 27.
107. *Ibid.*, pp. 27–29.
108. *Ibid.*, p. 29.
109. Andrews was murdered on September 26, 1937, by Arab terrorists, identified in Chapter 13 as “probably” led by Sheikh Kassab, as per correspondence from W.D. Battershill, October 12, 1937.
110. Cited in Gilbert, *Exile and Return*, p. 186.
111. “. . . though in the immediate neighborhood of Jerusalem dairy and fruit farms might eventually prove self-supporting.” *Palestine Royal Commission Report*, p. 268.

## 15. Britain’s Double Standard

1. King Hussein of Jordan, *Uneasy Lies the Head* (New York, 1962); Dr. Paul Riebenfeld, “The Integrity of Palestine—Jews and Arabs, Israel and Jordan,” *Midstream*, August/September 1975, p. 22; also see Hussein of Jordan, *My “War” with Israel* (London, 1969), p. 15.
2. The total population was over 1,200,000, excepting nomads. A. Granovsky, *The*

- Land Issue in Palestine*, Keren Kayemeth LeIsrael, Ltd. (Jerusalem, 1936), p. 46.
3. Martin Gilbert, *Exile and Return*, p. 226.
  4. Speech, June 27, 1923, cited in Esco Foundation, p. 288.
  5. John Gunther, *Inside Asia* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1939), pp. 600–601.
  6. According to this German source, “Von Falkenhayn decided to move to Nablus. On being ordered to evacuate, the Jews shed bitter tears, but the native population was stolidly indifferent, ‘they knew no fatherland.’” Schlachten des Weltkrieges, Reichsarchivs, IV, “Jildirim” (Berlin, 1926), pp. 122–123. Cited in de Haas, *History*, p. 459.
  7. Sir Geoffrey Furlonge, *Palestine Is My Country, The Story of Musa Alami* (New York: Praeger Press, 1969), pp. 114–129.
  8. Colonel R. Meinertzhagen, Letter, *The Times*, London, February 7, 1938. Cited in Martin Gilbert, *Exile*, p. 196.
  9. David Lloyd George, *The Truth About the Peace Treaties* (London: Victor Gollancz, Ltd., 1938), vol. I, pp. 1118–1119.
  10. Cited by Bernard Lewis, “The Return of Islam,” *Commentary*, January 1976, p. 41.
  11. *Ibid.*, pp. 40–41.
  12. T.E. Lawrence, *Secret Despatches from Arabia* (London, n.d.), p. 39, *Arab Bulletin*, November 26, 1916.
  13. Lawrence, *Secret*, p. 70; *Arab Bulletin*, March 12, 1917.
  14. T.E. Lawrence, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* (London: Jonathan Cape, Ltd., 1935), p. 100.
  15. B. H. Liddell Hart, *T.E. Lawrence to His Biographer* (1938), p. 101; cited by Elie Kedourie, *England and the Middle East*, p. 103.
  16. T.E. Lawrence, *Seven*, p. 23 (1940 ed.), as cited in Kedourie, *England*, p. 103.
  17. T.E. Lawrence, *Seven*, p. 101.
  18. *Haycraft Commission of Inquiry Report*, July 1, 1921, p. 19. Command #1540.
  19. August 22, 1921. Cited in Martin Gilbert, *Exile*, p. 139.
  20. Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, *A Survey of Palestine* (Palestine, 1945–1946), vol. I, p. 31.
  21. Protokoll der Verhandlungen des XVIII. Zionistenkongress, Vienna, 1934, p. 83. Cited in Esco Foundation for Palestine, *Palestine*, vol. II, p. 770.
  22. November 1, 1933, “Secret Report on the Political Situation” from Amman, C.H.F. Cox, British Resident. Doc. #2, vol. E, p. 2, 7177/169/31 in vol. 16927, Colonial Office No. 7754/33.
  23. For example, Permanent Mandates Commission, *Minutes of 27th Session*, 1935, p. 47; also see Christopher Sykes, *Crossroads to Israel* (London: Collins, 1965), pp. 60–61ff, 239.
  24. Weizmann to Churchill, March 1, 1921. Dr. Paul S. Riebenfeld, *Israel, Jordan and Palestine* (unpub.), App. E.
  25. On the “critical” issue of “frontiers,” after the “agreement reached with France” had “cut Palestine off” from “access to” and “possession of” the Northern territories. “Most promising” for “Jewish settlement on a large scale.” Weizmann, *ibid.*
  26. Permanent Mandates Commission, *Minutes of 27th Session*, 1935, p. 48.
  27. *Ibid.*
  28. Major J.B. Glubb, “The Economic Situation of the Trans-Jordan Tribes,” *Royal Central Asian Society Journal*, 1938, vol. 25, pp. 458–459. Glubb’s response to April 1938 article by E. Epstein, “The Bedouin of Transjordan,” *Royal Central Asian Society Journal*, vol. 25, 1938.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 459.
30. From Mr. Williams (Colonial Office) to Mr. Rendel (Foreign Office): Attitude of His Majesty's Representatives abroad regarding Zionist functions, PRO FO 371 E 779/257/31, February 6, 1933; also see PRO FO 371 E 7177/16927 signed J.C. Sterndale Bennet (extract).
31. Matiel Mogannam, *The Arab Women and the Palestine Problem* (London: Herbert Joseph, Ltd., 1937), pp. 217–218, cited in Esco, p. 528.
32. Esco, *Palestine*, pp. 771–772.
33. *Palestine Royal Commission Report* (London, 1938), p. 82.
34. August 14, 1937, Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations, Geneva. Cited in Gilbert, *Exile*, p. 186.
35. Martin Gilbert, *Exile*, p. 198.
36. Bernard Wasserstein, *Britain and the Jews of Europe—1939–1945* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), pp. 5–6. The Nuremberg laws, intricately defining qualifications of “non-Aryans” and harshly restricting Jewish existence, were enacted in 1935.
37. Bernard Wasserstein, *Britain*, pp. 6–7.
38. Ehud Avriel, *Open the Gates*, p. 15.
39. *Ibid.*
40. Martin Gilbert, *Exile*, p. 198.
41. Avriel, *Open*, p. 15.
42. July 6, 1938. For background prior to the Evian Conference see Henry Feingold, *Politics of Rescue*, p. 22ff; also see Dorothy Thompson, “Refugees, A World Problem,” in *Foreign Affairs*, April 1938, pp. 375–378; for British view, see Wasserstein, *Britain*, pp. 8–9, 189.
43. “Undersecretary of State, Sumner Welles, had devised the idea of an international conference,” believing that the calling of the conference and its related commotion “would in themselves act as an indicator of the American Government's stand and perhaps influence the Nazis.” Ehud Avriel, *Open*, pp. 20–21; also see Arthur Morse, *While Six Million Died* (New York: Hart Publishing Co., 1967), p. 60; also see Joint Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Immigration, United States Senate, and a Subcommittee of the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, House of Representatives, 16th Congress, 1st Session, April 20, 21, and 24, 1939, p. 160ff.
44. Speech at Konigsberg, April 1938. Cited in Avriel, *Open*, p. 21.
45. *New York Times*, July 4, 1938.
46. June 19, 1938.
47. Morse, *While*, pp. 203–215, particularly 207–211; also see Feingold, *Politics*, p. 23.
48. Avriel, *Open*, p. 24. For German Foreign Office reaction, see *Deutsche Diplomatische Korrespondenz*, July 12, 1938, quoted in *New York Times*, July 13, 1938, p. 13; also see Feingold, *Politics of Rescue*, pp. 36–37.
49. Avriel, *Open*, p. 19.
50. Morse, *While*, p. 213.
51. Avriel, *Open*, p. 25; also see Morse, *While*, p. 212.
52. Morse documented the votes:  
 “Australia, with vast, unpopulated areas announced: ‘As we have no real racial problem, we are not desirous of importing one.’ New Zealand was unwilling to lift its

restrictions. The British colonial empire, reported Sir John Shuckburgh, contained no territory suitable to the large-scale settlement of Jewish refugees. Canada wanted agricultural migrants and none others. The same was true of Colombia, Uruguay and Venezuela.

“France, whose population already included two hundred thousand refugees and three million aliens, stressed that it had reached its saturation point.

“Nicaragua, Honduras, Costa Rica and Panama issued a joint statement saying that they could accept no ‘traders or intellectuals.’ Argentina, with a population one-tenth that of the United States reported that it had welcomed almost as many refugees as the United States hence could not be counted on for large-scale immigration.

“The Netherlands and Denmark reflected their traditional humanitarianism. Though Holland had already accepted twenty-five thousand Jewish refugees, it offered itself as a country of temporary sojourn. Denmark, so densely populated that its own citizens were forced to emigrate, had already taken in a disproportionately large number of German exiles. Within its narrow limits, it would continue to do so.”

Morse, *While*, pp. 212–213.

53. Avriel, *Open*, p. 26.
54. Gilbert, *Exile*, p. 203.
55. *Ibid.*
56. In 1938, the total population of all Western Palestine was estimated at less than 1.5 million. Anglo-American Committee, *Survey*, vol. I, p. 141; in 1951, when the population of Israel—not all of Western Palestine—was roughly 1.3 million, “population density in Israel was only 200 per sq. mile, compared with 280 in Lebanon and 1,400 in the inhabited areas of Egypt.” *UN Yearbook*, 1951, p. 303.
57. PRO FO 371/20821; Nov. 26, 1937, Eden to Lindsay, British Ambassador to the United States. Cited in Gilbert, *Exile*, pp. 193–194.
58. Eden to Harvey, 7 September 1951, BL 56402. Cited in Wasserstein, *Britain*, p. 34.
59. Diary of Oliver Harvey, entry dated 25 April 1943, BL 56399. Cited in Wasserstein, *Britain*, p. 34.
60. Cabinet Committee Minutes: Cabinet Papers 24/285, April 20, 1939. Cited in Gilbert, *Exile*, p. 226; also see correspondence to Winston Churchill reporting of British officials who were “strongly anti-Semite” in Bucharest and Prague, despite the “persecution” of Jews there. Cited in Gilbert, *Exile*, p. 226.
61. January 18, 1939. PRO FO 371/23221, cited in Gilbert, *Exile*, p. 218.
62. Anglo-American Committee, *Survey*, vol. I, pp. 52–53.
63. *Ibid.*, p. 52.
64. Cabinet Minutes: Cabinet Papers 23/97, March 8, 1939. Cited in Gilbert, *Exile*, p. 225.
65. Anglo-American Committee, *Survey*, vol. I, p. 53. The *White Paper*, Statement of Policy, Command #6019, May 1939, full text in *ibid.*, pp. 90–99.
66. Cabinet Minutes: May 1, 1939, Cabinet Papers 23/99. Cited in Gilbert, *Exile*, p. 228. Also see Bethell, *Palestine Triangle*, for interesting observations by MacDonald many years afterward, pp. 72–75.
67. June 24, 1891. Cited in Gilbert, *Exile*, p. 43.

68. Cabinet Papers 24/282, January 1939. Cited in Nicholas Bethell, *The Palestine Triangle, The Struggle for the Holy Land, 1935–1948* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1979), p. 19.
69. *Report of the Commission on the Palestine Disturbances of August, 1929* (The Shaw Report), Command Paper #3530, London, 1930.
70. Hope Simpson, *Report*, p. 136.
71. According to Sir Christopher Sykes, the Zionists' "indignation" at appointment of the Mufti Haj-Amin, an "avowed enemy" of the Jews, was subordinated by "the threatening developments in the Eastern part of the British mandated territory" of Palestine. Sykes, *Crossroads to Israel*, p. 60ff.
72. In August 1939, the four opposing members insisted that the White Paper was in violation of the Mandate in its stand on Jewish immigration restrictions, on land restrictions, and its acquiescence in a probable rule by the Arabs. *Manchester Guardian*, August 18, 1939. Cited in Bethell, *The Palestine Triangle*, p. 70; see also Sykes, *Crossroads*, p. 259.
73. July 30, 1939, in correspondence with a sister. Cited in Gilbert, *Exile*, p. 239.
74. The United States added the word "Property" to the rights that must be safeguarded in the American delegation's recommendation to the Paris Peace Conference two years later.
75. The 1938 *Palestine Partition Commission Report* (p. 22) is a clear example of the British use of the term "existing" to describe Palestine's non-Jewish population increase: "an abnormally high (and possibly unprecedented) rate of natural increase in the *existing* indigenous population" was, according to the report, responsible for the growth of population aside from the Jews' immigration.
- According to a report on world population, published in 1936, "there is no evidence that the population increased or diminished during the last two centuries." Carr-Saunders, *World Population*, p. 310. The Palestine Partition Commission stated, "If the numbers fluctuated, the fluctuations cancelled out." From 1919 until 1938, the "Arab population" ("the word 'Arab' in this section is used in its strictest sense and not a [sic] equivalent to 'non-Jew.' ") increased "nearly 56 percent."
- "It is worthwhile to study the vital statistics for some explanation of this astonishing change in the Arab population since the war, which it is very unlikely that the authors of the Balfour Declaration or of the Mandate foresaw." *Palestine Partition Commission Report*, p. 23.
76. Professor Braver, in his geographical study, found that the so-called "landless peasants were new immigrants." "Immigration as a Factor in the Growth of the Arab Village in Eretz-Israel," *Economic Review—Problems of Aliyah and Absorption*, vol. 28, nos. 7–9, July–September 1975, p. 15.
77. "On the Arab side the number of landless Arabs has, no doubt been exaggerated and no account has been taken of the sources of employment opened to displaced tenant cultivators by the development of the larger towns or the increase of the area under citrus, *but in my view, the real basis of the outcry was not the existing state of affairs, as apprehension for the future.*" Response entitled "Comments of the Department of Development on the Memorandum of the Jewish Agency," from the Department of Development. Document Number 17204/33 FO 371, Reply to the Jewish Agency



regarding the letter sent by the former to the High Commissioner on March 19, 1933, pp. 3–4.

78. *Palestine Royal Commission Report; Palestine Partition Commission Report* (The Woodhead Report), 1938.
79. “Great Britain and Palestine, 1915–1945,” published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs (London and New York, 1946), Paper #20, p. 58.

### 16. Jews in Palestine as “Illegals” and as War Allies

1. From Germany alone the number of immigrant Jews to the Jewish-settled area of Western Palestine had risen from only 353 in 1932 to 5,392 in 1933; overall Jewish immigration in 1935 reached a “peak” of 61,844, the year the Nuremberg laws were enacted against Jews. Nicholas Bethell, *The Palestine Triangle, The Struggle for the Holy Land, 1935–48* (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1979), p. 25.
2. *Report . . . for the Year 1934*, Colonial No. 104, p. 28; *Report . . . for the Year 1935*, Colonial No. 112, p. 13; *Annual Report of the Dept. of Migration*, 1935, p. 19.
3. ISA 2 I/588/33 R2 July 1, 1933, Memorandum from AGW (Wauchope).
4. “Only 90 immigrants, all of whom were Jews, entered Palestine during the month. A large number of immigrants were *refused admission* to Palestine during the *temporary suspension of Immigration*, and on the 9th of June, officers of the department left for Trieste and Constantinople where these persons had collected, to examine their cases. The examination is not yet concluded, but about 700, all of whom had already started on their journey to Palestine, have been granted permission to proceed.” Public Record Extract, Doc. No. CO 7033, #42315. The administrative report of July 1921, under Immigration & Travel, p. 7. Sent by Sir W.H. Deedes, August 2, 1921. (Emphasis added.)
5. Memorandum On the Control of Immigration to Palestine 1920–30, July 16, 1930. ISA Group 2, File No. Imm/40/2.
6. *Ibid.*, para. 7.
7. *Ibid.*, para. 22.
8. PRO CO 537/848 (Doc. 36560). Handwritten, Personal July 11, 1921, from Sir Wyndham Deedes to Major H. Young, from Martin Gilbert’s files.
9. PRO CO 537/854/22, December 13, 1921, from Chaim Weizmann to Sir Wyndham Deedes.
10. In 1921, Civil Secretary Winston Churchill intended Transjordan as “a moderately efficient administration” with “at its head some Arab official . . .” utilizing “Palestinians of experience. . . .” July 2, 1921, Churchill to Herbert Samuel, High Commissioner, PRO CO 733/36252; also see PRO CO 733/35186, July 4, 1921, Samuel to Churchill.
11. For interesting insights during the period into the boundaries of the country that would be “Palestine,” see David Lloyd George, *The Truth About the Peace Treaties*, pp. 1144–1145; also see C.R. Conder and H.H. Kitchener, *The Survey of Western Palestine*, ed. by E.H. Palmer and Walter Besant (London: Comm. of Palestine Exploration Fund, 1881), particularly map of Palestine (east and west).
12. PRO CO 537/854/22, December 13, 1921. From Chaim Weizmann to Sir Wyndham Deedes.
13. PRO CO 537/854/22, December 22, 1921.

14. Statement of British Policy in Palestine, Command #1700, London, 1922.
15. Anglo-American Committee, *Survey*, vol. I, p. 165: "Immigrants had to satisfy two sets of conditions. First they must qualify as immigrants in the several categories; and secondly they (and travellers also) must not be disqualified for admission to Palestine in virtue of certain statutory disabilities," p. 166.
16. Memorandum on the Control of Immigration to Palestine 1920–30, July 16, 1930. ISA Group 2, Imm/40/2, paragraphs 24, 25, 30.
17. *Ibid.*, para. 33.
18. *Ibid.*, para. 34.
19. *Ibid.*, para. 36.
20. PRO FO 18615/26, "Instructions to His Majesty's Consuls and Passport Control Officers regarding the Grant of Visas For Palestine," regarding office circular of July 12, 1926; FO 372/3171 Doc. No. 7291/95, June 15, 1928: ". . . Deputations from the Zionist Executive and Vaad Leumi are asking for removal of restriction on immigration."
21. PRO CO 733/152, Memorandum from the Palestine Zionist Executive, F.H. Kisch to the Chief Secretary Government Offices, Jerusalem, August 30, 1928.
22. Phillip Jones, *Britain and Palestine 1914–1948* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 80.
23. PRO CO 733/152 Doc. No. 57198/28 November 9, 1928.
24. Memorandum on the Control of Immigration to Palestine 1920–30, July 16, 1930, para. 40.
25. "Among these immigrants were 1,580 persons who were in Palestine illegally (Jews 939, Christians 502, Moslems 137, Druzes 2) but received permission to remain permanently in the country." *Report . . . for the Year 1931*, Colonial No. 75, p. 22. On p. 21, the report noted that "Steps were taken to regularize the position of a large number of persons in Palestine . . . without permission" who were now "absorbed." "This action was considered to be desirable on general grounds, and also in view of the possibility that the persons concerned would otherwise be deterred from registering at the Census by fear of prosecution for the offence of *illegal presence* in the country." The "great majority" who "took advantage of it were Jews." (Emphasis added.)
26. The 1933 Annual Report stated: "There was, however, an unexpectedly large number of illegal Jewish settlers as well." *Report . . . for the Year 1933*, Colonial No. 94, p. 36. On page 35: "There was a considerable increase of *illicit* immigration, *mostly of Jews*, entering as transit travellers or tourists. . . ." And on page 180, separated from the "immigration" material by 145 pages, was the report that "The extent of illicit and unrecorded immigration into Palestine from or through Syria and Trans-Jordan has been estimated at about 2,000 and Jewish as to fifty percent." From "mostly Jews," the estimate had dropped to fifty percent. *Report . . . for the Year 1933*, Colonial No. 94, pp. 35–36, 180.
27. Conference of Protestant and Catholic Leaders, New York, December 1936, reported in *Palestine*, January 13, 1937, vol. XII, no. 2.
28. United States Senators' statement, reported in *Palestine*, January 13, 1937, vol. XII, no. 2.
29. *Manchester Guardian*, August 18, 1939. Cited in Bethell, *The Palestine Triangle*, p. 70.
30. May 17, 1939, 867N. 01/1556 1/2. Cited in Bethell, *The Palestine Triangle*, p. 69.

31. For detailed documentation of the United States actions and reactions, see Morse, *While*; Wasserstein, *Britain*; Feingold, *Politics*, Laqueur, *Terrible*. William Polk describes many British attempts at “compromise,” against what Britain deemed “American irresponsibility”—after the war, in 1946 unlimited immigration into “Palestine” was recommended by both the Democrats and the GOP, an entirely political maneuver according to Polk, motivated only to gain Jewish votes. *The United States and the Arab World* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975), p. 201.
32. Colonial Office note; FO 371/24091, July 22, 1939. Cited in Gilbert, *Exile*, pp. 238–239.
33. March 2, 1939, Foreign Office to Sir Neville Henderson: Treasury Papers, 188/226. Cited in Gilbert, *Exile*, p. 223. The text of the cable was: “There is a large irregular movement from Germany of Jewish refugees who as a rule, set out without visas or any arrangements for their reception, and their attempt to land in any territory that seems to them to present the slightest possibility of receiving them. This is a cause of great embarrassment to His Majesty’s Government and also, it appears, to the American Government, and the latter have expressed a wish that you should join American Chargé d’Affaires in Berlin in bringing situation to the attention of appropriate German Authorities and requesting them to discourage such travel on German ships.”
34. Gilbert, *Winston S. Churchill, The Prophet*, vol. V, pp. 1970–1971.
35. See examples of documents in Appendix IX; also see Chapter 17.
36. Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Col. 2144, May 23, 1939. Cited in Esco, *Palestine*, pp. 916–917.
37. July 30, 1939. Cited in Gilbert, *Exile*, p. 239.
38. Signed October 1, 1938, by Chamberlain, Hitler, Mussolini, and Daladier. As Martin Gilbert writes, “at the Munich Conference, from which the Czechs themselves were excluded, the Czechoslovak State—after twenty years of independence—was made to cede the Sudetenland to Germany.” Gilbert, *Exile*, p. 209.
39. Jewish Agency, FO 371/23239. Cited in Bethell, *Palestine Triangle*, p. 71.
40. Esco Foundation, *Palestine*, vol. II, p. 908; also see *Oriente Moderno*, July 1939, pp. 379–380.
41. Bethell, *Palestine Triangle*, pp. 69–71.
42. Chaim Weizmann told British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Anthony Eden’s Principal private secretary, Oliver Harvey, that the Jews of Eastern Europe would swim to Palestine if necessary, no matter what the British did. Diary of Oliver Harvey, BL 56398 dated entry January 29, 1942; for a detailed account of several instances when the Jews tried literally to do just that, see Wasserstein, *Britain*, p. 141ff.
43. Anglo-American Committee, *Survey of Palestine*, p. 53; also see Wasserstein, *Britain*, pp. 51–52, 348–349; also see Gilbert, *Winston S. Churchill*, vol. V (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1977), p. 1069; Gilbert, *Exile*, pp. 225–226; Wasserstein, *The Diplomatic Diaries of Oliver Harvey*.
44. Department of Migration Report, 1938, p. 24.
45. Bethell, *Palestine Triangle*, pp. 56–57.
46. United States Recommendation by Delegation to the Paris Peace Conference, January 21, 1919.
47. Wasserstein, *Britain*, p. 109. Latham minute, R.T.E. Latham, 24 December 1940, PRO FO 371/2524/487 (W 12667/12667/48).

48. Palestine Statement of Policy, Command #6019, The White Paper of May 1939, para. 14.
49. Anglo-American Committee, *Survey*, vol. I, pp. 212–213. See Chapter 17.
50. High Commissioner to Colonial Office, July 10, 1940, PRO CO 733/431 (76039). Cited in Wasserstein, *Britain*, p. 353.
51. Anglo-American Committee, *Survey*, vol. I, p. 56.
52. Ibid. See Menachem Begin's account of the broadcasting network in *The Revolt* (New York: Nash Publishing, 1977), pp. 82–84.
53. Ibid.
54. Lord Halifax report to the Cabinet of conversation with Kennedy, April 20, 1939. Cabinet Committee Minutes, Cabinet Papers, 24/285. Cited in Gilbert, *Exile*, p. 226.
55. August 30, 1938. Charles Bateman, afterward British Ambassador to Poland and Mexico. Cited in Bethell, *Palestine Triangle*, p. 44.
56. Bethell, *Palestine Triangle*, p. 45. Lacy Baggallay, Foreign Office.
57. See Weizmann's letter of May 31, 1939, to the High Commissioner of Palestine "with the request that its representations be forwarded to the Permanent Mandates Commission," in Esco, *Palestine*, pp. 911–912.
58. Viscount Halifax to Weizmann, December 19, 1939. PRO FO 371/24563/273 (E97/31/31). Cited in Wasserstein, *Britain*, p. 352.
59. Sloan, editor, *Ringleblum Journal*, p. 125. Cited in Wasserstein, *Britain*, p. 344. Wasserstein's work is one of the most comprehensive of the documented studies of the subject of Britain's attitude and its role in the crisis of European Jewry.
60. The American Christian Palestine Committee, *The Arab War Effort, A Documented Account* (New York: American Christian Palestine Committee, 1947), p. 13.
61. Anglo-American Committee, *Survey*, vol. I, p. 57.
62. The American Christian Palestine Committee, *The Arab War Effort*, p. 12.
63. *Palestine Partition Commission Report*, London, 1938, p. 261.
64. *Palestine Royal Commission Report* (The Peel Report), 1937, p. 121.
65. *Palestine Royal Commission Report*, p. 200.
66. The Palestine Royal Commission presented a plan for 3 zones in Palestine: "a Jewish state, including coastal region from South of Tel Aviv to North of Acre, the Valley of Esdraelon and Galilee; an Arab state, including the rest of Palestine as well as Transjordan; and a British enclave under permanent mandate, including Jerusalem, Bethlehem and a narrow corridor to Mediterranean including Lydda & Ramle." Laqueur, *A History of Zionism*, pp. 514–518.
67. June 29, 1937, Cabinet Papers, 24/166. Cited in Gilbert, *Exile*, p. 180.
68. Baxter, FO 371/21868. Cited in Bethell, *Palestine Triangle*, p. 56.
69. May 22, 1939. Cited in Gilbert, *Exile*, p. 229.
70. I.F. Stone, *PM*, April 15, 1944, cited in Esco Foundation, *Palestine*, p. 1044.
71. Parkes, *Whose Land?*, p. 305; see Anglo-American Report for the 1946 observation that the "success of Arab terrorism" had only begun to provoke Jews to self-defense, p. 32. Just before the attack of Deir Yaseen, during January to March 1948, 875 Jews "had fallen victims" and more than 1850 "were wounded in Arab attacks . . . throughout the country." Gabbay, *Political Study*, pp. 61–62.
72. Albert Memmi, *Jews and Arabs*, p. 33.
73. According to Philip J. Baram and the Zionist Archives of Bierbrier, "The American oil interests did not feel unduly threatened by Zionism," *The Department of State in the Middle East, 1919–1945* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,

- 1978), p. 309, n. 8. Baram adds, however, that no definitive research has as yet been presented.
74. "The first of ARAMCO's four parent companies, Standard Oil of California," got a sixty-year concession in 1933, resulting in that company's becoming a "pillar of the Saudi state," second only to its religion in influence, and "at the service" of the Saudis to a greater extent even than the East India Company of Britain, according to J.B. Kelly, *Arabia, the Gulf and the West* (New York: Basic Books, 1980), p. 252.
  75. Baram, *Department*, p. 277; also pp. 77, 78, 85, 91, n. 15. First posited in 1941, the proposal was renewed in December 1942.
  76. *Ibid.*, pp. 277–278. Wallace Murray, Near East head, was eager to discourage any "British-Saudi" ties. In the United States State Department, according to Baram's exhaustive study of the subject, "The Jews, more than the Russians or the Germans or anyone else . . . while not in any official sense the enemy, . . . were regarded as Unofficial Adversary Number One in the Middle East, obstructing America's natural inheritance of hegemony." *Department*, p. 307.
  77. Elie Kedourie, "Misreading the Middle East," *Commentary*, July 1979, p. 35.
  78. Baram, *Department*, p. 279, 308, n. 6.
  79. Letter, President Roosevelt to Ibn Saud, as drafted May 14, 1943, by Murray and Lieutenant Harold Hoskins; Roosevelt signed the draft after amending the wording, but not the meaning of the key assurance, to wit: ". . . without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews." Roosevelt to Ibn Saud, in Hull to Kirk, May 26, 1943, FR 4 (1943):787, cited in Baram, *Department*, p. 242, n. 23.
  80. According to Philip Baram, the State Department had shown a "passivity," in the 1930s, toward Saudi Arabia and Ibn Saud, stemming from the facts that 1) the California Arabian Standard Oil Company—later ARAMCO—was "doing satisfactorily on its own, unlike American companies in Iraq, or Kuwait . . . which got State Department assistance around 1930." 2) King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia "was more independent of direct British influence" than other heads of state in the region. *Department*, pp. 204–222; also see J.B. Kelly, *Arabia*, pp. 65–70, 252ff.
  81. Kedourie, "Misreading . . .," *Commentary*, July 1979, p. 34.
  82. Michael Widlanski, "How Britain Worked Against Mideast Peace," *Los Angeles Herald Examiner*, January 30, 1983; Columbia University Fellow Dore Gold recently came upon the secret documents while conducting unrelated research for a dissertation, he explained in a conversation with the author, March 17, 1983.
  83. Cabinet Middle East Policy Note by Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Ernest Bevin, on Israel: Bevin's report reviewing meetings with England's representatives in the Middle East, to Cabinet, August 25, 1949, PRO CAB 129/2 (CP/49 183).
  84. The seeking of Arab "agreement" may in some measure have been, may yet be, in reality, a modern rendition on the theme of "divide and conquer." That might explain the initial extreme perturbation of the Carter administration when Egypt's founding economy brought Anwar Sadat to his surprise peace pilgrimage to Menachem Begin in Jerusalem in 1977. In that speculative vein, according to the account of a highly placed unofficial Saudi spokesman, King Fahd of *Saudi Arabia* was following "misguided American dictates," not the reverse, in asserting a Saudi position against bilateral Lebanese-Israeli peace in 1983 and ramifications following therefrom. Therein, however, lies the topic for another book. (Emphasis added.)
  85. For additional information on the subject, see Chaim Weizmann, *Trial and Error* (New York: Harper and Bros., 1949), pp. 427, 432–433; Yehuda Bauer, *From Diplo-*

- macy to Resistance: A History of Jewish Palestine 1939–1945*, pp. 224–227, 250–252; H. St. John B. Philby, *Arabian Jubilee*, pp. 213–217.
86. R. Niebuhr, “Jews After the War,” *The Nation*, February 28, 1942, p. 254. Niebuhr wrote in 1942, before the enormity of Nazi extermination camps’ efficiency was fully effected.
87. *Survey of International Affairs*, 1938, vol. I, p. 417, n. 1, in Esco, *Palestine*, p. 878.
88. Esco, *Palestine*, p. 878.
89. *Jewish Frontier*, May 1939, p. 54ff; Esco, *Palestine*, p. 910.
90. James Parkes, *A History of Palestine from 135 A.D. to Modern Times*, p. 331.
91. Moshe Aumann, “Land Ownership in Palestine, 1880–1948,” in *The Palestinians*, by Curtis et al., p. 26. “Iowa land prices according to the U.S. Dept. of Agriculture.”
92. July 21, 1939, WO 216 46. Cited in Bethell, *Palestine Triangle*, p. 71.
93. August 6, 1942, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, vol. 382, cols. 1251–1253. Captain de Chair. Cited in Esco, *Palestine*, p. 1031.

### 17. “Muftism” and Britain’s Contribution to the “Final Solution”

- In Munich, on August 13, 1920, Hitler gave a two-hour speech about “Why we are Against the Jews”; there he instituted the motto “Anti-Semites of the World, Unite! People of Europe, Free Yourselves.” Quoted by Martin Gilbert, *Exile and Return*, pp. 131–132.
- The four days of “massacring, burning, pillaging” in Jerusalem’s Jewish quarters began April 4, 1920, on the Muslim holiday of Nebi Musa, which corresponds to the Christian Easter and the Jewish Passover. Maurice Pearlman, *Mufti of Jerusalem* (London: Victor Gollancz, Ltd., 1947), pp. 11–12; also see Esco, *Palestine*, pp. 132–134, 474. The conviction was decided by British Military courts; see Sir Ronald Storrs, *The Memoirs of Sir Ronald Storrs* (New York, 1937) for an account of the period. Storrs was Governor of Jerusalem in 1920. Also see Gilbert, *Exile*, p. 132; for contemporary description of Nebi Musa festivals, see Sir Harry Luke and Edward Keith-Roach, *Handbook of Palestine and Trans-Jordan* (London: MacMillan and Co., Ltd., 1934), pp. 206–207.
- The post of Mufti “had been in the hands of the [*effendi*] Husaini family for a number of generations.” Esco, *Palestine*, p. 467; according to the Esco Foundation study, Haj Amin got “his real power” from his Supreme Muslim Council (established 1921) appointment, particularly after his election as President in 1922, an election pre-ordained by the tradition from Turkish-held times, when “the Mufti of Jerusalem was generally recognized as the head” of the Muslims. Esco, *Palestine*, pp. 467–468. Haj Amin died in the Beirut area in 1972.
- Ernest Main, *Palestine at the Crossroads*, p. 267; James Parkes, *A History of Palestine from 135 A.D. to Modern Times*, pp. 315, 321–322. *Palestine Royal Commission Report*, Command #5479, 1938, pp. 130–131.  
 Also see David Landes, “Palestine Before the Zionists,” *Commentary*, February 1976; Sir John Glubb Pasha, article regarding peasants in Transjordan—“The Economic Situation of the Trans-Jordan Tribes,” *Royal Central Asian Society Journal*, 1938, vol. 25, pp. 458–459.
- The American Christian Palestine Committee, *The Arab War Effort. A Documented Account* (New York, 1947), p. 5. This documented series contradicts Arab historian Philip Hitti, who doubted that Islamic ideology might find practical agreement with

- Nazi thought. Hitti's *The Arabs* was written at the same time that in Baghdad the anti-Jewish *farhud*, a bloody pogrom, resulted in the massacre of Iraqi Jews and at the time when the foreign minister of Iraq declared that Jews were an offense against mankind. Philip Hitti, *The Arabs, A Short History*, p. viii, introduction.
6. American Christian Palestine Committee, *Arab War Effort*, p. 3.
  7. Somerset DeChair, *The Golden Carpet* (New York, 1945), appendix, p. 243.
  8. *Oriente Moderno*, 1941, pp. 552–553, broadcast over Iraqi and Axis radio. Cited in The American Christian Palestine Committee, *Arab War Effort*, p. 41.
  9. Bernard Wasserstein, *Britain*, p. 79; also see Chapter 3; In the Mufti's call to holy war, among the crimes against Iraq that had been committed by Britain—for which “in the name of merciful and almighty God I invite all my Muslim brothers throughout the whole world to join in the holy war for God, for the defense of Islam and her lands against her enemy . . . Oh faithful, obey and respond to my call, Oh Muslims!”—the Mufti cited an example of the “vivid proof of the imperialistic designs of the British is to be found in Muslim Palestine, which, although promised by England to Sherif Hussein has had to submit to the outrageous infiltration of Jews. . . .” American Christian Palestine Committee, *Arab War Effort*, p. 41.
  10. *Manchester Guardian*, February 26, 1942; March 2, 1942.
  11. *Ibid.*
  12. Minute by J.S. Bennett: “The present serious state . . . justifies strong measures,” May 4, 1941, PRO CO 733/449/PI/O/20. Cited in Wasserstein, *Britain*, pp. 79–80.
  13. Memorandum by J.E.M. Carvell, February 5, 1940, PRO FO 371/25239/150 ff W 2500/38/48. Cited in Wasserstein, *Britain*, p. 49.
  14. In 1941, Lord Moyne cited the “threat” of enemy fugitives being smuggled into Palestine as the motivation for sending away the *Struma*, which subsequently sank in mysterious circumstances off the coast of Turkey. Wasserstein, *Britain*, p. 144ff; also compare Wasserstein's documented account with an official account, which reports a “loss of 760 Jewish passengers” based on “security reasons.” Anglo-American Committee, *Survey*, vol. I, pp. 63–64.
  15. Wasserstein, *Britain*, p. 49; Wasserstein observed that in one correspondence from the Foreign Office to the Colonial Office, both the Colonial Office and the High Commissioner were criticized for “invoking the threat of enemy agents, without being able, when invited to do so, to produce any evidence” of a single Axis agent entering the “Middle East in the guise of illegal Jewish immigrants.” Snow to Downie, January 14, 1941, PRO CO 733/445/Part II/76 021.
  16. *Arab Higher Committee: Its Origins, Personnel and Purposes: The Documentary Record submitted to the United Nations, May 1947*, by Nation Associates of New York, p. 5; a documentary record of the Mufti's and other Arab notables' pro-Nazi activities.
  17. Captured files of German High Command in Flensburg, cited in *ibid.*
  18. *Arab Higher Committee*, p. 7; Diary of Major General Erwin LaHousen, of German Abwehr, September 3, 1941: “. . . Mufti . . . is currently in connection with Abwehr II [Sabotage division of Nazi intelligence]”; June 2, 1942: “. . . utilization of the connections with the Grand Mufti for the purpose of Abwehr II . . . to demonstrate the solidarity of the Axis powers”; July 13, 1942: “I took part in discussion” with the Mufti and Hitler's representative—“chief of the Abwehr” Canaris concerning “Arabian Freedom Movement.” “The Mufti made an offer . . . that followers of the . . . movement led by him, as well as the followers of former Iraq Prime Minister,

Kailani [leader of Iraqi revolt against Britain] were to be used for purposes of sabotage and sedition in the Near East in accordance with purposes of the Abwehr II." Secret Diary, cited in *The Arab Higher Committee*.

Among many documents included are photocopies of originals and translations of Hitler's "secret pledges to the Mufti for Revolt against British"; of Italy's "promise" to the Mufti to "aid in revolt against British"; "of Mufti's handwritten diary entries recording Hitler's "words of the Fuehrer on Nov. 21, 1941, Berlin, Friday from 4:30 P.M. till a few minutes after 6." The following is an extract of the November 1941 meeting between Hitler and the Mufti, with the Mufti quoting Hitler: ". . . It is clear that the Jews have accomplished nothing in Palestine and their claims are lies. All the accomplishments in Palestine are due to the Arabs and not to the Jews. I am resolved to find a solution for the Jewish problem, progressing step by step without cessation."

In reply to the Mufti's demand for an "Axis declaration to the Arabs," Hitler assured that, "Only if we win the war will the hour of deliverance also be the hour of fulfillment of Arab aspirations. . . . If the declaration is issued now, difficulties will arise. . . . Now I am going to tell you something I would like you to keep secret. First, I will . . . fight until the complete destruction of the Judeo-Bolshevik rule has been accomplished. Second . . . we will reach the Southern Caucasus. Third, then I would like to issue a declaration; for then the hour of liberation of the Arabs will have arrived. Germany has no ambitions in this area but cares only to annihilate the power which produces the Jews. Fourth, I am happy that you have escaped and that you are now with the Axis powers . . . You will be the man to direct the Arab force. . . . I understand the Arab desire for this (declaration—Ed.) but his Excellency the Mufti must understand that only five years after I became President of the German Government and Fuehrer of the German people, was I able to get such a declaration (the Austrian Union—Ed.) . . . you can rely on my word.

"We were troubled about you. I know your life history . . . I am happy that you are with us now . . . to add your strength to the common cause." The full text of Mufti's diary entries paraphrasing Hitler are found in *Arab Higher Committee*.

19. See original letters from the Mufti, in *ibid.*, Documentary Record, submitted to the United Nations, May 1947; example in text and in Appendix IX.
20. The Mufti to "His Excellency, the Minister of Foreign Affairs for Hungary," June 28, 1943. *Ibid.*; see p. 16a.
21. American Palestine Christian Committee, *The Arab War Effort*, p. 6.
22. *Ibid.*
23. "Decode of Telegram," Bucharest to Foreign Office, December 10, 1940, PRO FO 371/25242/400 (W 12451/38/48). Cited in Wasserstein, *Britain*, p. 74.
24. Wasserstein, *Britain*, p. 74.
25. "Evidence of an eyewitness" (translated from Hebrew), PRO CO 733/445/76021/31. Cited in *ibid.*, pp. 74–75.
26. Wasserstein, *Britain*, p. 74.
27. "Evidence of an eyewitness," PRO CO 733/445/76021/32, cited in *ibid.*
28. Wasserstein, *Britain*, p. 75.
29. Foreign Office to Swiss Legation, August 15, 1941. PRO CO 733/499/P5/1/63. Cited in Wasserstein, *Britain*, p. 76.
30. Wasserstein, *Britain*, pp. 74–76.
31. Wavell to Eden, November 30, 1940. PRO PREM 4/51/2/116. *Ibid.*, p. 71. For



- Mufti's probable first official contact with the Third Reich, July 16, 1937, see L. Hirszowicz, *Third Reich and the Arab East* (London, 1966), p. 34.
32. Anglo-American Committee, *Survey*, vol. I, pp. 63–64.
  33. Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen, in reply to Assistant Secretary to Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 20, 1941: Angora to Foreign Office, PRO CO 733/449 (P3/4/30). Cited in Wasserstein, *Britain*, p. 145.
  34. S.E.V. Luke minute, December 23, 1941. PRO CO 733/449/P3/4/30. Cited in Wasserstein, *Britain*, p. 145; also see Bethell, *Palestine Triangle*, p. 133ff.
  35. Moyne to Law, December 24, 1941. PRO CO 733/449/P3/4/30. Cited in Wasserstein, *Britain*, pp. 145–146; also see High Commissioner, Jerusalem, to Colonial Office, December 22, 1941.
  36. *Foreign Relations of the U.S.*, 1941, vol. II, p. 860. Cited in Bethell, *Palestine Triangle*, p. 112.
  37. Shertok to Macpherson, February 13, 1942. PRO CO 733/446/76021/42/55. Cited in Wasserstein, *Britain*, p. 147.
  38. CO 722 455, 1941; from Thomas Snow; Richard Catling, “senior Palestine policemen specializing in Jewish Affairs,” in Bethell, *Palestine Triangle*, p. 114.
  39. To Colonial Office, telegram, February 17, 1942. PRO FO 371/32661/56 W2483/652/48. Cited in Wasserstein, *Britain*, p. 151.
  40. Randall to Boyd, February 19, 1942. PRO FO 371/32661/57 W 2483/652/48. Cited in Wasserstein, *Britain*, p. 151; also see Bethell, *Palestine Triangle*, pp. 116–117; also see account of Menachem Begin, *The Revolt* (New York: Nash Publishing, 1951, 1952, 1977), p. 35, in which the *Struma* was reported to have “arrived off the coast of Eretz Israel,” when it was ordered back to Rumania and “sank” when it was “half-way there.”
  41. Wasserstein, *Britain*, p. 156.
  42. David Stoliar to Jaffa C.I.D., May 3, 1942. PRO CO 733/446 76021/42/26–7. Cited in Wasserstein, *Britain*, pp. 152–153.
  43. Wasserstein, *Britain*, pp. 152–153.
  44. *Ibid.*, p. 156; High Commissioner Jerusalem to Colonial Office, March 19, 1942. PRO CO 733/466/76021/42 (1942)/62; Beyoglu to Admiralty, February 27, 1942. PRO CO 733/466 76021/42/105. Cited in Wasserstein, *Britain*, p. 153.
  45. SSP file 15, 26. “Translation of report from the Polish ‘working-class party,’ ” the *Bund*, based on Yehuda Bauer, “When Did They Know?” in *Midstream*, April 1968, p. 57. Cited in Walter Laqueur, *The Terrible Secret, Suppression of the Truth about Hitler’s “Final Solution,”* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1980), pp. 136–137.  
 The “mass killings” of Jews “began in June 1941 and continued with mounting ferocity for the next three years,” according to an exhaustive study by Nora Levin, *The Holocaust. The Destruction of European Jewry 1933–1945* (New York: Schocken Books, 1973), pp. 287–289.
  46. Laqueur, *Terrible Secret*, p. 137.
  47. In 1941 only 47.7 percent of the refugee quota had been filled. David S. Wyman, *Paper Walls: America and the Refugee Crisis 1938–1941* (Amherst, 1968), pp. 220–222; also see Arthur Morse, *While Six Million Died*; Henry Feingold, *The Politics of Rescue*.
  48. Wasserstein, *Britain*, p. 161.
  49. Harold MacMichael, extract from note of discussion, 23 April 1942. PRO CO 733/445 (76021/41), cited in Wasserstein, *Britain*, p. 160–161.

50. Bethell, *Palestine Triangle*, p. 119.
51. Martin Gilbert, *Exile*, p. 261; Esco, *Palestine*, vol. II, pp. 1080–1081.
52. Lucy Dawidowicz, in her authoritative tracing of *The War Against the Jews, 1933–1945* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1975) includes a recounting of “The Fate of the Jews in Hitler’s Europe,” country by country (New York, 1975). Appendix A, pp. 357–401.
53. Extracts from Cabinet Conclusions, 5 March 1942. PRO CO 733/445 (76021/41), cited in Wasserstein, *Britain*, p. 158–159.
54. *Arab Higher Committee*: Letter to “Reichsführer S.S. and Minister of the Interior H. Himmler” from Mufti, July 27, 1944, reproduced in this chapter; letter from Ribbentrop to “Grossmufti of Palestine Amin El Husseini,” from Berlin, April 28, 1942; letter to Minister of Foreign Affairs of Rumania, June 28, 1943; letter to Bulgaria, May 6, 1943; letter to Italy, June 10, 1943; letter to Berlin, July 25, 1944.
55. October 3, 1944, letter from the Mufti to Himmler; photocopy of letter and translation in *Arab Higher Committee*.
56. High Commissioner Wauchope’s “secret” letter to Ormsby-Gore in 1937 confirmed that the government was aware of Arab immigration from as far afield as “Iraq.” Wauchope assured that “migrating tribes” from Iraq would continue to be permitted. PRO FO 371/E1203, January 23, 1937.
57. *Palestine Royal Commission Report*, pp. 198–202.
58. See Chapter 13.
59. *Palestine Partition Commission Report*, pp. 144–145.
60. Hope Simpson, *Report*, pp. 126, 138.
61. Anglo-American Committee, *Survey*, vol. III, p. 1331.
62. *Ibid.*
63. Anglo-American Committee, *Survey*, vol. III, pp. 1330–1334.
64. Sir John Schuckburgh, Deputy Under-Secretary in the British Colonial Office in 1940, Minute, April 27, 1940. PRO CO 733/426/75872/16. Cited in Wasserstein, *Britain*, p. 50.
65. See, for example, ISA M/91/4 January 28, 1941, Box 1190/N; ISA M/91/41 Box 1190, Doc. No. 7/91/41; “Transjordanians living in Jaffa,” memo from D.S.P. Tulkarem, ISA March 3, 1941, TKC/125/S.
66. ISA Record Group 2, File I/588/33 No. 14, April 15, 1942.
67. ISA Record Group 2, File I/588/33, 14a, A.I.G. “C,” Memorandum on Deportation—Arabs, April 9, 1942.
68. The Polish government in exile published the facts in London, September 28, 1942, cited in Gilbert, *Exile*, p. 262.
69. ISA Record Group 2, File I/558/33, 14a, A.I.G. “C,” Memorandum on Deportation—Arabs, April 9, 1942.
70. *Ibid.*
71. ISA Record Group 2, File I/588/33/15, April 21, 1942, from Acting Chief Secretary D. Thompson to Inspector General of Police.
72. Anglo-American Committee, *Survey*, vol. I, pp. 212–213.
73. *Ibid.*
74. “Of this number it is known that 713 deserted; 828 were officially repatriated; and 178 remained in employment at 31st December, 1945. The balance (2081) must be presumed to have been discharged in Palestine and either returned to their countries

of origin of their own volition or remained in Palestine illegally.” Anglo-American Committee, *Survey*, vol. I, p. 212.

75. See Chapters 11–14.

76. “No precise figures of their number are available but a recent police estimate is as follows:

a) Haifa and Jaffa ports	400
b) Haifa District (excluding Haifa port)	6,580
c) Galilee District	990
d) Lydda District (excluding Jaffa port)	1,100
e) Samaria District	472
f) Gaza District	140
g) Jerusalem District	5
	<hr/> 9,687

It is thought that nearly 7,000 of these are Syrians or Lebanese (including over 1000 Hauranis) and that the balance of about 2,700 are mainly Egyptians and Sudanese.” Anglo-American Committee, *Survey*, vol. I, p. 214.

77. *Ibid.*, p. 213.

78. *Ibid.*

79. *Ibid.*, p. 220.

80. Wasserstein, *Britain*, p. 348.

81. Henry Feingold, *The Politics of Rescue* (New York, 1970), pp. 208–247; also see Wasserstein, *Britain*, particularly pp. 188–205.

82. Stephen Wise, *Challenging Year* (London, 1951), p. 193; Morgenthau to Roosevelt, January 16, 1944, in Michael Mashberg, “Documents Concerning the American State Department and the Stateless European Jews, 1942–1944,” *Jewish Social Studies*, vol. XXXIX, nos. 102, Winter–Spring 1977, pp. 174–176. Cited in Wasserstein, *Britain*, pp. 246–248.

83. Quoted in Winant (London) to State Department, Washington, December 15, 1943, USNA 840.51 Frozen Credits 12144; also see “Memorandum on telegram from Bern dated October 6, 1943” from United States Embassy (London) Economic Warfare Division, Black List Section, 4 November 1943, PRO FO 371/36747 W 15684/48; Halifax to M.E.W., 24 November 1943, PRO FO 371/36747 W 15684/48; Bliss (M.E.W.) to Walker (Foreign Office), 1 December 1943, PRO FO 371/36747 W 16460/15684/48; Walker to Bliss, 10 December 1943, PRO FO 371/36747 W 16460/15684/48; Ministry of Economic Warfare to British Embassy, Washington, 11 December 1943, PRO FO 371/36747 W 17176/15684/48. Cited in Wasserstein, *Britain*, p. 247.

84. Halifax to Foreign Office, December 22, 1943, PRO FO 371/36747 W 17686/15684/48. Cited in Wasserstein, *Britain*, p. 248.

85. December 23, 1943, minute, Ian Henderson, PRO FO 371/36747 W 17686/15684/48. Cited in Wasserstein, *Britain*, p. 248.

86. Wasserstein, *Britain*, p. 248; AGW Randall minute, December 24, 1943, PRO FO 371/36747/47 W 17686/15684/48.

87. Morgenthau to Roosevelt, January 16, 1944, in Michael Mashberg, “Documents,” cited in Wasserstein, *Britain*, p. 248.

88. Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, *Report to the U.S. Government and His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom*, Lausanne, Switzerland, April 20,

- 1946, Department of State, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1946, Appendix IV, p. 76.
89. Ibid.
  90. Ibid., Appendix IV, p. 74.
  91. Ibid., Appendix V, pp. 84–85.
  92. Anglo-American Committee, United States *Survey*, p. 70. The United States and Britain abandoned proposals in 1944 to save what remained of Europe's Jewish community; one British official asked, "What should we do with a million Jews? Where should we put them?" Another remarked, in September 1944, and with full knowledge of the "final solution," that too much "time" was "wasted on dealing with these wailing Jews." Cited in Bethell, *Palestine*, p. 168ff., particularly p. 171; also see Morse, *While Six Million Died*, pp. 353–374, particularly for roles in rescue efforts played by Amb. Ira Hirschman, Joel Brand, Raoul Wallenberg, and others.
  93. Ibid., pp. 70–71.
  94. Eichmann was quoted as saying, "We accepted the obligation toward Hungarians that not a single deported Jew should return alive." However, he offered a Hungarian Jewish leader the deal that, for money, he "would not carry out the deportation." But before the grim bargain could be negotiated, 475,000 (Hungarian) Jews had been deported to Nazi concentration camps. According to the Hungarian leader, Maurizio Kostner, Eichmann said, "I will transport them to Auschwitz and keep them on ice. If my generous offer is accepted I will release them. If not, they will be gassed." But the "negotiations apparently broke down." *Palestine Post*, December 14, 1945, p. 1.
  95. The "total entries" of Jews from 1939, including "20,304 illegal" immigrants deducted from quota, was still under 75,000 as of January 1, 1946, seven months after the war's end. PRO CO 537/1703, "inward telegram" from Lieutenant General Sir A. Cunningham to Secretary of State for the Colonies, January 7, 1946.
  96. PRO CO 537/1768 No. 8589, "Most immediate secret" telegram to Foreign Office, London, from Earl of Halifax, December 27, 1945.
  97. PRO FO 371/14500 within E1767 January 1, 1946.
  98. Feingold, *Politics*, p. 326. Feingold traces the state of public awareness of the systematic extermination of Jews, pp. 326–327; also see Laqueur, *The Terrible Secret*.
  99. PRO CO 537/1768. Personal and Secret-Telegram No. 40 from Foreign Office to Washington; "This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the author and its recipient and not passed on." January 2, 1946.
  100. PRO CO 537/1768 No. 308. Prime Minister's personal telegram no. 24, January 4, 1946.
  101. The British government had "good reason at the end of 1945 to fear a re-examination of the status of Transjordan that would invalidate their contention that Palestine was too small a country to accommodate the number of Jewish survivors in Europe. . . ." The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry proposed to "examine" the situation deeply enough as Harold Laski, Chairman of the Labor Party Executive, said on January 25, 1946, to the *Jewish Chronicle*: "to make possible the abandonment of that administrative separation between Palestine and Transjordan. . . ." Paul Riebenfeld, "The Integrity of Palestine," *Midstream*, August–September 1975, pp. 18–19. According to Riebenfeld, Foreign Secretary Bevin "decided to avoid any risks; he took the bold step of announcing the forthcoming grant of independence to Transjordan

- even while the Committee was about to begin its hearings in London . . ." (p. 18). Transjordan became an independent Arab state in Palestine in May 1946.
102. PRO CO 537/1703. Extract of Colonial Office note regarding "conversation with Mr. Locker and Mr. Ettinghausen of the Jewish Agency," January 4, 1946.
  103. PRO CO 537/1703, inward telegram, Sir A. Cunningham to Secretary of State for the Colonies, January 7, 1946; see also CO 537/1703 Telegram No. 475 "Secret," March 24, 1946, from Cunningham to Secretary of State for the Colonies, regarding "deduction of Jewish enlistees from quota."
  104. PRO CO 537/1768 January 21, 1946.
  105. PRO CO 537/1768, note of Enclosure, from Sir Douglas Harris to Sir George Gater, January 22, 1946.
  106. See Sir Alan Cunningham, "Palestine—The Last Days of the Mandate," in *International Affairs*, October 1948, p. 488; UN Palestine Commission, *First Special Report*, Doc. No. S/676, February 16, 1948, para. 8, 9; Jewish Agency, Doc. No. S/721, pp. 10–14. Cited in Gabbay, *A Political Study of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, p. 60; also see Bethell, *Palestine Triangle*, particularly p. 350ff.
  107. February 11, 1948, Cairo, cited in Gabbay, *A Political Study*, pp. 60–61.
  108. December 17, 1947. Cited in Bethell, *Palestine Triangle*, p. 352.
  109. Gilbert, *Exile*, p. 307.
  110. Kenneth Bilby, *New Star in the Near East* (New York, 1950), p. 30; also see R.M. Graves, *Experience in Anarchy* (London, 1949), p. 133; Edgar O'Ballance, *The Arab-Israeli War of 1948* (London, 1956), pp. 38–44, particularly p. 103ff; Gabbay, *A Political Study*, p. 89.
  111. See the following Arab accounts: *Al Nida* (Arabic), Egyptian daily, February 14, 19, 24, 29; March 3, 8, 16, 30, 1948. *Al Tahrir* (Arabic), Syrian daily, January 5, 12, 16, 22, 31; Feb. 3, 8, 14, 22, 29, March 3, 4, 7, 13, 21, 1948 (published only until 1952).
  112. Gilbert, *Exile*, p. 307.
  113. PRO CO 537/1703, February 1, 1946. From R.J.M. Wilson, Undersecretary of State for the Colonies, to A.E. Judge, Esq., Home Office, Aliens' Department.
  114. PRO CO 537/1703 "Secret" Telegram, February 1, 1946; see also PRO CO 537/1703, Telegram, March 18, 1946, from High Commissioner for Palestine/Transjordan to the Secretary of State, regarding one-month interim immigration allowance of "1600 persons . . . commencing 15th March and ending 14th April, 1946. . . . 1,500 will be for Jews and remainder for Arab and other immigrants."
  115. Anglo-American Committee, *Report*, p. 7.
  116. Chaim Weizmann to Winston Churchill, June 13, 1945. Cited in Gilbert, *Exile*, p. 272.
  117. PRO CO 537/1703, April 2, 1946, from High Commissioner of Palestine to Secretary of State for the Colonies, regarding telegram no. 474 from Secretary of State for the Colonies—"Jewish Immigration."
  118. PRO CO 537/1703, June 24, 1946, extract from interview between the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the Chief Rabbi of Palestine regarding 100,000 quota as one of "ten recommendations."
  119. PRO FO 371/57597, July 5, 1946, Foreign Office "Confidential note." Cited by Gilbert, *Exile*, p. 294.
  120. PRO FO 371/57529, British officials Nuremberg to Foreign Office. Cited by Gilbert, *Exile*, pp. 291–292.

121. Bevin to Weizmann, Foreign Office meeting, October 1, 1946. Cited by Gilbert, *Exile*, p. 294; see Gilbert's study for detailed tracing of British postwar attitudes through primary source material, especially pp. 282–309; see also Richard Crossman, *Palestine Mission* (London, 1946), particularly pp. 21, 43; also see Bethell, *Palestine Triangle*, pp. 214 ff.
122. The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (first session October 18, 1945, subsequent sessions November 20, 1945–October 1, 1946), tried 24 Nazi leaders, while others escaped; 12 of the accused were given the death penalty by hanging, 3 were acquitted, 3 were sentenced to life imprisonment, and the remaining defendants received lesser sentences. In twelve trials (called Subsequent Nuremberg Proceedings) between 1946 and 1949, 177 Nazi war criminals were convicted of "crimes against humanity"; 12 received a death sentence, while the rest received long prison terms; most were liberated earlier by the Clemency Act of January 1951, passed by United States High Commissioner in Germany, John J. McCloy. *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 15th ed. (Chicago, 1979), vol. 19, pp. 554–557; *Encyclopaedia Judaica* (Jerusalem, 1972), vol. 16, pp. 287–302. The search for and discovery of countless other war criminals has continued until the present. The proceedings, affidavits, and documents are included in *Trial of the Major War Criminals*, official publication of the International Military Tribunal, 42 vols., between 1947 and 1949 ("Blue Series").
123. PRO FO 371/57583 O'Neill minute, January 8, 1946. Cited by Gilbert, *Exile*, p. 291.
124. PRO CO 537/1811 "Illegal Immigration: Reaction to His Majesty's Government Statement," Cabinet distribution from Washington to Foreign Office, extract, August 14, 1946.
125. It was, however, American Jews who nevertheless "rescued" the endangered crucial United States loan of \$370 million for Britain. See Bethell, *Palestine Triangle*, pp. 255–256.
126. Cabinet distribution from Washington to Foreign Office, extract, "Illegal Immigration: Reaction to His Majesty's Government Statement," August 14, 1946, PRO CO 537/1811.
127. For details of Palestine from the end of World War II until 1948, see: Government of Palestine, *Supplementary Memoranda by the Government of Palestine, Including Notes of Evidence to the United Nations' Special Committee on Palestine up to July 12, 1947* (Jerusalem, July 1947); The Jewish Agency Observations on Above Government Memorandum (Jerusalem, 1947); United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, *Report to the General Assembly*, vol. III, Annex A: Oral Evidence Presented at Public Meetings, Lake Success. Also see this book, Chapter 2; Nicholas Bethell, *The Palestine Triangle*; Martin Gilbert, *Exile and Return*; Arthur Koestler, *Promise and Fulfillment, Palestine 1917–1949* (New York, London: Macmillan, 1949); Samuel Katz, *Battleground: Fact and Fantasy in Palestine* (New York: Bantam Books, 1973); Geoffrey Furlonge, *Palestine Is My Country, The Story of Musa Alami* (New York: Praeger Press, 1969); Bernard Lewis, "The Palestinians and the PLO," *Commentary*, January 1975; Rony Gabbay, *A Political Study of the Arab-Jewish Conflict* (Geneva, Paris: Librairie E. Droz, Librairie Minard, 1959); James Parkes, *The Story of Jerusalem* (London: Crescent Press, 1950); J. Bowyer Bell, *The Long War: Israel and the Arabs Since 1946* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1969); Christopher Sykes, *Crossroads to*

*Israel* (London: Collins, 1965); Kenneth Bilby, *New Star in the Middle East* (New York, 1950).

### 18. The Flight from Fact

1. Terence Prittie, "The British Media and the Arab-Israeli Dispute," in *Middle East Review*, Summer/Fall 1980, p. 67. See also *New York Times*, February 23, 1981, p. 19.
2. An ILO report described the "natural migration" between Syria and Jordan as late as 1977: "These movements of labour are difficult to quantify as they are often informal in nature and go unrecorded." J.S. Birks and C.A. Sinclair, "Migration for Employment Project—A Preliminary Assessment of Labour Movement in the Arab Region: Background, Perspectives and Prospects," *World Employment Programme Working Paper* (Geneva: International Labour Organization, 1977), p. 43.
3. The constitutions of Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Qatar, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates contain articles providing that Islam is the state religion. Bernard Lewis, "Palestinians and the PLO," *Commentary*, January 1975.
4. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, to United States Secretary of State, May 17, 1939, memorandum, *U.S. Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. 4, p. 757.
5. Tawfic E. Farah, "Political Socialization of Palestinian Children in Kuwait," presented at Arab-American University Graduates Convention, October 1–3, 1976, New York. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, vol. 6, no. 4, Summer 1977.
6. Arthur Miller, *Incident at Vichy*, opened December 31, 1964; in *The Portable Arthur Miller* (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1977), p. 326.
7. American Sephardic Federation, New York, estimated between 1.4 million and 1.7 million; Foreign Ministry of Israel estimated between 1.4 and 1.5 million. However, the Sephardic Jews are a majority in Israel's Jewish population, which in 1982 was 3.5 million.
8. UNRWA Chart and Report, June 30, 1982, Vienna, 1982.
9. For information regarding refugee discrimination in Gaza, see A. Plascov, *Palestinian Refugees in Jordan, 1948–1957* (London and Totowa, N.J.: Frank Cass, 1981), p. 8. According to Dr. Don Peretz, after a study trip to the area more than twenty years ago, the camps' "refugee" employees, in the thousands, "constituted a great political pressure group, especially in Jordan. No politician in any . . . host countries dares to recommend abolition of their [refugee's] livelihood." *Arab Refugee Report*, 1962, in Schechtman, *Refugee in the World*, p. 207. Also see Chapter 1.
10. UNRWA Report, June 1982.
11. Thomas Friedman, *New York Times*, March 12, 1983.
12. *Ibid.*
13. U.S. Committee for Refugees, *1982 World Refugee Survey*, New York, 1982, p. 40.
14. U.S. Committee for Refugees, *1981 World Survey*, New York, 1981, p. 39.
15. Poul Hartling, Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech, 1981, in *World Refugee Survey 1982*, U.S. Committee for Refugees.
16. *Ibid.*, pp. 40–41.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 18.
18. The historian-Orientalist Daniel Pipes reports: "In recent years, the organization

received about \$250 million yearly from Saudi Arabia and . . . \$60 million a year from Kuwait” as well as “generous” aid from the “Soviet Bloc.” Pipes tells of the PLO request for “help from the Arab states last summer [1982, when] the Algerian foreign minister called in the Soviet ambassador in Algiers at four in the morning and gave him a check for \$20 million: the weapons reportedly arrived in Beirut several days later by air.” From “How Important is the PLO?” *Commentary*, April 1983, p. 19.

Zehdi Labib Terzi, the PLO’s UN “observer,” with inimitable candor confirmed the Soviet role in a TV interview in 1979; according to Terzi, “the Soviet Union, and all the socialist countries, they give us full support—diplomatic, moral, educational, and also open their military academies to some of our freedom fighters. . . . I mean our boys go to the Soviet Union. . . . There’s no secret about that. . . .” PBS, September 25, 1979.

19. Bassam abu-Sharif is reportedly from Kafr 'Aqab. Abu Daoud was reported to come originally from the same district, excluded from Israel 1948–1967; abu-Sharif was noted, in an ABC program on the Palestinians, to have been “expelled in 1948.” Yet no Jews remained in his village at the time, and no Israeli military force entered there before 1967. ABC, “Terror in the Promised Land,” 1979. See Karl Meyer, *Saturday Review*, February 3, 1979, for a critique of ABC broadcast.
20. Thomas Kiernan traces Arafat’s birth to Egypt, in *Yassir Arafat* (London, 1976); *Time*, April 14, 1980, states, however, that Arafat’s brother, Fathi, was “Born in the Old City of Jerusalem.”
21. George Orwell, *1984* (New York, 1949), p. 87.
22. *The Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People*, Office of Public Information, UN, New York, 1978.
23. E. Benes, *Democracy To-day and To-morrow* (1939), p. 21, cited in Alfred Cobban, *National Self-Determination* (London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1945), p. 45.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 46.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 69.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 74.
27. G. Starushenko, *The Principle of National Self-Determination in Soviet Foreign Policy* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing, n.d.), p. 9.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 235.
29. U.S.S.R. Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, *Izvestia*, September 27, 1961, quoted in Starushenko, *Principle*, p. 11.
30. Theodore Draper, “The United States and Israel,” *Commentary*, April 1975, p. 32.
31. Damascus, June 1977, interviews with Syrian Minister of Trade and Economy, Dr. Muhammad Imadi; Deputy Foreign Minister Abdallah al-Khani; Dr. Daoudy, “Political Advisor to President Al Assad.” Daoudy informed me that Syria intervened in Lebanon because “the Palestinians were going to partition Lebanon, and Syria wanted them to keep all their hostility directed at Israel, not to settle in Lebanon.” June 26, 1977, under auspices of NCAFP fact-finding mission led by Ambassador Angier Biddle Duke.
32. Interview with Yasser Arafat, Cairo Voice of Palestine (Arabic), March 12, 1977, rebroadcast from Egyptian Television, March 11, 1977.
33. Hayim Tadmor, “The Period of the First Temple, the Babylonian Exile and the



Restoration,” in Ben Sasson, *History*, Part 1, p. 102.

34. Fawaz Turki, *Journal of a Palestinian Exile* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972), pp. 37–38.
35. Senator Frank Church, interview with author, February 24, 1979; Senator Joseph Biden, speech at Israel Bond dinner, Chicago, November 21, 1978. In report by Ambassador Ira Hirschmann, in Lebanon, to William Macomber, Jr., U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, such a plan was proposed, April 6, 1968.
36. As the official daily of the Syrian government suggested in 1978, while the “Arab strategy for liberation continues to have as its ultimate aim the eradication of Zionism, . . . Arab leaders who deal in foreign diplomacy should . . . adapt their language, and properly so, to the style accepted in international diplomacy.” *Al Ba'ath*, Damascus, April 23, 1978.

Thus in 1981, Sheikh Yamani of Saudi Arabia asked for a more “Pro-Arab” stance in the United States in regard to giving friendly Saudis arms “only for defense.” Then with his next breath, Sheikh Yamani called for a *jihad*—holy war—against Israel. “ABC Evening News,” January 27, 1981.

37. From *Palestinian Leaders Discuss the New Challenges for the Resistance*, Palestine Research Center, Beirut, April 1974, reprinted in “The Positions of the Palestinian Organizations on Establishment of a Palestinian State and on Peace” in *The Palestinians*, Michael Curtis et al., eds. (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1975), pp. 166–172; see p. 167.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 171.



# Bibliography

## Abbreviations:

PRO—Public Record Office, Kew Gardens (London)

CO—Colonial Office, Great Britain

FO—Foreign Office, Great Britain

ISA—Israel State Archives (former Palestine Mandatory Government records), Jerusalem

*Survey*—Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, *A Survey of Palestine*

*Report . . . for the Year 19xx*—*Report by His Britannic Majesty's Government to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of Palestine and Trans-Jordan for the Year 19xx*, Colonial No. xx.

RH—Rhodes House, Oxford, England

Hope Simpson, *Report*—Sir John Hope Simpson, *Palestine: Report on Immigration, Land Settlement and Development*, Command #3686, 1930.

UNRWA—United Nations Relief and Works Agency

USCR—United States Committee for Refugees

## I

The unpublished archival sources, periodicals, official publications, and reports drawn upon for this book have been cited fully in the reference notes. The following are only the official data referred to most frequently, which were often abbreviated after the initial citation in the reference notes.

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- Minutes of the Twenty Ninth Session, 1936. C. 259. M. 153. 1936. VI.
- Minutes of the Thirty Second (Extraordinary) Session, 1937. C. 330. M. 222. 1937, VI.
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## II Books, Pamphlets, and Articles

Every source drawn upon for this book is fully cited in the reference notes and each had a role in the development of the research. The list that follows is neither a repetitious account of every single source used nor an exhaustive compilation of the infinite number of publications on the subjects of this book. It is, rather, a partial listing of those works principally called upon and thus abbreviated in some of the reference notes. In a few instances, I have noted works that contain related information not directly discussed here, but of value to those interested in further reading.

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JOAN PETERS has written and lectured widely on the Middle East, Central America, and the Soviet Union. She has contributed to *Harper's*, *Commentary*, *The New Republic*, *The New Leader*, and other periodicals, and was a White House consultant on the Middle East in 1977.

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